

# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

EDITED BY

K. J. DOVER, M.A.  
E. J. KENNEY, M.A.

---

## BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

PROF. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.A. (*Chairman*)

PROF. R. G. AUSTIN, M.A., D.LITT. (*Hon. Treas.*)

F. H. SANDBACH, M.A.

PROF. P. W. WALBANK, M.A., F.B.A.

PROF. W. S. WATT, M.A.

*Representing the Council of the Classical Association*

A. G. WOODHEAD, M.A., *representing the Cambridge Philological Society*

G. W. WILLIAMS, M.A., *representing the Oxford Philological Society*

*With the co-operation of*

PROF. B. D. MERITT, *Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton*

PROF. J. A. FITZHERBERT, *University of Adelaide*

and PROF. HOMER A. THOMPSON, *Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton*

---

## NEW SERIES · VOLUME XII

(Volume LVI of the continuous series)

OXFORD · AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1962



## INDEXES

### GENERAL INDEX

Agamemnon, the guilt of, 187 ff.  
 Agis IV, non-Phylarchean tradition of the programme of, 118 ff.  
 Alexander's campaigns, Persian accounts of, 141 ff.  
*Antigone*, the watchman scenes in the, 200 ff.  
 Aristophanes, the Triclinian edition of, 32 ff.  
 [Aristotle, *Poetics*]: pity, terror, and *peripeteia*, 52 ff.  
 Aristotle's biology, *γένος* and *εἶδος* in, 81 ff.  
 Aristotle's *Topics*, the date of, and its treatment of the theory of ideas, 72 ff.  
**Balme, D. M.**, *γένος* and *εἶδος* in Aristotle's biology, 8 iff.  
**Bradshaw, A. T. von S.**, the watchman scenes in the *Antigone*, 200 ff.  
**Brunt, P. A.**, Persian accounts of Alexander's campaigns, 141 ff.  
**Burnyeat, M. F.**, time and Pythagorean religion, 248 ff.  
**Calder, William M. (III)**, Parry on Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1271-4, 176.  
 Callimachus, emendations to, 212 ff.  
**Cawkwell, G. L.**, the defence of Olynthus, 122 ff.  
 Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 1 and 2, notes on, 252 ff.  
 Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 96-143, 67 ff.  
 Cipero's letters, LSJ and, 159 ff.  
**Cook, R. M.**, Spartan history and archaeology, 156 ff.  
*Δέν* in classical Greek, 235 ff.  
*Εὖ οὖτα* and *οὐδὲ εἰς*: cases of hiatus, 239 ff.  
 Euripides, *Orestes* 332-40: the musical papyrus, 61 ff.  
**Fuks, A.**, non-Phylarchean tradition of the programme of Agis IV, 118 ff.  
**Giangrande, G.**, emendations to Josephus Flavius' *Contra Apionem*, 108 ff.  
 —, emendations to Callimachus, 212 ff.  
 Hesiod, more notes on the text of, 177 ff.  
 Hiatus, cases of (*εὖ οὖτα* and *οὐδὲ εἰς*), 239 ff.  
**Huby, Pamela M.**, the date of Aristotle's *Topics* and its treatment of the theory of ideas, 72 ff.  
 Imperial estates, three notes on, 277 ff.  
 Josephus Flavius' *Contra Apionem*, emendations to, 108 ff.  
**Kenney, E. J.**, the manuscript tradition of Ovid's *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, and *Remedia Amoris*, 1 ff.  
**Ker, A.**, notes on some passages of the plays of Seneca, 48 ff.  
**Lacey, W. K.**, Cicero, *Pro Sestio* 96-143, 67 ff.  
**Lloyd-Jones, H.**, the guilt of Agamemnon, 187 ff.  
**Longman, G. A.**, the musical papyrus: Euripides, *Orestes* 332-40, 61 ff.  
**Lucas, D. W.**, pity, terror, and *peripeteia*, 52 ff.  
**MacMullen, Ramsay**, three notes on imperial estates, 277 ff.  
**Moorhouse, A. C.**, *δέν* in classical Greek, 235 ff.  
 — *εὖ οὖτα* and *οὐδὲ εἰς*: cases of hiatus, 239 ff.  
 Nonniana, 223 ff.  
 Olynthus, the defence of, 122 ff.  
 Ovid's *Amores*, *Ars Amatoria*, and *Remedia Amoris*, the manuscript tradition of, 1 ff.  
*Persae*, notes on the, 182 ff.  
 Plotinus, the Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in, 99 ff.  
 Propertius, some problems in, 263 ff.  
 Pythagorean religion, time and, 248 ff.  
**Quincey, J. H.**, notes on the *Persae*, 182 ff.  
 Quintilian 10. 1. 46 f., the textual tradition of, 169 ff.  
**Rist, J. M.**, the Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus, 99 ff.  
**Rose, K. F. C.**, the date of the *Satyricon*, 166 ff.  
**Sandbach, F. H.**, some problems in Propertius, 263 ff.  
*Satyricon*, the date of the, 166 ff.  
 Seneca, notes on some passages of the plays of, 48 ff.  
**Shackleton Bailey, D. R.**, LSJ and Cicero's letters, 159 ff.  
 Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1271-4, Parry on 176.  
 Spartan history and archaeology, 156 ff.  
**Watt, W. S.**, notes on Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 1 and 2, 252 ff.  
**West, M. L.**, more notes on the text of Hesiod, 177 ff.  
 — Nonniana, 223 ff.  
**Wilson, N. G.**, the Triclinian edition of Aristophanes, 32 ff.  
**Winterbottom, M.**, the textual tradition of Quintilian 10. 1. 46 f., 169 ff.

## INDEX LOCORUM

**Achilles Tatius:**  
1 (110-11), 230.

**Aeschines:**  
1 (122), 241.

**Aeschylus:**  
*Ag. (passim)*, 187-99; (838), 240.  
*Pers.* (33-35), 182; (93-96), 182-3;  
(173), (211), 240; (235-6), 183-4;  
(413-16), 184; (431), (435), 240;  
(546-7), 184-5; (784), 240; (858-63),  
185-6; (897-900), 186.  
*Sept.* (1039), 202.  
*Suppl.* (736-7), 185.

**Alcaeus:**  
fr. (320), 235.

**Apollonius Rhodius:**  
2 (196), 218; (200-1), 214; (521), 181.

**Aristides:**  
*Orat.* 26 (342), 116.

**Aristophanes:**  
*Ach. (passim)*, 38-40.  
*Av. (passim)*, 42-45; (456), 35.  
*Eq. (passim)*, 37-38.  
*Nub. (passim)*, 36-37.  
*Pas (passim)*, 45-47; (373), (1296-7),  
239; (1302), 240.  
*Pl. (passim)*, 35-36; (72-73), 239;  
(137-8), 245; (838), 239.  
*Ran. (passim)*, 37; (341), 35.  
*Thes.* (1197), 238.  
*Vesp. (passim)*, 40-41; (425), 240;  
(859), 242.

**Aristotle:**  
*An. Post.* 74 (a21), 90-91.  
*De An.* 402 (b2), 96.  
*De Caelo* 285 (a25), 92.  
*G.A.* 719 (a7), 87; 758 (b9), 86; 784  
(b21), 95.  
*H.A. (passim)*, 86-98.  
*Long. Vit.* 465 (a2), 95.  
*Metaph.* 985 (b23), 248, 250; 1034 (a1),  
91; 1091 (b30), 100.  
*P.A.* 644 (b4), 94; 679 (b15), 680 (a15),  
86; 683 (b26), 87.  
*Phys.* 227 (b11-14), 81.  
*Poet.* 1452 (a52), 52-54, 56-57.  
*Pol.* 1327 (b23-24), 96.  
*Top.* 113 (a25), 77; 121 (b25), 90; 137  
(b3), 77-78; 143 (b3), 147 (a3), 78;  
148 (a13), 78-79.

**Athenaeus:**  
5 (179 a), 113.

**Callimachus:**  
*Epigr.* 28 (3), 219.  
38 (1-5), 218-22.  
58 (3), 216.  
fr. 67 (1), 70 (2), 85 (9), 110 (57), 221.  
*Hymn.* 4 (241-2), 217.  
5 (82-84), 212-13.  
6 (91-93), 213-18.

**Cicero:**  
*Ad. Att.* 1 (1. 5), 252; (6. 2), 165; (10. 6),  
252-3; (13. 5), 165; (14. 2), 161;  
(16. 3), 253; (16. 8), 159; (18. 8),  
253-4.  
2 (3. 2), 254-5; (4. 2), (7. 2), 255;  
(9. 1), 256-7; (12. 1), (12. 2), 257;  
(12. 3), (12. 4), 258; (15. 2), 258-9;  
16. 4), (17. 1), 259; (17. 2), 259-  
60; (17. 3), 165; (19. 2), 260; (20.  
1), 164; (20. 6), 260-1; (21. 4), (22.  
5), 261; (24. 1), 261-2; (24. 4),  
262.  
5 (11. 15), 160.  
6 (3. 7), 159; (6. 1), 162; (9. 2), 161.  
9 (1. 1), 162-3; (10. 6), (13. 7),  
161;  
(11. 4), 163; (19. 1), 160.  
10 (1. 4), 159; (10. 5), 160-1; (17. 1),  
162; (17. 3), 159.  
12 (3. 3), 159-60; (41. 4), 164.  
13 (1. 2), 162; (23. 1), 164; (23. 3),  
162; (24. 1), 161.  
14 (5. 1), 160; (10. 1), 164-5.  
16 (11. 3), 163.  
*Ad. Fam.* 4 (6. 2), 253.  
13 (4. 4), 253.  
15 (17. 4), 163; (19. 4), 161.  
*De Off.* 2 (78-80), 120.  
*Or.* (46), 162.  
*Pro Sest.* (96-143), 67-71.  
*Q. F.* 2 (15. 5), 164.  
3 (3. 4), 162.

**Claudian:**  
*Bell. Gild.* (399), 275.  
*Cons. Prob.* (42), 276.

**Clement of Alexandria:**  
2 (517. 14), 218.

**Democritus:**  
(156), 235, 246.

**Demosthenes:**  
3 (6), 136.  
4 (2), 123; (17), 122-3; (23), 123; (43),  
126; (44), 123.  
20 (64), 246-7.  
21 (162), 128.  
36 (16), 128.  
59 (4), 128.

**Diodorus Siculus:**  
13 (35-4), 160.

**Dionysius of Halicarnassus:**  
8 (60. 2), 217.

**Etymologicum Magnum:**  
305 (1), 236.  
639 (17 ff.), 237.

**Euripides:**  
fr. (946), 242.  
*Hec.* (1-2), 66.  
*I.T.* (970-1), 65.  
*Or.* (332-40), 61-66; (1308), 62; (1554),  
59.  
*Tro.* (605-6), 62.

**Eusebius:**  
2 (1. 22. 1), 217.

**Galen:**  
*De Elem. Sec. Hipp.* 1 (2) = Diels 2 (97), 235.

**Gorgias:**  
*B23* (D.-K.), 54.

**Hermas:**  
*Simil.* 3 (5. 6), 113.

**Herodotus:**  
 4 (108-9), 186.  
 5 (97), 183.  
 7 (5), 183.

**Hesiod:**  
*Op.* (84), (213), (248), (789), 180.  
*Scut.* (258-60), (430-1), 181.  
*Theog.* (38), (88), 177; (169), 177-8; (173), (277), (445-7), 178; (448-52), (503), (538), (591-2), 179; (605), 179-80; (615-16), 180; (621), 236; (839-40), (848), (890), 180.

**Homer:**  
*Il.* 1 (385), 242.  
 4 (232), 181.  
 15 (571), 215; (610-12), 225.  
 21 (463-6), 216.  
*Od.* 2 (527-30), 181.  
 4 (425-6), 180.  
 11 (678-9), 179.  
 15 (497-8), 215, 216.

**Homeric Hymns:**  
*H. Herm.* (288), 178.

**Isocrates:**  
 1 (3), 76.  
 11 (49), 216.

**Josephus:**  
*Ant.* 3 (302), 113.  
 5 (5), 113.  
*c. Ap.* 1 (139), 109-14; (236), 114; (307), 114-15.  
 2 (23), 115; (131), 115-16; (215), 116-17.

**Longinus:**  
*De Subl.* 2 (3), 165.  
 7 (3), 160.  
 15 (1), 159.  
 26 (3), 159.  
 44 (1), 165.

**Lucan:**  
*B.C.* 7 (452), 275.  
 9 (985), 276.  
 10 (540-6), 167.

**Lucian:**  
*de Luctu* (9), 209.  
*Osyb.* (143), 159.

**Lucretius:**  
 6 (1231), 273.

**Lysias:**  
 2 (43), 161.

**Marcus Aurelius:**  
 6 (47), 217.

**Martial:**  
 11 (41. 6), 276.

**Nonnus:**  
*Dion.* 5 (307-9), 223.  
 8 (198-200), 224.  
 10 (333-4), 224.  
 12 (363-5), 224.  
 14 (137-8), 224.  
 20 (216-19), 224-5.

23 (280-3), 225.  
 24 (13-14), 225; (135-6), 225-6; (256-8), 226.  
 25 (424-6), 226; (469-70), 226-7.  
 28 (29-31), 227.  
 34 (329-33), 227.  
 36 (16-20), 227-8; (211-12), 227.  
 37 (531-3), (667), 228.  
 40 (183-5), 228; (448-50), 229.  
 41 (371-4), 229.  
 42 (67-70), 229; (396-9), 229-30; (447-55), 230.  
 46 (253-5), 230-1.  
 48 (502-5), 231.  
*(passim)*, 232-4.

**Ovid:**  
*Am.* (*passim*), 6-13.  
 2 (1. 17), 28.  
 3 (9. 23-24), 270; (15. 11-14), 272.  
*Ars Am.* (*passim*), 13-20.  
*Met.* 3 (325), 275.  
 8 (837-42), 214-15.  
 9 (276), 49.  
*Rem.* (*passim*), 20-23.  
*Tr.* 3 (6. 29), 161.

**Petronius:**  
*B.C.* (290-4), 167.

**Philo:**  
 2 (194. 2), 216.  
 3 (235. 16), 218.  
 5 (61. 7), 218.

**Plato:**  
*Epist.* 7 (344 d), 116.  
*Gorg.* 512 (e), 245.  
*Hipp. Mai.* 281 (c), 116.  
*Parm.* 166 (a), 237.  
*Phaed.* 57 (a), 237; 102 (a), 241.  
*Phaedr.* 268 (c), 55.  
*Rep.* 605 (d), 55.

**Plautus:**  
*Amph.* (327), 269.

**Pliny:**  
*Epp.* 4 (9. 1), 274-5.  
 6 (21. 3), 275.

**Plotinus:**  
*Enn.* 2 (4. 4), 99, 104.  
 (4. 3), 101, 105.

**Plutarch:**  
*Mor.* 280 (a), 274; 371 (b), 662 (f), 218.  
*Vit. Agid.* (*passim*), 118-21.  
*Vit. Phoc.* (12-14), 127.

**Polybius:**  
 4 (81. 12-14), 121.

**Propertius:**  
 2 (14. 19-20), 20; (19. 29-32), 263-4.  
 3 (11. 55-70), 264.  
 4 (1. *passim*), 264-71; (1. 65-66), (125-6), 271-2; (2. 1-2), 272-3; (7. 79-80), 273-4; (11. 15-20), 274-6.

**Pythagoras:**  
 14 (8a D.-K.), 248-9.

**Quintilian:**  
*Inst.* 10. 1 (*passim*), 169-75.

**Quintus Smyrnaeus:**  
 3 (456), 193.

**Sallust:**  
*Cat.* (38), 70.

## Seneca:

*Ag.* (425-9), 49-50.  
*Ep.* 99 (13), 269.  
*H.F.* (552-3), 49.  
*H.O.* (725-8), (1327-31), (1624-5),  
 (1849-51), 50-51.  
*Med.* (471-82), (951-3), 50.  
*Phaedr.* (66-72), 48.  
*Thyest.* (890-1), 48-49.  
*Tro.* (1166-70), 49.

## Sextus Empiricus:

*Adv. Math.* 9 (90), 218.

## Silius Italicus:

15 (76), 276.

## Simplicius:

*in Cael.* 294 (33) = Diels 2 (93), 235.

## Sophocles:

*Ant.* (223 ff.), (249-52), (256-8), (293 ff.),  
 (417-21), 200-11.  
*El.* (110-12), 66.  
 fr. (673), 241.  
*O.T.* (957), 240, 242; (1271-4), 176;  
 (1438), 240-2.  
*Tr.* (222), 242.

## Speusippus:

fr. (8), (10), (16), 82-83.

## Statius:

*Theb.* 2 (599), 263.  
 6 (55), (81), 276.  
 8 (546), 51.

## Tacitus:

*Ann.* 13 (6), 17.

## Teleclides:

41 (4), 240.

## Teles:

*π. φυγῆς (passim)*, 118-20.

## Terence:

*Eun.* (406), 49.

## [Theocritus]:

27 (49), (55), 229.

## Theophrastus:

*De Caus. Plant.* 1 (20. 3), 217.  
 3 (22. 2), 217.

## Thucydides:

3 (13. 1), 247.

## Virgil:

*Aen.* 4 (609), 276.

## Xenophon:

*Cyr.* 1 (6. 7), 185.  
*Hell.* 5 (4. 1), 245.  
 6 (1. 9), 241.



*Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C. 4*

GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON

BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI LAHORE DACC

CAPE TOWN SALISBURY NAIROBI IBADAN ACCRA

KUALA LUMPUR HONG KONG

© *Oxford University Press 1962*

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD  
BY VIVIAN RIDLER, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

## CONTENTS

### NUMBER 1

The Manuscript Tradition of Ovid's <i>Amores, Ars Amatoria and Remedia Amoris</i>	E. J. KENNEY	1
The Triclinian Edition of Aristophanes	N. G. WILSON	32
Notes on some passages of the Plays of Seneca	ALAN KER	48
Pity, Terror, and <i>Peripeteia</i>	D. W. LUCAS	52
The Musical Papyrus: Euripides, <i>Orestes</i> 332-40	G. A. LONGMAN	61
Cicero, <i>Pro Sestio</i> 96-143	W. K. LACEY	67
The Date of Aristotle's <i>Topics</i> and its Treatment of the Theory of Ideas	PAMELA M. HUBY	72
<i>Γένος</i> and <i>Εἶδος</i> in Aristotle's Biology	D. M. BALME	81
The Indefinite Dyad and Intelligible Matter in Plotinus	JOHN M. RIST	99
Emendations to Josephus Flavius <i>Contra Apionem</i>	GIUSEPPE GIANGRANDE	108
Non-Phylarchean Tradition of the Programme of Agis IV	ALEXANDER FUKS	118
The Defence of Olynthus	G. L. CAWKWELL	122
Persian Accounts of Alexander's Campaigns	P. A. BRUNT	141
Spartan History and Archaeology	R. M. COOK	156
L.S.J. and Cicero's Letters	D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY	159
The Date of the <i>Satyricon</i>	K. F. C. ROSE	166
The Textual Tradition of Quintilian	M. WINTERBOTTOM	169
Parry on Sophocles, <i>Oedipus Tyrannus</i> 1271-4	WILLIAM M. CALDER III	176

### NUMBER 2

More Notes on the Text of Hesiod	M. L. WEST	177
Notes on the <i>Persae</i>	J. H. QUINCEY	182
The Guilt of Agamemnon	HUGH LLOYD-JONES	187
The Watchman Scenes in the <i>Antigone</i>	A. T. VON S. BRADSHAW	200
Emendations to Callimachus	G. GIANGRANDE	212
Nonniana	M. L. WEST	223
Δέν in Classical Greek	A. C. MOORHOUSE	235
<i>EY ΟΙΔΑ</i> and <i>ΟΥΔΕ ΕΙΣ</i> : cases of Hiatus	A. C. MOORHOUSE	239
Time and Pythagorean Religion	M. F. BURNYEAT	248
Notes on Cicero, <i>Ad Atticum</i> 1 and 2	W. S. WATT	252
Some Problems in Propertius	F. H. SANDBACH	263
Three Notes on Imperial Estates	RAMSAY MACMULLEN	277

*The Publishers acknowledge with gratitude a generous grant  
from the British Academy towards the cost of this volume*

# THE MANUSCRIPT TRADITION OF OVID'S *AMORES, ARS AMATORIA, AND REMEDIA AMORIS*

Plus on aura de variantes, plus on aura de chances de trouver la bonne leçon  
(A. Dain, *Les Manuscrits*, p. 150).

To the editor of a classical text manuscripts are useful as they can be induced to yield the truth. The purpose of this article is purely practical: to discuss in moderate compass, though in greater detail than an O.C.T. preface<sup>1</sup> seems to demand, how the manuscripts of these poems can be used to find out what Ovid wrote. His text has been transmitted to us in circumstances which defy the rigid application of this or that 'method' of recension; and his editors will sometimes be wise to recognize the limitations of the evidence and to cultivate a robust indifference to unnecessary detail.<sup>2</sup>

## THE MANUSCRIPTS

The manuscripts on which I have based my text are as follows (palaeographical detail is kept to a minimum):

### (a) *Antiquiores*

P = Par. Lat. 8242, ix/x century. Written in France (cf. Chatelain, *Paléographie des classiques latins*, ii. xci). Contains *Heroides* (incomplete), *Am.* i. 2. 51–3. 12. 26, 3. 14. 3–3. 15. 8 (foll. 57–99<sup>b</sup>).<sup>3</sup> Collations by Bornecque, *Le Musée Belge* xxx (1926), 17 ff., Munari 117–36. The 'Puteaneus' of Heinsius.<sup>4</sup>

p = second hand of foreg., xi century.

P<sup>3</sup> = third hand of foreg., xii/xiii century.

The following works are cited by short titles:

Blok = F. F. Blok, *Nicolaas Heinsius in dienst van Christina van Zweden*.

Dörrie = H. Dörrie, *Untersuchungen zur Überlieferungsgeschichte von Ovids Epistulae Heroidum* (*Nachr. d. Akad. Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Kl.* 1960, Nos. 5, 7).

Munari = F. Munari, 'Sugli "Amores" di Ovidio', *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxiii (1948), 113–52.

Munari, ed. = P. Ovidi Nasonis *Amores*, ed. F. Munari, ed. 3, 1959.

Notes I, II = E. J. Kenney, 'Notes on Ovid', 'Notes on Ovid: II', *C.Q. n.s.* viii (1958), 54–66; *ibid.* ix (1959), 240–60.

Pasquali = G. Pasquali, *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo*, 1952.

Tafel = S. Tafel, *Die Überlieferungsgeschichte von Ovids Carmina amatoria. Verfolgt bis zum 11. Jahrhundert* (diss. Tübingen, 1910).

<sup>1</sup> See P. Ovidi Nasonis *Amores, Medicamina Faciei Femineae, Ars Amatoria, Remedia Amoris*, ed. E. J. Kenney (Oxford, 1961), pp. v–xii.

<sup>2</sup> The limitations of the evidence do not permit the construction of a stemma for the whole tradition, a statement which I do not regard as shaken by the stemma for the manuscripts of the *Fasti* (a somewhat analogous tradition) which will be found at F. Peeters, *Les Fastes d'Ovide*, facing p. 420. As to unnecessary detail, I have long thought that a case in point is the so-called 'vetustus Politiani' (on which see Lenz, *Parerga Ovidiana* [*Rend. Accad. Line.* 1937]), pp. 333–56; Munari 139, n. 2, 141–3). This was a manuscript of the common class, of no particular importance for establishing what Ovid wrote, and almost certainly anything but *vetustus*. It is because it is lost that we have heard so much about it: 'The fish that got away is always the biggest' (Ullman, *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxvii–xxviii [1956], 581).

<sup>3</sup> The folio numbers are to be taken in all cases as referring to relevant works only, i.e. *Amores, A.A., Remedia*.

<sup>4</sup> It was in fact known and used sporadically for the correction of the text before Heinsius exploited it systematically for his

S = St. Gall 864, xi century. Written in Germany (Chatelain, op. cit., *ibid.*).

Contains *inter al. Am. epigr. 1. 1. 1-1. 6. 45, 1. 8. 75-3. 9. 10* (pp. [sic] 350-96), *Met. 3. 642-83*. Collations by Borneque, *Rev. de Phil. liii* (1927), 354 ff., Lenz, *Rend. Ist. Lombard. lxix* (1936), 633 ff.

R = Par. Lat. 7311, ix century. Written in France (Chatelain, op. cit. ii. xciii). Contains *A.A., Rem., Am. epigr. 1. 1. 3-1. 2. 19, 1. 2. 25-50* (foll. 50<sup>b</sup>-103<sup>b</sup>). Collations for *Amores* only by Borneque, *Le Musée Belge* xxx (1926), 17 ff., Munari 114-15. The 'Regius' of Heinsius.<sup>1</sup>

r = second hand of foreg., xi century.

R<sup>3</sup> = third hand of foreg., xii/xiii century.

O = Oxford Bodl. Auct. F. 4. 32 (S.C. 2176), ix century. Written in Wales (Chatelain, op. cit., *ibid.*; *Umbræ Codicū Occidentalium* iv, R. W. Hunt, *Saint Dunstan's Classbook from Glastonbury*). Contains *inter al. A.A. 1.* Collation by Ellis, *Hermes* xv (1880), 425 ff.<sup>2</sup> The 'Oxoniensis' of Heinsius.<sup>3</sup>

S<sub>a</sub> = St. Gall 821, xi century. Contains *inter al. A.A. 1. 1-230* (pp. [sic] 94-96). Collation by Schenkl, *Zeitschr. öst. Gymn.* xiv (1863), 150 f.

E = Eton 150 (Bl. 6. 5), xi century. Probably written near Bari.<sup>4</sup> Contains *inter al. Rem.* (foll. 37<sup>b</sup>-54), *Her. 1. 1-7. 159*.

K = Par. Lat. 8460, xii century. Contains *inter al. Rem.* (foll. 1-17). Collation

edition. Cf., for example, L. Carrionis *Emendationum . . . Liber Primus* (Paris, 1583), p. 12, where he uses it to improve the received text of *Am. 2. 6. 1*; Heinsius to R. H. Schele, *Syll. ii. 744* (quoted by Blok 226), Dörrie 395. For the identification of manuscripts used by Heinsius see Lenz, *Eranos* li (1953), 66-88; Munari, *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxiv (1949), 161-5, xxix (1957), 98-114; Dörrie 399-409. Add incidentally that 'cod. Bernardi Rottendorphii' (Munari, loc. cit. 101) = Wolfenbüttel 4620 (Gud. 313).

<sup>1</sup> Who appears to have been the first to bring it into notice. He rightly relied on it heavily: (on *A.A. 3. 37*) 'sed solus codex Regius hic audiendus: qui nobis inter tantas fluctuationes Cynosura est. Ejus vestigis insistens, levi mutatione genuinam, nisi fallor, lectionem habebis . . .' The principle that the corruptions of a manuscript such as R are a truer guide than the corrected readings of interpolated manuscripts was instinctively perceived by Heinsius (cf. below, p. 64).

<sup>2</sup> Not without some errors: the most serious deserve to be mentioned because they have been perpetuated by editors. At 1. 338 O has *rabidi*, not the inexplicable *ualidi* recorded by Ellis. At 1. 683 it has *mala*: Ellis's silence led Marchesi and Borneque (reasonably enough) to infer that it had *sua*, the reading of Merkel's text, against which the collation was made. At 1. 513 *munditia* in Ellis for *munditie* is a simple misreading.

<sup>3</sup> Why did Heinsius not perceive, as he was capable of perceiving (cf. Blok 232-3), the obviously close relationship between R and O? The explanation may be that his collation of O, which he made at the age of 21 on his first and only visit to England in 1641 (Blok 21), was not made with the care and minuteness that later distinguished his collations (see on these Lindsay, *Zentralbl. für Bibl.* xviii [1901], 159-63; Munari, *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxiv [1950], 161-5, xxix [1957], 98-114; Blok 226 ff.). I notice two references to O in Heinsius' letters: in 1644, writing to Gronovius, he laments that he has mislaid his collation of O, which, he says, 'reliquorum omnium manuscriptorum, quibus usus sum, instar mihi erat' (*Syll. iii. 125*), and in a later letter (1657) he speaks of it as 'literis Langobardicis scriptus' (*ibid. 370*). For this identification cf. E. A. Loew, *The Beneventan Script*, p. 28, n. 1 (b).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 152, 338.

<sup>5</sup> The full list of contents is *Theodulus, Ecloga; Maximianus; Statius, Achilleid; Remedia; Her. 1. 1-7. 159; Arator, De actibus Apostolorum*. E is interesting as an early representative of the class of manuscripts that includes the *Remedia* in a cycle of poems thought to be of educational value: see Boas, *Mnem.* xlii (1914), 44-46; Rand, *Speculum* iv (1929), 260-1; Ullman, *Class. Phil.* xxvii (1932), 38-40; Tafel 45-59.

and discussion by Lenz, *Stud. it. fil. class.* xxix (1957), 3-10. The 'Puteaneus' of Heinsius.<sup>1</sup>

Intermediate between these and the *rec.* is:

A = B.M. Add. 14086, *circa* 1100. Contains *A.A.* (indexed in B.M. Catalogue as *Amores*). Description by Bouteemy, *Rev. Ét. Lat.* xiv (1936), 271 ff., xv (1937), 92 ff.

a = second hand of foreg., contemporary.

(b) *Recentiores*

A<sub>a</sub> = B.M. Add. 34749 (olim Phillipps 1056), xiii century. Contains *A.A.* 1. 1-95 (foll. 85-87).

A<sub>b</sub> = B.M. Add. 21169, xiii century. Contains *Her.*, *Am.*, *A.A.*, *Rem.* (foll. 27-72), *Fast.*, *Tr.*

A<sub>c</sub> = B.M. Add. 11975, xiii century. Contains *Am.* (foll. 2-31).

B = Bern, Bürgerbibliothek 478, xii/xiii century. Contains *Her.*, *ex P.*, *Tr.*, *Fast.*, *Rem.*, *A.A.*, *Am.* (foll. 148-206). Lost, but microfilm and enlargements available at the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des textes.

B<sub>b</sub> = Bern, Bürgerbibl. 505, xiii century. Contains *inter al.* *A.A.*, *Am.* 2. 15 (*Anulus*), *Am.* 3. 5. 1-18 (foll. 1-40).

B<sub>d</sub> = Bern, Bürgerbibl. 519, xi century. Contains *A.A.* 3. 617-812, *Am.* 3. 5 (*Somnium*) (foll. 231-6<sup>b</sup>).

C<sub>a</sub> = Cambridge, Gonville and Caius Coll. C.M.A. 1054 (James 202/108), xiii century. Contains *inter al.* *Rem.* (foll. 28<sup>b</sup>-60<sup>b</sup>). The 'Cantabrigiensis' of Heinsius.<sup>2</sup>

C<sub>c</sub> = Cambridge, Trinity Coll. R. 3. 29 (James 609), xiii century. Contains *inter al.* *Rem.* (foll. 107-14<sup>b</sup>).

D = Dijon 497, xiii century. Contains *inter al.*<sup>3</sup> *Fast.*, *Met.*, *Am.* (foll. 195-203), *Tr.*, *ex P.*, *Ibis*, *Rem.*, *A.A.* (foll. 225-34), *Her.* The 'Jureti liber' or 'excerpta' of Heinsius.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On this manuscript, a mainstay of Heinsius' text, but curiously neglected by later editors (Tafel was apparently aware of its existence, but did not use it for his dissertation), see the articles of Lenz (cited above) and myself (*Stud. it. fil. class.* xxx [1958], 172-4). It is composed of two quite unrelated parts, K itself, and a miscellany manuscript (fourteenth century) of the type described in the preceding note: see Lenz, loc. cit. 28-30; Boas, *Mnem.* xlii (1914), 42.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Lenz, *Eranos* li (1953), 75. As regards the *Remedia* the identification is certain: 565 *dormit*, 645 *querendo*, 726 *illa] mille*; and I regret to have to record that a hand of the seventeenth century which looks very like that of Heinsius has supplied some missing verses and made some corrections (these annotations are not noticed by James).

<sup>3</sup> D is an immense *Corpus Poetarum Latinorum*: besides Ovid it contains Statius, Virgil, Horace, Lucan, Persius, Juvenal, Avianus, Cato, Homerus Latinus, Sedulius, Prosper Aquitanus, Theodulus, and Maximianus. See Boas, *Mnem.* xlii (1914), 28-29.

<sup>4</sup> The identification was made for the *Ibis* by La Penna (*Publi Ovidi Nasonis Ibis* [1957], p. xcvi), and for *Her.* by Dörrie (403); but see also Lenz, 'Ovids Remedia und der Codex Iureti', *Stud. it. fil. class.* xxxi (1959), 169-74, contending that it does not hold true for *Rem.* But cf. *Am.* 1. 8. 80 *repressa*, 1. 11. 23 *lassere retento*, *A.A.* 1. 348 *suos*, 360 *luxuriatur*, 389 *temptabis*, etc., *Rem.* 213 *tandem firmis quamuis*, 307 *non cessent*, 407 *ueneri*, etc. Lenz's suggestion that by 'codex Iureti' Heinsius meant 'a MS belonging to J.' may be the right explanation; or H.'s

**E<sub>a</sub>** = Eton 91 (Bk. 6. 18), xiii century. Contains *inter al. Her., Am., A.A., Rem.* (fol. 18–46<sup>b</sup>), *Fast., Met., Tr., ex P.* The 'Junianus' of Heinsius.

**F** = Frankfurt A. M., Stadt- u. Universitätsbibl. Barth. 110, xii/xiii century. Contains *inter al. Met., A.A., Rem., Am.* (fol. 187–260), *Ibis, Am. 3. 5 (Somnium)* (fol. 269), *Ep. Sapph., Her., Fast., ex P., Tr.*

**H** = B.M. Add. 49368 (olim Holkham 322), xiii century. Contains *inter al. Fast., ex P., A.A., Rem.* (fol. 81–110<sup>b</sup>), *Tr., Am.* (fol. 145–67).

**L** = Leiden Periz. Q. 16, xiii century. Contains *A.A.* The 'Com(m)elinianus' of Heinsius.

**M<sub>a</sub>** = Munich 14809 (Em. g. 10), xii century. Contains *inter al. Rem.* (fol. 48<sup>b</sup>–65).

**N** = Naples Bibl. Nat. IV. F. 13 (Borb. 261), xii/xiii century. Contains *inter al. A.A., Am., Med., Am. 3. 5 (Somnium)* (fol. 2–54<sup>b</sup>). The 'Neapolitanus' of Heinsius.

**O<sub>a</sub>** = Oxford Bodl. D'Orville 170 (S.C. 17048), *circa* 1200. Contains *A.A.*

**O<sub>b</sub>** = Oxford Bodl. Canon. class. Lat. 1 (S.C. 18582), xiii century. Contains *Her., Am., A.A., Rem.* (fol. 1–76<sup>b</sup>), *Met., Fast., Tr., ex P.*

**O<sub>e</sub>** = Oxford Bodl. Rawl. G. 109 (S.C. 15479), *circa* 1200. Contains *inter al. Rem.* (pp. [sic] 143–66).

**O<sub>g</sub>** = Oxford Bodl. Canon. class. Lat. 18 (S.C. 18599), xv century. Contains *A.A., Rem.*<sup>1</sup>

**P<sub>a</sub>** = Par. Lat. 7993, xiii century. Contains *inter al. Her., A.A., Rem., Am.* (fol. 9–21), *Met., Fast., Tr., ex P.* The 'alter' or 'tertius Regius' of Heinsius.<sup>2</sup>

**P<sub>b</sub>** = Par. Lat. 7994, xiii century. Contains *inter al. Her., Am., A.A., Rem.* (fol. 28–98<sup>b</sup>), *Ibis, Med., Am. 3. 5 (Somnium)*. The 'Mentelianus prior' of Heinsius.

**P<sub>c</sub>** = Par. Lat. 7997, *circa* 1470–80. In the hand of Bartolomeo Sanvito.<sup>3</sup> Contains *Her., Am.* (fol. 69–118), *Ibis, Ep. Sapph., A.A., Rem.* (fol. 137–95<sup>b</sup>). The 'Sarriavianus' of Heinsius.

notes may have been in a muddle (cf. below, n. 2).

<sup>1</sup> The leaves from 33 to 37 are out of order, as follows: 32<sup>b</sup> ends with *A.A. 3. 528*, then follow 3. 593–656 (fol. 33), 529–92 (34), 720–83 (35), 657–719 (36), 784–fin. (37).

<sup>2</sup> Merkel, *Fasti* (1841), p. ccxxx, and Lenz, *Phil. Wochenschr.* li (1931), 441–2, 677, identify it as the 'alter Regius'; but some readings agree with those cited by Heinsius from his 'tertius Regius': *A.A. 3. 377 talis* (u.l.), 383 *teretesque* (u.l.), 476 *e duro . . . ore*. On the other hand, Heinsius gives *A.A. 2. 244 apposita*, 3. 694 *tremunt* as from the 'alter Regius' when they are in fact in Par.

Lat. 7998 (a. 1305); and he reports *A.A. 2. 355–6* as missing from the 'prior Mentellii' (= *P<sub>b</sub>*), which they are not. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that his notes were in some disorder or that he frequently misread them.

<sup>3</sup> This identification was made by the late Mr. James Wardrop (cf. *C.R. n.s. viii* [1958], 134). In dating the manuscript to about 1470–80 he compared its writing with a Horace in the Library of King's College, Cambridge (James 34). Cf. the Martial in his hand in the Bodleian (Auct. F. 4. 33), reproduced as no. 9 in *Humanistic Script (Bodleian Picture Book No. 12, Oxford, 1960)*.

P<sub>f</sub> = Par. Lat. 8430, xiii century. Contains *inter al. A.A., Am.* (foll. 25–60<sup>b</sup>).  
The 'alter Mentelianus' of Heinsius.

P<sub>h</sub> = Par. Lat. 8245, xiii century. Contains *Am., Rem.* (foll. 1–38), *Fast.* The 'Puteaneus alter' of Heinsius.

Q = Antwerp, Mus. Plant. O.B. 5. 1 (Lat. 68, anc. 43), xii/xiii century. Contains *Am. 3. 5 (Somnium)* (fol. 1), *Med., Ibis, Rem., A.A., Am.* (foll. 11<sup>b</sup>–75), *Her., Fast., Tr., ex P.* The 'Moreti liber' of Heinsius.

T = Tours 879, xiii century (facsimile at S. G. Owen, *P. Ovidi Nasonis Tristium Libri v*, p. 1). Contains *Her., Am., A.A., Rem.* (foll. 15<sup>b</sup>–39), *Fast., Tr., ex P., Ibis, Met.*<sup>1</sup>

U = Florence, Riccardianus 489, xiii century. Contains *inter al. Her., Am. 3. 5 (Somnium)* (fol. 18), *Fast., Tr., A.A.* (foll. 61<sup>b</sup>–73), *Med.* (foll. 74<sup>b</sup>–75).

V<sub>a</sub> = Vatican Barberinianus 26, xiii century. Contains *inter al. Am.* (foll. 1–46), *Her., ex P.* The 'Barberinianus' of Heinsius.

V<sub>b</sub> = Vatican Palatinus 1655, xii century. Contains *inter al. Am.* (foll. 104–32).  
The 'Palatinus alter' of Heinsius.

W = Perpignan 19 (anc. 10), xiii century. Contains *A.A., Rem., Am.* (foll. 2–106), *ex P.*

X = Leipzig, Stadtbibliothek 44 (Rep. I. 7), xiii century. Contains *ex P., Rem.* (foll. 15<sup>b</sup>–19), *Met. 1. 1–9. 200, 11. 457–fin., Am. epigr. 1. 1. 1–2. 5. 43, 2. 10. 29–fin.* (foll. 64<sup>b</sup>–74<sup>b</sup>). The 'Sen(atorius)' of J. C. Jahn.

Z = Linz, Studienbibliothek 329, xii century. Contains *inter al. ex P., Am., Rem.* (foll. 101–42).

(c) *Containing Am. 3. 5 (Somnium) only*

π = Par. Lat. 9344, xi century (fol. 42). Collations by Borneque, *Le Musée Belge* xxx (1926), 31; F. W. Lenz, *Parerga Ovidiana*, pp. 357f.

P<sub>q</sub> = Par. Lat. 8207, xiii century (foll. 9<sup>b</sup>–10<sup>b</sup>).

X<sub>b</sub> = Leipzig, Stadtbibl. 48 (Rep. I. 74), xii century (foll. 27<sup>b</sup>–28<sup>b</sup>). Collation by Lenz, *Rend. Ist. Lombard.* Ixix (1936), 656f.

X<sub>c</sub> = Dresden A. 167a, xii century (foll. 41<sup>b</sup>–42).

When reporting the readings of the *recs.* I have used the sigla  $\omega$  = all or most,  
 $\varsigma$  = some or a few (more than two). See below, p. 11.

(d) *Florilegia*

e = Escorial Q. I. 14, xiv century. Contains excerpts from *Met., Fast., Her., Am., A.A.* (foll. 40<sup>b</sup>–43<sup>b</sup>), *Rem.* (foll. 46<sup>b</sup>–47<sup>b</sup>), *Ibis, Tr., ex P.*

p<sub>1</sub> = Par. Lat. 7647, xiii century. Contains excerpts from *Met., Fast., Her., Am., A.A.* (foll. 67<sup>b</sup>–70), *Rem.* (foll. 72–73<sup>b</sup>), *Ibis, Tr., ex P.*

p<sub>3</sub> = Par. Lat. 17903 (Notre Dame 188), xiii century. Contains excerpts from *Met., Fast., Her., Am., A.A., Rem.* (foll. 27–31),<sup>2</sup> *Ibis, Tr., ex P.*

$\phi$  = common source of ep<sub>1</sub>p<sub>3</sub>.

<sup>1</sup> See Lenz, *Eranos* liii (1955), 63–64.

<sup>2</sup> In e and p<sub>1</sub>, but not in p<sub>3</sub>, the speech of

Ulysses from *Met.* 13 intervenes between *A.A.* and *Rem.*

**p<sub>2</sub>** = Par. Lat. 15155, xiii century. Contains excerpts from *Her.*, *A.A.*, *Rem.*, *Am.* (fol. 67<sup>b</sup>-83<sup>b</sup>), *Fast.*, *Met.*, *Tr.*, *ex P.*, *Med.*, *Ibis*.

(e) *Other excerpts and fragments*

**b** = Bamberg M.V. 18, x century. Contains excerpts from *A.A.* on margins of fol. 110<sup>b</sup>-112<sup>b</sup> (see Tafel 9-11).<sup>1</sup>

**l** = Florence, Laurentianus 66, 40, ix century. Beneventan. Contains *A.A.* 1. 1-6 (fol. 1). Cf. Traube, 'Perrona Scotorum', *Sitzber. Bay. Akad.* 1900, p. 484 (= *Vorl. u. Abh.* iii. 105).

**m** = Munich Clm 29007<sup>b</sup>, xii/xiii century. Contains extensive portions of *Rem.* 319-539. Cf. F. W. Lenz, *Parerga Ovidiana*, pp. 394-404.

**o** = Oxford Bodl. Rawl. Q. d. 19 (S.C. 16044), xiii century. Contains fragments of *A.A.* 1 found in binding of Rawl. Liturg. e. 15 (S.C. 15823).<sup>2</sup>

**p<sub>6</sub>** = Par. Lat. 8069 (Thuaneus), x/xi century. Contains *A.A.* 3. 65-66, 73-74 (= *Anth. Lat.* 269 R.), *Am.* 3. 11. 35-36, excerpts from *Rem.* (fol. 1<sup>b</sup>-3).

**Exc. Put.**, **Exc. Scal.** = 'Excerpta Puteani' and 'Excerpta Scaligeri', frequently cited by Heinsius. See below, pp. 30-31.

It will be convenient to discuss the tradition of each work separately, before attempting to draw general conclusions.

*AMORES*

It may seem superfluous to go into detail here since the appearance of Munari's articles and his excellent edition. Nevertheless something may perhaps be added to what he has established.

1. *The a-group.* The age and character of PSR separate them sharply from the rest of the manuscripts. It can be shown that PS certainly and RP (hence RPS) probably have a common ancestor which, following Munari (ed., p. xvii), I call *a*:

(a) The relationship between P and R was explained with some plausibility, though no certainty, by Tafel (31, cf. Munari, ed., p. xvi). The text of R in its present state ends at 1. 2. 50; the last leaf (fol. 103), which is torn, must have continued to 1. 3. 2 (or possibly, if one allows a space of one verse for the title, to 1. 3. 1). The text of P begins at the top of the first leaf of a gathering (fol. 57) with 1. 2. 51. Coincidence may account for this, but if we bear in mind (i) that R and P were both written in France, (ii) that they both present similar errors of spelling and word-division (see below, p. 7), and (iii) that

<sup>1</sup> Some words, and probably also the complete verse 1. 662, have been lost by the cutting of the margins. As Tafel (17) does not give the order of the verses it may be worth while for me to record it here: 1. 3-4, 19, 21, 35-38, 41-42, 44-45, 49-50, 52, 57, 59, 61-62, 64/65-66, 84, 99-100, 132, 136-7, 139-40, 143-4, 146, 149-51, 159-60, 162, 221-2, 238-40/243-4, 246, 250, 269-70, 274-5, 343-5, 356, 394, 433, 442-3, 485, 503-4, 574, 578, 580, 595-6, 606, 615-16,


643, 645, 655-6, 661, <662>/663-4, 741-2, 752, 753-4, 2. 197, 199-201, 279-80, *Priapetria* 5. 3-4, 2. 341-2, 464, 463, 363-4, 390, 351, 409-10, 437/438, 459-62, 501, 505-6, 519, 535, 548, 669-70, 702, 719-20, 3. 31, 41-42.

<sup>2</sup> The leaves are bound in the wrong order: they should run 2, 1, 4, 3. The fragment contains 1. 64-89, 97-121, 129-52, 160-84 (184 covered by repair), 192, 320-41 (lacking 323), 349-71, 380-404, 412-37.

RS (+D, on which see below, pp. 9-10) agree in preserving the true reading *nos* at *epigr.* 3; then it seems not unreasonable to conjecture, as Tafel did, that R was accidentally<sup>1</sup> mutilated not long after it was written, and that P was copied, probably directly, from the lost half (R'), which contained the rest of the *Amores* and the *Heroides*.<sup>2</sup> P offends far less frequently than R in the article of erroneous word-division, as would be natural if it had been copied from R' by a reasonably intelligent scribe.

(b) With PS we are on firmer ground. Their common origin is amply demonstrated by the errors collected by Tafel (24) and Munari (ed., p. xvii)—to repeat the list here would serve no useful purpose—and by their agreement in the wording of the titles of individual elegies.<sup>3</sup>

(c) The probable relationship of PSR appears therefore in the following stemma (on  $\sigma$  see below, p. 8):



2. *The value of a.* In assessing the value of a for the editor who desires to use it to discover what Ovid wrote the following points are relevant:

(a) This branch of the tradition preserves the truth in a number of places where it has been lost in the  $\beta$ -branch (on which see below, p. 9): (i) in PS at 1. 13. 33-34 om. PS: *habent*  $\omega$ ; 1. 15. 41 *adederit* PS: *adusserit*  $\omega$ ; 2. 1. 33 *laudata* PS<sup>1</sup>: *laudate, ut laudata est, laudata est, laudataque*  $\omega$ ; 2. 13. 21 *meis faue ilithyia* PS: *faue lucina puellae*  $\omega$ : *meis lucina faueto* P<sub>c</sub>X; 2. 15. 14 *laxus* PS: *lapsus*  $\omega$ ; 2. 16. 43 *iuraras* PS: *iurabas*  $\omega$ ; 2. 19. 7 *quo* PS: *quid*  $\omega$ ; 3. 1. 57 *mittis* PS: *misit*  $\omega$ ; 3. 2. 55 *puerisque potentibus arcu* PS: *puerique potentibus armis*  $\omega$ ; 3. 6. 25 *melie*

<sup>1</sup> Fol. 103 is torn roughly across, about a quarter of the way from the bottom, in a manner that makes Tafel's theory (30) that the division was, though maladroit, intentional seem somewhat unlikely.

<sup>2</sup> This assumes that in R' the *Heroides* followed the *Amores* and that the order of the two works was at some date reversed when P was rebound (Tafel 31).

<sup>3</sup> These titles must be older than a, since some were already missing from it: (R)PS give no title at 1. 2, 1. 6, 2. 18, 2. 19, 3. 7. No doubt a was copied from a manuscript in which the titles were written in the margins (with no space left between elegies), where they might more easily become illegible or escape the copyist's notice. They can hardly be antique: some are inept (1. 5 *compositus est ad Corinam*, 2. 2 *suasorum ad se* [unless this

is misplaced, as suggested by Merkel, or a truncation of *ad se<rum>*]), and all are banal. Some of the *rec.*, notably DFHZ, exhibit certain agreements with PS in the form of the titles, but the resemblance is not close enough to guarantee their existence in the archetype (supposing that there was such a thing: cf. below, p. 26). Certainly in the earliest state of the tradition of which we have evidence the introductory Epigram was not separated from 1. 1; and if, as I believe, the suggestion of Lucian Müller was correct (see below, p. 13), 2. 9b and 3. 11b were already then merged with the poems that preceded them.

<sup>4</sup> The intermediary  $\rho$  is inserted in anticipation of the identification made below, p. 24.

PS (-*g*): *media* *ω*; 3. 7. 41 *ad tactum* PS: *ad tactus* *V<sub>a</sub>* (u.l.): *attactu* *ς*: *a tactu* *ω*. (ii) in R at 1. 2. 33 *tendens* R: *tendent* *Sw*. (iii) in P at 1. 8. 23 *here* P: *hera* *Sw*; 1. 14. 12 *derepto* P: *direpto* *Sw*: *directo* *ς*: *deiecto* *A<sub>c</sub>V<sub>a</sub>*; 1. 14. 18 *derepta* P: *direpta* *Sw*: *directa* *ς*; 2. 1. 22 *mollierunt* P: *mollieran* *pSw*; 2. 8. 19 *puri* P, Arondelianus Heinsii: *nostrī* *Sw*; 2. 10. 33 *arundo* P, unde *arando* Heinsius: *eundo* *pSw<sup>φ</sup>*; 2. 12. 11 *dissors* P: <sup>1</sup> *discors* *Sw*; 2. 16. 46 *inrita* *qua* P: *irritaque* *ut* *Sw*; 2. 19. 14 *insonti* P: *insontis* *Sw*; 2. 19. 59 *quaeris* P: <sup>2</sup> *quaeres* *pSV<sub>b</sub>* (ut uid.): *quaeras* *ω*: *quaere* *ς*; 3. 4. 24 *tot iuuenes* P, exc. Scal.: *tam multos* *Sw*; 3. 6. 51 *anien* P: *annis* *S<sup>2</sup>ω*: *autem* *S<sup>1</sup>*. These lists are by no means exhaustive and include only passages where there is no reasonable doubt of the true reading.

(b) It should be noted that S nowhere gives the truth in isolation.<sup>3</sup> P, as might be expected, is the closer and more faithful representative of *a*. S has a large number of errors peculiar to itself;<sup>4</sup> it also not infrequently agrees with *ω* or *ς* in an inferior reading. Besides the examples to be found in list (iii) in the preceding paragraph, the following may be instructive as showing that S, though stemmatically belonging to the *a*-group of manuscripts, offers a text in what might be called an intermediate state of depravation: 1. 6. 17 *ut uideas* PHW: *ut inuideas* *Sw*: *et ut uideas* *ς*; 1. 8. 107 *uiuae* *PP<sub>c</sub><sup>1</sup>* (ut uid.): *uiues* S: *uiuas* *ω*; 2. 6. 28 *fiant* P: *fient* *S<sub>5</sub>*: *funt* *ω*; 2. 7. 25 *quierat* P: *quae erat* *S<sub>5</sub>*: *quae sit* *BE<sub>a</sub>*: *quae tam* *ω*; 2. 18. 19 *aut artes* *P<sub>5</sub>*: *aut partes* *SFN<sup>2</sup>*: *ad partes* *ω*; 3. 7. 49 *quo mihi* PH: *quod mihi* S: *quid mihi* *ω*; 3. 8. 11, 12 *uita* P: *fulta* SH: *stulta* *ω*. The hand of the interpolator and glossator can be seen at work at 1. 9. 41 *natus* *ω*: *nutus* P: *nudus* *S<sub>5</sub>*; 2. 16. 7 *cereris* *P<sub>ω</sub>*: *ciceris* S; 3. 2. 13 *conspecta* *P<sub>5</sub>*: *suspecta* S: *spectata* *ς*; 21 *a dextra* *P<sub>ω</sub>*: *a latere* *S<sub>5</sub>*; also it may be noted that S is the earliest manuscript to begin a new elegy at 2. 19. 37 (adding a title *ad amicam*). It is clear that one or more intermediaries (*σ* in the stemma) intervened between *a* and S and served as a channel for contamination.

(c) Where PS agree we can be certain of the reading of *a*. Where they disagree, P is much more likely to have preserved the original reading, but it has many errors,<sup>5</sup> and the editor who proposes to rely on its unsupported testimony should ponder well (cf. on R below, p. 15). The boundary between accidental and deliberate alteration (corruption and interpolation) is not always easy to draw with certainty, but it would be unwise to assume that P is immune from the interpolation which has made much greater and more obvious headway in

<sup>1</sup> P is our sole authority for the use of this word by a classical author.

<sup>2</sup> *A<sub>c</sub>* has *quaeras*, not *-is*, as reported by Munari. I perhaps ought to say expressly that Munari's edition is extraordinarily accurate.

<sup>3</sup> Unless one counts 2. 8. 7 *num* (prius) S: *nam* *P<sub>f</sub>*: *nunc* P: *non* *ω*. Cf. 3. 4. 8 *occlusis* *SA<sub>b</sub>V<sub>b</sub>*: *exclusis* *P<sub>w<sup>φ</sup></sub>*: *inclusis* *ς*.

<sup>4</sup> Possibly its exemplar was difficult to read: at 2. 16. 5 and 2. 17. 9 words are omitted and a space left. I have given a sufficiently ample selection of S's errors in the Appendix to my edition; a scrutiny of it should make an editor reflect seriously before laying any weight on its unsupported testimony at, for example, 1. 3. 3 *petii*, 2. 12. 20 *mouit*, 3. 7. 20 *amata* (this last accepted by Munari on the recommendation of Knoche).

<sup>5</sup> Also exemplified in my Appendix. They differ from those of S in being for the most part obvious blunders. The list could be lengthened enormously if all mistakes of the type of *ad* for *at*, *iubet* for *iuet*, *iacerem* for *iacerent*, and the confusion of terminations, were included. Thus the editor should beware of taking seriously, for example, 1. 6. 65 *pruinosus* (cf. 1. 9. 17 *infestus*), 2. 14. 15 *negasset* (cf. 2. 4. 48 *ingestum*), 3. 3. 37 *metuere* (cf. Munari ad loc.), 3. 11. 7 *perferre* (cf. 1. 6. 54 *adesse*). It is perhaps unlikely, though it is by no means impossible, that a future editor will emulate Borneque and print *stellantia* from P at 1. 8. 11. *quaerenti* at 2. 11. 22 is perhaps in a different class, as a probable interpolation rather than a blunder: it is certainly not what Ovid wrote (cf. Lee, *C.R. n.s.* ii [1952], 175).

S;<sup>1</sup> indeed the numerous cases where P agrees with  $\varsigma$  in obviously inferior readings should signal caution. On the character of  $\alpha$  see below, p. 24.

3. *The  $\beta$ -group.* It will be best to defer general discussion of the whole class of *rec.* for the time being (see below, pp. 25-26). In passing it should be noted that extreme and widespread contamination must be allowed for: i.e. the different works in a manuscript containing more than one poem may be taken from more than one source (cf. on D below). As I shall emphasize later, it is *readings* with which we are primarily concerned. As regards the *rec.* of the *Amores* the following points are important:

(a) The independence of the *rec.* from  $\alpha$  is certified by their agreement in transmitting two passages omitted by PS, 1. 13. 11-14 and 2. 2. 18-22, 25-27. If these verses are genuine, the manuscripts containing them are most unlikely (to put it no more strongly) to be derived from  $\alpha$ . In *C.R. n.s.* v (1955), 13-14 I demonstrated that (i) there are no internal grounds for suspecting Ovid's authorship (except of 2. 2. 23-24); that (ii) the error *honores* for *inanes* in P at 2. 2. 31 proves that this verse, and hence presumably the whole passage, was in some ancestor of P's, probably in fact the exemplar of  $\alpha$ ; and that (iii) to explain the omission of the verses in  $\alpha$  there is no need to look beyond the obvious palaeographical causes. If this hypothesis, which I have briefly restated for convenience' sake, be accepted, then Munari's conclusion (ed., p. xix) that the independence of the *rec.* from  $\alpha$  is 'fortemente probabile' is fully borne out. In the terminology of Dr. Maas, the *rec.* must rank as presumptive variant-carriers; and in fact no editor of the *Amores*, whatever his preaching may have been, has in practice treated them as anything else (the same is true of Ovid's other works). The real purpose of this demonstration is to convince future editors that they may continue to follow this procedure without any feeling of guilt as to whether it is strictly scientific. On eclecticism in general see below, p. 27.

(b) Whether the *rec.* descend from one or more ancestors must remain uncertain. I follow Munari in assuming for convenience' sake that a single source, which after him (ed., p. xviii and n. 1) I call  $\beta$ , lies behind them. On the character of  $\beta$ 's text and the authority to be accorded to it *vis-à-vis*  $\alpha$ , see below, pp. 25, 27.

(c) No individual member of the  $\beta$  class is to be regarded as invested with authority. Nevertheless a few individuals may be singled out for remark, chiefly to underline the limitations which the nature of the tradition imposes on an editor: (i) D. This is an interesting book in itself: see above, p. 3, n. 3. Its text in the *Amores* is marked by a closer agreement with PS than any other *rec.* presents, not only in good readings, but in significant errors, particularly that already noted at 2. 2. 31, *honores* for *inanes* (= P). But its place in the tradition is impossible to decide accurately: is D a descendant of  $\alpha$  heavily contaminated from  $\beta$  (so heavily as to have reacquired the missing verses discussed above), or is it a descendant of  $\beta$  contaminated from  $\alpha$ ? The former alternative seems more likely; or one might hazard, if one wished for an elegant explanation of the presence in D of the missing verses, that it descends at several removes from a manuscript intermediary between the archetype (to concede for the moment the existence of such a thing) and  $\alpha$ , a manuscript representing a stage in the tradition *before* the verses were lost, but *after* the *inanes* > *honores* corruption had occurred. Such speculations are of purely theoretical importance: the relation-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Knoche, *Gnomon* viii (1932), 522.

ship is too tenuous and contamination too extensive to allow anything to the 'authority' of a manuscript like D (but cf. *Notes I*, p. 56, for a possible instance). (ii) Z. Presents interesting agreements with S: 1. 14. 3 *quid enim* (*est add. S*); 2. 19. 11, 13 *o*; 3. 2. 14 *ruent*; 3. 6. 62 *omnes*; 101 *uel*. Whether its testimony should be therefore allowed to weigh even fractionally heavier in any given case may be doubted; but cf. *Notes I*, p. 66.<sup>1</sup> (iii) p. Munari (p. 116) distinguishes between P<sup>2</sup> (the diorthotes, ix/x century) and P<sup>3</sup> (x/xi century). It is often extremely difficult, if not actually impossible, to be certain about this distinction: I should myself say that all the important variants (i.e. not mere corrections of obvious errors) are by what Munari calls P<sup>3</sup>, and that even a good many mere corrections may be by P<sup>3</sup> rather than P<sup>2</sup>. To simplify the apparatus criticus I have therefore used the one symbol p to represent both Munari's P<sup>3</sup> and (where the correction might well be by either hand) P<sup>2</sup>. It is not often that p has preserved the truth in isolation, perhaps indeed only once, at 2. 9. 51 *rogantem* p: *cupido* PS<sub>ω</sub>;<sup>2</sup> but its readings deserve citation as perhaps the earliest member of the class of *rec. Munari's P<sup>4</sup>*, which I have called P<sup>3</sup> in my apparatus, the hand that supplies the verses omitted by a, is easily distinguished. It is remarkable in that at 1. 13. 12 and 14 it presents a text that is decisively superior to that of *ω* (*nescius errat*: *nescit an errat*; *et miles saeuas*: *miles et armiferas*), though it also inserts the missing verses after v. 18 (cf. the order in N, 1-8, 11-12, 9-10, 15-18, 13-14), an arrangement which seems a good deal less plausible than the vulgate (cf. especially the consequent separation of *atque eadem* in 19 from *tu* in 17). (iv) We may reasonably discuss here, since their source is quite uncertain, the glosses and variants written in rustic capitals in the margin of P. Of these 1. 8. 64 *NOMEN* (also offered in text by *s*) is simply due to a reminiscence of A.A. 1. 740; 1. 15. 12 *SEGES* (similarly offered in text by *s*) is a gloss on *ceres*. At 1. 8. 100 *NEMO*, written in fact opposite v. 101, is rightly printed by editors. A doubtful case is 1. 8. 16, where I suspect that *MICAT* is a gloss on *fulminat*: *uenit* of P<sub>ω</sub> may be dull, but is a perfectly proper word for the context, as shown by Heinsius' citation of *Met. 8. 289 fulmen ab ore uenit*. At 3. 7. 79 editors accept *LANIS* from the margin (it is also in X, for what that is worth) against the *ramis* of the rest of the tradition with more alacrity than they explain it. (It may be added in passing that there are similar addenda in the margin of R, but there they lack critical interest, being no more than repetitions of a word in the text; for this habit see C. H. Beeson, *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*, pp. 32-34.)

4. *Editorial choice*. Most of what is to be said on this head will be found below, pp. 27-28, where the tradition is discussed as a whole. As regards the particular problems of the *Amores*, the following selection of passages from Book 1 will perhaps suffice to show the situation. I adduce only those where there is no reasonable doubt as to the true reading: they demonstrate both the high incidence of contamination in the tradition and in particular the way in which

<sup>1</sup> Apropos of 3. 12. 15, where it gives, correctly in my opinion, *thebae*. But cf. W. M. Lindsay, *An Introduction to Latin Textual Emendation*, pp. 68-69; also Housman, *J.P. xxxiii* (1913), 59: 'When it is a question between *e* and *ae*, not even the best and oldest of Latin MSS are competent witnesses.'

<sup>2</sup> This seems certain: *cupido* repeated so soon after 47 is pointless and inelegant; it probably stems from an untimely reminiscence of 1. 6. 11 *risit, ut audirem, tenera cum matre Cupido*. *rogantem* may be due to conjecture, for an object is wanted after *exaudis*, and *pre-cantem* or *rogantem* are obvious possibilities; the hyperbaton is characteristic of Ovid.

the *rec.* are not infrequently divided among themselves (on the possible origin of the 'variants' see below, p. 26).

(a) For passages where the truth is transmitted by PS or P alone, see above, pp. 7-8. On errors in *a* see below, p. 25.

(b) The truth survives in PS<sub>5</sub>: 1. 3. 15 *desultor* PSB<sup>1</sup>D: *desertor* *w*: *delusor*, *simulator*, *seductor* *s*; 1. 4. 59 *paucas* . . . *horas* PS<sub>5</sub>: *paucis* . . . *horis* *w*; 1. 5. 13 *deripui* PS<sub>5</sub>: *diripui* *w*; 1. 8. 86 *in lusus* PS (in marg. m<sup>1</sup>) *s*: *illusus* S: *illusus* *w*; 1. 8. 89 *multos* PS<sub>5</sub>: *multi* *s*; 1. 9. 6 *uiro* PS<sub>5</sub>: *toro* *s*; 1. 10. 1 *europa* PS<sub>5</sub>: *europa* *w*; 1. 10. 28 *placitam* PS<sub>5</sub>: *placidam* *w*; 1. 12. 24 *cognitor* PS<sub>5</sub>: *creditor* *s*; 1. 13. 42 *num* PSD: *non* *w*; 1. 14. 3 *spatiosius* PSDX: *speciosius* *w*.

(c) The truth survives in PS: 1. 3. 20 *causa* . . . *sua* PS: *causae* . . . *suae* S<sub>5</sub>; 1. 3. 21 *habent* PS: *habet* Sw; 1. 3. 24 *uara* PHN: *falsa* Sw; 1. 4. 1 *nobis* PP<sub>b</sub>Q: *nobiscum* Sw; 1. 6. 20 *tremente* PS: *tremenda* Sw; 1. 9. 45 *agilem* PS: *wigilem* Sw; 1. 9. 46 *nolit* PD: *nolit* Sw: *non uult* *s*; 1. 10. 1 *auecta* PS: *aduecta* *w*: *deuecta* S; 1. 10. 60 *fit* P (ut uid.) *s*: *sit* Sw.

(d) The truth survives in Sw/*s*: 1. 4. 61 *abortis* S<sub>5</sub>: *abortis* PS; 1. 6. 25 *umquam* PSw: *numquam* PS; 1. 15. 19 *accius* Sw: *actius* PS.

(e) The truth survives in *w*: 1. 4. 68 *at* *w*: *aut* PS<sub>5</sub>; 1. 13. 43 *quot* *w*: *quod* PS<sub>5</sub>: *quos* *s*. (I have not included any of the numerous cases where PS agree in manifest error against *w*; for the errors of *a* see below, p. 25.)

(f) The truth survives in *s*: 1. 9. 14 *uerrendis* *s*: *uertendis* PSw; 1. 10. 21 *cuius* *s*: *quouis* PSw; 1. 10. 27 *equum* . . . *taurum* *s*: *equo* . . . *tauro* PSw;<sup>1</sup> 1. 10. 49 *pepigisse* *s*: *tetigisse* PSw; 1. 15. 21 *nesciet* ps: *nesciat* PSw. On the general problem presented by the survival of tradition in *s*, see below, pp. 27-28.

The foregoing lists by no means exhaust the possible and actual combinations which confront the editor, but they contain enough to show that once the evidence of the *rec.* is taken into account—and if the arguments advanced above, p. 9, are sound their testimony is indispensable—it becomes impossible to form a clear-cut picture of the tradition. The groupings of the *rec.* among themselves are completely random and impose some such system of group-sigla as that adopted here (on this see further below, p. 25).

### AMORES 3. 5 (Somnium)

As a pendant to the *Amores* we must consider the case of this interesting poem. For a valuable discussion see Munari 143-50.<sup>2</sup> Editors have been excessively timid in their treatment of the *Somnium*, whose claim to figure in editions of the *Amores* is tenuous—though the time for actual expulsion has, I fear, passed.

<sup>1</sup> I once proposed, but have never ventured to print, a conjecture which if accepted would eliminate this example. Is it possible that *equo* . . . *tauro* is a corruption which conceals the truth and that Ovid wrote *non equa munus equo, non a boue uacca poposcit*? For the antithesis *bos-uacca* cf. *Fast.* 4. 826 *alba iugum niueo cum boue uaccae tulit, Met.* 9. 740-1 *imagine uaccae / passa bouem est;* for *posco + a*, cf. *Am.* 1. 10. 53, *A.A.* 3. 25, *Rem.* 289; and for the *árdō kouovō* position of the preposition cf. *Am.* 2. 19. 31-32, *A.A.* 1. 333, 723-4, 763, *Her.* 6. 107-8 (reading *Tanai*) and cf. *Notes I*, p. 55; *II*, p. 254. But

to postulate the ousting of *a boue* by a gloss *tauro* perhaps strains credulity, and I do not press the suggestion.

<sup>2</sup> Munari sets forth the position admirably, but declines to pronounce the *Somnium* indubitably spurious. Once it is recognized that it was not written by Ovid—and I do not see how the attribution can be maintained—Munari's anxious questionings (149-50) are seen to be unnecessary: the *Somnium* was never 'separated' from the *Amores* because it never belonged to them in the first place (Munari notices this solution as a possibility, 150, n. 1).

(a) It is transmitted by our manuscripts<sup>1</sup> as follows:

(i) After 3. 4, where editors have printed it since Heinsius (who seems to have had no doubts of its authenticity<sup>2</sup>): PSO<sub>b</sub>TXZ.

(ii) After 2. 5: D.<sup>3</sup>

(iii) After 3. 8: V<sub>b</sub>.

(iv) After 3. 13: A<sub>c</sub>.

(v) With *Amores* but not in the body of the text: E<sub>a</sub>FNP<sub>c</sub>QV<sub>a</sub> (cf. n. 3, below).

(vi) Separately: B<sub>b</sub>B<sub>d</sub>P<sub>q</sub>UX<sub>b</sub>X<sub>c</sub>.

(vii) Omitted by manuscripts of *Amores*: A<sub>b</sub>BHP<sub>b</sub>P<sub>f</sub>P<sub>h</sub> (and by  $\phi$ , for what this is worth).

It follows from this that the *Somnium* was not in the 'archetype', but gained entry into the tradition at some subsequent date.

(b) On internal grounds it seems to me extremely unlikely (to put it no more strongly) that the *Somnium* is the work of Ovid: (i) The content, tone, and style are un-Ovidian and accord ill with the collection as a whole.<sup>4</sup> Gloom and mystery (31 *quicunque es*) pervade the poem; and the plunge *in medias res*, which leaves the reader uncertain of the situation until the poem is two-thirds over (v. 31), is very different from the technique of, for example, 3. 2, also a dramatic monologue.<sup>5</sup> Nor does the abrupt dénouement strike me as being in Ovid's manner. (ii) The language and style present specifically un-Ovidian features: *Repetitions*. That at 7-8 might pass as Ovidian; those at 27-28 and 31-33, it seems to me, will not; and *three* such repetitions in a poem of 46 verses are not to be paralleled in Ovid. *Hyperbata*. Ovid's predilection for this figure is notorious,<sup>6</sup> but the rest of his works afford few parallels for the violence of the hyperbata at vv. 14 and 18,<sup>7</sup> and none—which is more important—for such a recurrence in a space of five lines. *Miscellaneous*. 1 *somnus lassos submisit ocellos*: the omission of *mihi* or *nobis*, the use of *submittere* of lowering the eyes of another person, and the diminutive are all odd; 18 *pasto* used passively of the food eaten seems not to be paralleled except by *Hal.* 119 *epastas* (but there are of course those who believe that Ovid wrote the *Halieutica*); 35 *mobilibus foliis* looks like an inept adaptation of Hor. *C.* 1. 23. 5—the translators

<sup>1</sup> For manuscripts not on my list see Munari 147-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Pace* R. Ellis, *The Amores of Ovid*, p. 7. I cannot guess the source of his statement that the elegy 'was thought spurious by Heinsius'. Cf. Munari 144: 'Nessuna traccia di dubbi in N. Heinsius.'

<sup>3</sup> In V<sub>a</sub> the *Somnium* stands after 3. 15; it was not in V<sub>a</sub>'s exemplar, but the copyist evidently took it from a manuscript in which it stood after 2. 5, as in D (Munari 148, n. 3).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Munari 145-6. It might be argued that 3. 13 is just as unlike any other poem in the *Amores*, indeed much more unlike; and it is true that this attractive piece (on which cf. Lenz, *Stud. it. di fil. class.* x [1933], 312-13; *Fabula* i [1958], 255-62) reads more like a foretaste of the *Fasti* than anything else, but it could have been written by nobody but Ovid. What is really odd about it is the

mention of his wife, as remarked by H. Fränkel, *Ovid*, p. 235, n. 25.

<sup>5</sup> Lenz, *Bursian* 226 (1930), 112-13, produces parallels from the *Fasti* for the beginning *in medias res*. But the narrative technique of a long poem (continuous, though not an *ἀπάρτια διηγέρεις*) is different from that of a short self-contained elegy. Munari (145) shows himself too tolerant of Lenz's contention.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Housman, *J.P.* xviii (1890), 7; *C.R.* xi (1897), 428; Postgate, *C.R.* xxx (1916), 142 ff.; Platnauer, *Latin Elegiac Verse*, pp. 105-8.

<sup>7</sup> The closest are perhaps *A.A.* i. 399-400 *tempora qui solis operosa colentibus arua, / fallitur, et nautis adspicienda putat, Her.* 3. 19 *si progressa forem, caperet ne, nocte, timebam, 10. 110 illuc, qui silices, Thesea, uincat, habes.*

usually render 'under', which is dishonest;<sup>1</sup> *40 ingenium mouere* in the language of Ovid means 'inspire' (*Am.* 3. 12. 16, *A.A.* 2. 43, *Tr.* 4. 10. 59), not 'corrupt'.

(c) The *Somnium* is, in its way, an effective poem, and the work of an accomplished poet, possibly an *Ovidianus poeta* of the Silver Age. If so, he was a less exact imitator of Ovid's manner than the author of the *Nux*.<sup>2</sup> The date of composition has of course no necessary connexion with the date of entry into the canon: compare 3. 11. 35-36, rightly condemned by Heinsius, a distich which must have been composed before A.D. 79, since v. 35 is inscribed on a wall at Pompeii, together with a verse modelled on Prop. 1. 1. 5 (*C.I.L.* iv. 1520 = *C.L.E.* 354).<sup>3</sup> No doubt the *Somnium* led a detached existence in miscellany manuscripts such as π for a long time before it was included with other pseudo-Ovidiana in manuscripts of the *Amores* and finally interpolated into the canon at various places and times which must remain uncertain (cf. Munari 146).<sup>4</sup>

(d) It has long been thought by many that 2. 9 and 3. 11 (as they are transmitted in the manuscripts) each form two separate poems. I do not propose to recapitulate here the arguments of Lucian Müller (*Philol.* xi [1856], 89-91) or his successors, merely to say that I find them cogent. If they are accepted, together with the expulsion of the *Somnium* from the corpus, the interesting formal consequence follows that the three-book edition of the *Amores* originally contained in its three books 15, 20, and 15 poems respectively. This will come as no novelty to students of the article of W. Port in *Philol.* lxxxi (1926), 450-6; but it is well worth restating.

#### ARS AMATORIA

The facts here are less well known than for the *Amores*, since Tafel's dissertation, though meritorious, dealt only with one branch of the tradition, and his work was never followed up.<sup>5</sup> For this reason, and since his work is nowadays difficult to come by, I discuss the affiliations of the manuscripts at somewhat greater length and adduce more detailed evidence than I have done for the *Amores*.

1. *The a'-group.* ROS<sub>a</sub> and the fragmentary b form a group analogous to PSR in *Am.* They are derived from a common ancestor, which for the moment (see below, p. 24) I shall call a':

(a) They exhibit certain common errors, of which I give a selection only: (i) ROS<sub>a</sub> 1. 9 *oui*, 69 *sui*, 80 *referta*, 101 *primos*,<sup>6</sup> 141 *nec bene*, 155 *officio*. (ii) ROb

<sup>1</sup> Compare 6 *lene sonantis aquae*, a tag borrowed from the *Fasti* (where it occurs twice) and quite unsuitable in its new context.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. G. Lee, *Ovidiana*, pp. 468-9.

<sup>3</sup> For a separate appearance of the couplet in miscellany manuscripts (including p<sub>a</sub>) see Bachrens, *P.L.M.* iv. 17.

<sup>4</sup> Some miscellanies combined genuine extracts from Ovid together with pseudo-Ovidiana: e.g. B<sub>b</sub> has *Am.* 2. 15 (*Anulus*) along with *A.A.*, *Pulex*, *De Medicamine Aurium*, *Cuculus*. The *Somnium* is first attributed to Ovid by Servius auctus ad *Buc.* 6. 54, but this does not necessarily imply, as Ellis


thought (*The Amores of Ovid*, p. 7), that the poem was cited from a copy of the *Amores*. The sequence was probably (1) juxtaposition with Ovidiana and pseudo-Ovidiana, (2) attribution to Ovid, (3) incorporation into the canon. Our *Somnium* is not to be confused with the medieval poem of the same name discussed by P. Lehmann, *Pseudoantike Literatur des Mittelalters*, pp. 63-65.

<sup>5</sup> Borneque did not use S<sub>a</sub> for his edition of the *Ar. Vollmer*'s 'Kritischer Apparat zu Ovids Remedia' (*Hermes* lii [1917], 453-69) was based on the work of Tafel, who was killed in the First World War.

<sup>6</sup> Absurdly accepted by Ehwald into his

1. 240 *color*, 269 *forme*.<sup>1</sup> (iii) RO 1. 32 *medio*, 153 *dimissa*, 277 *conuenient*, 301 *et comes* . . . *nec iurta*, 307 *credita mens*, 316 *est ulta*, 330 *abisset* R: *abisset* O, 357 *quod*, 367 *pectentem*, 373 *properet*, 466-71 om. (see below, p. 17), 487 *sibillator* *eresupina* R: *sibi bellatore sopina* O, 491 *illis*, 505 *torqueare*, 559 *post curru* add. *desilit*, 628 *opus*, 639 *illis*, 649 *busiren* R: *bussiren* O, 653 *pericli*, 657 *fallent*, 739 *adnōeām*, 763 *piscis*. (iv) RS<sub>a</sub> 1. 10 *artegi* R: *arte regi* S<sub>a</sub>, 31 *tenuis*, 77 *nemphitica*, 129 *aeque*, 189 *pueris*, 222 *refert*. (v) Rb 1. 59 *quod*, 742 *credit*. (vi) OS<sub>a</sub> 1. 218 *-que* om. (add. O<sup>2</sup>).

(b) This gives us, with Tafel (21), the following stemma:



The situation is thus slightly more complicated than for the *Amores* (see above, p. 7), where the reading of *a* is given by the consensus of PS. In the *Ars* the text of *a'* can be established with certainty (i) where RO S<sub>a</sub>(b) agree, (ii) where RO agree against S<sub>a</sub> or OS<sub>a</sub> against R or Ob against RS<sub>a</sub>. In practice, since S<sub>a</sub> only contains the first 230 verses of Book 1, the editor generally has to rely on the agreement of RO(b) for the reading of *a'*; for the numerous cases where R and O differ, see below, p. 15.

2. *The value of a'*. The following considerations are relevant in assessing the value of *a'*:

(a) Like *a* in the *Amores*, the *a'*-branch of the tradition preserves the truth in isolation in a number of places: (i) in RO S<sub>a</sub> at 1. 60 *in . . . constituit* RO S<sub>a</sub>: *et . . . constat in rAw*; 83 *amori* RO S<sub>a</sub>: *amore rAs*: *amoris 5*; 170 *muneris* RO S<sub>a</sub>: *uulneris Aw*. (ii) in RO at 1. 27 *cliusque* RO: *cliosque rSaAw*; 264 *thalea* RO (cf. Seru. ad Buc. 6. 2): *thalia rAw*; 285 *qua* RO: *quo Aw*: *ut Q*; 331 *a-b* om. RO O<sub>g</sub> (on O<sub>g</sub> see below, pp. 17-18); 338 *rabidi* RO: *rapidi Aw*: *pauidi P\_bW<sup>1</sup>*, edd. (cf. Notes II, p. 248); 395-6 om. RO; 454 *ne* RO: *si Aw*; 710 *comiter* RO: *molliter* rAw; 762 *erit* RO: *erat Aw*; 766 *cerua* RO (u.l.): *curua rOAw*. (iii) in R at 1. 303 *quod* R, unde *quo* Heinsius: *quid OAw*; 370 *poteras* R: *poteris OAw*; 562 *in facili* R: *ut facili O<sub>g</sub>*: *en facile OP<sub>a</sub>*<sup>1</sup>: *ut facile Aw* (an interesting example); 650 *adfuso* R: *affuso O<sub>g</sub>*: *effuso OAw* (also interesting). (iv) in O at 1. 328 *carere* O: *placere RAwep<sub>1</sub>* (see below, para. (c)). As for the *Amores* I have included only passages where the true reading is reasonably certain; and examples are taken only from Book 1 (see below, para. (c)).

text. Romulus was a *πρώτος εὐπέρηψ*, and *primus* is the *mot juste* for him: cf. *Am.* 1. 7. 31-32, 2. 3. 3, 2. 11. 1-2, 2. 14. 5-6, 3. 10. 11-14; for the idea in general see Leo, *Plaut. Forstch.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 151 ff., and for this passage in particular R. Bürger, *De Ovidi carminum amatoriorum inventione et arte* (diss. Wolfenbüttel, 1901), pp. 48-50.

<sup>1</sup> A reminiscence of a common Ovidian phrase (*fiducia formae* at *A.A.* 1. 707 and five times in *Met.*). Housman's *ferme* was uncharacteristic (from an avowed enemy of palaeographical conjecture) and unhappy: the word does not occur in the poets between Lucretius and Juvenal (Axelson, *Unpoetische Wörter*, pp. 136-7).

(b) It is regrettable that so little survives of *S<sub>a</sub>*. At 1. 211 (*relinquies OS<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>*: *relinquis RAω*) its testimony is decisive in showing that *a'* had *relinquies*, which should therefore be preferred (in spite of Mart. 10. 10. 3 *hic ego quid faciam? quid nobis, Paule, relinquis?*, which may be a reminiscence). Its pretensions to sincerity, however, cannot but suffer when one contemplates the version which it offers of 1. 126 *et patuit multis tunc timor ipse dei*.

(c) It is of some importance to decide the respective merits of *RO* as accurate representatives of *a'* and repositories of the truth, since in Books 2 and 3 this branch of the tradition is represented solely by *R*, though its testimony can to some extent be controlled by *A* and *O<sub>g</sub>*, which are discussed below, pp. 16-18. It seems to me that their merits are in fact pretty evenly balanced. Errors of word-division are much more frequent in *R* than in *O*, which seems to imply that *R*'s exemplar (*ρ'* in stemma) was copied more mechanically than that of *O* (*η* in stemma).<sup>1</sup> Editors have been inclined in Book 1 to favour *R* rather than *O*, possibly because they have been unconsciously influenced by its undoubted pre-eminence in Books 2 and 3, which of course has nothing to do with the matter. The balance seems to be shifted, if anything, slightly in favour of *O* by the consideration of two passages, (i) 1. 328, already mentioned in para. (a) above, where *O* is alone in presenting the true reading *carere*, and *R* agrees with *Aω* in the interpolated *placere* (I have argued the matter fully in *Notes II*, pp. 247-8); and (ii) 1. 684 *duas O (u.l.) P<sub>f</sub>: uenus ROAω*: the superiority of *duas* is patent, and has been challenged by no editor since Heinsius, who placed it in the text. It is true that *O* has eccentricities in plenty, but they are for the most part mere blunders, though sometimes of that class which verges on interpolation.<sup>2</sup> Editors have tended to ignore the equally great propensity to absurd error shown by *R*, and surprising editorial choices have been made in consequence.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There is a small clue, partially obscured by Ellis in his collation of *O* and overlooked by Tafel, to the provenance of *η*. At 1. 267 *ubiq* for *ubique*, 655 *uterg . . . neg* for *uterg . . . neque* point to a confusion of the Continental symbol for *qu(a)e* (*q*) with the Insular symbol for *quod* (*q*). Cf. W. M. Lindsay, *Notae Latinae*, pp. 228 ('This . . . ancient Nota [*q*] . . . is characteristic of the earlier minuscule of all parts of the Continent, except Spain'), 254.

<sup>2</sup> Examples in the Appendix to my edition. At 1. 448 it is interesting to note that Tanaquil Faber might have claimed manuscript authority for his emendation of *praeteritum* to *nam pretium* (see *Tanaquilli Fabri Epistolae* [Saumur, 1659], Ep. liii [not lii, as reported by Burman], p. 179; the correction was seriously debated, more seriously than Faber's merits dictated—cf. Heinsius' famous note on *A.A.* 2. 660; D. Bourchenin, *De Tanaquilli Fabri Vita et Scriptis* [diss. Paris, 1885], p. 110). *O* has *pretium* for *praeteritum*, obviously through simple error. Tafel (16) refers *O*'s *deo* at 1. 76 (+*Pa*) and 416 to 'Interpolation eines christlichen Abschreibers'.

<sup>3</sup> C. Marchesi in his edition of the *Ars* (Corp. Parav. 1918) plumed himself (p. ix)

on restoring *feras* on the authority of *R* at 1. 199. Similarly editors have at various times preferred 2. 87 *dispexit*, 3. 150 *hyblae* (cf. Clausen ad Pers. 1. 131), 261 *mendo* (cf. *Notes II*, p. 257); and the supposed authority of *R* has maintained in the text a manifestly false reading at 1. 147, which on inspection turns out to be the work of *r*: see *C.R. n.s.* iii (1953), 7-10. A selection of *R*'s errors in the Appendix to my edition; it would be possible to add innumerable instances of omission of letters and syllables, and confusions of *d* and *t*, *u* and *b*, and the like. In the face of these propensities one appeals to the authority of *R* with diffidence: e.g. at 3. 170 *rubes* (also in *AN*) may very well be due to *colores* in the following verse, as Mr. A. G. Lee points out to me; the apostrophe seems singularly pointless and is not necessitated, as often, by the metre. A more important case at 3. 343 *deue tribus A<sub>5</sub>*: *deue tribus s*: *deue cerem R*: *deie cerem r*. How is it possible to assert confidently, as was done by, for example, Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.* ii\*, 211, that the reading of *R* conceals the truth and that *de(q)ue tribus* must be interpolated? The vulgate reading may be inconvenient to literary historians striving

The remarks already made about interpolation in PS (see above, pp. 8-9) apply with equal force to RO.

3. *The position and value of A.* This manuscript occupies an intermediate position between *a'* and the *rec.* It was first brought into notice by Boutermy (loc. citt. above, p. 3),<sup>1</sup> and has never yet been used by an editor of the *Ars.*

(a) It exhibits the following errors with members of the *a'*-branch: (i) ROA 1. 438 *erat RA* (ut uid., corr. a) L<sup>1</sup>: *erit OB.* (ii) RA 1. 326 *partus, 731 arion* (+Schol. Haun. = a commentary in Copenhagen Royal Library S. 2015 4<sup>to</sup>, xi/xii century), 2. 72 *bine, 107 sed, 227 epula* (+O<sub>g</sub>), 327 *uoces RF<sup>2</sup>* (u. l.): *uoce A: uoc\* O<sub>a</sub>, 644 ingenuo, 3. 58 uita.* (iii) OA 1. 341 *plena, 633 periura.* (iv) AO<sub>g</sub> 2. 537 *uirtus] uincunt.*

(b) It not infrequently forms one of a small minority supporting the *a'*-group against the bulk of the *rec.*: N.B. in particular 1. 153 *terra ROS<sub>a</sub>AF O<sub>g</sub>: terrae ω;* 160 *puluinum ROS<sub>a</sub>Ab (-illum) L<sup>1</sup>: puluinar ω; 328 et quantum ROAU: o quantum* *ς: a quantum ς; 428 ne . . . iuuet RO (-bet) AU (-uat) O<sub>g</sub>P<sub>o</sub>: nec . . . iuuet as:* *nec iuuat ω; 608 forsque RO (-ue) AL: sorsque ω: de ς incert.*

(c) It sometimes preserves the truth alone or with a very few others: 1. 268 *adeste AO<sub>a</sub>P<sub>o</sub>: adesse RO: adesto aw; 522 laedat A* (ut uid.) *ς: laedant ROaw;* 619 *nunc sit As: non sit ROL<sup>2</sup>* (u.l.): *fas sit ς: fas est ω: possit r; 686 graiaque* A an a incert., *ς: grataque ROω; 3. 335 uarroni AF<sup>1</sup>* (ut uid.): *uarronis Raw; 573* *faena AP<sub>a</sub>P<sub>o</sub>: frena RO<sub>g</sub>: ligna ς: taeda ς; 617 uoluntas A (-utas) ς: uoluptas* Raw.

(d) The second hand of A (a) seems to be contemporary with the first,<sup>2</sup> and the readings which it offers entitle it to rank as equal in authority. Examples are: 1. 21 *cedet OaA<sub>a</sub>D: cedit RS<sub>a</sub>Abω* (editors have usually preferred *cedit*, but *cedet* may quite well have been the reading of *a'*, and is clearly called for by the sense); 725 *qui as: quia RAs: quam O; 2. 209 suis Ras: tuis Aw; 414 infitianda* Ras: *inficienda Aw; 425 deuenteris Ras: diuenteris Aw; 601 profanis Ras: profanus* Aw; 627 *puellas aL: puella B<sub>b</sub>U: puella est RAω* (on the readings to be adopted here see *Notes I*, p. 65, n. 3); 3. 228 *quid RaP<sub>o</sub>: quae Aw: qui, dum, cum ς . . . prodis aF<sup>2</sup>* (u.l.) P<sub>o</sub>: *cogis RAω: fingis B; 401 nusquam RaF<sup>2</sup>* (u.l.): *numquam Aw; 497 scribenti as: scribentis RAω; 637 fuget aO<sub>a</sub>P<sub>b</sub>: fugat Aw: fugit RO<sub>g</sub>.*

(e) A sometimes offers readings peculiar to itself which have a relish of interpolation about them: 1. 292 *tabes (+F<sup>1</sup>, ut uid.), 407 tapetis (+O<sub>a</sub>), 2. 13* *nec/non minor est] nam maior, 215 nil, 355 torrebat, 3. 667 corpore.* At 2. 32 the unmetrical *regressus* of a (+ Itali) has had a long and successful career in the text (cf. *Notes II*, p. 254).

to establish the chronology of Ovid's early work, but an editor cannot help that. I do not positively assert that the scribe of R wrote *cerem* for *tribus*, but it cannot be proved that he did not and in view of his other errors it cannot be called unlikely. 'Die Wahrheit hat Regel und Einheit, Irrthum und Zufall dagegen sind regellos und können daher nicht stets bis auf ihren Ursprung verfolgt werden' (A. Boeckh, *Encyklopädie u. Methodologie d. philol. Wissenschaften* [1886], p. 194).

<sup>1</sup> His article may be consulted with advantage for a description of the manuscript, but

his observations on the text, in view of the inadequacies of the editions on which he had to depend, are worthless.

<sup>2</sup> As seems to be demonstrated by the fact that the rubrication includes the scholia, which are also by a. It is difficult to be sure whether A and a are identical; they are certainly very similar. a, like A, several times agrees with R in error: 2. 690 *atque (+O<sub>g</sub>), 3. 288 cum risu usa est (+P<sub>a</sub>), 398 ueste (+B<sub>b</sub>O<sub>g</sub>).* It looks as if A and a stem from the same exemplar and the choice between text and variant was governed by the whim of the copyist: cf. on P<sub>b</sub>\* below, p. 18.

(f) The errors listed in para. (a) above are not sufficiently numerous or striking to justify us in postulating for A anything but a descent at some few removes from  $\alpha'$ ; also its own errors and interpolations, and its frequent agreement in error with the *rec.*, forbid us to claim an authority comparable to that of R or O. Nevertheless its testimony, used with all due caution, may be valuable (i) as a pointer in Books 2 and 3 to the reading of  $\alpha'$  (especially if RAO<sub>g</sub> agree: see below), and (ii) in its own right as a possible quasi-independent source of truth.

4. *The  $\beta'$ -group.* For general considerations cf. p. 9 above. As to the *Ar.* in particular:

(a) As in the *Amores*,  $\alpha'$  omitted certain verses which the *rec.* transmit; if those verses are Ovid's, it is unlikely that the *rec.* derive from  $\alpha'$ . The case is in fact simpler than in the *Amores*, since no critic has ever doubted the authenticity of *A.A.* 1. 466-71, omitted by RO,<sup>1</sup> nor does there seem to be any conceivable reason for doubting it.

(b) For the sake of convenience I make the same assumption as for *Am.*, namely that the *rec.* descend from a single ancestor  $\beta'$ . On the place of  $\beta'$  in the tradition and the character of its text, see below, pp. 25-26.

(c) The remarks previously made about the value of individual *rec.* apply with equal force in the *Ar.* The following are nevertheless remarkable for various reasons: (i) O<sub>g</sub>. This is a notable instance of a very late manuscript retaining traces of an affinity with  $\alpha'$ .<sup>2</sup> Errors: 1. 455 *peroretur* RO<sub>g</sub>: *perhoronetur* O; 746 *tindare* ROO<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>; 2. 227 *epula* RAO<sub>g</sub>; 690 *alque* RaO<sub>g</sub>; 3. 398 *ueste* RaB<sub>b</sub>O<sub>g</sub>; 573 *frena* RO<sub>g</sub>; 637 *fugit* RO<sub>g</sub>; 649 *mala* RO<sub>g</sub>; 751 *incende* RO<sub>g</sub>; 752 *ueniens* RO<sub>a</sub>Q; 758 *cupies* RO<sub>a</sub>P<sub>1</sub>; 771 *sint* RO<sub>g</sub> (but cf. *Notes* II, p. 258); 794 *iubet* RO<sub>g</sub>; 809 *iussus* RO<sub>g</sub>. Correct readings: 1. 2 *hoc* ROS<sub>a</sub>aHO<sub>g</sub>: *me* Aw; 153 *terra* ROS<sub>a</sub>AFO<sub>g</sub>: *terrae*  $\omega$ ; 191 *annisque* ROS<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>U: *animisque* Aw $\phi$ ,<sup>3</sup> 211 *relinques* OS<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>: *relinquis* RAw (cf. above, p. 15); 331a-b om. ROO<sub>g</sub>; 497 *speciosa* ROLO<sub>g</sub>: *spatiosa* Aw; 562 *in facili* R: *ut facili* O<sub>g</sub>: *en facile* OP<sub>a</sub><sup>1</sup>: *ut facile* Aw; 650 *adfuso* R: *affuso* O<sub>g</sub>: *effuso* OA<sub>w</sub>; 2. 119 *formae* RB<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) O<sub>g</sub>, exc. Scal.: *formam* Aw $\phi$ ; 183 *numidasque* RA (ut uid.) DO<sub>g</sub> $\phi$ , exc. Put. et Scal.: *numidosque* a<sub>5</sub>: *tumidosque*  $\omega$ ; 306 *quod* RAO<sub>g</sub>U: *cum*  $\omega$ ; 374 *rabidos* RFO<sub>g</sub>: *rapidos* Aw $\phi$ ; 415 *quae* RO<sub>g</sub>: *qui* Aw; 735 *podalirius* RAP<sub>o</sub><sup>2</sup> (ut uid.): *podalarius* O<sub>g</sub>: *polidarius*  $\omega$ ; 3. 33 *Phasida* iam Itali: *phasidam* O<sub>g</sub>: *phasideam* RA<sub>w</sub>: *phasiadam* (uel -em) 5; 101 *ordior* RO<sub>g</sub>:

<sup>1</sup> For no apparent reason: cf. the omission by R of *Rem.* 9-10 and by P of *Her.* 9. 63-64, 147-52. When such things can happen, it is difficult to see why such a coil should be made about the omission in  $\alpha$  of *Am.* 1. 13. 11-14 and 2. 2. 18-27 (see above, p. 9), textbook cases of homeoteleuton and homeoarchon respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the even more remarkable case of Wolfenbüttel Gudianus 297 in the *Heroides* (Dörrie 179-84).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. A. Ker, *Ovidiana*, p. 224. For the expression compare 197 *genitor patriaeque tunisque*; for the flattery Tac. *Ann.* 13. 6 *imperatori quantum ad robur deesse, cum octavo decimo aetatis anno Cn. Pompeius, nono decimo*

*Caesar Octavianus civilia bella sustinuerint?*; and for the syllepsis in *auspicis annisque*—almost Ovid's favourite figure—Fränkel, *Ovid*, p. 197, n. 10; A. J. Bell, *The Latin Dual and Poetic Diction*, pp. 304 ff.; Korn-Ehwald ad *Met.* 9. 135. The confusion *annus/animus* is common: e.g. *A.A.* 2. 669, *Rem.* 392 (Tafel 40-41). At *Am.* 2. 6. 8 I believe that Ovid wrote *explata est annis ista querela suis* = 'that complaint of yours is satisfied by its years', i.e. by the long passage of time, a sentiment that he repeats and varies at v. 10 *magna sed antiqua est causa doloris Itys*. At *Am.* 1. 9. 5 Rautenberg's *animos* (transmitted by BV<sub>b</sub>) is not to be dismissed out of hand, though it is safer to keep *annos*.

ordiar A<sub>ω</sub>; 305 sit RO<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>: fit A<sub>ω</sub>; 359 sua RAO<sub>g</sub>P<sub>c</sub>: suo ω; 410 ponit Parrhasius: ponis O<sub>g</sub>: poemis RT (pe-): pene A<sub>ω</sub>; 614 duxque RO<sub>a</sub>P<sub>c</sub>: iusque A<sub>ω</sub>; 638 praeterquam RO<sub>g</sub>: praeter quos A an a incert., ω: praeter eos 5; 642 cedat RAO<sub>g</sub>: celet as: celat 5; 703 serae RO<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>: sera A<sub>ω</sub>; 740 positae RNO<sub>g</sub>: positam A<sub>ω</sub>; 742 labor iō RO<sub>g</sub>: labor et o B<sub>b</sub>P<sub>b</sub>\*: iam (o P<sub>b</sub>) morior aω: iam moriar A<sub>5</sub>; 775 atalantes RO<sub>a</sub>P<sub>c</sub>: atalantis ω: atalante A<sub>5</sub>. These agreements may justify us in occasionally using O<sub>g</sub>, always with great caution, to sway the critical balance. An interesting case is 1. 119 *sine lege ruentes* RS<sub>a</sub>A<sub>ω</sub>: *sine lege furentes* O: *sine more furentes* O<sub>g</sub>: *sine more ruentes* edd. Compare Theodulf. *Carm.* 28. 426 *ne ruat interius plebs sine lege furens*: here, as elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> Theodulf appears to echo an Ovid whom he had read in a text resembling that of a', and it seems extremely probable that a' had *furens* (though the possibility that it had variants must be reckoned with: see below, p. 24). It seems that *sine lege ruentes* is to be preferred: cf. *Met.* 2. 204 *sine lege ruunt*, and for *sine lege* cf. also *Met.* 11. 489, al. It may be worth recording that *sine more* was preferred by Burman (who found it in Heinsius' 'Codex Schefferi') on the strength of Virg. *A.* 5. 694 *tempestas sine more furit*, 8. 635 *raptas sine more Sabinas*, Claud. in *Eutrop.* 2. 438 *ast alios uicina palus sine more ruentes / excipit*, al.; and it remained in the text undisturbed until Borneque printed *sine lege*, not because it was correct but because it was in R. As to *furentes*, it may not improbably be due to reminiscence of one or other of the passages which Burman quotes. (ii) P<sub>b</sub>\*. P<sub>b</sub> itself is interesting as an example of a manuscript which has enjoyed a success disproportionate to its merits. Heinsius admitted several of its readings, not always on adequate grounds, to his text, and not all of them have yet been finally dislodged: 1. 338 *pauidi* (see *Notes II*, p. 248), 727 *palma*, 2. 269 *columba* (*ibid.*, p. 254), 726 *desere* (*ibid.*, p. 256). It must not be denied real merits: e.g. 1. 519 *et nihil* Itali, P<sub>b</sub>: *ut nihil* ROA<sub>ω</sub>; 2. 115 *nec hiantia lilia* florent P<sub>b</sub>T, the true reading variously corrupted in the rest of the tradition. But our concern here is with the second hand P<sub>b</sub>\*, which teaches an interesting lesson about the habits of Ovid's copyists. The leaf of P<sub>b</sub> containing *A.A.* 3. 710–89 resides now as fol. 102 in the middle of the *Ibis*; its loss was repaired by the insertion of a leaf (fol. 88) written in a contemporary and similar hand, which I call P<sub>b</sub>\*\*. Thus the verses are transmitted twice over. P<sub>b</sub>\* agrees with P<sub>b</sub> in a number of rare readings: 711 *relinquit*, 721 *ut*, 722 *tremente*, 745 *labens*; and four such coincidences within a relatively short passage make it reasonable to infer that the copyist of P<sub>b</sub>\* (who might well have been the same man using a different pen!) used the same exemplar that P<sub>b</sub>'s copyist had used. But there are not less notable discrepancies between the two: 720 *quia mens* P<sub>b</sub>: *quod amans* P<sub>b</sub>\*, 742 *o morior*: *labor et o*, 753 *cunctis*: *nocte*, 782 *semper . . . illa*: *stet uir . . . ipsa*. This state of affairs could be explained by the hypothesis that the exemplar of P<sub>b</sub> was heavily equipped with variants, from which both copyists selected at will. If this is accepted, it forms a vivid illustration of a process, repeated hundreds of times, which accounts for the chaos of variant readings in the *recc.*, and reinforces the necessity for the editor to regard all variants transmitted in the *recc.*, whether in or out of the text, as equipollent in authority (compare the case of A, a above, p. 16; and cf. that of K below, pp. 21–22). (iii) r. Two contemporary correctors' hands (xi century) seem to have been at work (Tafel 13),

<sup>1</sup> 1. 592 *bella Oωφ*: *uerba RAs*: *tela H*: *uerba PSg*: *bella s.*) Cf. also the echoes of the *Somnium* in Theodulf and Paulus Diaconus noted by Munari 146.

but it is impossible to be certain about this, and I have not attempted to distinguish. (The hand, also of the xi century, that has added the missing verses 1. 466-71, may be yet a third.) Like p (cf. above, p. 10), r gives the truth once in isolation, at 1. 231 *positi* (cf. *Notes* II, p. 244);<sup>1</sup> and occasionally as one of a small minority: 1. 73 *queque* *raB<sub>b</sub>O<sub>b</sub>*: *queque* *ROS<sub>a</sub>A<sub>w</sub>*; 467 *con-suetaque* *rs*: *consultaque* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 763 *hi* *rAs*: *hic* *ROw<sub>b</sub>*; 2. 257 *qua* *rF<sup>2</sup>* (ut uid.): *qua* *R<sub>A</sub>w*; 592 *artis* *rB<sup>2</sup>* (u.l.) F: *irae* *A<sub>w</sub>*: *ite* R; 3. 505 *es* *rs*: *est* *R<sub>A</sub>w*. When r is obviously correcting *suo Marte*, the results are usually deplorable: 1. 546 *male* *sedit*, 619 *possit*, 620 *sudetur*, 2. 18 *peruagus* *arte* (*hoste* R) *puer*. An interesting correspondence at 2. 651 *etiam* *R<sub>A</sub>w*: *eadem* *r<sub>b</sub>*.

5. *Editorial choice*. As for *Am.*, I give a selection of passages from Book 1 to show how diverse and arbitrary are the groupings of the manuscripts.

(a) For passages where a' or a representative alone transmits the truth, see above, p. 14. On errors in a' see below, p. 25.

(b) The truth survives in *ROS<sub>a</sub>s<sub>5</sub>*: 1. 2 *hoc* *ROS<sub>a</sub>HO<sub>gl</sub>*: *me* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 3 *mouentur* *ROS<sub>a</sub>abs<sub>5</sub>*: *reguntur* *A<sub>w</sub><sub>b</sub>*; 113 *carebant* *ROS<sub>a</sub>F*: *carebat* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 139 *a domina* *ROS<sub>a</sub>abs<sub>5</sub>*: *ad dominam* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 142 *quod* *RO<sup>2</sup>* (ex quid O<sup>1</sup>) *S<sub>a</sub>A<sub>b</sub>W*: *qua* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 147 *caelestibus* . . . *eburnis* R (ut uid.) *OS<sub>a</sub>s<sub>5</sub>*: *certantibus* . . . *ephebis* *rA<sub>w</sub>*;<sup>2</sup> 153 *terra* *ROS<sub>a</sub>AFO<sub>g</sub>*: *terre* *w*: 160 *puluinum* *ROS<sub>a</sub>Ab* (-illum) L<sup>1</sup>: *puluinar* *w*; 191 *annisque* *ROS<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>U*: *animisque* *A<sub>w</sub><sub>b</sub>*;<sup>3</sup> 192 *annis* *ROS<sub>a</sub>s<sub>5</sub>*: *animis* *A<sub>w</sub><sub>b</sub>*; 211 *uicto* *ROS<sub>a</sub>A<sub>s</sub>*: *uictos* *raw*.

(c) The truth survives in *ROs*: 1. 9 *repugnet* *ROA<sub>a</sub>*: *repugnat* *S<sub>a</sub>A<sub>w</sub>*; 287 *arbore* *ROs*: *arbor* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 328 *et quantum* *ROAU*: *o* *quantum* *s*: *a* *quantum* *s*; 331 *niso* *ROA<sub>b</sub>D*: *nisi* *aw*: om. A; 332 *rabidos* *RODH<sup>1</sup>*: *rapidos* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 343 *sperare* *RObDQ*: *superare* *A<sub>w</sub>*; 377 *a concubitu* *ROU*: *ad concubitum* *rA<sub>w</sub>*; 428 *ne* . . . *iuvet* *RO* (-bet) *AU* (-uat) *O<sub>g</sub>P<sub>c</sub>*: *nec* . . . *iuvet* *as*: *nec* . . . *iuvat* *w*; 433 *utenda* *ROAbs<sub>5</sub>*: *reddenda* *aw*; 679 *allata* *ROs*: *illata* A an a incert., *w*; 714 *corrupit* *RO* (-rip-) *P<sub>b</sub>*: *corripuit* *rA<sub>w</sub>*; 727 *tua* *ROs*: *tu* *rA<sub>w</sub>*; 761 *leues* *ROs<sub>5</sub>*: *leuis* *w*; 771 *superat* *RO* (spat) A (ut uid.) *s*: *superest* *aw*.

(d) The truth survives in *RS<sub>a</sub>s<sub>5</sub>*: 1. 11 *perficit* *RS<sub>a</sub>U*: *praeficit* *rOA<sub>w</sub>*; 40 *premenda* *RS<sub>a</sub>A<sub>s</sub>*: *terenda* *rOw*; 77 *linigerae* *RS<sub>a</sub>HN<sup>2</sup>*: *lanigerae* *OA<sub>w</sub>*: *niligenae* *as*; 109 *notant* *RS<sub>a</sub>A<sub>s</sub>*; *notat* *Ow*; 126 *timor* *RS<sub>a</sub>aNU*: *pudor* *OA<sub>w</sub>*.<sup>4</sup>

(e) The truth survives in *OS<sub>a</sub>s<sub>5</sub>*: 1. 189 *tum* *r* (ut uid.) *OS<sub>a</sub>*: *tu* *Rs*: *tunc* *as*: om. A; 211 *relinques* *OS<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>*: *relinquis* *R<sub>A</sub>w* (cf. above, p. 15).

(f) The truth survives in *Rs*: 1. 112 *ludius* R (-is, ut uid.) *A<sub>s</sub>*: *lydius* *s*: *ludius* *rOS<sub>a</sub>w*; 761 *tenuauit* *Rs*, unde *tenuabit* *Itali*:<sup>5</sup> *tenuabat* *OA<sub>w</sub>*.

(g) The truth survives in *Os*: 1. 21 *cedet* *OAA<sub>b</sub>D*: *cedit* *RS<sub>a</sub>Abw* (cf. p. 16 above); 328 *uno* *rO*: *unum* R: *Awep<sub>1</sub>* (cf. *Notes* II, pp. 247-8); 684 *duas* O (u.l.) *P<sub>t</sub>*: *uenus* *ROA<sub>w</sub>* (cf. p. 15 above).

(h) The truth survives in *S<sub>a</sub>s<sub>5</sub>*: 1. 176 *heu* *S<sub>a</sub>A<sub>s</sub>*: *heu* *RODO<sub>a</sub>*: *heu heu* *w*: *heu mihi* *s*.

(i) The truth survives in *w*: 1. 252 *diem* *w*: *die* *ROAs<sub>5</sub>*; 301 *it* *w*: *et* *RO*: *fit*

<sup>1</sup> I cannot be absolutely certain of the reading of *O<sub>a</sub><sup>1</sup>* here. r's reading may be no more than a lucky guess: cf. 3. 151 *positus* *w*: *positos* *RA<sub>s</sub>*: *posito* *rL<sup>1</sup>*: *cultus* *s*, where the attempt was less successful.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C.R. n.s. iii (1953), 7-10.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 17, n. 3.

<sup>4</sup> On the full reading of *S<sub>a</sub>* see above, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Also [Plan.] (*λεπτυνεῖ*): see below, p. 21, n. 3.

AFO<sub>a</sub><sup>2</sup>; 360 *luxuriabit ωφ*: *luxuriavit ROAs*; 693 *ferendo ra* (ut uid.) *ω*: *ferenda* RAB<sup>1</sup> (ut uid.) O<sub>b</sub>: *terenda OOgPe*: *terendo, gerendo, tenendo, tenenda s*; 715 *accedere ω*: *abscedere ROAs*;<sup>1</sup> 764 *hos Aw*: *hic rṣφ*: *hoc R*: *haec O*.<sup>2</sup>


(j) The truth survives in 5: 1. 4 *leues ras*: *leuis ROS<sub>a</sub>Abωφl*; 64 *cogeris Itali, aW<sup>2</sup>* (ut uid.), Schol. Haun. ('*quia nescies*') : *cogeris et RO* (-es et) S<sub>a</sub>Abω (cf. Notes II, pp. 241-2); 73 *quaque raB<sub>b</sub>O<sub>b</sub>*: *quaequ ROS<sub>a</sub>Aω*; 81 *qua* Naugerius: *quo U*: *quae ROS<sub>a</sub>Aω*; 210 *auerso s*: *aduerso ROS<sub>a</sub>Aω*; 351 *captandae* Itali: *captando U*: *captatae ROaw*: de A incert. (cf. Notes II, pp. 248-9; this and the preceding passages underline the merits of U, which can frequently be seen in the truthful minority); 519 *et nihil* Itali, P<sub>b</sub>: *ut nihil ROAw*.

For the purposes of this section A is treated as one of the *recc*. Many other combinations are of course found, but these will be enough, as for the *Amores*, to show the shifting allegiances of the manuscripts, particularly the *recc*.

#### REMEDIA AMORIS

Here too the work of Tafel was never followed up. It is perhaps odd that he did not identify K as Heinsius' 'Puteaneus'.<sup>3</sup> one cannot have the book in one's hands for two minutes without becoming aware of its importance for the criticism of the *Remedia*.

1. *The a"-group.* REK and the excerpts contained in p<sub>6</sub> form a group analogous to PSR in the *Amores* and ROS<sub>a</sub>(b) in the *A.A.* For their interrelationship it will suffice to refer to the articles of Lenz and myself, where detailed demonstrations will be found (references at p. 3 above). I give a modified version of the relevant portion of the stemma printed in my article:



It will be seen that the reading of *a"* can be established by the consensus of REK, RE, or RK, with occasional confirmation from p<sub>6</sub>.

2. *The value of a".* The following considerations are relevant in assessing the value of *a"*:

<sup>1</sup> *abscedere*, though dismissed by Heinsius as 'contrario plane sensu', and translated with marvellous perversity by Brandt and Bornequelle, is defensible: cf. 2. 349 ff. *cum tibi maior erit fiducia, posse requiri, / cum procul absenti cura futurus eris, / da requiem eqs.*; Prop. 2. 14. 19-20 *hoc sensi prodesse magis: contemnite, amantes; / sic hodie ueniet, si qua negauit heri*; Plaut. *Mil.* 1034-5, and cf. Prinz, *Wien. Stud.* xxxvi (1914), 53, n. 1. For *abscedere* used of feelings and emotions see *Thes. L. L.* i. 145. 79 (cf.

*abeo*, ibid. 70. 27 ff.). But at this stage of the affair the advice implied by accepting *abscedere* would be premature (cf. also below, p. 25, n. 1).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 763 *hi rAs*: *hic ROωφ . . . illi As*: *illuc Oωφ: illa R*. The reference must be to the diversity of the quarry, not the locale.

<sup>3</sup> He seems to have known of its existence, though he did not use it for his dissertation: Lenz, *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxix (1957), 2.

(a) Like *a* in *Am.* and *a'* in *A.A.*, the *a''*-branch of the tradition preserves the truth in isolation in a number of places: (i) in REK at 73 *dominis* R: *domini* EK: *dominis an domini* incert. exc. Scal.: *dannis* 5: *uitiis* ω; 334 (u. om. K<sup>1</sup>, add. K<sup>2</sup> in marg.) *manum* RE (-us) K<sup>2</sup>: *pedem* K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) ωm. (ii) in RE at 61 *philomela* RE: *philomena* Kω; 481 *ulla* RE<sup>2</sup> (u.l.): *illa* E<sup>1</sup>Kωm. (iii) in RK at 112 *certa debuerat* R (*caetera*) K<sup>1</sup>: *celeri d.* K<sup>2</sup>: *d. celeri* Eω; 131 *temporis ars medicina fere est* RK<sup>2</sup>: *temporibus m. ualet* EK<sup>1</sup>ωφ; 699 *dulichio* R (*duchio, li* add. r) K<sup>2</sup>, exc. Scal.: *dulichias* K<sup>1</sup>ω: *dulichim* E. (iv) in R at 141 *uino* Rp<sub>6</sub>, exc. Scal.: <sup>2</sup> *limo* EO<sub>g</sub>Z [Plan.]:<sup>3</sup> *riuo* Kωφ; 161 *quaeritis* R, exc. Scal.: *quaeritur* EKω; 291 *domina* R: *domine* EKω; 337 *inambulet* R, exc. Scal.: *ambulet* EKωm: *ut ambulet* 5; 399 *iuuenale* R: *iuuenile* EKωm; 486 *distineatur* in Scaligeri codice, teste D. Heinsio: *destineatur* R, exc. Scal.: *detineatur* rEKωm; 593 *triterica* R: *triterica* E: *triterica* Kω; 729 *refricatur* R: *recalescit* E: *recreatur* rK<sub>5</sub>: *renouatur* 5: *reuocatur*, *recitatur*, *referatur* 5; 753 *citharae lutosque* R, unde c. *lotosque* Heinsius: <sup>4</sup> c. *ludosque* r: c. *cantusque* rEK<sup>1</sup>ω: *citharaeque iocique* K<sup>2</sup>5: *cantus citharaeque* 5. (v) in E at 560 *illa* Itali, E: *ille* RKω; 745 *cnsida* [Plan.]: *cōsida* E: *gnosida* Rω: *gnosia* K<sub>5</sub>.<sup>5</sup> (vi) in K at 13 *ardens* K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.): *ardet* REK<sup>1</sup>ωp<sub>6</sub>;<sup>6</sup> 453 *pocride* K<sup>1</sup>, unde *Proclide* Heinsius: *prognide* REK<sup>2</sup>ω; 632 *multam* Itali, K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.): *multum* REK<sup>1</sup>ωφ. As before, I mention only passages where the true reading is reasonably certain. For the purpose of this section K is taken to mean K<sup>1</sup> and K<sup>2</sup> impartially; on this see below, para. (b).

(b) The respective merits of REK can be seen quite well from this list. As in the *Ars* (see above, p. 15), R stands nearer to the hyparchetype *a''*, and has been less heavily affected by interpolation than EK, though, just as in the *Ars*, it is both interpolated and carelessly written.<sup>7</sup> E complements R usefully, but is both interpolated and corrupt.<sup>8</sup> K is a witness of some importance, used by Heinsius but ignored by subsequent editors until Lenz. It preserves the truth in three cases where it has been lost elsewhere; but it shows too many signs both of contamination from the *β''*-branch of the tradition and of gross independent depravation for an editor to be able to follow its unsupported testimony elsewhere with confidence.<sup>9</sup> The most important conclusion relative to K to be drawn from the list in para. (a) is that the first and second hands K<sup>1</sup> and K<sup>2</sup> (which seem to me to be in fact identical) present readings which are equipol-

<sup>1</sup> K<sup>2</sup> has in fact written *ars fere* over the line without altering *temporibus*.

<sup>2</sup> The true explanation of *uino*, that plane-trees were thought to benefit from the infusion of wine on their roots, was given by Gronovius, *Observ.* I. v; Lenz's note is beside the mark.

<sup>3</sup> This is the Greek prose version mentioned in *Notes II*, p. 258, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *citharae lotosque* was in fact first read by Salmasius, ex codd., and was reported by Heinsius from exc. Scal.: it may well be that R was the source of both reports (cf. below, p. 30). Lenz's critical note is inaccurate: below, p. 22.

<sup>5</sup> At *A.A.* 3. 158 R preserves the correct spelling *cnsosi*. Editors still do their best to render Ovid uncouth: cf. the index to H. Breitenbach's edition of *Met.* (Zürich, 1958): 'Cnidos s. Gnidos! Chnossos s. Gnosos!'

<sup>6</sup> Lenz, *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxix (1957), 10, well compares *Am.* 1. 2. 33 *tendens* R: *tendent* S<sub>ω</sub>.

<sup>7</sup> Examples in Appendix to edition.

<sup>8</sup> Examples in Appendix to edition. Several of E's peculiar readings recall those of S in *Am.* (see above, p. 8, n. 4): 71 *wolustis*, 85 *potantibus*, 102 *lentae*, 647 *queraris* (*loquaris* for *queraris* at *Am.* 1. 4. 23 *queraris* 5, exc. Put. et Scal.: *loquaris* PS<sub>ω</sub>). I have not included this in the list at p. 11, above, but *queraris* must surely be right: Munari's suggestion that *loquaris* = *malo loquaris* is ingenious, but reference to the passages on which it is based will show that in all of them the context makes the pejorative sense unmistakable, which cannot be said of the *Amores* passage).

<sup>9</sup> Examples in Appendix to edition. Peculiar readings which recall S and E are 93 *prefer*, 186 *torta*, 522 *promptius*.

lent in point of excellence; and the analogies of A and P<sub>b</sub>\* (see above, pp. 16, 18) suggest that the source of K<sup>2</sup> was not a separate one as conjectured by Lenz,<sup>1</sup> but rather that the exemplar of K contained variants and that the copyist edited as he went along. Whether or not this hypothesis is correct matters for practical purposes little: readings, not manuscripts, are what count in this tradition, and, for example, *Rem.* 13, 131, 699 show that the editor of the *Remedia* is not merely entitled, but in duty bound, to put K<sup>2</sup> on an equal footing with K<sup>1</sup>.

3. *The β''-group.* For general considerations cf. p. 9 above. As to *Rem.* in particular:

(a) There is no evidence which guarantees the independence of the *rec.* from REK; but it seems reasonable to assume it, especially in view of the considerations advanced below, p. 25.

(b) As to the descent of the *rec.* from a single ancestor β'', I make the same assumption as for *Am.* and *A.A.* On the relationship of β'' to β and β' see below, p. 25.

(c) Only two individual *rec.* deserve special notice: (i) O<sub>g</sub> here too displays traces of affinity with a'. Errors: 14 *nauigat* E<sup>1</sup>O<sub>g</sub>; 25 *longis* EM<sub>a</sub><sup>2</sup>O<sub>g</sub><sup>1</sup>; 37 *funere* EM<sub>a</sub>O<sub>g</sub>; 60 *est* om. E<sup>1</sup> (ut uid.) O<sub>g</sub>Z<sup>2</sup>; 62 *potuisset* EO<sub>g</sub><sup>1</sup>; 402 *qualibet* RO<sub>gm</sub>; 410 *quo* RO<sub>g</sub>; 641 *rogatri*<sup>8</sup> & E: *rogari* O<sub>g</sub>. Correct readings: 19 *fodit* Itali, O<sub>g</sub>: *fodiat* REK<sub>w</sub>; 302 *titulum* ed. Venet. 1474, O<sub>g</sub>: *titulo* RK<sub>w</sub>: *titulos* Es; 320 *et* K<sup>1</sup>O<sub>g</sub>: *nec* REK<sup>2</sup>wm; 463 *fortius* REH<sup>1</sup>O<sub>gm</sub>: *parcius* K<sub>w</sub>φ; 517 *nec te* REO<sub>gm</sub>: *ne te* K<sup>2</sup><sub>5</sub>: *ut te* K<sup>1</sup><sub>5</sub>: *quod te* w. (ii) r. Apart from correcting many of the more obvious errors of R, r contributes little in *Rem.*: of some interest perhaps are 375 *tragicos* om. R: *tumidos* rF; 386 *uitta* rs: *uittis* K<sup>1</sup>: *uita* R<sub>sm</sub>: *uicta* s: *inuita* est E<sup>1</sup>: *inuicta* est E<sup>2</sup>: *nupta* s: *uittata* est K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.); 737 *niseide* REK<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) w: *rifeide* r (*ref.*) K<sup>1</sup>A<sub>b</sub><sup>2</sup>: *ripheide* K<sup>2</sup>W. Attempts at independent correction are no more successful than in the *Ars*: 147 *animo sine uulnere*] *animos in uulnere* R, ut uid.: *animoso in uulnere* r; 154 *deliciae*] *dile*||| R: *dilect* r; 431 *quod* om. R, add. *autem* r; 464 *quam quem* E (ut uid.) WX [Plan.]: *quam quae* RK<sup>1</sup>ωφm: *quem quoque* r: *quam quoque* p<sub>3</sub><sup>2</sup>; 753 *citharae lutosque* R: c. *ludosque* r (Lenz's critical note is inaccurate here: the 'Rasur' which Vollmer is taken to task for not noticing (Lenz, ed. p. 91) is non-existent).

4. *Editorial choice.* The proliferation of variants, most of them rather to be classed as 'variations' (see below, p. 26), has proceeded even more vigorously in the *Remedia* than in the other poems. Some part of this phenomenon, at any rate as regards the post-Carolingian period, must have been due to the unexpected popularity enjoyed by the poem as an educational text, a fascinating story outside the scope of this discussion.<sup>2</sup> The groupings of the manuscripts may be exemplified by the following selection of passages:

(a) For passages where a'' or a representative alone transmits the truth, see above, p. 21. On errors in a'' see below, p. 25.

(b) The truth survives in REK<sub>s</sub>: 97 *pauca* REK<sup>1</sup><sub>s</sub> [Plan.]: *parua* K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.): *magna* ωφ . . . *de magnis* RKM<sub>a</sub> [Plan.]: *magnis de* E: *de paruis* se: *paruis de* s: *paruis e* A<sub>b</sub>p<sub>1</sub>p<sub>3</sub>; 167 *ne nil illic* REK<sup>1</sup>M<sub>a</sub><sup>1</sup>Z<sup>1</sup>, exc. Put. et Scal.: *fecit ne nil* K<sup>2</sup> ω: *fecit ne nil illic* HM<sub>a</sub><sup>2</sup>Z<sup>2</sup>; 235 *prenso* REKF (ut uid.) M<sub>a</sub><sup>2</sup>: *pressos* ωφ; 253 *iubebitur* REKF: *uidebitur* ω; 397 *continuant* REK<sup>1</sup><sub>s</sub>: *nouum librum inc.*

<sup>1</sup> *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxix (1957), 13.

<sup>2</sup> Tafel 45-59; Boas, *Mnem.* xlii (1914), 17; Ullman, *C.P.* xxvii (1932), 38.

K<sup>2</sup>wm; 471 illis REKA<sub>b</sub>M<sub>a</sub><sup>2</sup>m: illi ω; 517 sibi REK<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) sm: tibi K<sup>1</sup>ω; 581 non REK<sup>1</sup>D: nam K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) ω . . . secretis REK<sup>2</sup>ς: secretos K<sup>1</sup>ω; 643 redditis REK<sub>s</sub>, exc. Scal.: quaeris ω; 657 non curare sat est REK<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) F, exc. Scal.: non curandus adest ς: nec curandus adest K<sup>1</sup>ς; 663 aderam iuueni REK<sub>s</sub>: aderat iuuenis ω; 791 hunc REK<sup>1</sup>ς: nunc K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) ς: tu ς.

(c) The truth survives in RE<sub>s</sub>: 307 inacescant RESp<sub>s</sub>: acescant P<sub>b</sub>: marcescant Kω; 407 figura RE<sup>2</sup>sm: figuram E<sup>1</sup>Kω: figuram HP<sub>c</sub>; 463 fortius REH<sup>1</sup>O<sub>gm</sub>: parcus Kωφ; 513 falle tamen REF<sup>1</sup> (ut uid.) M<sub>a</sub>T: fallet amor K<sup>1</sup>sm: fallat amor ς: fallit amor K<sup>2</sup>ς; 517 nec te REO<sub>gm</sub>: ne te K<sup>2</sup>ς: ut te K<sup>1</sup>ς: quod te ω; 589 pyladen RE<sub>s</sub>: pyladen Kω; 651 altior REHZ [Plan.] (ut uid.): altius Kω; 756 quaREHZ: quid Kω: quod ς (but cf. on this very difficult passage *Notes* II, p. 260).

(d) The truth survives in RK<sub>s</sub>: 47 (u. om. E) in herculeo RK<sup>1</sup>M<sub>a</sub>: achilleo rK<sup>2</sup>ω . . . hoste RK<sup>1</sup>M<sub>a</sub>: hosti K<sup>2</sup>ω; 95 amor RK<sup>1</sup>ς: amans K<sup>2</sup>ω: om. E; 111 quam RK<sup>1</sup>Q<sup>1</sup> (ut uid.) T: qua EK<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) ω; <sup>1</sup> 137 ut fecere RK<sup>1</sup>P<sub>a</sub><sup>1</sup>: quod f. EK<sup>2</sup>ςφ: quae f. ς; 159 etola R: ethola rKF<sup>1</sup>: etholia uel sim. Eω; 222 ut prope RK<sup>1</sup>ς: nec prope EK<sup>2</sup>ω; 325 qua RK<sub>s</sub>: quam Eω; 407 uenerem RK<sup>2</sup>sm: ueneris EK<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) ω: ueneri K<sup>1</sup>D; 484 posita est cura RH: prior est posita EK<sup>2</sup>sm: prior est cura K<sup>1</sup>ς; 574 substituisse RKW: sustinuisse Eω: supposuisse, proposuisse, praeposuisse ς; 704 utque facis RK<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) ς: utque faues EK<sup>1</sup>ς: ut faueas ω; 755 saltantur RK<sup>1</sup> (salu-) ς: cantantur EK<sup>2</sup> (u.l.) ς: firmantur ς: monstrantur, captantur, formantur ς; 791 quo RK<sub>s</sub>: qui ω: om. E.

(e) The truth survives in EK<sub>s</sub>: 756 nocet EKZ: docet Rω (cf. *Notes* II, p. 260).

(f) The truth survives in R<sub>s</sub>: 153 iuuenalia RW: iuuenilia EKωφ; 264 sua R<sub>s</sub>: tibi EKω . . . neritias RP<sub>a</sub>: neritias ς: nericias K: naricias E<sub>s</sub>; 372 quidque Rm: quaeque EKω: quodque ς; 476 syllaba RH: littera EKωm; 611 recedit RH: decidit EKω; 667 aberrat RM<sub>a</sub>Z: oberrat EKω; 694 quid R<sub>s</sub>: quod EKω: cur ς; 695 ipse RM<sub>a</sub><sup>1</sup>: ipsa EKω: illa ς . . . fauebis R<sub>s</sub>: cauebis EKω: caueto ς; 740 epotis R<sub>s</sub>: et potat K<sup>2</sup>ω: hic potat E: optatas, acceptas, aequoreas ς; 775 nunc R<sub>s</sub>: tunc EKω.

(g) The truth survives in E<sub>s</sub>: 333 uti E<sub>s</sub>, exc. Scal.: ut RK<sub>s</sub>: quod ωm; 464 quem E (ut uid.) WX [Plan.]: quae RKωφm.

(h) The truth survives in K<sub>s</sub>: 190 (u. om. R) deligit KH<sup>1</sup>Zφ: colligit Eω; 309 possit K<sub>s</sub>: possit REω; 320 et K<sup>1</sup>O<sub>g</sub>: nec REK<sup>2</sup>ωm; 321 nec K<sup>2</sup>ς: et REK<sup>1</sup>ωm; 354 esipa K<sup>1</sup> (h-) P<sub>a</sub>: oesopa Rm: esopa EK<sup>2</sup> (h-) ω; 446 diducto K<sub>s</sub>φ: deducto E<sub>s</sub>: seducto R<sub>s</sub>: subducto ω (cf. *Notes* II, p. 259; whether *laesaque*, transmitted by K<sup>2</sup>M<sub>a</sub> (*haesaque* R), is the truth, may perhaps be more debatable, but it seems to me that the editor must either print it, as the reading transmitted by the better branch of the tradition, or obelize. The latter is t.e solution of Lenz, but in face of Quint. *Inst.* 5. 13. 13 there is no excuse for accepting *seducto*, as he does); 798 an ueniat K<sup>1</sup>ς: adueniat REK<sup>2</sup>ω: aut, haud, qui ueniat ς.

(i) The truth survives in ς: 9 (9-10 om. R) possit ς: possit EKω; 19 fodit Itali, O<sub>g</sub>: fodiat REKω; 230 leuabis ς: lauabis REKωφ; 307 titulum ed. Venet. 1474, O<sub>g</sub>: titulo RKω: titulos E<sub>s</sub>; 364 impugnet D. Heinsius, T: impugnet REKωm; 386 uitta r<sub>s</sub>: uittis K<sup>1</sup>: uita R<sub>s</sub>m: uicta ς: inuita est E<sup>1</sup>: inuicta est E<sup>2</sup>: nupta ς: uittata est K<sup>2</sup> (u.l.); 409 rarae sibi Heinsius, P<sub>a</sub>: rare tibi K<sub>s</sub>: rara est ibi R: raro tibi Eω: nam raro m; 586 quae releuet ς: quaeque leuet REKωφ; 612 considerat P<sub>a</sub>P<sub>c</sub>: considerat A<sub>b</sub><sup>1</sup> (ut uid.) E<sub>a</sub>: considerant REKω: deciderant ς; 804 expediere Heinsius, P<sub>b</sub>: experiere REKω.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 111 partem REK<sup>1</sup>ς: parte K<sup>2</sup>ς.

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. *The a-branch.* In dealing with the older manuscripts of the amatory poems I have so far derived them from three separate hyparchetypes, which I have called *a* (*Amores*), *a'* (*Ars*), *a''* (*Remedia*). In fact the presence of both the *Ars* and the *Remedia* in R virtually assures the identity of *a'* and *a''*; and if Tafel's hypothesis about the derivation of P from the missing portion of R be correct, it follows that in all probability the three hyparchetypes which I have postulated were in reality one and the same manuscript (call it *a*), which contained all the amatory poems, including the *Heroides*<sup>1</sup> (whether or not it included the *Medicamina Faciei* can hardly be proved): the existence of such a manuscript was postulated long ago by Lucian Müller.<sup>2</sup> The solution is both economical and plausible, and nothing is lost and much is gained by accepting it.

2. *The character of a.* The character and provenance of *a* were fully discussed by Tafel (31 ff.); cf. also Munari, ed., p. xvii. In spite of the presence in the *a*-branch of a few blunders which clearly derive from the misreading of a manuscript in majuscule script,<sup>3</sup> it seems probable that *a* was a French minuscule manuscript fairly close in date to the oldest members of the group. Tafel's suggestion that it was Spanish is not, it seems to me, borne out by the phonetic and graphic errors which he adduces;<sup>4</sup> and I do not know on what evidence Lenz bases his suggestion that the exemplar of R was Beneventan. It is very difficult to believe with Müller (loc. cit., n. 2) that *a* was Merovingian. A date *circa* 800 would seem probable. Insular influence played some part in the tradition: witness O and the insular characteristics of b (Tafel 44). There is some evidence that *a* had 25 verses to the page:<sup>5</sup> *A.A.* 2. 77-78 occur in R (in the reverse order) after 2. 103; and *Rem.* 801-2 occur in R after v. 750 and are omitted by E (v. 801 only added in the margin by the first hand). It is possible that it contained variant readings: *A.A.* 1. 12 *placida RS<sub>a</sub>A<sub>w</sub>*: *mollis OS<sub>a</sub>* (u.l.) 5; 13 *exterruit RS<sub>a</sub>A<sub>w</sub>*: *perterrit OS<sub>a</sub>* (u.l.) 5; 76 *syro O* (sscr.): *uiro r* (ut uid.) *S<sub>a</sub>A<sub>w</sub>*: *deo OP<sub>a</sub>*: *de R. incert.*; 264 *rotis R* (u.l.) *Oas*: *modis RA<sub>s</sub>*; 684 *duas O* (u.l.) *P<sub>t</sub>*: *uenus ROA<sub>w</sub>*; 766 *cerua RO* (u.l.): *curua rOAw*; *Rem.* 481 *ulla RE<sup>2</sup>* (u.l.): *illa E<sup>1</sup>K<sub>wm</sub>* (and cf. of course K<sup>1</sup> and K<sup>2</sup>; if the suggestion made above, p. 22, that K's exemplar was equipped with variants is correct, a proportion

<sup>1</sup> For the presence of *Her.* in *a* see Tafel 22-23, 30-31. Here a complication arises, however: Dörrie has shown, to my mind convincingly, that the tradition of *Her.* cannot be traced back to two independent copies of the archetype (Dörrie 124 ff.; cf. my review, *Gnomon* xxxviii [1961], 479, 484), i.e. there is no equivalent in the tradition of *Her.* of the *β*-branch. It seems to follow that the archetype of *Her.* and the archetype of *Am.*, *A.A.*, *Rem.* (using the term 'archetype' for convenience, as explained) were distinct, and that the two traditions were first amalgamated in *a* (cf. Dörrie 127). This hypothesis helps to explain why the text of *Her.* is so much less well preserved than that of the other amatory works.

<sup>2</sup> *De Re Metrica*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 24 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Am.* 2. 1. 24 *funtis P*, *A.A.* 1. 9 *oui ROS<sub>a</sub>*, *Rem.* 433 *istangere R*, *Her.* 9. 160 *eat P* (Tafel 34). At *A.A.* 1. 9 *oui* must have been

the reading of *a*, therefore it was *a*'s exemplar that was in majuscules: cf. Timpanaro, *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxxii (1960), 57 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Possibly Spanish symptoms are faulty aspiration (cf. E. A. Loew, *The Beneventan Script*, p. 102), the confusion of *e/a* (common in R), *i/a* (e.g. *A.A.* 2. 660 *sit*] *sa R*), *ily* (e.g. 1. 201 *parthy R*), *c/a* (2. 358 *uaneſcīque*] *uaneſaīque*, 444 *eticiendus*] *eliaendus R*). On the other hand, the confusion *a/ti* (1. 612 *arte*] *tirte*, cf. 525 *uatem*] *uirtim R*) recalls the Corbie *ab* script; in, e.g., the example at Lowe, *Codd. Latt. Antiqq.* v. 650 the confusions *e/i*, *o/u*, *b/p*, *c/g*, *d/t*, all characteristic of *a*, are found. Cf. also U. Knoche, *Handschriftliche Grundlagen des Juvenaltextes*, p. 246, n. 2, on the *quod/qui*, *quod/quo* confusion in early Continental minuscule.

<sup>5</sup> Not 26, as suggested by Müller, loc. cit., p. 27; cf. Tafel 33-34.

of them might have come down from *a*. But no certainty is possible). Speculation can be pursued further, but not with much advantage to the editor: I restrict myself to estimation of the textual value of *a*, as it can be reconstructed from its descendants. Its practical importance, as representing a relatively early stage in the tradition—since, as I shall stress, we have very little idea what happened to Ovid's text in antiquity and the Dark Ages—is too obvious to need further emphasis. Two circumstances lessen its value somewhat: (a) we cannot always reconstruct its text with certainty; (b) it was certainly corrupt and probably interpolated.<sup>1</sup>

3. *The recentiores*. The vast mass of Ovid's later manuscripts, ranging in date from the twelfth to the fifteenth century, confront the editor with a problem which defies a neat or definite solution—might, indeed, be said to be in principle insoluble. It has been demonstrated that in the *Amores* and *Ars* the *rec.* do not derive from *a* (see above, pp. 9, 17), and it seems reasonable to assume the same for the *Remedia*: the by no means negligible number of passages where the truth survives in *s* alone would otherwise be surprising, though I am aware that this argument is not absolutely cogent and I have refrained from employing it for *Am.* and *A.A.*, where it need not be insisted on. It does not, however, follow from the probable identification of *a*, *a'*, and *a''* as a single manuscript (above, p. 24) that *β*, *β'*, and *β''* are to be similarly identified. It seems *a priori* unlikely that all the *rec.* of the amatory poems are derived from a single ancestor, and it certainly cannot be proved. It may be permitted, however, to continue to use the convenient fiction of 'the *β*-branch' of the tradition, always with the reservation that it probably represents, as we now have it before us, the product of more than one stream of tradition. Two points may be usefully made about it: (a) It must be stressed that the *rec.* are valuable *taken as a class for the readings they transmit*. Individual members of the class, though they may sometimes offer an unusually large number of true readings, can never claim authority. The chief, indeed the only substantial, fault of Munari's excellent edition of the *Amores* is that six *rec.*<sup>2</sup> are far too few to represent the class and do not give an adequate idea of the amount of truth that has survived in *β*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Tafel 74. Corruption is sufficiently attested by the common errors noted above, pp. 7, 13–14. Forgetfulness of the fact can lead to unwise editorial choice: e.g. at *Am.* 2. 11. 21 *at a*: *ad PS*, edd. *nonnulli*, distinctione *sic positā*—*haec alii referant ad uos*: *quod quisque eqs.* Cf. 3. 1. 57 *at illa*] *ad illam* *P*: *ad illam* *S*. The borderline between accidental and wilful depravation ('corruption' and 'interpolation') is difficult to draw, particularly in a tradition such as this, but readings of *a* which seem to me to belong in the class of interpolations are the following: *Am.* 1. 10. 49 *pepigitse s*: *tetigisse PSs*; 1. 14. 24 *mala s*: *male PSs* (cf. *Notes I*, p. 58); 2. 4. 5 *non esse s*: *non nosse PSs*; *odisse s*; 2. 4. 46 *moribus V<sub>b</sub>W*: *corporis PSs* (cf. *Notes I*, p. 60); 2. 6. 33 *ducensque DF*: *ducitque PSs*; 2. 7. 23 *ornandis a*: *ornatis PSs* . . . *operosa a*: *operata PSN*; 2. 11. 40 *aestus a*: *eurus PSs* (cf. *Notes I*, p. 62); 2. 18. 26 *dicat ps*: *dictat PSs* (but *dictat* has, incredibly, been defended); 3. 3.

11 *aeterni S<sup>2</sup>ω*: *aeterno PS<sup>1</sup>s*: *aeternum s* (cf. *Notes I*, p. 64); 3. 7. 9 *cupida . . . lingua s*: *cupidis . . . linguis P<sub>b</sub>P<sub>c</sub>*: *cupide . . . linguis PSs*; *A.A.* 1. 64 *cogeris Itali, aW<sup>2</sup>* (ut uid.): *cogeris et ROS<sub>n</sub>Abu* (cf. *Notes II*, pp. 241–2); 269 *cunctos Aω*: *formae ROB* (cf. above, p. 14; the error may, however, have been wholly unconscious); 684 *duas O* (u.l.) *P<sub>t</sub>*: *uenus ROAω* (cf. above, p. 15); 715 *accedere a*: *abcedere ROAs* (cf. above, p. 20, n. 1). It seems probable that *abcedere* arose from a misunderstanding of the preceding *a*); *Rem.* 19 *fodit Itali, O<sub>g</sub>*: *fodiat REKω* (doubtful); 446 *diducto Ks<sup>2</sup>ω*: *deducto Es*: *seducto R<sub>s</sub>*: *subducto a* (cf. *Notes II*, p. 259); 599 *subnubilus rK<sup>2</sup>* (u.l.) *a*: *sub nubibus REK<sup>1</sup>s*; 798 *an ueniat K<sup>1</sup>s*: *adueniat REK<sup>2</sup>ω*. (It will be appreciated that *A.A.* 2 and 3, where *R* is the sole surviving representative of *a*, do not come into consideration.)

<sup>2</sup> In my notation these are *E<sub>a</sub>HNO<sub>b</sub>V<sub>a</sub>V<sub>b</sub>*.

The remark of Dain, quoted at the head of this article, which was offered by him in ironical commendation of the Dutch editors of the eighteenth century, is in sober earnest true: for 'bonne' read 'vraie', and the sentence can serve, within prudential limits, as the editor's motto today. (b) The variants given by the second hands in the *rec.* (unless the second hand be very much later—generally they are nearly contemporary) must enjoy equal status with the text, whether their source be deemed to be the exemplar (as in the case of *P<sub>b</sub>*\* above, p. 18) or another manuscript. This follows from what has been said about the circumstances of the tradition, and also from examination of the readings thus transmitted.

4. *History of the tradition.* What is known or can with reasonable certainty be inferred about this subject is slight.<sup>1</sup> The story of Ovid's text in antiquity and the Dark Ages is virtually a closed book.<sup>2</sup> There is no way of proving that all our extant manuscripts of these poems go back to a single archetype, and for Ovid, who was certainly not forgotten in the centuries from Claudian to Theodulf, the hypothesis is *a priori* most doubtful.<sup>3</sup> In the Carolingian period it is certain that there existed at least two manuscripts (*α*, *β*), independent of each other, though possibly equipped with variant readings to an extent which already blurred the distinction between the texts which they presented. In general the text of *β* was markedly though not invariably inferior to that of *α*, and its inferiority was to a large extent the product of deliberate interpolation: e.g. *Am.* 2. 10. 33 *eundo* for *arando*; 2. 13. 21 *lucina* for *ilithyia*; *A.A.* 1. 710 *molliter* for *comiter*; *Rem.* 73 *damnis* or *uitiis* for *dominis*, etc.—the banal and familiar for the exquisite and the unfamiliar. Ovid enjoyed his chief period of popularity, the so-called *aetas Ovidiana*, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; but it is evident that the contamination which we find in the manuscripts copied at this period was no new thing: manuscripts such as *A* and *K* already stand at the end of a long process of 'horizontal transmission'.<sup>4</sup> The analogous cases of Juvenal and Lucan spring to mind. The consequence is that no manuscript, not even *R*, preserves a stream of tradition uncontaminated by other streams; the fact is amply illustrated by the examples given above, pp. 11, 19–20, 22–23. The picture is yet further confused by the superadded tinkerings of the copyists of the *aetas Ovidiana*, sometimes though not always qualitatively distinguishable from the variants of earlier periods of the tradition.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Observe the caution of Tafel (32): 'Wir kennen weder die Mittelglieder noch den Gang der Zersplitterung des Korpus.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Dörrie 419 on the *Heroides*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Pasquali 15–21; and on *Am.* Munari 150; on Juvenal see Housman's edition, p. xl, n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> For the term see Pasquali 140 ff.; and for the analogous situation in the *Metamorphoses* see Pasquali 388–90, D. A. Slater, *Towards a Text of the Metamorphosis of Ovid*, p. 19.

<sup>5</sup> On these variants see L. Rosa, 'Sulle varianti della tradizione manoscritta degli *Amores di Ovidio*', *Annali della fac. di lett. e fil.*, Naples, iv (1954), 41–60. Her selection of examples is uncritical, but the discussion demonstrates well the spirit in which

medieval copyists approached their task, as reflected in the variants which they introduced into the text. Many readings transmitted solely by *s* clearly come into the class of 'metrical variations': e.g. *Am.* 1. 13. 48 *adsueto] est solito*; 2. 16. 40 *saxa cruore] sanguine saxa*; 2. 16. 44 *sidera nostra] qui rapuere* (ex 3. 11. 48); 3. 9. 52 *dilaniata] dilacerata*; 3. 15. 6 *militiae turbine] fortunae munere* (ex *Tr.* 4. 10. 8); *A.A.* 1. 591 *stimulata] stimulante*; 610 *cupias] incipias*; 2. 282 *turba sed] sed tamen*; 370 *cubare] iacere*; 380 *aonii cornibus icta dei] aonio concita baccha deo* (ex 1. 312); 603 *exigua] eximia*; 3. 297 *quoniam prosunt impendere] magnam prodest impendere*; 421 *speciosa] formosa*; 722 *micante] timente*; *Rem.* 75 *incipiens] o uates*; 233 *tristissima] strictissima*; 640 *superpliciter] simpliciter*, etc. Such 'variations' (for

5. *Editorial choice.* Where the *rec.* all agree together against  $\alpha$ , the editor is faced with a simple choice between  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ , two independent branches of the tradition, in Maasian terminology 'variant-carriers'. These cases are in fact relatively few in comparison with the passages where there is dissension in either or both branches. The examples already quoted demonstrate that the true reading may be transmitted by almost any combination of witnesses. Two cases deserve particular remark: (a) those where  $\alpha$  is to be balanced against  $\beta$  (in this class one must for practical purposes include the cases of  $\alpha\varsigma$  against  $\omega$ ). An examination of the passages cited above in which  $\alpha$  or its representatives are alone in offering the truth will show that there is a qualitative difference between these cases and most of those where  $\varsigma$  or  $\omega$  preserve the truth against  $\alpha$ . To go no farther than the first example quoted on p. 7, para. (a) (i), if PS had not preserved *adederit* at *Am.* 1. 15. 41, it is highly probable that *adusserit* would pass without remark; whereas (to take the first instance again, p. 11, para. (f)) the correction of *uerendis* to *uerrendis* at 1. 9. 14 would have required no Politian to make it even if the true reading had not survived in  $\varsigma$ . This is merely another way of saying that  $\beta$  was more depraved by interpolation than  $\alpha$ , which therefore deserves, *ceteris paribus*, to enjoy a certain precedence. But the sphere within which that precedence may be allowed to make up the editor's mind for him is not large: at *A.A.* 1. 211 (p. 15 above) the two variants *relinques* and *relinquis* are absolutely equivalent in point of sense, and the authority of  $\alpha$  is as good a criterion as any other for deciding; or at *Rem.* 446 (cf. above, p. 23), where the sense is uncertain and must remain so, the editor is entitled to accept *laesaque* from  $\alpha$  in a spirit of what I may perhaps term enlightened despair. (b) Those cases where the overwhelming weight of manuscript authority is in conflict with what appears, on its merits, to be a better reading: i.e. the cases of  $\alpha\omega$  against  $\varsigma$ . It is often suggested that where  $\varsigma$  presents what appears to be the truth, it is due to emendation, not to tradition. The point is of less importance than it seems, in my opinion, but nevertheless can be countered adequately. It is true that Ovid was read and studied intensively in the *aetas Ovidiana*, and that many of the 'variants' in his text date from this period (above, p. 26); it is also true that their authors had a good grasp of the resources of Latin verse. That the students of this period were capable of the emendations sometimes ascribed to them, however, I take leave to doubt. If they were capable of them, why were their operations so incomplete and so capricious? Why did they leave so much to the scholars of the Revival which they ought to have been able to do *stantes pede in uno*? If the *aetas Ovidiana* could correct *iraes* to *artis* at *A.A.* 2. 592, as on this theory we should have to suppose,<sup>1</sup> how did it come to miss the infinitely easier change of the meaningless *c(o)epio* to *capto* at 1. 234?<sup>2</sup> Again, it is difficult on this theory to account for the readings of the manuscripts at *A.A.* 1. 351

the term cf. Dörrie 125) need not usually be signalled in the apparatus criticus; but qualitatively most of them are not very different from, for example, *Am.* 1. 13. 7 *aer*] *humor*  $\varsigma\varsigma$ ; 1. 13. 15 *colentes*] *colonus*  $\varsigma\varsigma$ ; *A.A.* 1. 63 *cupis*] *petis*  $\alpha\varsigma$ ; 627 *ostendit*] *ostentat*  $\alpha\varsigma$ ; 761 *modo se] sese*  $\alpha\varsigma$ ; *Rem.* 45 *salutares*] *salutiferas*  $K\varsigma$ ; 398 *fortius*] *fortiter*  $EK\varsigma$ ; 653 *euanidus*] *radicitus*  $K\varsigma$ , etc. These are not real 'variants', but an editor is (rightly) expected

to record them; an apparatus in which *all* obviously false or unauthoritative readings were suppressed might in a sense be truly critical, but it would not fulfil one of its functions, that of giving a conspectus of the tradition.

<sup>1</sup> *artis*  $rB^2F$ : *iraes*  $\alpha\omega$ : *ite* R.

<sup>2</sup> *capto* Itali: *coepio*  $RP_c$ : *cepi*  $O\alpha\omega$ . Cf. *Notes II*, pp. 244-5.

*captandae Itali: captando* U: *captatae* ROaw (de A incert.); or at 2. 115 *nec hiantia lilia florent* P<sub>b</sub>T: *nec hyancia l. f.* A<sub>b</sub>: *nech yaccintia l. f.* R: *nec cinthia l. f.* ra (ex *ne cinthia* A, i.q. E<sub>a</sub>) 5: *nec candida l. f.* a (u.l.) w<sup>o</sup>: *nec f. l. semper* a (u.l.) 5: *nec semper l. f.* 5. One example seems to me virtually to clinch the matter. Axelson has shown that *omitto*, possibly on account of what was felt to be an anomalous scansion, was not much used by the Latin poets (*Unpoetische Wörter*, pp. 22-23). What medieval corrector would have ventured to restore *omisi* at *Am. 2. 1. 17*,<sup>1</sup> or would have thought of doing so? And if the truth can thus survive once it can do so fifty or a hundred times. Again, analogies in other traditions are not far to seek.<sup>2</sup>

Two difficulties attend this result. (a) How are we to distinguish genuine cases of the survival of traditional truth from the tinkerings of the *aetas Ovidiana*? Only by scrutinizing all cases impartially on their merits: only when a reading supported solely by 5 is demonstrably ungrammatical, unmetrical, or un-Ovidian, is there no *prima-facie* case for authenticity. The practical importance of this for the editor is in the formation of his apparatus criticus: if it is to be truly critical it must be selective, and the reader must trust the editor to suppress those 'variants' which have no claim to figure in it. (b) How is it possible to be certain that the truth when offered by a minority of the *rec.* (which for practical purposes must exclude most manuscripts after the thirteenth century) is due to survival, and that, when offered by a few manuscripts of the fourteenth or fifteenth century, it is due to deliberate editorial activity by the *Itali*? No certainty is in fact possible; this is a difficulty which must be stated honestly but which cannot be resolved. On balance the probability is that a true reading which apparently makes its first appearance at such a late stage in the tradition is due to Renaissance scholarship, but one can never be sure, short of collating every manuscript of Ovid in the world, that the first appearance might not be earlier.<sup>3</sup> The collation of a few more thirteenth-century manuscripts might well entail rewriting some critical

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps worth pausing to establish that Ovid certainly wrote *omisi*. The verses (15-20) run as follows: *in manibus nimbos et cum Ioue fulmen habebam / quod bene pro caelo mitteret ille suo. / clausit amica fores: ego cum Ioue fulmen omisi; / excidit ingenio Iuppiter ipse meo. / Iuppiter, ignoscas: nil me tua tela iuabant; / clausa tuo maius ianua fulmen habet.* The only variants of importance are those at v. 17: *fulmen omisi* 5: *fulmen amisi* PDN<sup>2</sup>: *fulmina misi* pSw—the steps by which the vulgate reading arose are clear. At 15 *cum Ioue* is *ἀνὸ κονων*: Ovid was just embarking on the composition of a Gigantomachia and, poet-like, identified himself with his subject: 'With Jove I held in my hand the clouds and the thunderbolt, a bolt worthy to have been thrown by him in defence of his heaven [the conventional rendering of 16 is feeble and pointless: Ovid surely means that he was doing his subject proud—cf. 12 *et satis oris erat*]. My mistress shut her door: I dropped Jove and thunderbolt both—Jove himself fell from my mind [17 is an example of Ovid's

favourite figure, syllepsis; *cum Ioue* now has to be taken in a somewhat different sense, but *excidit* in 20 insures against misunderstanding]. Forgive me, Jove; your weapons were of no use to me; her closed door has a more powerful bolt than yours.' The correctness of *omisi* is guaranteed (a) because the sense demands a word meaning 'dropped', and *misi* means 'threw' (as Burman pointed out in 1727); (b) because the singular *fulmen* is vital to the word-play (for *fulmen* in this sense cf. 1. 6. 16; the joke was pointed out by Lee, *C.R. n.s. ii* [1952], 176). It may be remarked that this passage may not be used as evidence that Ovid really wrote or began a Gigantomachia.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Housman, *Juvenalis*, pp. xxvi-xxvii; U. Knoche, *Handschriftliche Grundlagen des Juvenaltextes*, p. 74; Pasquali 43-108; W. V. Clausen, *Persi Saturarum Liber*, pp. xviii-xxii.

<sup>3</sup> A good example in Clausen, op. cit., p. xxii, n. 1.

notes: e.g. *Am.* 2. 18. 3 *ignaua* Itali, T: *ignaua* PSw<sup>φ</sup>. Is T's *ignaua* really survival of tradition, conjecture, or mistake? If it was traditional, did it survive T's descendants, so that in the late manuscripts where Munari found it it should be accounted traditional? The symbol 'Itali' is convenient for a select apparatus, and is in fact more informative than a reference to manuscripts, since it shows at a glance the date of the reading it follows. In reporting a contaminated tradition by any method short of listing every reading of every manuscript some imprecision is inevitable,<sup>1</sup> though it may give offence to those 'whose love of neatness is stronger than their Creator's'.

The text of the amatory poems seems on the whole to be reasonably well preserved. I employ the obelus more frequently than most previous editors, but the number of desperate cruces is small. 'The arsenals of divine vengeance', however, must always be reckoned with: we can only guess what irreparable damage was done in the Dark Ages—at *Her.* 1. 2 the truth survives only in a grammarian's citation.<sup>2</sup> The discovery of another manuscript of the same age and comparative excellence as P or R—or of the missing portions of O, for that matter—would produce surprises. If P had been mutilated at *Am.* 2. 8. 19, supposing that a sagacious critic had been revolted by the insipidity of *nostri*, would he have been inspired to conjecture *puri*, and what would have been his reception if he had? And if a similar accident had befallen R at *A.A.* 3. 85–86, the truth would have been lost for ever and commentators would be inviting us to admire the vulgate. Necessary and convincing emendations are still being made in Ovid's text,<sup>3</sup> and it is only reasonable to assume that errors still await detection.

## APPENDIX

In conclusion it will be convenient to discuss two sources which are of somewhat uncertain provenance and use, the *florilegia* and the 'excerpta Puteani' and 'excerpta Scaligeri' used by Heinsius.

### THE FLORILEGIA<sup>4</sup>

The descent of  $ep_1 p_3$  from a common ancestor ( $\phi$ ) is demonstrated by the following coincidences: *Am.* 1. 10. 55–56 inter *A.A.* 3. 411–12 et 3. 425–8; 2. 7. 13 *qui temere insimulas qui credis ad omnia frustra*; 2. 10. 23 *saepe fit in graciles ep<sub>1</sub>*: *s. f. ut g. p<sub>1</sub><sup>2</sup> p<sub>3</sub>*; 3. 8. 57 *possideant] pessundant*; 58 *seruit et . . . gerunt*; 3. 14. 47 *tibi] quidem*; *A.A.* 1. 47 *hamum*; 482 *ista] cuncta*; 2. 167 *amet] aget p<sub>1</sub>*: *agat ep<sub>3</sub>*; 236 *mollibus his] militiae*; 337 *sed non] non tibi*; 412 *haec] quaedam*; 626 *atque . . . nil] nil . . . nunc (nil p<sub>3</sub>)*; 698 *laedunt nonnullos*; 669–72 inter 3. 9–10 et 3. 59–60; 3. 370 *maius opus] magnum opus est*; 407 *erat et*; 509 *nostro (-a p<sub>3</sub>)*; 540 *nostra] docta*; 673 *et] hoc*; *Rem.* 91 *sera est medicina medentis (+W)*; 145 *nullo sub*

<sup>1</sup> It is instructive to compare S. G. Owen's ed. maior of the *Tristia* with his O.C.T. and to ask oneself which type of apparatus really tells the reader more.

<sup>2</sup> The indirect tradition for the *carmina amatoria* is sparse and of little assistance to the editor: see Tafel 62 ff.; E. Lissberger, *Das Fortleben der Röm. Elegiker in den Carm. Epig.*, diss. Tübingen, 1934. When Seneca (*Contr.* 2. 2. 8) puts *rurus* into the mouth of Porcius Latro at *Am.* 1. 2. 12, he is almost

certainly misquoting; similarly the author of *C.L.E.* 936, who gives *A.A.* 1. 475 as *quid poterat durum saxo aut quid egs.*

<sup>3</sup> In particular I think of Axelson's wholly convincing *subestur* at *A.A.* 1. 620 (*Hermes* lxxvii [1958], 127–8).

<sup>4</sup> On these and other *florilegia* see Tafel 46–47; Ullman, *C.P.* xxvii (1932), 11–19; Boas, *Mnem.* xlii (1914), 22 (p<sub>3</sub>); F. W. Lenz, *Parerga Ovidiana*, pp. 404–10.

(+X); 234 *praecipuus labor est*, 344 *ipsa puerula] semina saepe*. This is a larger number of passages than are really needed to prove common descent; but they also serve to draw attention to the character of the differences between  $\phi$  and the other manuscripts. These differences are in most cases attributable to deliberate alteration, designed to render the verse quotable out of context. This consideration is important, since it impairs any claims which  $\phi$  might have to independent authority: it is, as is well known, the chief piece of evidence for the location of *Ep. Sapph.* between *Her. 14* and *16*,<sup>1</sup> where most editors since Heinsius have placed it, but neither this fact (the authorship of *Ep. Sapph.* being dubious) nor the preservation of the correct *prensi* at *Am. 1. 2. 14* (cf. *Notes I*, p. 54) can outweigh the obvious evidences of sophification. If the 'editing' suffered by  $\phi$  be ignored, it emerges as a manuscript belonging to the  $\beta$  family. I have cited it extensively in my apparatus because no previous editor has used it, but no more authority must be allowed to it than to any other *rec.*<sup>2</sup>

The other *florilegium* which I list,  $p_2$ , is of less interest, and I cite it only occasionally. Like  $\phi$ , it quotes from *Ep. Sapph.* between *Her. 14* and *16*, but the choice of excerpts in *Am.*, *A.A.*, and *Rem.* differs from that in  $\phi$ , though a few readings seem to indicate a distant connexion: *Am. 2. 10. 23* *saepe fit ut graciles*; *A.A. 3. 509 nostro*; *Rem. 234 praecipuus labor est*.

#### THE 'EXCERPTA PUTEANI' AND 'EXCERPTA SCALIGERI'

The exc. Put., where they are first mentioned by Heinsius (ad *Her. 2. 73*) are expressly said by him to be 'à Puteaneo codice diversa'; they were in fact compiled by Hendrik van Put, otherwise Puteanus (Sandys, *Hist. Class. Schol.* ii. 305), and thus have nothing to do with the collation of P sent to Heinsius in 1639 by its owners, the Dupuy brothers (V. Fabricius to N. H., *Sylloge*, iii. 792)—a collation, it should perhaps be added, of no moment, since Heinsius afterwards collated P for himself (N. H. to R. H. Schele, *Sylloge*, ii. 744; Blok 226). Heinsius was eagerly expecting these excerpts in March 1655 (N. H. to I. Vossius, *Sylloge*, iii. 681), but I cannot find when he received them. The provenance of exc. Scal. (which must be distinguished from the 'Scaligeri codex' in which Scaliger recorded many of his corrections) I have not discovered. When Heinsius cites the readings of both sets of excerpts, they always agree, and it seems extremely probable that they represent in fact not two sources but one.<sup>3</sup> They often agree with *a* or its representative, but not invariably: *Am. 1. 4. 23 queraris, 48 superiecta, 1. 6. 6 subtili, 41 prodit, al.*; *A.A. 1. 581 si sorte, 730 hic . . . hunc, 2. 164 uale, 666 legit; Rem. 333 uti (Scal.), 364 quo uolet (Put.), 574 sustinuisse (Scal.).* These signs of independence are more frequent in the *Amores* than in the *Ars* or *Remedia*. This state of affairs can be explained in various ways, since it is quite uncertain from how many sources the excerpts were compiled. In *A.A.* both Put. and Scal. and in *Rem.* Scal. agree very closely with R (cf. in particular *Rem. 486 destineatur R, exc. Scal.*), and it would be wise to reckon with the possibility that one of their sources was a collation of R. If so, it is odd that Heinsius, who was not blind to the

<sup>1</sup> See Palmer's edition<sup>2</sup> of the *Heroines*, p. 422; Ullman, *C.P.* xxvii (1932), 13.

<sup>2</sup> It can hardly have been earlier in date than the twelfth century (so Ullman, *C.P.* xxiii [1928], 131, n. 1); certainly not the ninth, as suggested by Purser (*loc. cit.*).

<sup>3</sup> The two sets can hardly have been identical, or Heinsius would not have bothered to cite both. Either one set was copied, with some omissions and a few additions, from the other (i.e. Put. from Scal.), or both derived from a common source.

principles of stemmatics (Blok 232) and must have known something of the history of the excerpts, should have proved himself here no better than a Havercamp (cf. Munro's ed. of *Lucretius*, i<sup>4</sup>. 18). In the present state of our ignorance, and since Heinsius was Heinsius and not Havercamp, I have, wisely or unwisely, cited the excerpts fairly freely in my apparatus as if they possessed independent authority.

*Peterhouse, Cambridge*

E. J. KENNEY

#### ERRATUM

I take this opportunity of correcting a particularly reprehensible error of my own on p. 140 of my edition of these poems. At *A.A.* i. 730 read '... hoc multi †non ualuisse† putant'; and at ll. 3-4 of the critical apparatus read 'equidem multi⟨s⟩ utique' eqs. In other words, the manuscripts are unanimous in offering *multi*. I hope that Dr. Lenz will be glad to have this evidence of our common humanity (*Maia* xiii [1961], 131).

E. J. K.

## THE TRICLINIAN EDITION OF ARISTOPHANES

AMONG the Greek manuscripts in the Earl of Leicester's library at Holkham, which were recently acquired by the Bodleian Library through the generosity of the Dulverton Trust, is a volume containing eight of Aristophanes' plays. This manuscript (no. 88, formerly no. 269) is not included in the list of Aristophanes' manuscripts compiled by J. W. White,<sup>1</sup> and it seems that no editor has ever consulted it. The object of this paper is to describe the manuscript, which will be called L, to prove that it is an almost complete copy of the Triclinian edition of Aristophanes, and to point out its close relationship to the Aldine edition, whose readings it often anticipates. In the past only the *Plutus*, *Clouds*, *Frogs*, and part of the *Knights* have been known in the recension of Triclinius.<sup>2</sup> It is now possible to confirm the ingenious conjectures of von Holzinger, who suggested that Triclinius probably edited eight of the comedies.<sup>3</sup> The result of using the new evidence should be to simplify the apparatus criticus and to throw light on Byzantine and Renaissance scholarship.

At this point I must make some acknowledgements. The credit for first noticing the value of the Holkham MS. belongs to Dr. C. T. Gelzer, who expressed a particular interest in its relation to the Aldine edition.<sup>4</sup> As I had independently made considerable progress in my own study of the manuscript when his article appeared, he has kindly allowed me to continue with my original plan and include some remarks on Musurus. I am also greatly indebted to Mr. D. Mervyn Jones for his generous help in discussing problems with me and lending me numerous photographs and other material.

Now to describe the manuscript: it consists of 278 leaves of paper measuring 258×192 mm., with one column of 20 lines to the page; the space occupied by the text measures approximately 190×90 mm., and there is a large area in the margins assigned to the scholia. The paper is thick and well made, with a watermark similar to the designs numbered 7680 and 7682-4 in Briquet's collection,<sup>5</sup> which suggests a date c. A.D. 1400-30. The quires are of 8 leaves, not numbered. The whole manuscript, with the exception of the last folio which is of later date, was written in a clear and good hand typical of the first half of the fifteenth century. I have not been able to identify the scribe or any of the later owners, several of whom made a few corrections. There are numerous scholia and glosses in the same brown ink as the text, but written rather smaller. The book shows few signs of use and is in extremely good condition except that the text breaks off at *Peace* 1268, and it is impossible to say how much is missing. The binding is fairly modern, with the usual Holkham emblem stamped on it. Nothing is known of the early history of the manuscript.

<sup>1</sup> *Classical Philology* i (1906), 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See A. Turyn, *The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Euripides* (Urbana, 1957), p. 32, n. 49; W. J. W. Koster, *Autour d'un manuscrit d'Aristophanes* (Groningen, 1957), also his article in *Stud. it. di fil. class.* xxviii (1956), 171-80.

<sup>3</sup> *Vorstudien zur Beurteilung der Erklärertätigkeit des Demetrios Triclinios zu den Komödien des Aristophanes* (= *SB Wien* 217, 4) (Vienna, 1939), esp. pp. 3-35.

<sup>4</sup> See *Gnomon* xxxiii (1961), 28, n. 9.

<sup>5</sup> C. M. Briquet, *Les Filigranes*.

The contents of the manuscript are as follows:

Item Folio

1. 1. Excerpts of Hephæstion, inc. τὸ ἱαμβικὸν μέτρον δέχεται. This is not now to be found in the Triclinian MS. Vat. gr. 1294 (=Vv5), owing to the loss of the initial leaves.
2. 2. Demetrius Triclinius, περὶ μέτρων inc. ἵστεον ὅτι πάντα τὰ μέτρα (Dübner, *Prolegomena*, no. xvii). The last part of this is on fol. 1b in Vv5.
3. 2<sup>v</sup>. The same, περὶ σημείων τῆς κοινῆς συλλαβῆς, inc. ἐπειδήπερ οἱ πάλαι περὶ γραμματικῆς (Dübner, no. xvii continued). Found on fol. 1b in Vv5.
4. 3. Excerpts of Platonius, περὶ διαφορᾶς κωμῳδῶν, inc. καλὸν ἐπισημήνασθαι τὰς αἰρίας (Dübner, no. i). Found in Vv5 on fol. 1b verso.
5. 4. Platonius, περὶ διαφορᾶς χαρακτήρων, inc. Κρατῖνος ὁ τῆς παλαιᾶς κωμῳδίας (Dübner, no. ii). Found in Vv5 on fol. 2.
6. 4. Anonymous, περὶ κωμῳδίας, inc. τῆς κωμῳδίας τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἀρχαῖον (Dübner, no. v). Found in Vv5 on fol. 2.
7. 4<sup>v</sup>. Anonymous, περὶ κωμῳδίας, inc. ὅτι ὁ γέλως τῆς κωμῳδίας (Dübner, no. vi). Found in Vv5 on fol. 2<sup>v</sup>.
8. 5. Thomas Magister, *Life of Aristophanes*, inc. Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ κωμῳδοποιὸς γένει μὲν ἦν Αθηναῖος, πατρὸς δὲ Φιλίππου (Dübner, no. xv). Found in Vv5 on fol. 2<sup>v</sup>.
9. 5. Aristophanes, *Plutus*, preceded as in Vv5 by hypothesis I (ed. Bergk, Teubner 1897). The scholia open with the same heading in L and Vv5: σχόλια τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μαγίστρου.
10. 36<sup>v</sup>. *Clouds*, preceded as in Vv5 by hypothesis VIII (Bergk). The scholia are divided into two sets on the Triclinian model but have no heading.
11. 72. *Frogs*, preceded as in Vv5 by hypothesis III (Bergk). There are Triclinian metrical scholia and ordinary scholia; the latter have a heading which is not found in Vv5: σχόλια τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μαγίστρου.
12. 107. *Knights*, preceded as in Vv5 by hypotheses I-III (Bergk). The scholia are divided into two sets, the metrical scholia being headed: τὰ περὶ τῶν μέτρων ταῦτα ἡμέτερά ἐστι Δημητρίου τοῦ Τρικλινίου and the others σχόλια παλαιὰ Ἀριστοφάνους γραμματικοῦ, as in Vv5.
13. 140. *Acharnians*, with hypothesis I (Bergk). Scholia divided into two sets, both with the same headings as those to the *Knights*.
14. 170. *Wasps*, with hypotheses II, I (Bergk). Metrical scholia of the Triclinian type and ordinary scholia headed: σχόλια παλαιὰ Ἀριστοφάνους γραμματικοῦ.
15. 206<sup>v</sup>. *Birds*, with hypotheses IV, I, II (Bergk). Metrical scholia of the Triclinian type and ordinary scholia headed: σχόλια παλαιὰ Ἀριστοφάνους γραμματικοῦ.
16. 248. *Peace*, with hypotheses I-III (Bergk). The end of the play from l. 1268 is lost; ll. 1228-68 are written in a later hand and have clearly been transcribed from the Aldine edition. Metrical scholia of the Triclinian type and ordinary scholia headed: σχόλια παλαιὰ Ἀριστοφάνους γραμματικοῦ.

This list of contents makes it clear that L is a copy of the Triclinian edition of Aristophanes, and it will be proved below that we have here the latest of the Triclinian recensions, which is known also from the MS. Vat. gr. 1294

(= Vv5). As the metrical scholia to the *Acharnians*, a play not found in the Paris or Vatican manuscripts of Triclinian origin, are explicitly attributed to Triclinius in L, we are in a position to confirm the hypothesis of Holzinger, that the late metrical scholia known from the Aldine are the work of Triclinius, despite the doubts of Thiemann and Koster.<sup>1</sup>

The next step is to prove that L is not contaminated, by which I mean that the Triclinian metrical scholia have not been added to a text of different character, and that there is a very close relation between L, Vv5, and the Aldine in both text and scholia: all this will become quite clear from the collations given below. As to the stemmatic position of L in the plays that are otherwise known in the Triclinian recension, it is clear from the state of the text that L and Vv5 are very closely connected with each other, but it is not easy to find readings which show clearly whether L is derived from Vv5 or not. This problem is more easily approached by way of the scholia; for an examination of these in the *Triad* and *Knights*, where L and Vv5 can be compared, shows that although L in some places has fewer or shorter scholia than Vv5, there are other passages in which it has a fuller or otherwise superior reading: so I infer that L must be treated as a gemellus of Vv5.

As for the plays not previously known in the Triclinian recension, the new manuscript will be welcome in two ways. It sides consistently with various groups of manuscripts whose text shows many signs of the conjectural activity of a medieval editor. There can no longer be any doubt that this editor was Triclinius. In future editors should be able to simplify the apparatus by using the symbol L or Tri at numerous points where it has been the custom to refer to various combinations of late manuscripts and the Aldine. Secondly, there is now a manuscript source for some scholia previously known from the Aldine alone. This allows us to test the accusation that might be made against Musurus, that he wrote these scholia himself. Collation of L shows that at any rate in the *Birds*, where the evidence is easy to assemble, thanks to White's edition of the scholia, most of the scholia that were known from the Aldine alone are of Triclinian origin (*v. infra*). These scholia have other uses as well. At worst they show Triclinius's aims and methods in editing the plays; it is, however, quite possible that they will turn out to be of value by preserving notes not found elsewhere.

Another point of interest is the new light thrown on the history of scholarship. The collations presented below show that in all the plays, and perhaps most noticeably in the *Peace*, readings which editors have previously regarded as conjectures first introduced into the text by Musurus are found as early as the Triclinian edition. This is important for our estimate of what Byzantine scholars were capable of doing for a text. The contribution of Musurus drops correspondingly, the ingenious scholar whose work is preserved in B loses a little of his glory, and even the conjectures of such scholars as Bentley and Brunck occasionally turn out to be anticipated by Triclinius.

There is one more problem to be discussed. In view of the extreme similarity in text and scholia between L and the Aldine, can it be that L was once in the hands of Musurus? It is known that Musurus had several manuscripts, for he speaks in his preface of διάφορα ἀντίγραφα. He made considerable use of the Modena MS. Estensis a.U. 5. 10 (= E), which has a note of his ownership,

<sup>1</sup> *Autour d'un manuscrit*, pp. 37, n. 1, 91, n. 1, 98, n. 1.

but this was not his only guide in constituting the text.<sup>1</sup> It seems clear also that at least two of his other manuscripts were representatives of the Triclinian edition. The proof is this: there are scholia peculiar to the Aldine edition which comment on striking variant readings and make it clear that such readings are to be found in a number of manuscripts; e.g. at *Frogs* 341 ἐν δέ τιον ἐκλέοπτε τὸ τινάσσων, and *Birds* 456 ἐν τιοι δ' οὐ κεῖται τὸ φρενός. But as these readings are now known to us only in the Triclinian manuscripts it seems certain that Musurus was referring to such manuscripts, especially as both readings may well be alterations for the sake of the metre.

Nevertheless I do not think it possible that Musurus ever handled L. There are several reasons for this. First of all L shows little sign of wear and tear and none of the characteristic marks that would suggest that it had been used as printer's copy.<sup>2</sup> But this is not in itself decisive, as the same is true of the Estensis. More important is the argument of Holzinger and others:<sup>3</sup> in the Aldine there is a subscription at the end of *Birds*, which was clearly intended to mark the end of the book, and as the Aldine also contains the *Peace* and *Ecclesiazusae*, the obvious inference is that at first Musurus possessed the text of only seven plays, and when he had set up the type for these, a new manuscript suddenly appeared.

Here are some collations to demonstrate what has been said above.

#### Item 9, *Plutus*. A: text.

Detailed information about the readings of various manuscripts can be had from Holzinger's *Kritisch-Exegetischer Kommentar zu Aristophanes' Plutos*, passim, and W. J. W. Koster, *Autour d'un manuscrit d'Aristophane*, pp. 144 ff. With the aid of these two works I was able to establish that in *Plutus* 1-300 L has all the characteristic readings of Vv5 except at l. 73, where L's scribe made the obvious correction ἐργάσεσθε and did not add above the line the variant ἀφήσετον (which in Vv5 is probably in a later corrector's hand anyway). In the remainder of the play sample collations showed that L shares the following readings peculiar to Vv5: 550 Διονύσουν εἶναι ὅμοιον 586 κοτίνῳ στεφάνῳ (also in R) 607 χρῆν . . . ἀνύτεων 683 ἀθάρης 852 μυριάκις (om. καὶ) 1012 ἥτησεν ἀν σ'.

Koster remarks (op. cit., p. 137) that Triclinius anticipates later scholars at many points. One may add to his examples, for at l. 90 L and Vv5 have the small metrical correction (ἐποίησεν) usually ascribed to Bentley, and at 91 (διαγιγνώσκομι) and 993 (νννί γ', omisso ἔτι) they both have the corrections attributed by current editors to the Aldine.

#### B: scholia.

The scholia are Triclinian and follow the pattern of those in Vv5, as may be seen at 635, where neither L nor Vv5 has the scholium of Triclinius's earlier recension, and 1193, where L has the note otherwise known only from Vv5 (for details see Holzinger in *Charisteria Alois Rzach*, p. 68). On the other hand, the scribe of L abbreviates or omits a number of scholia, as will be seen shortly. Koster discusses (op. cit., pp. 68 ff.) some scholia that vary from one Triclinian

<sup>1</sup> See Zacher in *Bursian* lxxi (1892), pp. 30-32. Lobel, *The Greek Manuscripts of Aristotle's Poetics*, pp. 57 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For a list of such manuscripts see E. <sup>3</sup> *Vorstudien*, pp. 29-30.

recension to another. Of these L lacks the notes to 197, 286, 397, and 631, but at 456 L has the same note as Vv5. What is more interesting is that at 505 L has a longer version than Vv5, coinciding with that in MS. Coislin 192, from which Koster edited the note (*Scholia in Ar. Plut. et Nub.* [Leiden, 1927], p. 20). This suggests that L is a gemellus rather than a copy of Vv5. Confirmation of this idea came from collation of the scholia to *Plutus* 1–20 in Vv5 and L. Although L lacks the metrical scholium, some of the shorter notes, and the indication *παλαιόν* that Triclinius put in front of his note on the first line, in two places it adds to the version of Vv5, first by having a general heading *σχόλια τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μαγίστρου* and then in the gloss to l. 5: Vv5 has *τῶν ἀφροσυνῶν ὡν ὁ δεσπότης ἔχει*, to which L adds *ηγουν τῶν πληγῶν αἱ τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι τοῖς δεσπόταις ὄφειλονται*.

Item 10, *Clouds*. A: text.

Collation of ll. 1–200 combined with sample collations from the rest of the play once again showed the very close connexion between Vv5, L, and the Aldine. Here I will do no more than list a few striking readings which are common to all three witnesses, despite the fact that Coulon in his edition says that they are peculiar to the Aldine: 115 *τάδικώτατα* 274 *ἐπακούσατε* 286 *μαρμαρέασιν ἐν* 471 *εἰς λόγον* 786 *δή γε* (omisso *νῦν*) 1029 *τότε ζῶντες* *τηνίκ'* *ἵσ* 1231 *ἄλλ' ἀν.*

B: scholia.

The scholia support all that has been said before. I have made a detailed comparison of the scholia on 1–100 with the transcript of Vv5 given by Zacher ('Die Handschriften und Klassen der Aristophanesscholien', in *Jahrbücher für Klassische Philologie* xvi [1888], 605 ff.). The result is as follows:

(a) Omissions of L:

1. There is a lacuna in the metrical scholium, on which see below. 2. L omits *πρότασις*. 4. L omits *κατασκενή*. 16, 21, 81, 99. L omits the heading *παλαιόν*. 22. L omits the gloss *όφειλω*. 32. L omits the gloss *οὐ . . . φασίν*. 33. L omits the gloss *πραγμάτων*. 41. L omits *προκατάστασις*. 43. L omits *διήγησις*. 43. L omits the note. 51. L omits the gloss *ἄζε*. 52. L omits the heading of the scholium. 66. L omits the gloss *μόλις*.

(b) Additions or improvements in L:

5. A gloss *καὶ ὁ φασιν ἴδιωτικῶς ῥοχαλίζοντος*. 8. Before the line: *βάσις*. 14. L has the right reading *δύναμαι* for *δυνάμενος* Vv5. 51. A gloss *αὐτη*. 70. A gloss *περὶ αὐτόν*. 70. At the end of the scholium L adds: *ἄλλοι δέ φασι δὰ τὸ ἴδιωτικῶς λεγόμενον σωσάντιν· καλεῖται δὲ σωσάντιν ὡς σῶζον τοὺς ἄνδρας*.

Some passages in the metrical scholia deserve a comment. The analysis of l. 470 which Holzinger noted as peculiar to Vv5 (see *Charisteria*, p. 70) occurs also in L. The line is described as *δακτυλικὸν ἐφθημιμερὲς διλκμάνειον καλεῖται*. The metrical scholium on l. 1 allows some inferences about the relation of L, Vv5, and the Aldine. The text is: *ἡ εἰσθετος τοῦ δράματος ἀρχεται ἐκ συστηματικῆς περιόδου καὶ ἔξῆς ἐκ προσώπων ἀμοιβαίων οἱ δὲ στίχοι εἰσὶν ἰαμβικοὶ τρίμετροι ἀκατάληκτοι συθ' (σμέ' L Ald.)*, ὃν προτίθεται ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ δράματος

κῶλον ἰαμβικὸν μονόμετρον ἀκατάληκτον, τὸ ίοὺ ίού· μετὰ δὲ τὸν σκα' τίθεται ἐν εἰσθέσει κῶλον ἰαμβικὸν μονόμετρον ἀκατάληκτον· καὶ μετὰ τὸν σλύ' ἔτερον κῶλον ἰαμβικὸν μονόμετρον βραχυκατάληκτον· τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων τῶν στίχων οὗτος· καταπαττόμενος γάρ παιπάλη γενήσομαι. ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀποθέσεσι τῶν συστημάτων παράγραφος· ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τέλει κορωνίς.

The words spaced are omitted in both L and the Aldine. The scribe of L left a space and added in the margin ζήτει, realizing that something was missing from his exemplar. In the Aldine there is no such indication. As the whole scholium is clear in Vv5 this is a proof that L cannot be a direct transcript of Vv5. The corruption of the number 259 was not noticed and corrected by Musurus.

Item 11, *Frogs*. A: text.

We can come to the heart of the matter at once by referring to a single passage. Holzinger (*Charisteria*, p. 67) remarked that of all the manuscripts known to him Vv5 alone omitted the word *τίνασσων* at 342. So does L. Once again collation in this play showed many readings common to L and Vv5, and a number in which they anticipate the Aldine: 33 ἐγώ 907 μέν γε 1272 *Αἰσχύλε* 1307 *ταῦτ'* 1362 *δέκντάτων*. At 71 Vv5 and L have added γ', a correction that used to be assigned to Bentley.

B: scholia.

The scholia in 1-92 in Vv5 were transcribed by Zacher (op. cit., pp. 614 ff.). Comparison in L showed that the scribe included one gloss not in Vv5 (*εἴποις* on l. 7), but left out a few others: 18, 35, 72, 79, 87. L omits the heading *παλαιόν*. 22 L omits the note. 39 L omits the gloss *ἥν*. 48 L omits part of the second gloss. 79-82 L omits the glosses.

Other evidence of the relation of L and Vv5 is available from some notes which Triclinius altered slightly from one recension to another. These scholia have been studied by Professor Koster (*Autour d'un manuscrit*, esp. pp. 77-80). It turns out that at 665 and 798 L has the Triclinian notes that are peculiar to the edition which we have in Vv5.

Item 12, *Knights*. A: text.

Vv5 preserves *Knights* as far as l. 270, and the closeness of L and Vv5 in these lines is seen from the fact that the only difference between them, apart from minor faults of itacism and inconsistency in the writing or omission of the subscript, is at 36: *θεαταῖσιν* Vv5, *θεαταῖς σοι* L. That the rest of the text in L is Triclinian seems beyond doubt, as it shows almost all the readings of the interpolated class of manuscripts which have been listed by Mr. D. Mervyn Jones (*C.Q. n.s. v [1955]*, 42). I reproduce the relevant readings below, and add that L does not have those that are known only from B.

1-270 The text of L in these lines is indicated above. 344 *τι πρᾶγμα* LVp2 Ald.B 377 *εἴτε γ'* LVp2Ald.B 379 *σκεψόμεσθ'* LAld.B 382 *πυρός γ'* LVp2 Ald.B 407 *οἴομαι* LAld.B 408 *ησθέντα καὶ παιῶνα δὴ καὶ* LVp2Ald.B 418 *ἐπιλέγω* L *ἐπιλέγων* Vp2Ald.B 423 *ἐλάνθανόν γ'* LVp2Ald. 434 *ἔάν* LVp2 Ald.B 453 *καὶ post ἀνδρικώτατα om.* LVp2Ald.B(M) 463 *γομφούμενά γε* LAld.B(*τε* Vp2) 508 *ἐπη λέξοντάς γ'* LVp2Ald.B 517 *δλύγοις χαρίσασθαι* LVp2Ald.B(MS) 542 *πρῶτα* LVp2Ald.B(MS) 569 *κούδεις οὐδεπώποτ'* LVp2

Ald.B 600 καὶ σκόροδα LVp2Ald.B(schol.M) 616 ἄξιόν γε LVp2<sup>sc</sup>Ald.B 629 πιθανώτατα δ' ἡ βουλή γε LVp2Ald.B 635 μόθινές γε κόβαλοι LVp2B (τε B) 662 τριχίδες εἰ LVp2Ald.B(R) 668 ἵν' ἀπό LVp2<sup>sc</sup>Ald.B 687 αἰμύλοις LVp2Ald.B 717 τῷ μὲν LVp2Ald.B(Γ<sup>2</sup>MS) 742 τὸν στρατηγὸν ὑπεκδραμῶν τὸν ἐκ Πύλου LVp2Ald.(similia BI<sup>2</sup>) 789 εἰλεῖς LVp2Ald.B(A) 846 ἦ τῶν LVp2Ald.B(RS) 869 τοιτῷ γε LVp2Ald. 873 δον γε LVp2Ald.B 878 δῆτα ταῦτα LVp2Ald.B 893 περιήμπισχέν γ' ἵνα σε LVp2B 899 τοιτὶ γ' εἰπ' LVp2Ald.B 901 ἦν καὶ LVp2Ald.B 904 οὐ με LVp2Ald.B 908 γε LVp2Ald.B(RM) 921 δὲ τῶν ξύλων LVp2Ald.B 970 ἵνα LVp2Ald.B(RM) 989 ἀν LVp2Ald.B 1069 ὅτι τοῦτο τί ἐστι LVp2Ald.B 1088 γε LAld.B (RI<sup>2</sup>) 1098 καὶ μὴν LVp2Ald.B 1100 ἐγώ LVp2Ald.B 1196 ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐκεῖνοι γ' LAld.B 1214 τί οὖν ἐστ'; Άλλ. ἀλλά γ' οὐχ LAld.B 1218 ὁρᾶς οὐν LVp2Ald.B 1259 τοίνυν γ' LVp2Ald.B 1268 τὸν ομ. LAld.B 1273 διὰ τὸ κακῶς LVp2Ald.B 1296 τῆς ομ. LVp2Ald.B 1339 κάτειπέ μοι πρὸ τοῦ ποίου LVp2Ald.B 1346 τοιαῦτά μ' ἔδρων, ἐγώ δ' οὐκ LVp2Ald.B 1373 οὐδεὶς ἐν ἀγορᾷ LAld.B 1401 αὐτὸν τὸ λούτρον πίεται LVp2Ald.B.

B: scholia.

The expected similarity between L and Vv5 in 1-270 occurs. I have collated in detail 1-50 (unfortunately there is no transcript of these by Zacher) and noted the following differences: 4. The first gloss in Vv5 is: μετὰ φθορᾶς εἰσῆλθεν, but in L: μετὰ φθορᾶς παρεγένετο, ὡς ἀναιδῶς ἐλθόντος. 20. L omits the note beginning: ἐστι καὶ εἰδος ὀρχήσεως. 26. L omits the note on ἦν beginning: ἰδού· καὶ ἐν Πλούτῳ. 33. L adds on τεκμηρίῳ the gloss παραδείγματι. 38. L adds on ἐπίδηλον the gloss φανερόν. 41. L omits a note beginning: ὅτι κυάμοις ἔχρωντο. 48. On θωπεύω L adds: ἀπὸ τοῦ θῶ τὸ εὐωχοῦμαι. ὁ μέλλων θώσω· τὸ ἔνθου· ἀφ' οὐ δι' Αὐρεῖς θωρεῦσθαι λέγονται τὸ εὐωχεῖσθαι. καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ἔνθεσιν οὗτος λέγει τὴν τροφήν. 50. L omits the note λείπει δὲ ἡμέραν, ἵν' γίνιαν ἡμέραν ἔσται ἀδίκαστον.

In his article referred to above Mr. Mervyn Jones mentions some scholia in the Aldine whose source is at present unknown (pp. 44-45). These notes on 355, 628, 1140, 1150, and 1185 are not found in L, and so we are no nearer a solution of the problem. There is, however, one point in the Aldine scholia that is elucidated by L, namely the notes about the chorus in ancient comedy and tragedy found at 589. These have been discussed by Professor Fraenkel in his commentary on A. Ag. 1344 ff., pp. 634 and 831, and it can now be seen that the interpolations in the scholium are due to Triclinius, not Musurus. The text of L is as follows: οἱ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ χοροὺς ἰστασαν οἱ τὰ χορικὰ ὑπεκρίνοντο καὶ γέδον μέλη. συνεστήκει δὲ ὁ χορὸς ἐξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ὅμοι καὶ παῖδων. ἐστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ ἡμιχόρια ἰστασαν, ἦτοι ἐξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ (legendum ἡ) γυναικῶν. ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν κωμικὸς χορὸς ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν κδ', ὡς καὶ οὗτος ἀπηριθμησεν ἐν Ὁρνίθων δράματι, ἄρρενας μὲν ὅρνις ἀπαριθμήσας ιβ', θηλεῖς δὲ ιβ', ὁ δὲ τραγικὸς ιε', ὡς Αἰσχύλος ἀπαριθμεῖ ἐν Ηγαμέμονος δράματι. φασὶ δὲ ὅτι ἐπλεονέκτει πάντοτε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν μέρος, καὶ ἡσαν ιγ', αἱ δὲ γυναικες ια'. εἰ δὲ παῖδων εἴη καὶ γυναικῶν, αἱ γυναικες ἡσαν πλείους, ηγουν ιγ'. εἰ δὲ πρεσβυτῶν καὶ νέων, ἐπλεονέκτει τὸ τῶν πρεσβυτῶν μέρος.

Item 13, *Acharnians*. A: text.


The manuscripts of this play were studied and collated by E. Cary in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* xviii (1907), 157 ff., and I have used his

work as the basis of what follows. The stemmatic position of L can be made plain quickly, as it has all the readings peculiar to the group *chB* (Cary, p. 180), but none of those peculiar to *c* alone (Cary, p. 171). With regard to the readings of *hB* (Cary, pp. 179 and 181), L has all the metrical corrections, and nearly all the non-metrical peculiarities. 233 ἐπὶ *hB*) (ἐπὶ L 358 τοῦπιξηνος *LhB* 385 στρέφεις τεχνάζει *LhB* 621 κατάρξω *LhB* 627 τοὺς ἀναπαιστους *LhB* 738 μαχανά *LhB* 766 παχεῖαι καὶ καλαί *LhB* 770 θᾶσθαι *LhB* 816 ἐρμῆ μπολαῖς *hB*) (ἐρμ' ἐμπολαῖς L.

The other readings of L may be classed under various headings:

- (a) Metrical changes in *h* only (Cary, p. 182). L has all these except that it reads ἀν γ' θλέσειν at 1153 and γε ταῖς ἐμαῖσιν ἀν τύχαις at 1197.
- (b) Metrical changes in *B* only (Cary, p. 183). L has only one of these, 437 ἐπειδήπερ γ'.
- (c) Other readings in *h* only (Cary, pp. 173-4). L has a number of these: 965 τρεῖς κατασκόντις λόφους 997 ὅρχον 1146 ρύγωντι 1212 ἵω ἵω.
- (d) Other readings in *B* only (Cary, p. 175). L has a small proportion of these: 581 ἀν τῶν 626 λόγοισιν 642 πόλεσιν.
- (e) Anticipations of the Aldine. Of these there are only two: 1089 ἐστίν 1197 ἐμαῖσιν ἀν τύχαις.

As a result of these readings it seems possible to revise Cary's stemma as follows:



#### B: scholia.

In dealing with the scholia to the *Acharnians* and the three other plays found in L it is my intention to show that L has a number of scholia which Holzinger had marked out as Triclinian in his *Vorstudien*, and then to give a transcript of the scholia on the first few lines of each play, as it will be seen even from these short specimens how Triclinius went to work in making his abridgement of the old scholia.

(a) Holzinger (*Vorstudien*, pp. 86-87) pointed out the Triclinian character of some notes on *Ach.* 626-7. L has exactly what he would have expected here, namely the headings *Xορός* (*κομμάτιον*) at 626, and *παράβασις στίχων λα'* at 628, together with the following scholium: ἐξελθόντων τῶν ὑποκριτῶν εἰσάγεται ὁ χορὸς συνήθως λέγων τὴν παράβασιν, ἃς προτίθεται κομμάτιον στίχων ἀναπαιστικῶν τετραμέτρων καταληκτικῶν δύο. ἡ δὲ παράβασις, ὡς καὶ μακρόν λέγεται, στίχων ἐστὶν ὄμοιων ἀναπαιστικῶν τετραμέτρων καταληκτικῶν λα', ὃν τελευταῖος Οὐτέ πανουργῶν οὐτέ κατάρδων ἀλλὰ τὰ βέλτιστα διδάσκων. ἡ δὲ ἔκθεσις αὐτῆς κώλων ὄμοιων ἀναπαιστικῶν 5', ὃν τὰ μὲν ε' δίμετρα ἀκατάληκτα, τὸ δὲ 5', τὸ Δευτέριον καὶ λακαταπύγων, δίμετρον καταληκτικὸν ἐφθημμερές, παροιμιακόν. ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει ἀμφοτέρων παράγραφος. (See also Addenda below, p. 47.)

#### (b) Schol. L *Ach.* 1-10.

1. ἡ εἰσθεσις τοῦ παρόντος δράματος ἀρχεται ἐκ συστηματικῆς περιόδου, καὶ ἔξης ἐκ προσώπων ἀμοιβαίων. οἱ δὲ στίχοι εἰσὶν ἱαμβικοὶ τρίμετροι ἀκατάληκτοι σα', ὃν τελευταῖος Ἐγώ δὲ φεύξομαι γε τοὺς Αχαρνέας. μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων κατὰ

εἰσβολὴν κῶλα δ· μετὰ τὸν μβ' στίχον, κῶλον ἱαμβικὸν μονόμετρον ὑπερκατάληκτον ἦτοι πενθημμερές, τὸν πρῶτον ἔχον πόδα ἀνάπαιστον· μετὰ τὸν νθ', κῶλον ἱαμβικὸν δίμετρον καταληκτικὸν ὁ καλεῖται <έφ>θημμερές, ἐκ δακτύλου καὶ χορείου· μετὰ τὸν ριά', μονόμετρον βραχυκατάληκτον ἐξ ἀναπαιστον· μετὰ τὸν ριβ', ἔτερον δμοιον. καὶ μετὰ τὸν ρκ', κῶλον δμοιον τῷ μετὰ τὸν μβ', ἦτοι πενθημμερές. ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀποθέσεσι παράγραφος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τέλει τῶν στίχων κορωνίς.

1. θαυμαστικὸν τὸ ὄσα ἀντὶ τοῦ πολλά. πλῆθος γὰρ ἀριθμοῦ σημαίνει τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον.

1. καλῶς ἔφη Δέδηγμαι τὴν καρδίαν, παρόσον περὶ τὴν καρδίαν συνίσταται τὰ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὡς καὶ παρ' Ὁμήρων Ὀδυσσεὺς θυμούμενος κατὰ τῶν μνηστήρων. Στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην τ' ἡνίπαπε μύθῳ, Τέτλαθι καρδία φάσκων.

2. εὐφράνθην ὀλίγα.

3. ἀλυπήθην ἦγουν πολλὰ νικῶντα καὶ τῆς φάμμου τὸν ἀριθμόν.

3. ἀπὸ δύο λέξεων ἡ σύνθεσις τῆς λέξεως. σύγκειται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς φάμμου καὶ τοῦ γάργαρα, ὁ σημαίνει τὰ πολλά. τὸ μὲν γὰρ Εὔπολις ἐπεσημάνατο, λέγων ἀριθμεῖν θεατὰς φαμμοσίους, ὡς εἰ ἐλεγεν ἔξακοσίους ἡ ἐπτακοσίους. τούτων γὰρ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τὴν κατάληξιν ἔχει. τὸ δὲ γάργαρα Ηριστομένης, "Ἐνδον γὰρ ἡμῖν γάργαρα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Λίμναις, Ανδρῶν ἐπακτῶν πᾶσα γάργαρος" ἔστια.

4. χαρᾶς καὶ ἡδονῆς.

5. ἔγώ οἶδα τὴν καρδίαν εἶπε κέαρ ὡς καὶ ἄνω "Οσα δὴ δέδηγμαι εἰρηκεν.

6. ἔζημώθη γὰρ ὁ Κλέων πέντε τάλαντα διὰ τὸ ὑβρίζειν τοὺς ἵππεας.

6. ἀπέδωκεν.

6. παρὰ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἔλαβε πέντε τάλαντα ὁ Κλέων, ἵνα πείσῃ τοὺς Αθηναίους κουφίσαι αὐτῶν τοὺς φόρους. αἰσθόμενοι δὲ οἱ ἵππεις ἀντέλεγον καὶ ἀπήγγησαν αὐτὸν τάυτα. μέμνηται τούτου καὶ Θεόπομπος.

7. λίαν ἔχάρην, ὑφράνθην, ἀπὸ τοῦ γάνυμαι· τοῦτο δὲ ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν λαμπρυνομένων χαλκέων σκευῶν.

8. τὸ καταδικασθῆναι τὸν Κλέωνα.

8. τοῦτο παρῳδία καλεῖται, ὅταν ἐκ τραγῳδίας τι μετενεχθῇ εἰς κωμῳδίαν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον τοῦτο ἐκ Τηλέφου Εὐριπίδου ἔχον οὐτως· Κακῶς δῆλοιτ· ἄν- ἄξιον γὰρ Ἐλλάδι. εἰς τὸ δράμα δὲ τῶν Ἰππέων ἀποτείνεται διὰ τούτου γὰρ φαίνεται καταδικασθεῖς ὁ Κλέων καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὰ πέντε τάλαντα.

9. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐμπαθέσ.

10. ἀτενῶς ἔβλεπον.

10. τὸν Αἰσχύλον εἶπεν ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰς Αἰσχύλου τραγῳδίας. οὐ γὰρ ἔζη κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον. τιμῆς δὲ μεγίστης ἔτυχε παρ' Αθηναίοις Αἰσχύλος, καὶ μόνα τὰ δράματα αὐτοῦ ψηφίσματι κοινῷ μετὰ θάνατον ἐδιδάσκετο.

#### Item 14, *Wasps*. A: text.

Collations of the manuscripts were published by J. W. White and E. Cary in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* xxx (1918), 1 ff. In this play also the manuscripts designated by the symbol Vp2+ present a text containing various metrical alterations. L shares these alterations and in a few points anticipates readings previously known in B only. To this play Musurus appears to have made little contribution, and in any case his reading ἔλαβες at 718 is not found in L. The following readings should make the position clear: 55 ὀλίγα γ' LBV p2+ 172 γ' LBVp2+ 202 προσκύλιε γε LBVp2+ 217 γοῦν . . . γε LBV p2+ 218 παρακαλοῦντές μ' ἀεί LBVp2+ 235 δὴ om. LBVp2+ 317 πάλαι μὲν τῆκομαι LBVp2+ 319 τηροῦμ' LBVp2+ 320 del. πάνυ LBVp2+ 538 γράφομαι γώ LBVp2+ 542 γὰρ ἀν LBVp2+ 550 γ' ἡ καὶ LBVp2+

684 γε διδῶ LB 693 τι LRBVp2+ 724 τοῦ om. LBVp2+ 732 δότις δὴ LBVp2+ 736 σὺ δ' αὐτὸν LBp2+ 743 αὐτόν LB 746 παρακελεύοντος LBVp2+ 747 οὐν LBVp2+ 749 τε σοί γ' LBVp2+ 758 ἐγὼ ν LBVp2+ 761 πείθομαί σοι LBVp2+ 775 οὐδείς σ' LBVp2+ 843 αὐτῷ LB 873 ὡς πανσαμένοισι LBVp2+ 886 εἰνεκά γε LBVp2+ 890 τῶν νῦν γε σοῦ νεωτέρων LBVp2+ 967 ταλαιπωρουμένους LBVp2+ 973 post τί om. τὸ LBVp2+ 982 ἔστι γε LBVp2+ 996 εἰπὲ κεῖνό μοι LBVp2+ 1010 γε ταχέως LB, τε ταχέως Vp2+ 1030 τοῖσι LBVp2+ 1056 ἐσβάλλετε δ' LBVp2+ 1062 δὴ LBVp2+ 1097 δὲ LBVp2+ 1141 οὐ τοίνυν γ' LB, οὗτοι νῦν γ' Vp2+ 1150 στῆθοι γ' LBIVp2+ 1193 λαγόνας τε LBVp2+ 1268 ὄντιν' LBVp2+ 1287 οἱ κτὸς LBVp2 1290 ταῦτα LB 1295 πλευρὰς L, -ηγ- supra lineam (cf. B) 1307 κάτυπτε δὴ με LΓτΒVp2+ 1324 δὸι δὲ δὴ καὶ LΓτVp2+ 1371 σοί LBVp2+ 1454 μέγα τι om. LBVp2+ 1474 πράγματα, om. τὰ, LB 1487 ὑπαὶ LBVp2+ 1492 γ' LBVp2+

## B: scholia.

(a) Holzinger (*Vorstudien*, pp. 34-35) noticed in the Aldine two metrical scholia of characteristic Triclinian phraseology, and these two notes both appear in L. First on *Wasps* 863: διὸ καὶ τὸ παρατέλευτον ἔχει κῶλον, and then on 1450-73: διαλύονται γὰρ αἱ μακραὶ συλλαβαὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἴαμβων καὶ τροχαίων, ὡς εἴρηται, εἰς δύο βραχεῖας.

Another Aldine scholium on the *Wasps* that has attracted interest is at 270, where there is a reference to the stasimon of A. *Prom.* 397 (see Professor Fraenkel on A. *Ag.* iii. 635). Unfortunately L does not help us to decide on the exact origin of this note, as it presents it only in a shortened form without the reference to Aeschylus.

(b) Schol. *Wasps* 1-10.

1. προλογίζοντι δύο οἰκέται ἀποδυσπετοῦντες πρὸς τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ γέροντος, τοῦ δεσπότου αὐτῶν. οὕτω δὲ λέγουσι τὸ ἐπινυστάζειν ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς.
2. φυλακὴν καταλύειν νυκτερινήν ἦγουν καταλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν βούλομαι καὶ μελετῶ καθεύδειν, οἷον νυστάζω.
3. άντι τοῦ φυλάσσειν μελετῶ καθεύδειν, οἷον νυστάζω.
4. οἷον μέγα τι κακὸν ἐχρέωστεις ταῖς πλευραῖς σου καὶ θέλεις αὐτὸν ἀποδοῦναι.
5. θηρίον.
6. οἷον ἀφυπνῶσαι.
7. μέρμηρα λέγεται ἡ μέριμνα καὶ ἡ φροντίς. λέγεται δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ ἡ πρὸς ὄρθρον γνομένη ἐν ταῖς ἀγρυπνίαις τοῦ ὑπνου καταφορά. οἱ γὰρ πρὸς ὑπνον τραπέντες ἀποτίθενται τὰς μερίμνας.
8. δέον ἦν εἰπεῖν κατακοιμᾶ.
9. δέον εἰπεῖν κατακοιμᾶ· ἐπεὶ ὑπνώσας ἔμελλεν μαστίζεσθαι τοῦτο εἰπε τὸ παρακινδύνευε. ἀντὶ τοῦ προηγουμένου τὸ ἐπόμενον.
10. ἦγουν ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς.
11. ὄνειδίζει καὶ οὗτος αὐτὸν ὑπνῷ περιπτίπειν λέγοντα.
12. ἀντὶ τοῦ μαίνη, παρόστον οὗτοι οἱ δάιμονες μανίας εἰσὶν ἐμποιητικοί. Σαβάζιον τὸν Διόνυσον οἱ Θρῆκες καλοῦσι, καὶ Σάβους τοὺς ἵερεῖς αὐτοῦ. παῖζει δὲ ὡς εἰ λέγει βάρβαρός τις καὶ σκληρὸς ὑπνος.
13. ἦγουν τοῦ Διονύσου. πρὸς τὸ κορυβαντιᾶς δὲ καὶ οὗτος τοῦτο ἐπήγαγεν.
14. τρέφεις.

Item 15, *Birds*. A: text.

Collations of the manuscripts were published by J. W. White and E. Cary in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* xxix (1918), 77–131. In this play the metrical recension is found in the manuscripts Vp2, H, and C, and their agreement is indicated in what follows by the symbol Vp2+. L has most but not all of the characteristic readings of this group, and as in other plays it anticipates some of the good suggestions of B. The list below shows all the readings which L shares with the group Vp2 and B, but it does not include minor points of spelling and punctuation or differences in the assignation of parts. I have no information about the contributions made by Musurus in this play, since White and Cary unfortunately did not treat the *editio princeps* as the equivalent of a manuscript, and the reports of Coulon's apparatus are grossly inaccurate.

58 γ' add. LBVp2+ 78 τε add. LB<sup>1</sup>Vp2+ 100 Σοφοκλέης LRVp2+ 109 οὐ· μάλα L, similia Vp2+ 121 εὐάερον LAVp2+ 122 μαλθακήν LRMVp2+ 129 πρώ τις ἐλθών LΓ<sup>c</sup>B 150 ὅτιη LBVp2+ 155 ἔσθ' LBVp2+ 167 τίς οὐτος ὅρνις LBVp2+ 172 ποιῶμεν LVp2+ 177 τι add. LBVp2+ 182 τοῦτο γε LB<sup>1</sup>Vp2+ 222 αὐλεῖ τις LB, similia RVΓEM 225 σωπήσεις LBVp2+ 227 L = B, similia Vp2+ 230 ὄσα LBVp2+ ἀγρῶν LBVp2+ γνίας Lvulg. 234 ὄσα LBVp2+ 242 L = Vp2<sup>1</sup>CH 243 ὄσα LBVp2+ 244 τὰς ὁξυστόμοις LBVp2+ 245 ὄσα LVp2+ εὐδρόσους τε LVp2+ 247 καὶ λειμῶνα τὸν ἐρόεντα LBVp2+ 248 ὅρνις τε LBVp2+ 254 τῶν ταναδεῖρων LVp2+ 273 γ' ἔστι LVp2+ 278 ἐπέπτατο LBVp2+ 281 ἔστι μὲν LB<sup>1</sup>Vp2+ 285 τῶν add. LVp2+ 291 ἡ πὶ LVp2+ 293 οἰκοῦσιν LBVp2+ 298 πηνέοψ L, similia BVp2+ 312 πότε om. LBVp2+ 333 παρέβαλέν τε LB 335 πολέμιον γ' ἐτράφη LVp2+ 342 κκοπῆς LVp2+ 359 τοῖς δὲ LVp2+ 364 ἐλελεῖν LVp2+ 373 χρήσιμον, om. ἡ, LBVp2+ 375 δῆτα LVp2+ 377 οὐδὲν LBVp2+ 386 τήν τε χύτραν LVp2+ 387 τῷ γε LBVp2+ 398 τοῖσι πολεμίοις LVp2+ 419 τὸν ἔχθρὸν LVp2+ 423 σὺ ταῦτα γάρ δὴ πάντα LVp2+ 424 καὶ<sup>2</sup> LBVp2+ 434 μὲν om. LUBVp2+ 437 ἔνελεξ<sup>2</sup> LAVp2+ 444 διατίθεμ<sup>2</sup> ἔγωγε LBVp2+ 456 φρενὸς om. LVp2+ 497 τὸ LABVp2+ 499 δ' om. LAVp2+ 500 γ' add. LBVp2+ 502 ἐκυλινδούμην LBVp2+ 515 ἔστηκ<sup>2</sup> ὅρνιν LBVp2+ 521 τις τὶ LVp2+ 547 τὰ, om τε LVp2+ 555 φῆ LVp2+ 560 κωλὴν LBVp2+ 564 θεοῖσιν LB 566 ὥν LBVp2+ 567 τίς βοῦν LBVp2+ 587 αὐτοῖσιν LB 595 ὥστ<sup>2</sup> οὐκ ἀπολεῖται LVp2+ 600 οἴδασι LH 602 πολλῷ LVVp2+ 607 παιδάριον τ' LEVp2+ 628 τοῖσι LVp2+ 644 τῷ δὲ τὶ LBVp2+ 645 θρῆθεν LAME, ?Vp2+ 646 δεχόμεσθα LEBVp2+ 648 δεῖν<sup>2</sup> LVp2+ 649 φράσον γε νῦν ὅπως LVp2+ 659 εὖ om. LBVp2+ 672 ὀβελίσκον LAU 675 ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ LVp2+ 701 γένετ<sup>2</sup> L, cf. BVp2+ 710 γέρανοι LAME ?, Vp2,+ μεταχωρεῖν LAVp2+ 731 τ' add. LVp2+ 751 ὠδήν LUVp2+ 755 ἔστιν ἐνθάδ<sup>2</sup> LAMVp2+ 769 τοιάνδε LΓUBVp2+ 782 οὐλυμπιάδες LBVp2+ 796 αὖ LAVp2+ 807 ἡκάσμεσθα LVp2+ 809 δρᾶν γε LBVp2+ 816 χαμεύνην LBVp2+ 823 ἡ LBVp2+ 832 ἀν καθέξει L, cf. Vp2+ 858 ὡδάν om. LVp2+ 860 post τοντί distinx. LBVp2+ 862 τοῖς καινοῖς LABVp2+ 885 ἐλεῖ LBp2+ 903 εὐξώμεσθα LB 944 ἔβας πολλὰς LVp2+ 949 δὴ ταδί LBVp2+ 952 πολύσπορα LRVp2+ 954 ἀλλὰ γάρ LVp2+ 976 διδόν<sup>2</sup> LMBVp2+ 982 παρὰ τοῦ LVp2+ 983 ἀνθρωπος ἡνὸν ἀκλητος LBVp2+ 992 τοντί LEBVp2+ 1001 προσθεῖς LBVp2+ 1011 κάμοιγε LB, cf. Vp2+

ὑποκίνει LBVp2+ 1017 ἀν γε LBVp2+ 1033 οἰδ' LAMVp2+ 1040 καὶ τοῖσδε LBVp2+ 1065 -όμενα L plérique 1069 ὄπόσσα περ ἀν LVp2+ 1070 ἐν φοναῖς ὅλυται LVp2+ 1076 βουλόμεσθ' LRBVp2+ 1080 δείκινοι καὶ LVp2+ 1085 ἡμῶν LVp2+ 1087 ἡμεῖς LVp2+ παλεύστε LΓUBVp2+ 1094 ναίω LVp2+ 1095 ὀξυομέλης LVp2+ 1105 πρώτον LMVp2+ 1126 ὥσθ' ὑπεράνω μὲν L, cf. Vp2+ 1131 -αόργυιον LBVp2+ 1157 πελεκάντων LRAMVp2+ 1168 ὥδε LVp2+ 1193 ὅν γ' LVp2+ 1208 τοῦτο τὸ LBVp2+ 1212 κολιάρχας LCH προσῆλθες LΕVp2+ 1244 ἀτρέμας LBVp2+ 1264 γε τὴν LVp2+ 1268 βροτὸν LAVp2+ πέμπτεν ἀν κάπινον LVp2+, cf. B 1281 πάντες LAVp2+ 1326 ἀνθις ἀν γ' LBVp2+ 1338 ὑπέρ om. LBVp2+ 1351 ἀν οἰκισθεῖς LRAVp2+ 1353 ὅρνισιν LVB 1358 γάρ LAMBVp2+ ὥν τὸν Δι' LBVp2+ 1364 ταύτην δέ γε LBVp2+ 1365 τουτὶ LBVp2+ 1366 γε τὸν LBVp2+ 1377 γενεάν LVp2+ 1381 λιγύμυθος LMBVp2+ 1389 γε LVp2+ 1390 πτεροδίητα LVp2+ 1396 πνοιαῖσιν LB 1397 τὸν om. LVp2+ ἐγὼ LΓVp2+ 1419 χρὴ δεῖ LAMEVp2+ 1426 προσκαλεῖν LBVp2+ 1437 ταῦτα LBVp2+ 1457 ὀφλήση LUBH, cf. Vp2C 1465 σήμερον LMUBVp2+ 1477 μετὰ LVp2+ 1478 μέν γε ἥρος LVp2+ αἰεὶ LBVp2+ 1494 τάλας γ' LVp2+ 1497 μὰ τὸν Δι' LVp2+ 1503 ἔκκαλυφομαὶ LRMVp2+ 1504 ὡ om. LVp2+ 1506 ὀλέσεις LBVp2+ 1514 δρ' L, cf. UVp2+ 1519 Θεσμοφορίοις LBVp2+ 1522 ἐπιστρατεύειν LΓMUBVp2+ 1523 τὰ πόρι' LVp2+ 1525 εἰσὶν LRBVp2C 1533 Τριβαλῶν LVp2+ 1538 κεραμεύει LVp2+ 1543 λάβης LΓUBVp2+ ἄπαντ' LBVp2+ 1548 Δι' αἰεὶ LΓBVp2+ 1550 φέρε μοι σκιάδειον LBVp2+ 1553 τοῖσι LVp2+ 1554 λιμηνῆς ἄλλος οὐτος, om. οὐ LVp2+ 1555 Σωκράτης γὰρ LVp2+ 1560 καὶ ἀμνόν LVp2+ ἥς τεμὰν τοὺς λαυρὸν LBVp2+ 1561 ἀπῆλθεν LBVp2+ 1566 ἢ LΓUBVp2+ 1579 τις LBVp2+ 1583 κρέα δὲ LBVp2+ 1584 δημοτικοῖσιν LBVp2+ 1587 ἐνθάδ' LVp2+ 1588 περὶ πολέμου LBVp2+ 1590 λιπαρά γ' LBVp2+ 1612-13 om. LVp2, added by later owner in L (16th cent.) 1623 λούμενος L, λούμενος adscr., cf. Vp2+ 1627 καὶ om. LUVp2+ Τριβαλόν γε LVp2+ 1636 ἀνθις LVp2+ 1646 τάλας γ' LB 1665 τοῦ γένους LUVp2+ 1668 ὥν LVp2+ 1671 αἰτίαν LAVp2H 1672 ἥς LVp2+ 1677 Τριβαλῶ LAVp2+ 1690 ταυτὶ γ', ὡμεῖς δὲ νῦν LBVp2+ 1693 ἀλλὰ LBVp2+ δότω LΓUBVp2+ 1700 εἰσὶν LRVB 1703 κείνων LVp2+ 1710 ὥδεν ἐλαμψε LEBVp2+ 1712 οἷον δ' LUVp2+ 1722 ὡ om. LBVp2+ 1725 τῇ πόλει LBVp2+ 1728 ὡμεναῖοις . . . νυμφίδιοις LBVp2+ 1736 om. LΓUBVp2+ 1742a ὡ 'Υμέναι' ὡ om. LBVp2+.

## B: scholia.

(a) Holzinger (*Vorstudien*, pp. 35 ff.) inferred the existence of a Triclinian commentary on the *Birds*, and his idea is confirmed fully by the following scholia from L:

Line 740 (fol. 224). The metrical analysis runs as follows: τὸ δέ ἀσυνάρτητον προσῳδιακὸν καλούμενον, περὶ οὐ εἴρηται ἐν τῇ παραβάσει τοῦ Νεφελῶν δράματος.

Line 539 (fol. 219<sup>v</sup>): εἰσθεσις μέλους χοροῦ, ἐπωδικὴ μὲν διὰ τὸ μετὰ τὴν διπλῆν τίθεσθαι, προσῳδικὴ δὲ διὰ τὸ προτίθεσθαι ἐτέρας διπλῆς. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀντίστροφος τῆς προρρηθείσης στροφῆς διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκ' κώλων συγκεῖσθαι καὶ στίχων ἀσυνάρτητων θ' ὄμοιών ἐκείνην. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἐν ἐκθέσει τοὺς συνήθεις δύο στίχους ἀναπαυστικοὺς ὄμοιούς τοῖς ἔξῆς. ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει δύο διπλαῖ ἔχω νενευκίαι συνήθως. δεῖ δὲ κάνταῦθα διάλειμμα μικρὸν εἶναι ἐν τῇ ἐνώσει τῶν κώλων.

Line 1731 (fol. 247): "Ηρά ποτ' Ὀλυμπίᾳ. τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶδη καλεῖται τριὰς ἐπωδική, καὶ εἰσὶ τῆς μὲν στροφῆς τὰ κῶλα εἴ, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς τοσαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὲ πάντα ἴωνικά ἀπὸ μείζονος δίμετρα καταληκτικά ἦτοι ἐφθημμερῶς [sic] ἐπιμεμρυμένα κρητικοῖς δακτύλοις ἀναπαίστους καὶ διτροχαίοις καὶ παίωσι. τῆς δὲ ἐπωδοῦ [sic] κῶλα 5' ἀναπαίστικά, ὃν τὰ μὲν εἴ δίμετρα ἀκατάληκτα, τὸ δὲ 5', τὸ Δευόν τ' ἀργῆτα κεραυνόν, δίμετρον καταληκτικὸν ἦτοι ἐφθημμερὲς παρομιακόν. ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει τῆς μὲν στροφῆς καὶ ἀντιστροφῆς παράγραφος, τῆς δὲ ἐπωδῆς κορωνίς, εἴτα παράγραφος.

There is a scholium on *Birds* 250 found in the manuscripts Γ<sup>2</sup>MAld. which narrates the story of Alcyone. It has been printed by J. W. White, *Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes*, p. 307 (see also p. lxxxiii). It is found also in L (fol. 213<sup>v</sup>) in the following fuller form:

παρὰ τὰ Αλκάρμανος εἴρηται τοῦτο, "Ος τ' ἐπὶ κύματος ἄνθος ἀμ' ἀλκυόνεσσι ποτᾶται. διὸ καὶ Δωρικῶς εἴρηται. ή δὲ ἀλκύων θαλάσσιον ἐστιν ὄρνεον. καὶ ἴστορίαν τοιαύτην περὶ αὐτῆς φασίν, ὡς ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ὅρνις ἐγένετο καὶ Κήνος τοῦ τῶν Τραχιών βασιλέως ὑπῆρχε γυνή. οἵτινες διβρῶ μεγίστης ἐπαρθέντες εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥλθον φρυάγματος ὡς καὶ ἀπαξιοῦν τοῖς ἰδίοις αὐτῶν καλεῖσθαι ὄνόμασιν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐκάλεσεν ἑαυτὸν Δία, ή δὲ ἑαυτὴν "Ηραν. καὶ ποτε ἐν θαλάσσῃ αὐτοῦ πλέοντος ὁ Ζεὺς ὄργισθεις αὐτὸν τε διέφευρε καὶ τὴν ναῦν, ή δὲ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἄγαν περιπαθῶς ὠδύρετο τὸν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς θάνατον παρὰ τῷ Σύλλω. ἦν ἐλεήσας ὁ Ζεὺς εἰς ὅρνιν μετέβαλεν αὐτήν τε καὶ τὸν καταποντισθέντα αὐτῆς ἄνδρα, διὸ καὶ καλοῦσι Κήρυλον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐθήρηνε τῶν ὥστων αὐτῆς κλωμένων ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ κατὰ Διός αὐτης οἰκτον ἐπτὰ μὲν ἡμέρας ἐλαχεῖν ἐν χειμῶνι ἐπωάζειν ἐν τῷ αἰγαιαλῷ καὶ ἔξαγειν τοὺς νεοσσούς γαλήνης οὐσης βαθείας, ἔτερας δὲ αὐτης ἐπτὰ αὐτόθι διατρίβειν ὥστε μικρὰν ἰσχύν τινα λαβεῖν τοὺς νεοσσούς εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι νῆκεσθαι. τοσαύτη δὲ γαλήνη ἐστὶ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν θάλασσαν ἐν ταύταις πάσαις ταῖς ἡμέραις ἐν μέσω τῷ τοῦ χειμῶνος καιρῷ ὥστε ἀφόβως πλέειν [sic] τὴν θάλασσαν τοὺς ἐκεῖ καθάπερ ἐν θέρει η ἐν ἔαρι καὶ τὰς ἡμέρας ἀλκυονιτίδας καλεῖν.

In White's list of supplementary scholia (op. cit., pp. 305 ff.) there are many that he found in the *editio princeps* alone. Nearly all these appear in L, sometimes in a slightly different form, and are therefore not due to Musurus. The notes which L has occur at lines 1, 7, 34, 54, 66, 158, 209, 212, 227, 237, 244, 247, 249, 258, 268, 269, 310, 327, 343, 353, 357, 359 (two glosses), 363, 375, 386, 400, 407, 434, 451, 539, 562, 588, 626, 638, 661, 676, 685, 723, 737, 769, 785, 801, 834, 851, 859, 863, 873, 881, 889, 895, 903, 920, 931, 936, 946, 954, 959, 992, 1058, 1079, 1088, 1118, 1188, 1199, 1262, 1269, 1313, 1329, 1337, 1372, 1382, 1471, 1494, 1553, 1565, 1638, 1639, 1694, 1696, 1706, 1720, 1731, 1748.

(b) Schol. L *Birds* 1-10.

1. η εἰσθεσις τοῦ παρόντος δράματος εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀμοιβαίων ἀρχεται προσώπων, οἱ δὲ στίχοι εἰσὶν ἴαμβικοὶ τρίμετροι ἀκατάληκτοι ση', ὃν τελευταῖος "Εσβαινε κανέγειρε τὴν ἀηδόνα. ἐν εἰσθέσει δὲ μετὰ τὸν ρέα' κῶλον ἴαμβικὸν μονόμετρον βραχυκατάληκτον" καὶ μετὰ τὸν ρέα' ἔτερον ὄμοιον μονόμετρον ἀκατάληκτον. ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει διπλὴ ἔξω νενευκυῖα.

1. πεποίηται διόματα τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πειθεσθαι τῷ ἐταίρῳ, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐλπίδα.

1. ὅτι ὁ μὲν κολοιὸν ἐκράτει, δεῖξαι αὐτῷ δῆθεν τὴν πρὸς τὰ ὄρνεα ὄδόν, δὲ

κορώνην διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν χρείαν. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι δὴ τοῖς ὄρνεοις πιστεύσαντες μακρὰ διήνυσαν ὅδόν, καὶ οὕπω τὸ ζητούμενον ηὔρον.

1. ὅπου ὡς ἐν ἀπόπτῳ τινὶ δένδρῳ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ κολοιοῦ σημαίνοντος δῆθεν κατ' ἔκεινο πορευθῆναι.

2. ὡς τῆς κορώνης εἰς τούναντίον τῷ κολοιῷ παρακελευομένης δῆθεν *Eἰς τούπισω πορεύθητι.*

3. πλανώμεθα. Αττικῆς δὲ παρῆκται.

4. μάτην ὡδε κάκεῖσε πορευόμενοι.

5. Αττικῷ ἔθει εἰρήται ταῦτα ἀναπόδοτα, ὡς καὶ ἐν Νεφέλαις φησί Τὸ δὲ μηδὲ κυνῆν ἐλθεῖν ἐμὲ τὸν κακοδαίμον' ἔχοντα. νοεῖται δὲ ἔξιθεν τὸ οὐκ εὐηθες η̄ οὐ μωρίας πλέων η̄ τι τοιοῦτο.

6. οὐκ εὐηθες Αττικὴ η̄ κράσις τοῦ πλέον πλέων.

8. ἀφανίσαι, ἀποκροῦσαι, τυπτόμενον ἐκβάλλειν. οὐ μωρίας πλέων.

9. ὡς πολὺ ἀφεστηκότων τῆς πατρίδος ταῦτα φησον.

Item 16, *Peace* 1-1268. A: text.

This I have collated against the edition of K. Zacher and O. Bachmann (Leipzig, 1909), neglecting a few minor points of itacism and punctuation. L has the same lacunae as the other late witnesses PCBAld., and its stemmatic position can be defined more precisely by the fact that it almost always sides with the sub-group BAld., but never has readings of P and/or C against BAld. There are many points at which L has a reading previously known from the Aldine alone. In 1228-68 L is a copy of the Aldine, for the last folio that contains these lines is a late substitute for the original lost leaf. The agreement between LBAlld. is just what was expected in view of the fact that B and the Aldine had long been recognized as the representatives of a metrical recension. The readings which make the situation clear are:

(a) Agreements of LBAlld.

16 ἑτέρας γε 76 Πηγάσιον μοι 186 δ' ομ. (also S) 256 οὐτοσὶ γὰρ 265 η̄ει γε 282 κακὸς 291 τέρπομαι καὶ χαίρομαι 334 τι 337 μηκέτ' οὐν 346 εἰ γάρ (μοι L<sup>pc</sup>) γένοντ' ὕδειν ταῦτην τὴν ἡμέραν ποτὲ 351 γ' ἄν μ' 357 τε 367 μάλ' 373 γ' 380 τοῦ ομ. 385 the whole verse 390-1 τις, γε 399 ἡμεῖς ομ. 407 ἐπιβουλεύοντο 409 ὅτι νὴ τὸν 424 σπένδων 439 διάγειν με 445 γ' ἐν 465 ὄγκυλεσθ' 489 ὡ̄ εἴλα ὡ̄ εἴλα 491 οὐ 496 κακόν εἰ 499 εἴσ' 508 λαβώμεσθ' 513 η̄δ' ἐγγὺς 518-19 the whole of both lines 536 ἐς 542 κυάθοις (also S) 545 γάρ 547 πέπαρδεν 566 νὴ Δί' 587 τὸ μέγιστον 600 προσγελάσονται σε 601 η̄δη 610 γάρ 612 η̄κουσ' 627 ἀνδρῶν γε 630 ἐνδίκως δῆτά γ' τὸν λίθον 633 ἐλάνθανεν 640 φρονεῖ 645 ἐβύσσον 648 ομ. 661 αὐτοῖσι 663 εἰλέν γ' 676 ὕσπερ 682 οὐν 699 τῆς 714 ἀπαγέ συ 732 φύλαττέ συ 747 τὰ νῦτα 752 ἐπιχείρει 758 καμήλου 761 μοι ομ. 819 η̄ν ἐλθεῖν 822 ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ φαίνεσθε 824 ἐγώ πυθόμην 840 βαδίζουσ' 849 πορνοβοσκοῦσ' 855 καὶ κανᾶ 866 βὰς 872 τίς ἔσθ' αὐτῇ 892 κεκάπνικ' ἄρ' (ἄρ' B) 906 ιδ' 910 δστις γ' 916 φήσεις τι δῆτ', ομ. νέου 917 ἡγησόμεσθα 919 Τρυγαῖος ομ. 931 τὸ ρῆμά γ', ομ. ὅταν 942 ἀν θέλη γε 1029 ἔστι χρεών 1029b τὸν γε 1030 φρενὶ καὶ πορίμῳ τῇ τόλμῃ 1033 τίς οὐκ ἀν 1037 πεπαύσει ποτ' ἀν 1054 φράζεθ' 1084 λοιποῦ γ' ἐν 1111 δώσει 1112 τρὸν διδόναι 1116 τί δ' ἔγωγε 1135 ἐκπεισόμενα 1140 ἔστιν 1159 η̄νικ' ἀν 1165 φύληχ' 1181 γ' ἔσθ' 1195 ἐπείσφερε.

## (b) Readings of LB against the Aldine.

118 ὅτι LB 408 τοῖς γὰρ 415 γ' 785 ὑπάσης 1084 ἔτι om. 1142 τί δ' ἀν τηγικάδε.

## (c) Readings of LAld. against B.

Hyp. I, p. 4, l. 12 ἐνοικίας l. 13 καὶ καθείρξας 82, 102, 114 the headings 193, 220/1 the distribution of parts 239 καὶ τοῦ βλέμματος 257, 264 the distribution of parts 331 τοντοδὶ 391 τόδε 402 εἰσὶ 492 attributed to the Chorus 500 attributed to Trygaeus 527, 528, 532 the distribution of parts 557 ἄσμενος γ' 559 ἡμῖν γὰρ ἐπὶ 649 οὐ πάρεστ' 650 τις 733 χῶσα τε νοῦς αὐτὸς 835 ὥστε γ', om. ἥλθ' 900 ἡνίκα δὲ 939 ἀν θέλη γε 1127 γ' om. 1133 οὐκ ἔῆς 1184 αὐτὸν ἔθει τὸ κακόν.

Addendum: at 458 the scribe of L wrote κάλοις and added above the line κάλως, thereby anticipating Brunck.

## B: scholia.

(a) Holzinger (*Vorstudien*, p. 93) noted the curious fact that in the metrical scholium to *Peace* 729 known from the Aldine the number of lines in the *makron* is incorrectly given as 33 instead of 31. This mistake occurs also in L.

(b) Schol. L *Peace* 1-10.

1. εἴσθεσις τοῦ παρόντος δράματος εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀμοιβαίων ἀρχεται προσώπων. οἱ δὲ στίχοι εἰσὶν ἴαμβικοι τρίμετροι ἀκατάληκτοι π', ὧν τελευταῖος Ἰππηδόν εἰς τὸν ἀέρ' ἐπὶ τοῦ κανθάρου, μετὰ δὲ τὸν ιθ', κῶλον ἴαμβικὸν μονόμετρον ἀκατάληκτον. ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει παράγραφος, ὄμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀποθέσεσιν.

1. δύο εἰσὶν οἰκέται, ὧν ὁ μὲν τρέφει τὸν κάνθαρον, ὁ δὲ ἔτερος μάττει. ὁ τρέφων οὖν λέγει τῷ μάττοντι Αἴρε ἀέρε.

1. ἡ τάχος ἡ διὰ τάχους.

1. μᾶλα κυρίως ἡ τροφὴ ἡ ἀπὸ γάλακτος καὶ ἀλεύρου, παρὰ τὸ μάττεσθαι. περισπαστέον δέ. καταχρηστικῶς δὲ νῦν οὐ τὴν ἐξ ἀλφίτων φυραθεῖσαν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀποπάτημα λέγει. πίτυρα δέ τινα ρύπαρὰ μάττουσιν οἱ οἰκέται. κόπρον γὰρ φυρᾶν ἀδύνατον.

1. κάνθαρος δὲ εἶδος ζώου. παρὰ τὰς τίλφας τὸ μέγεθος.

2. ἀπεχθάνεται τὸν κάνθαρον διὰ τὸ ἀπτεσθαι τῆς κόπρου.

2. ἰδού, δὸς αὐτῷ παρεπιγραφή· ὁ γὰρ ἔτερος τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ προσταχθὲν ποιῶν αὐτῷ παραφέρει καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι τὴν τροφήν.

3. πρὸς τὸ μεθυόμενον [sic] ἐπαξεν. οὐ γὰρ ὄντως ἥσθιεν.

4. ἐπίτηδες εἰσάγεται τὰ τῶν οἰνων ἀποπατήματα.

5. ἦν νυνδὴ 'φερες· οὐτως Ἀττικοι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρτίως. ἐν ἐρωτήσει δέ· ἐκείνου γὰρ αἰτήσαντος μᾶζαν ἔτεραν φησὶν αὐτὸς "Ἡν γὰρ νῦν προσέφερες οὐ κατέφαγεν;

6. ἄλλο δὲ φαγεῖν καὶ ἄλλο καταφαγεῖν. φαγεῖν μὲν γὰρ τὸ τάξει, καταφαγεῖν δὲ τὸ ἀθρόως. τὸ ἀδδήφαγον [sic] δὲ νῦν τοῦ ζώου δεικνὺς λέγει.

7. περιειλίσαι πρὸς τὴν τάξιν τῶν πτωχῶν [sic] ἀκολούθει τὸ δυνικόν.

7. περικυλίσας· περιειλίσας· ἔθος γὰρ τοῖς κανθάροις τὰς ὄνδας περικυλίειν. λέγεται δὲ ὁ κάνθαρος εἰς ὄνθον ἀποστέρατζειν, καὶ οὕτω περιστρέφειν τοῖς ποσίν, ὡς ἀν τὸ σπέρμα ἐγγυμνασθὲν ἀποδοθῆ καὶ ἐγγεν(ν)ήσῃ. θῆλυς γὰρ κάνθαρος οὐ γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἄρρενες.

9. βοηθήσατε.

κοπρόλογοι· τοῦτο ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας ἀποτείνεται, διαβάλλων αὐτοὺς ὡς μυστηρίους καὶ λοιδόρους, ἡ τοῖς συνεργοῖς τῶν ὁμοδούλων εἰς ἐπικουρίαν καλεῖ.

9. προσλάβεσθε· βοηθήσατε· συνέχει γὰρ τῇ μιᾷ χειρὶ τὴν ῥῖνα, τῇ δὲ ἔτερᾳ μάττει. ζητεῖ οὖν τοὺς διαδεξομένους.

10. ἀποπνιγέντα· ἀποκλειομένων τῶν ῥινῶν τῇ θλίψει τῶν δακτύλων ἀνάγκη στενοχωρουμένου τοῦ πνεύματος πνίγεσθαι αὐτόν.

Merton College, Oxford

N. G. WILSON

## ADDENDA

### A. Some New Testimonia to Aristophanes.

- (1) *Ach.* 704: Michael Choniates, *Hypomnesticum*, ed. G. Stadtmüller, Michael Choniates (*Orientalia Christiana* 33. 2. 91. 1934), p. 283.
- (2) *Nub.* 145: Michael Choniates, *ibid.*, and Theophylact of Bulgaria, *ep.* 4, ed. Migne, *PG* 126. 316 B.
- (3) *Nub.* 430: Planudes, *ep.* 42, ed. Treu.
- (4) *Plut.* 9: Michael Choniates, *ep.* 106, ed. Lambros, vol. ii, p. 199.
- (5) *Plut.* 600: Symeon Magister, *ep.* 75, ed. J. Darrouzès, *Epistoliers Byzantins du Xme siècle*, p. 142.

B. (p. 39). Notes in L at 440 and 1189 confirm the Aldine's report that these lines are parody of the *Telephus*. L's reading of fr. 717 of the *Telephus* is *τὶ δ'* ὡ τάλας σοὶ τῷδε πείθεσθαι μέλει;

## NOTES ON SOME PASSAGES OF THE PLAYS OF SENECA<sup>1</sup>

*Phaedra* 66–72

70

quicquid solis pascitur aruis  
sive illud Arabs diuite silua  
sive illud inops nouit Garamas  
sive ferocis iuga Pyrenes  
sive Hyrcani celant saltus  
uacuisse uagus Sarmata campis,  
arcus metuit Diana tuos.

In this passage transposition is surely necessary, as Leo saw. The only verb which can be supplied for *Sarmata* in l. 71 is *celant*; but whereas the Hyrcanian forests may hide Diana's prey, the nomad Sarmatian can scarcely be said to do so; *Sarmata* requires some verb like *nouit* (68). Leo put l. 71 after l. 68. But it is not easy to see how *uacuisse* . . . *campis* fell to two lines later. The transposition would be more easily explicable if Seneca, after l. 66, wrote 69–70, then 67, 68, 71, i.e.

quicquid solis pascitur aruis,	66
sive ferocis iuga Pyrenes	69
sive Hyrcani celant saltus,	70
sive illud Arabs diuite silua	67
sive illud inops nouit Garamas	68
uacuisse <sup>2</sup> uagus Sarmata campis	71
arcus metuit Diana tuos.	72

A copyist would have had four lines beginning with *sive*, and he might easily have dropped the first two; and then they would have been added later, perhaps, *after* the next two instead of before. *Illud* (67) is now happier in a position in which it is more naturally resumptive.

The geographical order is a little strange. On the other hand a European forest in the west, an Asiatic forest in the east, an Arab tribe, an African tribe and a north European tribe may be said between them to circle the known world fairly systematically. *aruis* (66) of course means *agris*; cf. *Med.* 453, *Phaedr.* 1093.

*Thyestes* 890–1 :

Sed cur satis sit? pergam et implebo patrem  
funere suorum.

B. Schmidt objected to *implebo patrem*; and his successors have either deleted the whole sentence or altered the text to M. Müller's *impleto patre*, 'I will proceed even(?) though the father be glutted with his dead children.' The only objection so far raised to *implebo* is that Thyestes has *already* eaten his children. But the text, I think, is correct: it means 'I will glut the father with the truth

<sup>1</sup> I am much indebted for help in the writing of this paper to Professor Mynors, and also for suggestions made by Mr. F. H. Sandbach, Mr. M. Platnauer, and Mr. E. J.

Kenney.

<sup>2</sup> It is difficult, after all these *sive*'s, to resist Bentley's *uacuisse* for *uacuisse*.

about his sons' death'; cf. 895, where *uideat pater* cannot mean 'let the father see that he is feasting'. It must mean 'let him see the *real nature* of the feast'. (This is clear from ll. 903 foll.) The same grotesque idea occurs at l. 979; and no one seems to object to it there.

*H.F. 552-3* non illic geminum Tyndaridae genus  
succurrunt timidis sidera nauibus.

The commentators are silent on the construction of this sentence. But how is it to be construed? It seems most improbable that Seneca could have intended *Tyndaridae* (nom. plur.) to have two appositional phrases attached to it, one furnished with an epithet (*geminum genus*), the other not (*sidera*). Nor could a genitive singular *Tyndaridae* be used (for the plural) to define *sidera*. Surely we must alter *sidera* to *sidere*.

*Troades* 1166-70 concidit uirgo ac puer;  
bellum peractum est. quo meas lacrimas feram?  
ubi hanc anilis exspuam leti moram?  
natam an nepotem, coniugem an patriam fream?  
an omnia an me sola?

Translators, and perhaps editors too, seem to think that Hecuba is here asking where she is being taken to. But she knows already that she is to go with Odysseus on his ship to Ithaca, see ll. 987-93. The question she is really asking is, I think, a more pertinent one: *ubi* means 'on whom': 'on whom (or 'on what theme') shall I spew out this complaint of an old woman's prolonged death?' *hanc leti moram* is short for *querelam de hac leti mora*, in much the same way as at Virg. *E. 6. 46* Silenus is said to console Pasiphae for the love of the bull, the meaning being that *he sings of* Pasiphae consoling herself for the love of the bull. See Conington ad. loc.

For *ubi* in this sense cf. Ov. *Met. 9. 276*: *Alcmene, questus ubi ponat aniles, . . . Iolen habet.* And Mr. Sandbach points out to me an even closer parallel, where the verb *exspuo* is combined with this sense of *ubi*: Ter. *Eun. 406* *quasi ubi illam exspueret miseriam ex animo.* Garrod's *exuam* is therefore quite unnecessary.

Moreover, that *ubi* means 'on whom' here seems to be supported by the next sentence, in which Hecuba asks 'shall I weep daughter or grandson, husband or country?', i.e. 'Of all my themes for lamentation which shall I choose?'; and also by the fact that she now has two *new* themes, having just heard of the deaths of her daughter and grandson (1166).

*Agamemnon* 425-9 ad militares remus aptatur manus  
omnisque nimium longa properanti mora est.  
signum recursus regia ut fulsi rate  
et clara lentum remigem monuit tuba,  
aurata primas prora designat uias.

Leo alters *lentum* (428) to *laetum*. He says *ineptum est hoc uersu lentum dici remigem cui omnem nimium longam properanti moram fuisse modo audiuerimus.* But surely Seneca means here, not that every oarsman was delaying, but that *some* were; and indeed he has just said that there *was* some delay, and that it seemed intolerable to those who wanted to start (426). The whole is a piece of realism

for which Seneca should have the credit, nor should the repetition in *lentum* of the idea in *mora* (426) be regarded as un-Senecan.<sup>1</sup>

*Medea* 471-82

adice expetita spolia Phrixei arietis  
somnoque iussum lumina ignoto dare  
insomne monstrum, traditum fratrem neci  
et scelere in uno non semel factum scelus,  
ausasque natas fraude deceptas mea  
secare membra non reuicturi senis;  
aliena quaerens regna deserui mea;  
per uicta monstra, per manus . . . per caelum . . .  
475 miserere, redde supplici felix uicem.

482

Here Leo and his successors transpose l. 477 to follow 482. But the sequence of thought which the manuscripts offer is not unnatural. Medea is reminding Jason of all she did for him (471-6). She then says: 'I deserted my own kingdom in search of a kingdom for another; I beg you by all these services (479-81) that I have done you, to do the like (*uicem* 482) by me.' It is not clear what the repayment is to be; but probably, since Medea has told Creon (273-5) that she is prepared to go if Jason goes too, and repeats that idea at l. 524,<sup>2</sup> she here means 'leave your *regna* with me, as I left mine with you'.

*Medea* 951-3

cursus increscit dolor  
et feruet odium, repetit inuitam manum  
antiqua Erinys.

The manuscripts offer *inuisam*<sup>3</sup> at 952; most editors accept Gronovius's *inuitam*. But Erinys does not take her victims by the hand; and even if she did, surely a safer correction of the text would be *inuisa manu* (sc. *me*). The absence of an object might well cause the ablative to be turned into one.

*H.O.* 725-8

medios in ignes solis †eiceram† facem  
quo tincta fuerat palla uestisque inlita.  
abiectus horret sanguis et Phoebi coma  
tepefactus ardet.

Deianira is describing the effect of the sun on the piece of fleece, which already carried Nessus' blood, and with which (we must read *qua* in 726, not *quo*) the robe had been smeared. *eiceram* (E) will not do<sup>4</sup> (nor will A's *et claram*, since a verb is needed, to govern *in ignes*). And, moreover, the aorist, not the pluperfect, is the tense required. It seems likely, then, that Seneca wrote *eici* (Leo). But *facem* must be wrong: what Deianira put out was the fleece; and without further help no reader could possibly guess that *fax* was used here, metaphorically, for that. Now the word *coma*, which does mean a fleece, appears at the end of l. 727; and I suggest that the two words have changed places, and that we should put *comam* (indeed E has it in the accusative) after *eici*, and *face* after *Phoebi*. It is, of course, very rare for a transposition to occur at the end of two lines which are a line apart, but a rather similar thing has happened at l. 812, whose ending has evidently been wrongly repeated from

<sup>1</sup> Moricca disapproves of Leo's *laetum* on the strange ground that it 'male s'accorda con *remigem*'. Is there no joy in rowing (especially rowing home)?

<sup>2</sup> See also l. 513, where there is no cause

to reject *exilium* for the Aldine's *exitium*, as many editors do.

<sup>3</sup> Herrmann is wrong in ascribing *inuitam* to the manuscripts.

<sup>4</sup> See Housman, *C.Q.* xvii (1923), 170.

1. 810. It may be that *eiceram* first appeared from a telescoping of *eici comam* to *eicomam*.

*H.O. 1327-31* ita nulla saeuas terra concipiat feras  
post me sepultum nec meas unquam manus  
improlet orbis; si qua nascentur mala,  
nasceret †odium†. undique infelix caput  
mactate saxis, uincite aerumnas meas.

Hercules begs the earth and its cities to supply weapons to kill him. 'In return I pray (*ita*) that there be no monsters, and that the world feel no need of me to kill them; if monsters *are* to be born, then let them . . . ; kill me from every quarter.' The crux lies in E's *nasceret odium*, which makes no sense; and A's *nascentur alius* will not do, as *alius* is so feeble. The editors' attempts to correct *odium* all seem to me unconvincing; and I suggest that the corruption extends to the next word, for *undique*, though just possible, seems very otiose. Perhaps Seneca wrote *nascentur alium in uindicem. infelix*, etc.: 'then let them be born for some other champion.' For *uindex* of Hercules cf. 1334, 1416, etc. For the elision in the third foot, as well as in the fourth before the caesura, cf. 1306.

*H.O. 1624-5* stat uasta late querqus et Phoebum uetat  
ultraque totos porrigit ramos manus.

It seems most unlikely that Seneca, whose use of metaphor is very restricted, would write *manus* of the branches of a tree. And even if that is wrong, this use is particularly clumsy, because *ramos* has to mean the branches of *the others*. A has *nemus*, I think rightly. But *ramos* must be the object, not *nemus*, for although a *lucus* can have its *nemus* (see l. 1636), it is going much further to say that a single oak can stretch its *nemus*; and for that reason, rather than for the reasons he gives, Raphelingius's correction of *totos* to *totum* must be accepted.

*H.O. 1849-51* mater . . . toto stetit  
succisa fetu bisque septenos greges  
deplanxit una.

'Niobe mourned her family of fourteen.' Leo altered *greges* to *grem*. He evidently intended this to mean 'she mourned for her fourteen children, a single one for the family'. If we had to alter I should prefer *bis septenum grem*, 'a brood of fourteen children', cf. *septenus Ister* (Stat. *Silv.* 5. 2. 136) = 'the Danube with its seven mouths', where *septenus* stands for *septemplex*. But I doubt if change is necessary: Seneca uses the plural *greges* at *Tro.* 32, where Hecuba speaks of *meorum liberorum magni greges* 'great troops of my children'. Could not the plural here similarly mean 'her fourteen-fold troops of children'?

Trinity College, Cambridge

ALAN KER

<sup>1</sup> At Stat. *Theb.* 8. 546 *nemus* is commonly translated 'foliage'; but *ulmus querit utrumque nemus* there cannot mean 'the elm misses the foliage' of itself and its vine, as Mr. Sandbach points out to me, because the elm still has its own and its vine's foliage with

it, though now fallen upon the ground. Tr: 'the elm misses the wood' (of elms and vines in which it stood before it fell). At Ov. *M.* 8. 743 *nemus* means 'a wood' (pace Friedlaender on Mart. 9. 61. 9: *una nemus* there means 'in itself a wood').

## PITY, TERROR, AND *PERIPETEIA*

IN an article (*C.Q.* xli [1947], 73 ff.) based on an unpublished paper by Professor Cornford, Mr. I. M. Glanville returned to the suggestion that the words *καθάπερ εἰργται* at the beginning of Chapter 11 of the *Poetics* (1452<sup>a</sup>23), which are part of the definition of *peripeteia*, refer back to the phrase *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι’ ἄλληλα* (52<sup>a</sup>4),<sup>1</sup> thereby raising the question whose expectation it is to which events turn out contrary, that of the audience or of the characters in the play. The purpose of this article is to show that if one has to be chosen to the exclusion of the other, the expectation of the characters must be intended, but further to suggest that Aristotle made no clear distinction between the two, because it was generally assumed that the audience watching a play shared to a great extent the experiences of the characters in the drama. This will be supported by some consideration of the meaning of pity and fear, or terror, when regarded as responses particularly appropriate to tragedy. Finally I shall examine how *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis* as they appear in the light of these considerations can be applied to extant tragedy, and whether they are a satisfactory differentia between simple and complex plays.

*Peripeteia* is defined as *ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή*, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὥσπερ λέγομεν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἡ ἀναγκαῖον (52<sup>a</sup>22) and it happens ὅταν γένηται παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι’ ἄλληλα (52<sup>a</sup>4). The words δι’ ἄλληλα do no more than repeat κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἡ ἀναγκαῖον, the requirement constantly made in the *Poetics* that events should be causally connected. Were they not so connected neither audience nor characters would have a firm impression of the likely course of events, and any surprise that might be aroused would be random and arbitrary. The first problem is the reference of *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*. Is it to the audience or to the characters? If it is to the audience, as is strongly held by Professor Else,<sup>2</sup> then we accept what may be called the traditional interpretation of *peripeteia* whereby *πραττομένων* is equivalent to *γνωμένων*, and it is the situation which changes to the opposite. If we suppose the expectation not fulfilled to be that of a character or characters in the play, then we approach the view put forward by Vahlen<sup>3</sup> and accepted by many critics,<sup>4</sup> but probably not by the majority, according to which there is a reversal of what was intended by one of the parties to the action of the play. This interpretation is not less satisfactory if expectation is substituted for intention. It is generally supposed that Aristotle must have held one or other of these views, but it is difficult to maintain that he held either exclusively.

<sup>1</sup> It was made, if not before, by Twining, *Aristotle's Treatise on Poetry*, 2nd ed. (London, 1812), ii. 78, and it is so understood by Rostagni in his edition, Torino, 1945, and, apparently, by Butcher in his essay on A.'s *Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* (London, 1907), p. 279. I have not seen A. Micev's article, *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*, *Assoc. l'Univ. de Sofia, Fac. Phil.* 1955, pp. 451–87, but from the summary in *Rev. Et. Grec.* lxviii (1957), 543, his approach appears to be entirely different.

<sup>2</sup> *Aristotle's Poetics: the Argument* (Harvard, 1957), p. 330, n. 103, and p. 345. He calls

the sentence in question 'one of the most pregnant remarks in the whole *Poetics*' (p. 329). The same interpretation in P. Turner, 'The Reverse of Vahlen', *C.Q.* n.s. ix (1959), 207.

<sup>3</sup> *Sitzb. Wien*, lli (1866), 90 ff. He takes *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* as part of the definition of *peripeteia*, but gives another explanation of *καθάπερ εἰργται* (loc. cit., p. 93).

<sup>4</sup> Refs. in Else, op. cit., p. 344. Add H. House, *Aristotle's Poetics* (London, 1956), p. 96.

The traditional view, according to which *peripeteia* relates to situation, runs into trouble in two ways. In the examples chosen to illustrate it from the *Oedipus* and the *Lynceus* the wording suggests strongly that it is the expectation of the characters that is in question ἐλθών ὡς εὑφρανῶν τὸν Οἰδίπουν καὶ ἀπαλλάξων κ.τ.λ.<sup>1</sup> It may not be impossible that Aristotle having the audience in mind<sup>2</sup> should have written ὡς εὑφρανῶν intending it to mean δοκῶν εὑφρανεῖν καὶ ἀπαλλάξειν, but this is not an hypothesis to be adopted if the natural translation can be made to yield sense. Second, an objection which seems decisive, *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*, introduced by μέν and δέ (52<sup>22</sup>, 30), are a closely associated pair; each is a *μεταβολή*; often they occur together, but either by itself is sufficient to give a play the characteristic of complexity. It is hardly conceivable, therefore, that they should not produce similar emotional effects. Now it is possible that the *peripeteia* of the *Oedipus* might be regarded as contrary to the expectation of the audience, since, as Else, for instance, suggests,<sup>3</sup> the knowledge of the audience which tells them, as soon as ever the Messenger arrives from Corinth, that Oedipus is about to learn his real parentage, can be considered as accidental and not intrinsic to the play, in which the facts are stated only as Oedipus learns them. But no one could suggest that knowledge of the identity of characters who are later revealed by an *anagnorisis* is accidental. In all the eight extant plays<sup>4</sup> in which recognition scenes are important the characters involved are presented to the audience in their true identity before the recognition takes place, except in the *Oedipus*. At the beginning of this play no one but Teiresias knows who the son of Polybus really is. Euripides might have had a god set out the facts in the prologue.<sup>5</sup> Sophocles relies on the familiarity of the story; that it is familiar, he certainly assumes, since many ironies would otherwise lose their meaning. It is clear, therefore, that an *anagnorisis* is no surprise to the audience. Electra, Orestes, Iphigenia, Ion, Creusa, Alcestis, all are known to the audience from the start; it is only the characters, or some of them, who are in ignorance. But since *anagnorisis* and *peripeteia* are so closely associated,<sup>6</sup> it is unlikely that they were thought to produce different emotions; and different they would certainly be, if one set of events was, in any literal sense, a surprise to the audience, and not the other. Accordingly it follows that a *peripeteia* was not παρὰ τὴν δόξαν in relation to the audience, or else that Aristotle did not make the distinction between characters and audience because he assumed that what surprised the characters would also surprise an audience absorbed in their fortunes.

<sup>1</sup> It is worth remembering that the 'hero' is the victim of an *hamartia* (?misapprehension), and a natural consequence of this at the end of a causally connected series of events is a surprise. This is not to say that an *hamartia* must result in a *peripeteia*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kühner-Gerth 488 a (a), Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, p. 864, 'what is stated in the participle is stated as the thought or assertion of the subject of the leading verb, or as that of some other person prominent in the sentence'. The audience are not in the sentence, but it could be argued that they are prominent in the thought. Else translates 'when it seems that he will make Oedipus happy', and similarly Turner, loc.

cit., p. 208. Else reads <δ> ἐλθών, ὡς εὑφρανῶν in an attempt to evade the difficulty that the Messenger did not come from Corinth in order to relieve Oedipus of his fears.

<sup>3</sup> p. 346.

<sup>4</sup> Aesch. *Choephoroe*; Soph. *O.T.*, *Electra*; Eur. *Alcestis*, *Electra*, *Iphigeneia in Tauris*, *Ion*, and, more dubiously, *Helen*, in which the main recognitions are between characters who, in fact, know each other by sight. Cf. B. Perrin in *A.J. Phil.* xxx (1909), 371 ff.; he does not count the *Alcestis* as a recognition play.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the prologue to Euripides' *Antigone*, frs. 157, 158. It is not known how his *Oedipus* began.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Else, p. 343.

The first alternative is not altogether satisfactory. The whole passage is angled from the point of view of the audience's reactions. Tragedy is a representation of things terrible and pitiful (52<sup>a2</sup>); it represents them most effectively when things happen *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν δι' ἄλληλα*, as such events have *τὸ θαυμαστόν* (52<sup>a4</sup>), a word which must refer primarily to the audience. If the words *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* referred specifically to the emotions of the characters in this context in which the main subject is the reaction of the audience, the emphasis would be much astray. There remains the other possibility.

The audience at a play are not mere spectators; to a greater or less extent they participate in the experience of the characters and share their emotions; they can, in the same way, share their preconceptions. If this were not so, few would be able to give more than languid attention to a play seen for a second time. It is because we are able in a real sense to sympathize with, 'to experience along with', the characters, that we continue to be thrilled when Electra recognizes Orestes or Macbeth perceives that Birnam Wood is advancing on Dunsinane. And in so far as audience and actors are emotionally at one, it ceases to be relevant for which of them the events turn out to be *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*. But it is a pertinent question whether Aristotle made no distinction because he thought the distinction irrelevant, or because he never gave his attention to the problems which arise in connexion with the emotional responses of an audience. Professor Else, at the end of the discussion already referred to on the 'accidental' knowledge possessed by the audience of the story of Oedipus,<sup>1</sup> observes 'I think it is not unfair to Aristotle to say that he gives no sign of awareness of these subtleties', and further consideration of the question suggests that he is right.

The same unwillingness to distinguish between actor and audience as appears in this use of *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* as 'unexpected', without particular reference to the possessor of the expectations, can be detected in earlier references to tragic (and epic) performances, and to the pity and terror which, from the time of Gorgias, were the emotions associated with them.<sup>2</sup> This is no doubt part of an assumption about a question which had not yet been consciously raised, not a piece of critical theory. The relevant passages are few and mostly familiar. To Gorgias it seemed that through the *ἀπατή*,<sup>3</sup> the illusion of tragedy, *ἐπ' ἄλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυστραγίας ιδίων τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐπαθεῖ η ψυχή*—*Helen* 4; 'we suffer in our own persons because of misfortunes not our own', which implies that the force of illusion causes us to have the experiences, or something like them, which we should have if stricken by the same misfortunes. Hence come the *φρίκη περιφοβος* καὶ *ἔλεος πολύδακρυς*<sup>4</sup> which enter into those who hear poetry, emotions more full-blooded than those recognized by most commentators on the *Poetics*. The simile of the magnet in Plato's *Ion*,<sup>5</sup> while it need not be pressed so far as to suggest complete identity of experience as between poet, performer, and audience, clearly implies the communication of powerful emotions. The same conception is even more obviously present in the *Republic*. When we see the

<sup>1</sup> p. 346.

<sup>2</sup> Süss, *Ethes* (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 84 ff. He goes too far in claiming Gorgias as the inventor of the *katharsis* theory. Cf. Paulenz, *Grött. Nachr.* (1920), pp. 159 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Ap. Plutarch, *Mor.* 348 c (*De Glor.*

*Ath.* 5).

<sup>4</sup> Gorgias, *Helen* 10. *φρίκη* is a very strong word, cf. Soph. *O.T.* 1306, Plato, *Rep.* 387 c.

<sup>5</sup> 533 d; for the violence of the emotion experienced by rhapsode and audience see 535 c-e.

heroes of Homer or of the tragic poets weeping and lamenting οἰσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἀν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῆ (605 d), 'we undergo the experience along with the characters', and we give most praise to the poet 'who puts us most completely into this condition', i.e. the condition of those who are weeping and wailing on the stage. The word συμπάσχειν possesses its literal sense.<sup>1</sup> The intimate connexion between the experiences of performer and audience can be illustrated from Plato's reflections on comedy (*Republic* 606 c), where listening to unsuitable jokes is said to have the same effect on the soul as making them. Similarly the would-be tragic poet can write speeches which are οἰκτράς καὶ τούναρτίον αὐθ φοβεράς καὶ ἀπειλητικάς (*Phaedrus* 268 c);<sup>2</sup> all three epithets are suitable from the point of view of the characters in the play, but if, as is likely, Plato has in mind the emotions awakened in the audience, ἔλεος and φόβος being already associated with tragedy, then ἀπειλητικάς too can apply to the audience in so far as they feel themselves threatened along with the character who has their sympathies. The next question to be considered is whether Aristotle himself interpreted the tragic emotions in this way, as he must have done if the view here put forward of παρὰ τὴν δόξαν is correct.

Emotions at the best of times are difficult to discuss; the vocabulary is limited, the terms ill-defined, the basic experiences vaguely recollected and hard to recapture, and no doubt interpretation of emotional experiences is to some extent affected by the words available to describe them in any one language. Aristotle makes surprisingly little effort to analyse the differences between aesthetic emotions and those evoked by the experiences of real life. He allows a distinction between our response to pictures of unpleasant objects and our response to the objects themselves (48b11).<sup>3</sup> The word τοιούτων in the expression τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν has been understood by some<sup>4</sup> to indicate a difference between the pity and fear aroused by tragedy and the same emotions in real life. But only on the unlikely hypothesis that *katharsis* affects the quality of the emotion experienced is it possible to credit Aristotle with a serious examination of the question.

None the less it is possible to make a distinction, though it is by no means hard and fast, between two sorts, or levels, of emotion mentioned by Aristotle,<sup>5</sup> though not overtly distinguished by him. One species of pity, for example, is awakened by an exposition of the suffering combined with innocence of the victim, the other is awakened by the sight of the victim's sufferings. This is analogous to the process in the law courts, when an advocate first stirred the

<sup>1</sup> As at its only other occurrence in Plato, *Charm.* 169 c: one person yawning sets off another.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Süss in connexion with Gorgias and the tragic emotions, op. cit., p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Politics* 1340<sup>a</sup>23–37.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. Susemihl and Hicks, ed. *Politics* (London, 1894), p. 652, notes 4 and 5.

<sup>5</sup> Most discussion of emotion in the *Poetics* is a preliminary to an attack on the problem of *katharsis*. Schadewaldt in a valuable article devoted to this end, *Hermes* lxxxiii (1955), 129, complains that in con-

ventional translation the words φόβος and ἔλεος are emasculated; they mean Schrecken and Jammer, not Furcht and Mitleid. He speaks of the 'Mitgestimmtheit des Zuschauers', p. 132. Pohlenz in *Hermes* lxxxiv (1956), 49 ff., denies the general applicability of these terms, but in his *Griechische Tragödie*, 2nd ed. (1954), i. 486, he too speaks of the 'Miterleben' which is part of the experience of the audience, also in *Gött. Nachr.*, loc. cit., p. 168, 'sie bewirkt auch, dass wir die Affekte der handelnden, leidenden Personen wie eigne miterleben'.

feelings of the judges by arguing the innocence of a client and making vivid to them the outrages he had endured, then produced his wife and children to convey the pathos of the situation to the judges through their eyes. It is not possible wholly to dissociate thought and emotion; whenever we go to a theatre, our knowledge that we are seeing a play and not a piece of life affects our feelings. But we can distinguish the direct and the indirect appeal. Most discussion of the tragic emotions in the *Poetics* is necessarily based on Chapters 13 and 14, where the problem is considered in relation to the goodness and badness of the characters, and in consequence the emphasis is laid on the sort of emotion most closely connected with judgements. A reason for this may be that in these chapters Aristotle has very much in mind the criticisms of Plato,<sup>1</sup> who denied any rational justification to the values of tragedy and the feelings aroused by it, and accordingly he is at pains to assert that the fear, and more especially the pity, aroused by tragedy are at least not in conflict with what is morally desirable, but are automatically based on rational judgement of the merits of the characters. And by temperament he may have inclined more to the attitude to emotion which is appropriate to the studies of the *Rhetoric*.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, it may well be that if we possessed the account of *katharsis* which appears to have been part of the *Poetics*, we should find fuller justice done to the more direct type of emotional impact. That Aristotle recognized its existence is shown by the section on *pathos* (52<sup>b</sup>10-13), which arises from the exhibition of death or physical agony on the stage, and by the reference to  $\delta\phi\mu\sigma$ , the appearance of the characters, fallen heroes pitiful in rags, or the Erinyes terrible in the garb of Tartarus. This sort of emotion is probably implied also in the obscure and compressed passage (55<sup>a</sup>22-34), in which it appears to be suggested that the poet ought to induce in himself the feelings ascribed in his characters in order the better to communicate them.<sup>3</sup>

Finally there is the place given to fear, or terror, as the equal, more or less, of pity among the specific effects of tragedy, which has been a lasting embarrassment to commentators. Since Lessing<sup>4</sup> there has been a tendency to make it a poor second to pity, an anxiety over the future fortunes of the hero, an anticipation of pity soon to be felt, or the fear of the audience for themselves as they realize that they inhabit the same insecure world, and are exposed to the same unforeseen disasters as the protagonist.<sup>5</sup> Such words as 'premonition' or 'apprehension'<sup>6</sup> betray the watering down of the original conception of  $\phi\beta\delta\sigma$ . In fact there is only one kind of terror that a theatre audience can feel, the terror which they share with those who in the play are aware of their own impending doom. If we allow that Aristotle thought that the audience in their 'sympathy',  $\sigmaυμπάσχοντες$ , projected themselves into the situation of the characters, it becomes possible to understand how terror can be reckoned the equal of pity, and one of the two pre-eminently tragic emotions. It is clear, too, that

<sup>1</sup> Else, p. 374.

<sup>2</sup> Especially Bk. 2, Chs. 5 and 8. It is generally agreed that the ideas of the *Rhetoric* cannot be imported straight into the *Poetics*. In the former fear is said to drive out pity, in the latter they clearly exist side by side. The *Rhetoric* is naturally concerned with the indirect appeal to the emotions, which are 'dependent on calculation' and 'self-regarding' (Else, p. 371).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Gudeman's commentary on 55<sup>a</sup>30, p. 306.

<sup>4</sup> See Schadewaldt, loc. cit., p. 130.

<sup>5</sup> So Döring, *Die Kunstlehre des A.* (Jena, 1876), pp. 306 ff.

<sup>6</sup> D. C. Stuart in *A. J. Phil.* xxxix (1918), 268 reduces pity and terror to sympathy and suspense. Cf. H. Philippart, 'La thème aristotélien de l'anagnorisis', *Rev. Ét. Grecs* xxxviii (1925), 171.

what is unexpected for the characters can, in a real sense, be unexpected for the audience, since they see events mainly through the eyes of the characters, so that, so far as concerns the meaning of *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*, the distinction which has been so much discussed does not arise.

In the light of this it is possible to give a slightly modified definition of *peripeteia*. *ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον μεταβολή* implies a complete change of situation. A man thinking himself in a good position and in a fair way to succeed in his intentions finds himself, as a natural consequence of previous events, in peril and faced with disaster. This character is often what we call the hero. Aristotle has no word for him, though the character who experiences the *μεταβολή* is, in general, the hero in our sense. We are not told that the *peripeteia* must be primarily in the hero's fortunes, though usually, no doubt, it is. *Peripeteia* concentrates in a short passage an event, or events, of far-reaching consequence, and it culminates in a realization that a previously held belief is an illusion, in some cases, that of Oedipus for instance, an illusion that has been present for a long time. Since it is unexpected, it happens suddenly;<sup>1</sup> otherwise, if it came gradually, the shock of surprise would be modified. It will often happen that the train of causally connected events which lead up to the *peripeteia* starts from an intention of the hero which is based on a misconception, an Aristotelian *hamartia*.<sup>2</sup> This will be a *peripeteia* as defined by Vahlen ending in self-frustration. This is a special case of *peripeteia* as more generally defined. If, ignoring *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν*, we demand that *peripeteia* should always involve an issue contrary to intention as well as expectation, we shall find ourselves driven to feats of verbal draughtsmanship in order to make recalcitrant plots fit the formula, or else have to be content with far fewer instances of *peripeteia*.

Aristotle states without explanation that *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*, separately or together, are the differentia of simple and complex plays. The descriptions simple and complex applied to plays have an inherent meaning and it is possible, indeed it is the case, that a play without *peripeteia* or *anagnorisis* can give a strong impression of complexity. In fact, outside classical drama these categories have little application, and it is rare to find an Elizabethan play which turns on a single *peripeteia*, as the *Merchant of Venice* turns on the Trial Scene. Accordingly, if a particular definition of *peripeteia*, when applied to extant tragedy, fails to cover many plays which are *prima facie* complex, or if it causes to be classed as complex plays which appear simple, this would be reason for revising the definition. There seems to be a certain reluctance to consider plays individually with reference to this classification, perhaps because it is felt that to admit that a play is simple is to condemn it to an inferior status.

*Anagnorisis* of people, the realization of an identity previously mistaken, is a simple enough conception and raises no difficulties. But Aristotle allows also a subordinate sort of *anagnorisis* of lifeless things, which he ignores in his fuller treatment of the subject in Chapter 16, and, in particular, realization that someone has, or has not, done something (52<sup>a</sup>36).<sup>3</sup> It is a question whether

<sup>1</sup> Those who do not regard *παρὰ τὴν δόξαν* as referring to *peripeteia* are free to deny that suddenness is part of the definition. Cf. Gudeman on 52<sup>a</sup>15, op. cit., p. 220.

<sup>2</sup> This is not to accept Else's conclusion that *hamartia* is confined to complex plays, p. 384.

<sup>3</sup> Twice, for example, in the *Trachiniae*.

Deianeira realizes that she has charged her gift to Heracles with deadly poison, and Heracles realizes that his affliction comes from the long-dead Nessus, and that his own imminent death is the consequence. Possibly Aristotle does not deal further with this kind of *anagnorisis* because it can be regarded as part of the *peripeteia*. Philippart, loc. cit.,

a *peripeteia* can exist at all without a realization of this kind; for if the change involved in *peripeteia* is not perceived by those it affects, most of the drama is gone out of it. For instance, Rhesus comes to Troy in full confidence that he will save the city and drive the Greeks into the sea; instead his throat is cut while he sleeps in his camp outside Troy. As it stands, this is not a *peripeteia*. It could have become one had Rhesus been shown in the moment of realization, appreciating the transformation of his own fortune. There is a similar case in the *Phoenissae*. Creon learning that the safety of Thebes requires the sacrifice of Menoeceus, his son, warns the boy to leave the city. The consequence is that Menoeceus, to save the city, brings about his own death, but we do not see the effect of this on Creon, who makes only a casual reference to his loss when he next appears 300 lines after Menoeceus' last exit (1310). This is an incipient *peripeteia*, but, lacking the moment of realization, it comes to nothing. A borderline case is the death of Lycus in the *Heracles*.

It cannot often be doubtful whether or not there is an *anagnorisis* in the personal sense. A character is either known or not known.<sup>1</sup> The case of *peripeteia* is more difficult. Few examples are so clear-cut as the two which Aristotle chooses. Here the question of degree enters in. How sudden is sudden? Many dramatic situations have no well-defined opposite. How drastic a change is to be postulated? Must it affect a principal character, and be a vital part of the *μεταβολή*? For instance, what of the punishment of Polymestor at the end of the *Hecuba*? What of the discovery by Aegisthus of his wife's corpse, when he expected to find Orestes', at the end of Sophocles' *Electra*?<sup>2</sup> In this case the action is essentially complete before it happens. In several plays we find the ingredients of a *peripeteia*, yet they are not at the centre of gravity of the episodes to which they belong. It is less obvious than might be supposed which plays are simple, by Aristotle's definition, and which are complex. One valuable piece of guidance is provided in the *Poetics*; plays on the subject of Ajax, which must include our *Ajax*, are described as belonging to the category of the 'pathetic' (56<sup>a</sup>1). As the 'complex' category has just been mentioned, this should mean that 'pathetic' plays are 'simple', and that the *Ajax* is without *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*.<sup>3</sup> This was by no means self-evident. The deception of the Chorus and its subsequent discovery that the 'reconciliation' of Ajax was of a kind far different from what had been supposed constitute a rudimentary *peripeteia*. From this it appears that the term is by no means to be applied loosely. There must be more dramatic concentration<sup>4</sup> than in the *Ajax*.

The following plays can safely be classed as simple: all Aeschylus except *Choephoroe*; *Ajax*, *O.C.*;<sup>5</sup> *Andromache*, *Heraclidae*, *Supplices*, *Troades*, *Phoenissae*, *Rhesus*, *Cyclops*. The following as complex: *Choephoroe*; *Trachiniae*, *O.T.*, *Electra*; p. 178, note 2, is of course right in saying that *anagnorisis* proper (of persons) is not inseparable from *peripeteia*; but a moment of realization is inseparable, whether or not A. called it *anagnorisis*.

<sup>1</sup> For Eur. *Hel.* see above, p. 53, n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> The *anagnorisis* of Electra and Orestes of course puts the complexity of the play beyond question.

<sup>3</sup> Else, 531, the only commentator, so far as I know, to take this point.

<sup>4</sup> The Trügredre begins at 646, the body is discovered in the next episode at 898. It

might be objected that the *peripeteia* of the *O.T.* extends over two episodes, from the news of Polybus at 942 to the exit of Oedipus at 1185. But there are two separate realizations here, and that of Jocasta at 1071 falls within the first episode. It is far from clear how long before the climax Aristotle considers a *peripeteia* to start. Bywater in *Festschrift Gomperz* (Wien, 1902), p. 171 restricts the *peripeteia* to *O.T.* 1110-85.

<sup>5</sup> The *O.C.* is not easy to classify; a play so full of oracles whose fulfilment is recognized cannot be entirely simple.

*Alcestis*, *Hecuba*,<sup>1</sup> *Heracles*, *Electra*, *I.T.*, *Ion*, *Helena*, *Bacchae*. This leaves us with a number of plays which, in the ordinary sense of the word, are complex, but lack by Aristotle's standard an obvious claim to this status. The strangest case is the highly complicated *Philoctetes*. There is a sort of *peripeteia* when Odysseus finds himself frustrated by the youth he had thought to use as his tool, but the incident is only partly dramatized, and it does not take the weight of the scene of which it forms only the beginning. A stronger claim might be made for an *anagnorisis* in *Philoctetes*' realization that he has been played false, and that Neoptolemus is keeping his bow. But the significant fact remains that the complexity of the play is largely independent of *peripeteia* or *anagnorisis*, even if we allow these incidents to count as such. Another play which will certainly be claimed as complex by some is the *Antigone*. The appearance of Antigone under guard as the culprit is undoubtedly unexpected, but if the *Ajax* is simple, this incident hardly suffices to establish the *Antigone* as complex. Again, Creon by his folly destroys himself, and a decisive point in his *μετάβασις* is reached when Teiresias warns him of the divine anger. But though Creon is shaken, realization of disaster does not come to him until almost the end of the play, and the concentration necessary for a *peripeteia* is lacking.

Of the four Euripidean plays in question the *Medea* is the most obviously simple, and it is instructive to consider why Jason's discovery that he has been fooled does not make a *peripeteia*. When Jason returns to the stage at 1293 after an absence of over 300 lines he has already learnt of the death of his bride and her father, and some of the depth of Medea's hatred has been revealed. But he has still no inkling of his children's death, and there is plenty of emotional dynamite available. But Euripides concentrates the explosion, not in the realization itself, from which attention is quickly diverted by the appearance of Medea aloft, but in the last relentless altercation. Material from which a *peripeteia* could have been made is not used to this end. The same is true of the more complex *Orestes*. The one major surprise is the turning of the tables on Menelaus by Orestes and Electra. There is no *peripeteia* because the decisive moment, the moment when Menelaus discovers that there has been so far as he is concerned a *μεταβολή εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον*, takes place off stage. ηκω κλύων τὰ δεωὰ καὶ δραστήρια δισσοῦν λεόντων (1554) says Menelaus, as he comes in sight of his house from which he has been shut out. He knows already. There is plenty of excitement to come, but no *peripeteia*. The *Iphigeneia in Aulis* is probably to be regarded as complex on the strength of the transformation brought about by Iphigeneia's change of mind, but we know what Aristotle thought about Iphigeneia as a character,<sup>2</sup> and he might have denied that a change so little κατὰ τὸ εἶκος η ἀναγκῶν constituted a *peripeteia*.

Least obvious is the status of the *Hippolytus*. If we knew of its plot only so much as the ancient *Hypothesis* tells, we should no doubt assume that such a play of intrigue and deception would have features which stamped it as unmistakably complex. In fact neither of the two potential *peripeteiae* is fully developed. The innocent Hippolytus, falsely charged with the pursuit of the woman who had pursued him, would seem an inevitable centre-piece for a *peripeteia*. In fact the moment of his realization is blurred, because the charge

<sup>1</sup> Gudeman, who makes more effort than most to apply the *Poetics* to Greek drama, numbers the *Hec.* and, with hesitation, the *Phil.* among simple plays. But *Hec.* can be

claimed as complex, if not on account of Polymestor, on account of 658-87, the discovery of Polydorus' death.

<sup>2</sup> 54<sup>a</sup>32.

emerges only gradually from the bitter ironies of Theseus' accusation (936-80), and his own defence is wrapped up in a justification of his whole way of life (983-1035). Again, Theseus destroys his own innocent son by a hasty curse, and his recognition of this over-hastiness might well have supplied a *peripeteia*. But that is not how the play is constructed. The news that Hippolytus is mortally injured (1236 ff.) is followed after an interval by the appearance of Artemis who declares his innocence (1283 ff.). But this is the beginning of a scene, not itself a climax but leading up to a climax, the entry of the dying Hippolytus. There is no lack of unexpected incidents, but the emotion they provoke is not concentrated on a few outstanding moments; it is spread out over longer periods.

In fact plays are not so well suited for sorting into fixed categories as the natural organisms with which Aristotle had his most notable success as a classifier. It is surprising that as differentiae *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis* work as well as they appear to do. Any play which contains a well-developed specimen of either is likely to be fairly complex, because actions based on misapprehension lead to complication, but complication need not show itself in *peripeteia* or *anagnorisis*. The basic difference between the *Prometheus* or *Troades*, admittedly simple plays, on the one hand, and on the other an admittedly complex play like the *Ion*, or a doubtfully complex play like the *Orestes*, is that both the latter contain a greater variety of emotional tensions, as fresh hopes and fears possess the characters. The emotions of Prometheus represented, as it were, on a temperature chart would show a fairly steady increase of anger and apprehension. A similar chart for Orestes or Creusa would show violent fluctuations. But it is by no means necessary for these fluctuations to appear in the play as moments of concentrated excitement which are the characteristic feature of *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*. Any definition narrower than the one here adopted would have the effect of excluding still more plays. In fact the later generalized use of the word *peripeteia* such as we find it in Polybius, who said that no war had contained *peripeteias μείζους* than that between Rome and Carthage in Sicily (1, 13, 11), reflects very adequately Aristotle's essential meaning.

*King's College, Cambridge*

D. W. LUCAS

## THE MUSICAL PAPYRUS: EURIPIDES, *ORESTES* 332-40<sup>1</sup>

ἰὼ Ζεῦ,	
τίς ἔλεος, τίς ὁδ' ἀγών	
φόνιος ἔρχεται,	
θοάζων σε τὸν μέλεον, ὡς δάκρυα	
δάκρυσι συμβάλλει	
πορεύων τις ἐς δόμον ἀλαστόρων	
ματέρος αἴμα σάς, δ' οὐτ' ἀναβακχεύει;	338
δ' μέγας ὅλβος οὐ μόνιμος ἐν βροτοῖς.	340
κατολοφύρομαι κατολοφύρομαι.	339
ἀνὰ δὲ λαῖφος ὡς . . . κτλ.	

339 ante 338 habet *Π*: post 340 trai. Kirchhoff: cf. stropham

THE version given above is from Murray's Oxford text: the recent Budé text of Chapouthier concurs in accepting Kirchhoff's transposition. Other editors, such as Paley and Weil, have also given their approval to this proposed alteration, though Biehl<sup>2</sup> regards it as superfluous. Most commentators<sup>3</sup> are agreed, however, in considering that the choice must lie between the traditional line-order and Kirchhoff's transposition: few<sup>4</sup> regard the papyrus line-order as either probable or even possible.

Kirchhoff's line-order is designed to put *κατολοφύρομαι κατολοφύρομαι* into correspondion with the similarly repetitive *καθικετεύομαι καθικετεύομαι* (324), but there is no strong evidence to suggest that this correspondion is either a metrical or a musical necessity.<sup>5</sup> The advantage is a dubious one, and opposed to it is a strong disadvantage, namely that vv. 341 ff. contain the elaboration of the gnomic utterance in v. 340, and the interposition of this passionate exclamation into a passage of meditative moralizing not only seems inappropriate<sup>6</sup> but also disrupts the sequence of thought in a way which cannot be paralleled. In such circumstances, when the objection is clear and the possible gain is, at the most, marginal, then, as a matter of principle, the manuscript tradition must be preferred to the conjecture.

<sup>1</sup> I have been greatly indebted, in writing this paper, to Professor R. P. Winnington-Ingram for encouragement and most valuable advice (accompanied by detailed references). For the main argument of this paper, concerning the textual problem and its proposed solution, I alone am responsible: this argument was originally put forward, with less explanatory detail, as part of a lecture to the Institute of Classical Studies (University of London) entitled 'Musical Testimony to the Text of Euripides' *Orestes*'.

<sup>2</sup> *Textprobleme in Euripides Orestes*, pp. 24-25.

<sup>3</sup> No editors of the play have adopted the

papyrus line-order in their text: suggestions that it should be adopted are confined to writers who discuss the papyrus separately—see n. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Professor E. G. Turner, to whom we owe the invaluable re-dating of this fragment (*J.H.S.* lxxvi [1956], 95-96), puts forward some arguments in favour of the papyrus line-order, and quotes Crusius (*Philologus* lxi [1893], 179) in his support. Cf. also D. D. Feaver, *A.J.P.* lxxxi (1960), 1-15.

<sup>5</sup> See E. G. Turner, *op. cit.*, and, in particular, his footnote 8.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Biehl, *loc. cit.*

If we then leave aside Kirchhoff's transposition, how satisfactory is the text of our medieval manuscripts? The passage can be construed, and must be translated as follows:

'Alas, O Zeus, what pitiable situation, what bloody struggle is this which comes, driving thee onwards, the wretched one, for whom one of the Avengers heaps tears on tears, conveying into the house the blood of thy mother, which drives thee mad? I lament, I lament! Great prosperity . . . etc.'

Nevertheless, though this text is intelligible, it is suspect, in my opinion, on account of numerous oddities. The word-order is involved, and the sentence-construction tortuous. The relative clause within a relative clause is rather awkward. One might expect the two participles, *θοάζων* and *πορεύων*, similar in meaning and grammatical form, to be parallel to one another, but, with this text, they refer to dissimilar subjects and govern dissimilar objects.<sup>1</sup> The position of *ἀλαστόρων* is very curious: rather than take it as dependent upon *τις*, one is tempted by the word-order to take it with *δόμον* ['the House of the Avengers' = 'Hades'].<sup>2</sup> Similarly, one is tempted by the word-order to take *δάκρυνα δάκρυντι* *ευμβάλλει* as a phrase complete in itself, with *ευμβάλλει* used intransitively<sup>3</sup> ['tears vie with tears'], but the nominative which comes in the next line would then be left without a verb. Again, one would certainly expect *κατολοφύρομα* to be used transitively ['bewail', rather than 'wail']: this transitive use would accord with all the other occurrences of the verb.<sup>4</sup>

One further objection to this text renders it, in my opinion, unacceptable. The image presented by the expression *πορεύων αἴμα* is quite extraordinary. If the Chorus had been speaking at the time of Clytemnestra's death, they might well have referred in such terms to 'an Avenger conveying the murder of thy mother into the house', and if the Chorus were now speaking of that past event (i.e. if the participle were not *πορεύων* but *πορεύεται*), the phraseology would likewise be appropriate.<sup>5</sup> But the present participle must plainly, in this text, oblige us to regard the act of *πορεύων αἴμα* as contemporaneous with (and an intrinsic part of) the *new* calamity which the Avenger is now bringing upon the house. Hence scholiasts and editors alike have tacitly interpreted the phrase as meaning 'an Avenger conveying the blood-guilt (from thy mother's murder) into the house', since, though the murder is past, the blood-guilt still remains. But this interpretation is impossible. The whole conception of blood-guilt

<sup>1</sup> Pace Weil, who construes *πορεύων* with *εἰς* understood (see below).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Σ ad loc. (Schwartz 133, 3-5): *τινὲς δὲ ἥκουσαν εἰς ἀλαστόρων δόμον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς Ήδον, εἰς τὸν οἶκον τῶν ἀλαστόρων καὶ τὸ δὲ ἡ νόσος πορεύεται αὐτὸν ποιῶν εἰς Ήδον.* (The reference to *νόσος*, in place of *ἔλεος* or *ἀγάν*, would seem to derive from a confused recollection of the similar phraseology used at vv. 831-3.) Cf. also Schwarz's first footnote on p. 133.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 461: *Ἄργης Άρει εὐμβαλεῖ, Δίκη Δίκη.* For examples of polyptoton with

*δάκρυνα* as the subject, cf. Eur. *Tro.* 605-6: *δάκρυνά τ' ἐκ δάκρυντον καταλείπεται ἀμετέροις δόμοις*, and *Orest.* 1308: *δάκρυνα δάκρυντι ἔπεσεν.*

<sup>4</sup> See *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, s.v., and cf. L.S.J., s.v. In all its other occurrences, including Eur. *I.T.* 644, the verb governs an accusative. This would seem to illustrate well the usage whereby intransitive verbs are compounded with *κατά* to make them transitive: cf. L.S.J., s.v. *κατά E. VI.*

<sup>5</sup> Cf., for instance, *μέλεον ἀπόφονον αἴμα δούς* (192).

and its punishment, as the ancient doctrine is represented to us in Greek drama and elsewhere, is that the blood-guilt *abides*<sup>1</sup> in the house (or with the malefactor) from the time of the murder, and the avenging deities, so far from bringing it with them, are attracted to it,<sup>2</sup> and sooner or later punish the malefactor by means of it or because of it.<sup>3</sup>

The Scholiast, who doubtless recognised this problem, makes a desperate attempt to solve it by supposing that the blood-guilt lay dormant, and was awakened to activity by the Avenger's arrival. He writes:<sup>4</sup> πορεύων καὶ περιέλκων ματέρος αἷμα κάτι, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνακινῶν τὸ αἷμα τῆς μητρός του κατὰ τοὺς οἴκους καὶ μὴ τρέμειν αὐτὸν ἔων ἀτιμάρητον. To this one can only reply that πορεύων clearly cannot be equivalent to either περιέλκων or ἀνακινῶν, and that ἐς δόμον cannot, in this context, mean the same as what the Scholiast means by κατὰ τοὺς οἴκους. Weil, prompted by another scholiast,<sup>5</sup> and perhaps because he was tempted, quite understandably, to take πορεύων as parallel to θοάζων, tries to avoid the problem of πορεύων αἷμα by construing the sense as πορεύων (ce) εἰς δόμον, and taking ματέρος αἷμα κάτι as in apposition to δάκρυα (335). But if it is necessary to supply ce from the previous clause, which has a different subject, and to refer back ματέρος αἷμα κάτι to so distant and dissimilar a noun as δάκρυα, the sentence-construction becomes even more impossibly contorted, while the reference to 'an Avenger conveying Orestes into his house' is feeble and pointless.

In short, the text of the medieval manuscripts involves us not only in many minor difficulties but also in a major problem of interpretation which can neither be evaded nor resolved. It will be seen, also, that Kirchhoff's transposition, which we earlier set aside as unjustifiable, would not, if adopted, contribute anything to the removal of either the minor difficulties or the major problem: it can therefore be dismissed as a needless complication.

The papyrus line-order, at first sight, appears to be quite impossible. Not only, like Kirchhoff's transposition, does it seem to offer no release from the perplexities of the traditional text, but it also adds a further and harsher contortion to the already over-contorted sentence-construction. It introduces κατολοφύρομαι κατολοφύρομαι, as a quite unparalleled exclamation, into the middle of a participial clause, between πορεύων, the verb, and αἷμα, the noun it governs. One would then be intolerably tempted to understand αἷμα as the object of κατολοφύρομαι, rather than of πορεύων, and this would either leave πορεύων without an object, in which case the clause would be meaningless, or, if we adopt (in a different context) Weil's improbable theory that πορεύων governs ce understood, the clause would, as we have seen, become feeble and pointless. It is not surprising, therefore, that editors are unanimous<sup>6</sup> in rejecting the papyrus line-order: the general view is summed up in Chapouthier's brief reference (ad loc.) to 'le fragment de papyrus à notation musicale . . . qui pose plus de problèmes qu'il n'en résout'.

Nevertheless, the papyrus must be accounted a formidable witness. This is

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 154 f. (the note on μίμεται), Sidgwick on *Cho.* 67; Soph. *O.T.* 97-98, 101; Eur. *Orest.* 512-17 (note the phrases αἷμα ἔχων and ἐνέξεθαι φόνῳ).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1188-90, *Cho.* 400-4, 577-8, 649-51, *Eum.* 230-1, 244-7, 253, 264-6;

Soph. frag. 743.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Aesch. *Cho.* 283-4, Sidgwick on *Eum.* 358-9; Eur. *Orest.* 36-37, 411, 423, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Schwartz 134, 12-14.

<sup>5</sup> Id. 132, 21-22 (cf. 133, 2-3).

<sup>6</sup> See p. 61, nn. 3 and 4.

not merely because of its age (iii-ii B.C.),<sup>1</sup> but also because the musical notation, which accompanies the text, is an additional guarantee of its integrity. It seems reasonable to assume that the writer of the papyrus, or the person for whom he was writing, knew the tune, or could, at any rate, distinguish musical sense from musical nonsense. Therefore, since any gross dislocation of the text would have involved, unavoidably, a corresponding dislocation of the music, the line-order must have been doubly safeguarded against corruption.<sup>2</sup>

In these circumstances, we can be guided by a rule which may be considered as amounting to an important principle of textual criticism. When, out of two well-attested manuscript variants, one is impossible and the other improbable, it frequently happens that the impossible one is the nearer to the true reading.<sup>3</sup> The impossible variant, deriving from a mere mechanical error of transcription, is susceptible of simple correction: the improbable variant, having resulted, at a later date, from an ill-contrived reconstruction of an obviously corrupt passage, presents a text which, but for the other variant, would defy emendation.<sup>4</sup> It is my belief that this rule applies in the present case, and that the text implied by the papyrus line-order can be restored by the correction of a single letter.

I propose that, retaining the papyrus line-order, we read in v. 337 an *ε* for *ι*, that is *πορευωντεσεις* for the *πορευωντισεις* of the traditional text.<sup>5</sup> The resulting text will then be:

ιώ Ζεῦ,	
τίς ἔλεος, τίς ὅδ' ἀγών	
φόνιος ἔρχεται,	
θοάζων σε τὸν μέλεον, φ δάκρυν	
δάκρυσι συμβάλλει,	
πορεύων τέ <i>ε</i> ' εἰς δόμον ἀλαστόρων;	
κατολοφύρομαι κατολοφύρομαι	339
ματέρος αἴμα σᾶς, δ <i>ε</i> ' ἀναβακχεύει.	338
δ μέγας δλβος οὐ μόνιμος ἐν βροτοῖς,	
ἀνὰ δὲ λαῖφος ὡς . . . κτλ.	340

The text, in sense and syntax, is now perfectly straightforward:

<sup>1</sup> See E. G. Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 95. He adds (p. 96): 'Now the revised dating of the fragment . . . means that its aberrant text cannot be dismissed as due to careless copying of the order of lines in the Alexandrian edition. The papyrus must in fact be independent of, perhaps prior to, the Alexandrian tradition.'

<sup>2</sup> E. G. Turner (*op. cit.*, p. 96) points out that 'it is surely difficult to attribute the text of the papyrus to a mere scribal error. Divergencies from the accepted text that are found in early Ptolemaic "wild" papyri are in general intelligible Greek, that is, they are at least possible variants. Under what conditions, however, is it possible to conceive the displacement of phrases in a lyric text that is "protected" by musical notation (both of pitch and rhythm)?'

<sup>3</sup> I have not seen this principle expressed as a maxim, though it seems as useful a canon as *Difficilior lectio potior*. Perhaps *Impossibilis lectio verae propior*: I owe this formulation to a discussion with Mr. S. A. Handford.

<sup>4</sup> Cf., for instance, the variant readings at Juvenal 8. 148: *sufflamine multo consul* and *multo sufflamine consul*, where the former reading, though metrically impossible, is, in comparison with its more plausible alternative, far nearer to the true reading, *sufflamine mulio consul*. Similarly, at Virgil, *Georgics* 4. 412, the reading *tantu*, as opposed to *tantum* and the highly plausible *tanto*, enabled Ribbeck to restore the true reading, *tam tu*.

<sup>5</sup> Or, with equal probability, *πορευωντεσεις* for *πορευωντισεις*, if the corruption occurred in a text which had *εις* for *εις*.

'Alas, O Zeus, what pitiable situation, what bloody struggle is this which comes, driving thee onwards, the wretched one, for whom tears vie with tears, and conveying thee into the House of the Avengers? I bewail, I bewail the murder of thy mother, which drives thee mad. Great prosperity . . . etc.'

It will be seen that this suggestion involves no alteration in the papyrus text, since the papyrus fragment does not extend to v. 337. I think it probable that, when intact, the papyrus contained the reading which I have proposed, and that the corruption of *τε* to *τι*, with the consequent alteration in line-order, occurred at a later date.

The adoption of this reading removes all the oddities of the former text. There is no longer a relative clause within a relative clause. The participles *θοάζων* and *πορεύων* are parallel: they refer to the same subject (*άγων*) and govern the same object (*ει*). The words *δόμον ἀλαστόρων* are taken together; the phrase *δάκρυν δάκρυντι συμβάλλει* is complete in itself; the verb *κατολοφύρομαι* is used transitively. Finally,<sup>1</sup> the meaningless phrase *πορεύων αἷμα* no longer exists to perplex us.

Certain other points may be noted in support of this reading:

1. The continuity of sense and syntax is no longer disrupted by an exclamatory line. Instead, the repeated verb (*κατολοφύρομαι κατολοφύρομαι*), like the repeated verb of the strophe (*καθικετέομαι καθικετέομαι*), is closely bound in with the construction of the whole surrounding passage.

2. The sense of *θοάζων*, which might otherwise seem obscure, is now explained and elaborated by *πορεύων* and the clause it governs. Moreover, *πορεύων* itself now appears in a most appropriate context: the word is a *vox propria* in connexion with journeys to and from the lower world.<sup>2</sup>

3. The reference of *ἀλαστόρων* is to the Erinyes,<sup>3</sup> whose home is in Hades. It

<sup>1</sup> Another, and incidental, advantage derives from the adoption of this reading. With the change from *τι* to *τέ ει*, the papyrus line-order yields an acceptable sense, and this vindication of the papyrus text should enable students of Greek music to feel greater confidence in the authenticity and integrity of the accompanying musical score—virtually the oldest piece of written evidence in the study of ancient Greek music. The supposed dislocation of the text has naturally lent countenance to grave doubts concerning the music's Euripidean authorship [cf. Mrs. Henderson, *New Oxford History of Music*, i. 337], concerning its accurate transmission [cf. E. G. Turner, who states the problem well (op. cit., p. 96, n. 10): 'In that case, has the scribe got both words and musical notation in the wrong order, or have the words and music got out of phase?'], and concerning its general interpretation [cf. J. F. Mountford, *Greek Music in the Papyri and Inscriptions (New Chapters in Greek Literature*, edited by Powell and Barber—Second Series), p. 149,

who writes: 'Yet any conclusions which we are inclined to draw from this fragment will always be open to some doubt, since the order of the lines in the papyrus is different from that upon which modern scholars are agreed.' Cf., also, his n. 1 on that page]. These doubts are dispelled if, by the adoption of the suggested reading, we no longer need to assume any dislocation, or, indeed, any corruption whatsoever, in the papyrus text.

<sup>2</sup> Cf., for example, Pindar, *Pyth.* 11. 21; Aristophanes, *Pax* 126 (the only occurrence, in this author, of the word in its active form); Eur. *H.F.* 838, 1278, *Rhes.* 832, *Alc.* 443, 1073.

<sup>3</sup> For this identification, cf. Roscher, *Lexicon der Mythologie*, s.v. Alastor (d), Page on *Medea* 1259-60 (p. 169 in his edition), Pearson on *Phoen.* 1556. Note also the verb *ἡλάστρουν* used of the 'Erinyes' at *I.T.* 970-1: δέαι δ' Ἐρινύων οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν νόμῳ, δρόμοις ἀνδρύστοις τὴλάστρουν μ' ἀει (cf. *ibid.* 934).

is in Hades that, traditionally, when they have driven him to his death, the Erinyes punish the malefactor.<sup>1</sup>

4. The descriptive phrase *δόμον ἀλαστόρων*, for 'Hades', is apposite in the context. The periphrasis is striking in its originality, but it is in line with other traditional designations of the lower world.<sup>2</sup>

5. This interpretation makes the passage a characteristic utterance of the Chorus. Though they sympathize with Orestes, and regard the matricide as justifiable, they nevertheless deplore it on account of its consequences (*ὅς εἰς ἀναβακχενεῖ*). In their next ode they express this sentiment again (831-5), in words which echo with the same phraseology—*δάκρυα* (831), *τίς ἔλεος* (832), *μητροκτόνον αἷμα* (833), *βεβάκχενται* (835). In their following ode (960-81: lines falsely attributed to Electra), the sequence of thought is similar—an oblique mention of the lower world: *ἀ κατὰ χθονὸς νερτέρων τὸ Περσέφασσα τὰ καλλίπτας θεά* (963-4), compassion for imminent death: *ἔλεος ἔλεος* (968), followed by reflections upon the unstable nature of human prosperity (976-81).

*King's College, Newcastle upon Tyne*

G. A. LONGMAN

<sup>1</sup> For their home in Hades (Hades and Persephone are, according to the more ancient tradition, their parents), cf. Roscher, op. cit., s.v. *Erinys* (1318-20); Aesch. *Eum.* 72, 115, 395-6; Soph. *O.C.* 40, 1568, *El.* 489-91; Eur. *I.T.* 286. For the Erinyes as avengers who set out from the lower world, drive their victim to death, and then punish him in Hades, cf. Roscher, op. cit., s.v. *Erinys* (1324-5); Homer, *G* 278-9, *I* 569-72, *T* 258-60; Pindar, *Ol.* 2, 41-42; Aesch. *Eum.* 267-75, 338-40, 368; Soph. *O.C.* 1432-4. Euripides, in our play, represents Orestes as fearing the Erinyes not only as tormentors of the living but also as bringers of death (and punishment thereafter): *μέθες μὲν οὐδετὰ τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων μέσον μὲν ὅχμάζεις, ὃς βάλῃς ἐς Τάρπαρον* (264-5).

<sup>2</sup> Thus in Homer we find not only *δόμον Ήδος*, *δῶμ' Ήδοι*, *Ηδεω δόμον εὐρώντα*, but also the more enterprising *εἰς Ήδονος δόμους καὶ ἐπαυγῆς Περσεφόνειας* (κ 491). In close company with Hades and Persephone, in references to the lower world, are found their offspring (see n. 1, above), the Erinyes. Prayers to the parents are answered by the children, and conversely: cf. *κικλήσκους Ήδην καὶ ἐπαυγὴν Περσεφόνειαν . . . τῆς δ' ἡροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς ἐκλινεν ἐξ Ἐρέβεσφιν* (*I*

569, 571-2), and *στυγερὰς ἀπεκέκλετ' Ἐρινύς . . . θεοί δ' ἔτελειον ἐπαράς, Ζεὺς τε καταχθόνιος καὶ ἐπαυγὴ Περσεφόνεια* (*I* 454, 456-7). In Pindar, besides the conventional *Ἄΐδα δόμον* (*Pyth.* 3, 11), we find the designation by Persephone alone: *μελανοτειχέα νῦν δόμον Φερσεφόνας ίθι* (*Ol.* 14, 20-21), and *δῶμα Φερσεφόνας* (*Isthm.* 8, 60). In Sophocles the offspring again figure with their parents in a comprehensive invocation of the lower world: *ῳ δῶμ' Ήδον καὶ Περσεφόνης, ὡς χθόνι* 'Ἐρμῆ καὶ πότνι Ήρά, *σεμναὶ τε θεῶν παιδες Ἐρινύες* (*El.* 110-12: cf. *O.C.* 40, *Ant.* 1075); a more recondite reference to the lower world is *Στύγον δόμον* (*O.C.* 1564). Euripides uses a variety of periphrases: besides *τὸν Ήδα δόμον* (*Heracl.* 913), we find *Πλούτωνος δῶμα . . . νέρτερον* (*H.F.* 808), *τῶν κάτω Κόρης Ήνακτός τε . . . ἀνηλίους δόμους* (*Alc.* 851-2), and *νερτέρων . . . δωμάτων* (*Alc.* 1073); cf. *ηκὼ νεκρῶν κενθμάνα καὶ σκότου πύλας λιπάν, ίν' Ήδην χωρὶς φύκισται θεῶν* (*Hec.* 1-2). In a context, therefore, where it is plain that *ἀλαστόρων* = *Ἐρινύων* (see p. 65, n. 3), there is no reason why Euripides should not designate the lower world by mention of these other inhabitants. For *ἀλαστόρες* dwelling in Hades, cf. *Medea* 1059: *μὰ τοὺς παρ' Ήδῃ νερτέρους ἀλαστόρας*.

## CICERO, *PRO SESTIO* 96-143

IN a recent paper<sup>1</sup> Mr. Balsdon has condemned the 'political barrenness of Cicero's thought and the thought of his political friends'. The speech *pro Sestio*, we are told, with its stress on *otium*, implies 'an acceptance of the existing political and social conditions, of what Cicero describes as *otiosae dignitatis . . . fundamenta* (98), which the *principes* must protect and defend'. Defence of these was 'a placid acceptance of the existing régime' and the appeal for *otium* 'the retort of Maître Pangloss that all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds'.

Whatever the ultimate truth of Balsdon's view of Cicero's political thought, any view which is founded on such an interpretation of Cicero's sermon to the young in *pro Sestio* 96 ff. seems to involve such a grave misrepresentation of the nature and purpose of this discourse that it can hardly be allowed to pass unchallenged.

The political context of *pro Sestio*, spoken in March 56, was that these *fundamenta*, or most of them, had been swept away by force, first in 59 by Caesar as consul, then by Clodius in 58 and under the aegis of his brother for much of 57, until sufficient force had been raised by his opponents to secure Cicero's return from exile.<sup>2</sup> In 56, with Clodius again in office, now as aedile, there was a grave danger—an actuality on some occasions during the year<sup>3</sup>—that the gangsterism of 58 would revive. There was no *otium*<sup>4</sup> in Rome, of any sort, let alone *otium cum dignitate*; there was an explosive revolutionary situation, comparable only to the opening days of 63 and the context of the speeches *contra Rullum* (see e.g. *Agr.* 2. 8, 102).

If it be objected that, as Ed. Meyer asserted (*Prinzipat*, p. 135 n. 2), *pro Sestio* as we have it is not the speech as actually delivered but a 'brochure to gain support for Cicero and the Senate's party', it can be replied that the significance of such an assertion depends entirely on the date at which he supposed the 'brochure' to have been published.

If it were published before the conference of Luca took place, the political background is the same, and the objection for the purpose of this paper purely academic. If after the conference of Luca, Meyer's adherents have to answer two questions: firstly 'Was Cicero an adherent of the Senate's after the conference of Luca?' and secondly, 'If so, was he a leader of senatorial opinion?' Immediately after Luca, the answer must be 'no' to both questions (e.g. *ad Att.* 4. 5. 1), and this would appear to persist at least till *ad Fam.* 1. 9 (late in 54). From 53 it becomes steadily less easy to

<sup>1</sup> *C.Q. n.s.* x (1960), 43-50. I have to thank Dr. A. H. McDonald especially, also Mr. J. A. Crook, Mr. R. Gardner, and Dr. D. C. Earl for reading this through and giving me advice from which I have much profited. Reff. to *pro Sestio* are cited without heading.

<sup>2</sup> Dio 39. 8, Velleius 2. 45. 3. But even this did not suffice to quell Clodius; for the attacks on Cicero's, Q. Cicero's, and Milo's

houses in Nov. 57, *ad Att.* 4. 3. 2-3: for intimidation of the Senate in Dec. 57, *ad Q.F.* 2. 1. 3. All dates are B.C.

<sup>3</sup> See esp. *ad Q.F.* 2. 3 and 4, for the situation early in 56; Dio 39. 20-21 for an attack on Cicero's house later.

<sup>4</sup> For examples of *otium* used for internal tranquillity, S. Wirszubski (*J.R.S.* xliv [1954], 4); the whole article is of the greatest interest and value.

see how Cicero could have produced this political 'brochure' when he had published his *pro Vatinio* (*ad Q.F.* 2. 15. 3) and drew closer to Caesar in sympathies.

Carcopino's view (*Hist. Rom.*, pp. 734-5) that the speech propounds a general policy against the 'Triumvirate'—which is Cicero's reason for attempting to assert that optimates are as widely based as he maintains—Involves accepting two assumptions: firstly that the 'Triumvirs' were the sole purveyors of *vis* in the forum, and that Clodius was a tool of the 'Triumvirs' (a 'fact' not proved by being constantly stated), and secondly that the 'Triumvirs' had a policy at this period—which manifestly they did not; *ad Q.F.* 2. 3. 2 (Milo's trial) should suffice to explode any theory that Clodius was a tool of Pompey's, though there is evidence that he was in league with Crassus (*ibid.*) and Caesar (Appius' embassy, *ad Q.F.* 2. 4. 6). But Clodius was quite prepared to use *vis* on his own, both in defiance of the 'Triumvirs' (*ad Att.* 2. 22. 1, 59 B.C.), and against Pompey in alliance with many of the *nobiles* (*ad Q.F.* 2. 3. 4). The element of truth in Carcopino's view lies in the supposition that Cicero in *pro Sestio* was trying to rally the normally inactive classes in the State to stand up and oppose *nobiles* like Clodius and his relations in their attempt to rule the forum by force, as he had in 63 rallied these same classes against another clique of *nobiles*.

The whole of Sestius' case hangs on the question of whether it is justifiable to take to arms to defend the State against intimidation, and, more fundamentally, whether the rule of law is to be defended against the rule of the club and the sword.<sup>1</sup> The speech *pro Sestio* is therefore basically a call to defend *lex* and *ius* against *vis*. It is true that (as Balsdon says) there is no platform of political and social reform put forward, but at such a moment such platforms were out of place; what was primarily wanted was an end to intimidation, and an acceptance of Cicero's doctrines (*pro Sestio* 137, 139; cf. *de Off.* 1. 85-86, etc.) that the State's interests are the advantage of everyone, not of a party or faction, combined with a recognition that acquisition of political power involves acceptance of responsibilities (*de rep.* 1. 51 f. *et al.*).

The law of *vis*, Cicero had just argued (*pro Sestio* 91 ff.), was the law of the jungle; civilized societies are characterized by the replacement of *vis* by *ius*; the State's youth must also wonder at the perversion of values when Gabinius and Piso are reaping the fruits of office while Sestius and Milo are on trial, and Clodius, the prime architect of *vis*, behind the prosecution (93-95). This, and the challenge of Vatinus that optimates are a *natio*, or clique, are the immediate preludes to Cicero's sermon.

Cicero's first theme, therefore, is that optimates are the bulk of the population 'numero . . . innumerabiles; . . . sunt principes consili publici, sunt qui eorum sectam sequuntur, sunt maximorum ordinum homines quibus patet curia, sunt municipales rusticique Romani, sunt negoti gerentes, sunt etiam libertini optimates' (97; compare 98, 'hoc [cum dignitate otium] qui volunt omnes optimates'; 109, 'omnes ordines'; 138, 'optimates sunt, cuiuscumque sunt ordinis'). Optimates are equated with *optimus quisque*, and at times (e.g. 137, 143) with *boni*, though *boni* sometimes seems to mean politically inactive optimates (e.g. 100), sometimes all optimates (e.g. 139); they are

<sup>1</sup> Others certainly felt the same: cf. s.c. the magistrates to draft a law to break up against *sodalitates* and *decuriae*, which asked the organized gangs (*ad Q.F.* 2. 3. 5, Feb. 56).

everyone who is neither guilty of crime nor mad nor bankrupt (97), and it is the business of *principes optimatum*<sup>1</sup> in the senate to see to the interests of all classes.<sup>2</sup>

The opposition are the men of violence, the guilty, the mentally unstable, and the bankrupt (99). They cannot prevent themselves from seeking to destroy the *res publica*—‘etiam sponte sua contra rem publicam incitantur’ (100). They are not even *populares* in the proper sense; not till 109 is this word used of contemporaries, and then only to pose the question ‘utra igitur causa popularis debet videri?’, Cicero’s, or that of men like Gellius who, his friends claimed, was ‘homo populo Romano deditus’—‘qui . . . usque eo non fuit popularis ut bona solus comesset’ (110); Cicero’s cause had the backing of ‘omnes honestates civitatis, omnes aetates, omnes ordines’ (109).<sup>3</sup> The whole section from 104 to 135 contrasts the *populus Romanus* with the hireling bands of Clodius (e.g. 127), and the ‘paradox’ *populum ipsum . . . non esse popularem* (114) is the conclusion of the argument from elections, and is further explained ‘qui ita vehementer eos qui *populares* habentur respuat, eos autem qui ei generi adversantur honore dignissimos iudicet’; the word *popularem* might be sarcastic too (cf. 122 ‘in causa hominis non popularis’ [himself]).

It is also not true that (as Balsdon says) the thing that differentiates these false *populares* from the true *populares* is bribery. It is, in the first place, lack of a programme; ‘homines seditiosi ac turbulenti quia nulla iam largitione *populum Romanum* concitare possunt . . .’ (104), the assumption being that this is what a ‘popular’ programme necessarily involves; the whole of 104 is on this theme (cf. 106). In the second place, their supporters were organized gangs; ‘conductas habent contiones’ (*ibid.*); *operas conductorum* and *emptos plausus* (115) refer to people who were organized as well as paid, and 34 seems to show clearly a para-military organization, as do the rival forces of *ad. Q.F. 2. 3. 2*. Clodius’ gangs were in fact not merely bribed individuals, but groups similar to those organized by the fascist, &c., régimes to intimidate public meetings and arouse hysteria.<sup>4</sup>

‘Sumpsi doctrinam quandam iuventuti qui essent optimates. In ea explicanda

<sup>1</sup> Called also ‘defensores optimatum, ipsique optimates gravissimi et clarissimi cives et principes civitatis’ (97), ‘summi viri et conservatores civitatis’ (98), ‘[optimatum] principibus ac rei publicae defensoribus’ (136), ‘optimatum principes, auctores et conservatores civitatis’ (138). They are also senatorial leaders (‘principes consili publici’ (97)), and probably also the senatorial majority too since both are called ‘propugnatores rei publicae’ (101, 137). The variety of expression and the *copia* of all these passages should be enough warning against trying to press any as a technical term. They make the absence of *nobilitas* or *nobiles* all the more conspicuous however; the sole reference to *nobilitas* is in 136, where aspiring optimate leaders are divided into *nobiles* and ‘you who can gain *nobilitas* by *ingenium* and *virtus*’.

<sup>2</sup> ‘(maiores) senatum ipsum proximorum ordinum splendorem confirmare, plebis libertatem et commoda tueri atque augere

voluerunt’ (137 fin.), taking Bate’s emendation as accepted by Peterson in O.C.T. of the MSS. *splendore confirmari*; cf. *pro communibus commodis* (139).

<sup>3</sup> The facts, at least on Cicero’s exile and triumphant return, unmistakably support Cicero’s version. The account tallies with the contemporary letter to Atticus (*ad Att. 4. 1*), and since his audience could well remember events six months back, and the senatorial, etc., records could be checked, Cicero could hardly dare to misrepresent the true state of affairs. It is also a fact that the Roman people resented being coerced by force; for 59 B.C., see *ad Att. 2. 18. 1*, 2. 19, 2. 21, etc.; for a contemporary example, *ad Q.F. 2. 3. 4* (Pompey). It is a strange assumption that they should like being coerced by Clodius’ *operae*, because he was Cicero’s enemy.

<sup>4</sup> See the demonstrations of *ad Q.F. 2. 3. 3-4*; cf. Dio 39. 18 ff.

demonstrandum est non esse populares omnes eos qui putentur (119).<sup>1</sup> Genuine *populares* like the Gracchi had a basis of popular support, because they offered the people things they wanted;<sup>2</sup> in their day the optimate path was one to be trodden with trepidation, since both sides had genuine interests in mind, *multitudinis studium aut populi commodum* on the one hand, *reipublicae utilitas* on the other.<sup>3</sup> There were in fact two genuine policies, and the people respected the optimate politicians on major issues (105); 'Wisely Cicero gives no examples' says Balsdon; Cicero could have quoted the question of colonial status for Junonia and the refusal of suffrage to Latins and Italians as two examples from the Gracchan period. Cicero's contemporaries masquerading as *populares* were frauds; they had no policy and no genuine support; in Sallust's expression (*Cat.* 38) 'under the pretence of *publicum bonum* they were competing each man for his own *potentia*'.

Optimate leaders must nevertheless base their opposition to *seditionis* on principles derived from knowledge;<sup>4</sup> they must also work hard and be prepared to face dangers and hardships, knowing that they will thus gain the only true reward—glory and immortality in fame (100, 102, 138, 139, 143).<sup>4</sup>

A contrast is made between the active leaders and the quietist mass of the optimates, coupled with the dangers of quietism (100); Wirszubski (op. cit. p. 11) denies this is important. But Cicero would surely not suggest that any of his audience might join Clodius' side; the choice before the youth must be either those who fight or those who merely enjoy the benefits of the fighters' success. Only the bravest and staunchest can be *propugnatores rei publicae* (101); the contrast *virtus—desidia, dignitas—voluptas* (138) is led up to by the whole of 136–7, to show that *virtus* and *dignitas* belong to *principes optimatum*, whereas *desidia* and *voluptas* belong to 'quietist' optimates, who enjoy the *otium* that the *propugnatores* give.

The theme of the *exempla* of 101 is of the constancy of the optimate leaders of long ago; the theme of 140 ff. is that the Roman people repents of outbursts of fury against optimates, whereas agitators always meet a bad end. Even the Athenians, who habitually wronged their saviours, did not lack those 'qui rem *publicam contra populi temeritatem* defenserent'; how much more should Rome not lack defenders, Rome the virtual birthplace of *gravitas* and *magnitudo animi*, whose achievements dwarf all human records, 'res publica quae tanta dignitate est ut eam defendendam occidere optatus sit quam oppugnantem rerum potiri' (141 fin.).

This passage, part of the climax of Cicero's 'sermon', requires much more

<sup>1</sup> 'Ipsa enim largitio, et spes commodi propositi sine mercede ulla multitudinem concitabat' (105); they received marks of popularity (*ibid.*)—and all the measures mentioned in 103 were in fact passed.

<sup>2</sup> 103, reading *aut* with Peterson in O.C.T.; *ac* (with Lamb) seems to give better sense, since *studium* and *commodum* are complementary, not antithetical. The point is that such *populares* had real interests to serve; there is no 'crux' to solve as Balsdon supposes.

<sup>3</sup> Rather oddly introduced (137), especially in the O.C.T. punctuation. 'Haec est una via et laudis et dignitatis et honoris, a bonis viris sapientibus et bene

natura constitutis laudari et diligi; nosse descriptionem civitatis a maioribus nostris sapientissime constitutam.' The *descriptio civitatis* is of the Senate open to the whole people (*ab universo populo deligerentur*) and acting as *rei publicae custodem, praesidem, propugnatorem*; the Senate in turn is the magistrates' counsellor, and looks after the interests of all the people. These are the optimates' principles (138); cf. 99.

<sup>4</sup> The theme of 102 is that the *exempla* of the *propugnatores reipublicae* are eternal; also of 142, that the memory of those victimized is eternal, the names of their persecutors forgotten.

consideration than it customarily receives. It both states unequivocally the aim of the men of violence—*potentia*, and destruction of *res publica*, is clearly desired by those who seek *rerum potiri*—and emphasizes optimate objectives—active defence of the *res publica* and its *dignitas*. Wirszubski (op. cit., p. 9) and Balsdon (op. cit., p. 49) both question whether the State can have a *dignitas* distinct from that of individuals. Since the SPQR undoubtedly had a corporate *maiestas*, to deny its *dignitas* is very strange, both *prima facie* (cf. 'dignitatem et libertatem [rei publicae]' *ad fam. 2. 5*), and in the light of the conclusion that Cicero's sermon is not basically a defence of the *status quo*, but a call to defend *lex* and *ius* against *vis*, and to urge the young to take to the optimate way with courage and energy.

St. Catharine's College, Cambridge

W. K. LACEY

## THE DATE OF ARISTOTLE'S *TOPICS* AND ITS TREATMENT OF THE THEORY OF IDEAS

It is generally agreed that the *Topics* is one of Aristotle's earliest works. But after saying this most writers are unwilling to commit themselves any further and discuss the work, if they discuss it at all, with a vagueness about dating that leads them to do it less than justice.<sup>1</sup> Part of the difficulty, no doubt, lies in the fact that the *Topics* consists of a central, early, core, surrounded by later additions, and cannot therefore be dealt with as a whole. The suggestions about its date that I wish to make now are concerned solely with what I take to be the original *Topics*—or such part of it as remains—which I believe can be delimited almost exactly.

The division was first made by H. Maier,<sup>2</sup> who regarded Books 2–7. 2 as the earliest part, belonging to the same period as the dialogues, and 1, 7. 3–5, 8, and 9 as later additions, with minor insertions within the earlier part. He based his views on the absence from the earlier books of the terms *συλλογιζεσθαι* and *συλλογισμός* in their later, technical, sense, except in a few passages which he supposed to be later additions. He has been followed, in greater or less detail, by most later writers, and Gohlke has both added to the evidence for the early date of Books 2–7. 2,<sup>3</sup> and claimed that the major part of Book 1 is also early.<sup>4</sup>

In this paper I wish to bring forward a piece of stylistic evidence which entirely supports the main division into earlier and later parts, suggests that the earlier part is almost completely homogeneous, and on one possible interpretation indicates a very early date indeed. This I would support with a discussion of the treatment of the soul, the dating value of which has, I believe, been under-estimated. If this very early date for the *Topics* is accepted, it can then be treated as a most valuable piece of evidence both for Aristotle's development and for the state of affairs in the Academy under Plato.

In most of his works Aristotle uses freely both members of the pairs of synonyms<sup>5</sup> *δῆλον ὅτι* (or *ως*) and *φανερὸν ὅτι*, and *καθάπερ* and *ὡσπερ*. I have examined nearly all his authentic works on this point, and find that the early

<sup>1</sup> Ross, *Aristotle*<sup>5</sup>, pp. 56, 59, implies that it is early; Solmsen, *Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik*, pp. 191–5, puts it before Plato's death; Nuyens, *L'Évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, pp. 115–18, gives an early date, but on insufficient grounds according to Verbeke, *Rev. Phil. de Louvain* xlvi (1948), 342; Viano, *La Logica di Aristotele*, p. 248, also puts it before Plato's death; Düring, *Eranos* liv (1956), 113, suggests 360–355; G. E. L. Owen, in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. Düring-Owen, pp. 173–4, sees parts as early, though it 'may have stretched over a considerable period'.

<sup>2</sup> *Syllogistik des Aristoteles*, ii. 2, p. 78, n. 3.

<sup>3</sup> *Hermes* lxiii (1928), 457. He notes the following terms, which he regards as early: *ἀντικείμενα* (with *πρός τι*, *ἐναντίον*, *στέρησις*, *ἀντίφασις*), *μᾶλλον*, *ὅμοιος*, *πτώσις*, *γένεσις*, and *δύναμις*, and the absence of *τι ἢν εἶναι*.

<sup>4</sup> *Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik*, pp. 18 ff. He does, however, think that 2. 1 is late, because of its reference to the quantity of a judgement, which presupposes the developed syllogism, and points out a few other passages which are almost certainly late.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of how far they are synonyms see below, p. 74.

part of the *Topics* has the peculiarity that  $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\circ\eta$   $\circ\tau\iota$  and  $\circ\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$  are almost completely absent. In the following table I give figures for (a) typical other works of Aristotle, (b) the early books of the *Topics*, (c) the rest of the *Topics*.

Of the exceptional cases of  $\circ\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$  noted, that in Book 6 comes at 151<sup>b</sup>20 in the last sentence but one of the book, a position where one might easily find a later addition, and that in Book 4, at 126<sup>b</sup>33, could also be one of Aristotle's own additions or even an interpolation.<sup>1</sup> About the single case of  $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\circ\eta$ , at 141<sup>a</sup>31, I have no suggestions to offer.

TABLE

	$\delta\eta\lambda\circ\eta$	$\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\circ\eta$	$\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho$	$\circ\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$
<i>Physics</i> 1	13	12	2	27
<i>Pol.</i> 7	14	13	9	29
<i>Metaph.</i> Γ	20	12	5	19
<i>Topics</i> 1. 7-18	12	0	13	0
<i>Topics</i> 2	19	0	15	0
<i>Topics</i> 3	9	0	9	0
<i>Topics</i> 4	31	0	25	1
<i>Topics</i> 5	0	0	38	0
<i>Topics</i> 6	34	1	27	1
<i>Topics</i> 7. 1-2	6	0	5	0
<i>Topics</i> 7. 3-5	5	3	4	1
<i>Topics</i> 8	14	5	10	3
<i>Topics</i> 9 ( <i>Soph. El.</i> )	12	18	15	24
<i>Topics</i> 1. 1-6	5	0	3	2

Notes to the table.

(a) Texts used: *Topics*, ed. Ross; *Physics*, ed. Ross; *Politics*, ed. Immisch; *Metaphysics*, ed. Jaeger. Relevant manuscript variants are few: in the *Topics* there are only three places, 104<sup>b</sup>22, 171<sup>b</sup>37, and 179<sup>a</sup>5, where the reading is seriously in doubt, and only at 104<sup>b</sup>22 are both members of a pair actually found in important manuscripts.

(b) I have confined myself to cases where  $\delta\eta\lambda\circ\eta$  and  $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\circ\eta$  are actually followed by  $\circ\tau\iota$  or  $\circ\omega\sigma$ , with the meaning 'that'. Other cases which might have been included are comparatively few.

(c) In general, over the whole of Aristotle,  $\delta\eta\lambda\circ\eta$  and  $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\circ\eta$  occur in roughly equal numbers. Of the other pair, however,  $\circ\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$  is considerably, though not overwhelmingly, the more frequent.

My conclusion is that there are good stylistic grounds for supporting the view that 1 (from 103<sup>a</sup>6) and 2-7. 2 are all of a piece, apart from a few additions, and I am also inclined to believe that they are very early. It would be useful if we could compare the evidence of the dialogues and other lost works on this point, but unfortunately we have very few verbatim fragments. However, I believe we can treat the *Protrepticus* as an exception. Ross, Fragments 3 (Oxy. Pap.), 4, 5 (two passages), 6, 7, 9, 10 (two passages), 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are probably, as Jaeger thinks,<sup>2</sup> mainly condensed and jumbled quotations, but

<sup>1</sup> Zürcher, *Aristoteles' Werk und Geist*, also discusses  $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho$  and  $\circ\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$ , giving figures for the *Meteorologica*, p. 191, and the *Politics*, p. 235. He is, however, completely wrong in saying, p. 192, that the *Topics* shows the same preponderance of  $\circ\omega\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho$  over  $\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\rho$  as a number of other works, but states the position correctly on p. 333. He is inclined, p. 232, to regard the relative frequencies of

the two words as partly a sign of date and partly a sign of authorship, linking this point with his view that the *Corpus Aristotelicum* was largely rewritten by Theophrastus.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle<sup>2</sup>, ch. iv. I have mentioned only those fragments which contain some of the relevant words.

quotations none the less, and a count of the relative frequency of the words in which we are interested should not be very misleading.<sup>1</sup> A check on whether a sentence is from Aristotle is given by the fact that in the *Protrepticus* he tried to avoid hiatus.<sup>2</sup> These fragments are largely free from hiatus, but one or two complete sentences are full of it, and may therefore be taken to be not by Aristotle.

What we find in these fragments is:

δῆλον φανερόν καθάπερ ὥσπερ  
15 3 7 20 (of which one is in a passage containing  
hiatus)

Thus the *Protrepticus* resembles the majority of Aristotle's works in this respect, and if we explain the peculiarity of the *Topics*, as I shall try to do, by Aristotle's newness to writing, we have some evidence that the *Topics* was written before the *Protrepticus*. The *Protrepticus* itself cannot, of course, be dated with any exactness, but I have little doubt that it was at any rate prior to Plato's death in 348.

What are we to make of this verbal characteristic of the *Topics*? It should be remembered that while in Plato and most of Aristotle our pairs of words function as synonyms, there is some difference of quality between them. In his book on Diokles of Karystos<sup>3</sup> Jaeger emphasizes Diocles' strong and unusual preference for *καθάπερ*, which he uses in places where there is no need to try to avoid hiatus, as well as where there is. Jaeger finds that *καθάπερ* is a very formal word, which occurs frequently in the fifth century in official inscriptions, but is rare in literature. Of its three examples in Aristophanes, one is in a parody of a psephism. It is very significant that in spite of its value for the avoidance of hiatus Isocrates does not use it. In fact it does not appear frequently in Attic literature until the later works of Plato. Jaeger explains Diocles' fondness for it on his theory that Diocles, like Aristotle, was brought up in Platonic circles.

I would suggest that the young Aristotle was fascinated by this grand new word and used it at first to the exclusion of *ὥσπερ*, but soon lost his stiffness as a writer and began to use *ὥσπερ* on the whole more frequently. Since *ὥσπερ* occurs freely in the later parts of the *Topics* it is clear that there was no necessary connexion between his subject-matter and the way he used these words.

The words *φανερόν* and *δῆλον* were used rather rarely in early prose. The only clear-cut case is that of Thucydides, who has only *δῆλον ὅτι*,<sup>4</sup> and that infrequently. Waitz<sup>5</sup> points out that when Aristotle distinguishes between the two words *φανερός* means clearly visible, *δῆλος* clear to the mind. But frequently he ignores the distinction. The absence of *φανερόν ὅτι* from the early part of the

<sup>1</sup> We can learn something of the methods of Iamblichus, the source of the majority of these fragments, by studying the passages he takes from Plato. In those I have examined he is usually verbally accurate: he selects large chunks and puts them together, with a number of grammatical alterations due to rearrangement and omission, and occasional changes and expansions to make the meaning clearer. In a number of cases he changes the grammar to that current in his own time, and there are a few sentences of his own which

summarize a longer passage in the original. But nothing suggests that he would have tampered with the words that concern us now. See also I. Düring, *Eranos* li (1954), 142 ff.

<sup>2</sup> This point has been neglected by W. G. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, and seems to vitiate much of his argument.

<sup>3</sup> pp. 16 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *φανερός* in Thucydides always means visible or evident.

<sup>5</sup> *Organon*, ii. 326-7.

*Topics* could indicate an early sensitivity to the difference in meaning which he later lost.

The other early feature of the *Topics* that I wish to discuss is the frequent reference to the tripartite division of the soul found in Plato's *Republic*, and the use<sup>1</sup> of the very expression *τὸ θυμοειδές*. Professor Skemp<sup>2</sup> has shown conclusively that the tripartite division was a temporary piece of Platonic psychology, not found in any work later than the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*,<sup>3</sup> and was superseded in Plato's later writings. The natural way to take the references in the *Topics*, which are given purely as examples, is to suppose that they were written at a time when this division was still accepted, or at least was still common currency in the Academy, even if Plato himself had passed beyond it. Von Arnim, the only writer to deal with this point at any length, regards the references as expressing accepted doctrine, which surely could be so only for a short period.<sup>4</sup> It is noteworthy that the term *τὸ θυμοειδές*, in this sense, occurs nowhere else in Aristotle, and in the whole Aristotelian corpus only in the *Περὶ Αρετῶν*.<sup>5</sup> When he discusses the tripartite division in the *De Anima*<sup>6</sup> Aristotle speaks of *τὸ θυμικόν*, as he once does here.<sup>7</sup> This is also the term used in the Aristotelian Divisions.

Not only does Aristotle mention the tripartite division but, as von Arnim has pointed out,<sup>8</sup> he criticizes it and even adds to our knowledge of it. He accepts the division in general and the related allocation of the virtues,<sup>9</sup> but he criticizes Plato's treatment<sup>10</sup> of *σωφροσύνη* as a *συμφωνία* covering the three parts,<sup>11</sup> and prefers to regard it as a virtue of *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* alone.<sup>12</sup> Further, we learn, rather surprisingly, that *αἰσχύνη* as well as *βούλησις* is seated in *τὸ λογιστικόν*,<sup>13</sup> and that *όργη* and *φόβος* are in *τὸ θυμοειδές*,<sup>14</sup> and *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* in *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*.<sup>15</sup> All this makes it appear that the doctrine was not yet obsolete.

A curious small point which may have some dating value is the reference<sup>16</sup> to a definition of 'life' by Dionysius. This is surely Plato's Dionysius,<sup>17</sup> and suggests a time when memories of him and his philosophizing were still green, which would surely not be for a very long period.

I propose, therefore, to take the *Topics*, in its original form, as written about 360, at a time when Aristotle had begun to take part in the teaching of the Academy, and was starting to develop his own characteristic form of logic within the framework of Plato's dialectic, with its emphasis on the method of division. The *Topics* is fundamentally a handbook of rules for argument. It is concerned particularly with problems of classifying and defining objects, over which the students of the Academy were expected to argue until they reached the truth. Aristotle here provides them with a number of ways of defending a position and attacking that of an opponent.

<sup>1</sup> 113<sup>a</sup>35, 126<sup>a</sup>8, 10.

<sup>11</sup> 123<sup>a</sup>33, 139<sup>b</sup>32.

<sup>2</sup> *Plato's Statesman*, p. 239.

<sup>12</sup> 117<sup>a</sup>31-33.

<sup>3</sup> This is one of the reasons for dating the *Timaeus* early.

<sup>13</sup> 126<sup>a</sup>6-8, 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Das Ethische in Aristoteles' Topik*, p. 6.

<sup>14</sup> 113<sup>a</sup>35-113<sup>b</sup>1, 126<sup>a</sup>10.

Nuyens does not mention this point.

<sup>15</sup> 126<sup>a</sup>9-10.

<sup>5</sup> 1249<sup>b</sup>26, 30, 1250<sup>a</sup>5, 6, 17, 19.

<sup>16</sup> 148<sup>a</sup>27.

<sup>6</sup> 432<sup>a</sup>25, 433<sup>b</sup>4.

<sup>17</sup> He has, however, been identified by, for example, Colli and Tricot with the sophist of *Physiognomica* 808<sup>a</sup>16. But there are no grounds for this beyond the fact that both have the same name.

<sup>7</sup> 129<sup>a</sup>12.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 50.

<sup>9</sup> *Republic* 435 e ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Republic* 431 e.

Accepting this view we may consider a number of points. First, it is clear that most of the terms used and the logical presuppositions found in the *Topics* were already current in the Academy and not Aristotle's invention, as Hambruch<sup>1</sup> and Jaeger<sup>2</sup> have already pointed out.

Secondly, Gohlke<sup>3</sup> has put forward the view that Aristotle's original name for the *Topics* was the *Dialectic*. He refers to *Prior Analytics* 1. 30,<sup>4</sup> where Aristotle says that he has considered the method of choosing premises in  $\tau\hat{\eta}$  πραγματείᾳ  $\tau\hat{\eta}$  περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικήν. This must refer to the *Topics*, especially 1. 14, and it may be supposed that at the time he wrote the *Topics* Aristotle called it the *Dialectic*, using this term in Plato's sense as a general study of the problems of discovering the truth by means of arguments of all kinds. Later, with the discovery of the syllogism and the far more rigorous method of argument which it brought, Aristotle gave a lower place to the *Topics*, and distinguished between what he calls demonstrative or apodeictic reasoning on the one hand and dialectic on the other. Demonstrative reasoning starts with premises which are true: dialectic only with the probable or with generally received opinions.<sup>5</sup> In the main body of the *Topics* he follows what must have been Plato's view in saying that dialectical problems are concerned with two types of activity, questions of what to choose and to avoid, and questions of intellectual truth and falsehood.<sup>6</sup>

Thirdly, we may refer to a passage in the pseudo-Isocratean *Ad Demonicum*, already considered by Jaeger.<sup>7</sup> He sees in it a reply to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and takes the reference to writers of *προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι* as confirmation of the garbled tradition on this point. In the same passage, and presumably referring to the same person, is a reference to *ὅσοι . . . τοῖς νεωτέροις ἐσηγοῦνται . . . δι'* ὡν *τὴν δεινότητα τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀσκήσουσαν*. This does not seem to fit the *Protrepticus*, but it would be very pertinent if Aristotle had at the same time made a name for himself as a teacher of methods of argument at the Academy.

With the suggested very early date in mind we can now examine those passages in the *Topics* which are concerned with Plato's Ideas, to see if they throw any light on the contemporary situation in the Academy.

On general impressions my own feeling is that these criticisms are very different from those made later by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*. The latter, while sometimes unfair, are on the whole both subtle and to the point. The former seem by comparison crude and amateurish. To some extent this might be explained on the ground that the *Topics* aimed only at providing arguments of all kinds for use in debate. But several of the arguments remind us of the kind of difficulties which Plato was facing in the *Parmenides*, and I should prefer to regard them as typical of the points being raised by the young men of the Academy at this period. A more serious difficulty is that there does not seem to be a single viewpoint expressed in the *Topics*. In some passages Aristotle seems to accept the existence of the Ideas, and to use them as points in his argument: in others he criticizes them and shows ways of attacking them.

<sup>1</sup> *Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik, passim.*

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle<sup>2</sup> (trans. Robinson), p. 369.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik*, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> He actually says 1. 33.

<sup>5</sup> *Topics* 100<sup>a</sup>27—a later addition—and *Prior. Anal.* 24<sup>a</sup>20.

"Topics 104<sup>b</sup> 1-2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ad Demonicum* 3. Jaeger's *Aristotle*<sup>2</sup>, pp.

58-60-

However, in order to discuss this discrepancy we must first examine the passages in detail.

(a) 113<sup>a</sup>25. An object cannot have contrary predicates. Suppose for instance our opponent said that the Ideas existed in us. Then they would be both in motion and at rest, and objects of perception and of thought. For 'those who suppose that Ideas exist' (*οἱ τιθέμενοι ἰδέας εἶναι*) think that the Ideas are motionless and objects of thought, but if they are in us they cannot be unmoved, but necessarily move when we move; and equally they must be objects of perception, for it is through sight that we recognize the form in each individual — *τὴν ἐν ἔκαστῳ μορφήν*. This passage is puzzling. At first sight it is closely related to the *Parmenides*, and seems to be a criticism, like that found there, of the view that Ideas are thoughts. Cherniss, however, gives reasons for supposing that it refers rather to the theory of Eudoxus that Ideas were mixed with particulars.<sup>1</sup> Certainly the second difficulty, that we can *see τὴν ἐν ἔκαστῳ μορφήν*, would be a very weak criticism of the view that Ideas are thoughts: even as it is, the use of the word *μορφή* is striking, for it is rarely used by Plato of his Ideas, and equally rarely by Aristotle, though he uses it frequently as a synonym for *εἶδος* in his own technical sense.<sup>2</sup> Its use here seems to be dictated by the twofold function it has to perform. On the other hand, to limit the Ideas to being *ἐν ἡμῖν*, when Eudoxus seems to say that they are in *all* particulars, is rather odd. It is, of course, not certain what we are to understand by *ἐν ἡμῖν*: the expression is also found in the *Parmenides*,<sup>3</sup> where Parmenides says that he expects Socrates would agree that the Ideas are not *ἐν ἡμῖν*. Most translators render this 'in us', but Cornford gives 'in our world', and also connects the theory with Eudoxus.<sup>4</sup> Undoubtedly this is the most acceptable sense if we are dealing with Eudoxus, but it does not seem to me that the expression *ἐν ἡμῖν* in either Plato or Aristotle would be taken naturally to have this meaning—unless perhaps this was the customary way of referring to Eudoxus' theory.

However this may be, there does at any rate seem to be a close link here between the *Topics* and the *Parmenides*, and there is a further similarity in Aristotle's uncertain position with regard to the Ideas. There are those, he says, who believe in them and say that they are motionless and known by the mind, but whether he supports this view or anything like it he does not say. His general tone is very similar to that of Plato at the same period.

(b) 137<sup>b</sup>3. In testing whether a property belongs to a subject, we should look at the Idea concerned. Here we must distinguish between properties of the Idea *qua* Idea, and of the Idea as Idea of something. Thus with *αὐτοάνθρωπος* being motionless belongs to it not *qua* man but *qua* Idea, but with *αὐτοζῷον* being a compound of body and soul belongs to it *qua* *ζῷον*, and will therefore be a property of *ζῷον*.

This passage too can be treated in various ways. Cherniss<sup>5</sup> thinks it shows that Aristotle 'had at this time rejected the theory of Ideas', because it silently denies the Platonic conception of the Idea as the *identification* of essence and

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, i. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Phaedo* 104 d 10, is the most probable example, but even that is doubtful in view of 103 e 5. There is perhaps some

similarity to the usage in the *Topics* passage under discussion.

<sup>3</sup> *Parm.* 133 c.

<sup>4</sup> Plato's *Parmenides*, pp. 96, 86.

<sup>5</sup> Op. cit., p. 2.

existence; von Arnim,<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, thinks there is nothing here to lead us to suppose that either Aristotle or his hearers had given up their belief in the Ideas. Taking this passage by itself, and with my early date in mind, my sympathies are with von Arnim. Plato did not have the very technical distinction between essence and existence in any explicit form, and if he himself was prepared both to speak of Ideas *qua* Ideas as having certain properties,<sup>2</sup> and to try to give definitions and classifications of the particulars of which they were the Ideas, Aristotle's line of argument is but another step on the slippery path by which the implications of the theory of Ideas were brought out. That those who followed this path to its conclusion were forced to abandon the theory, as Aristotle himself did, is true, but I do not think that the use of the particular argument under discussion is evidence that Aristotle had yet reached this stage.

(c) 143<sup>b</sup>23. Here the atmosphere is different. Aristotle is dealing with the point that a genus cannot be divided into species by means of a negation, and after a general discussion of the difficulties of defining a line as 'length without breadth' he attacks *τοὺς τιθέμενους ἴδεας εἶναι*. For if there is absolute length—*αὐτομῆκος*—how can it be predictable of the genus that it either has breadth or lacks it? For of one and the same thing (the Idea), either one or the other must be true, but not both. But in fact there exist both lengths that have and lengths that have not breadth, so that this rule (*τόπος*) can be used only against those who say that the genus<sup>3</sup> is numerically one, but this is what those who believe in Ideas do.

Aristotle is here maintaining that the genus used in division cannot be the same as the Idea, because if it were, the Idea would be one thing with contradictory attributes. Cherniss<sup>4</sup> connects this passage with the very explicit statement of the difficulty in *Metaphysics Z*, 1039<sup>a</sup>33, where Aristotle clearly says that you cannot both say that the Ideas are substances which exist apart from particulars, and at the same time form the species from the genus and the differentiae. The statement in the *Topics* is much less clear than this, and it is doubtful if Aristotle yet had the argument fully developed in his mind.

(d) 147<sup>a</sup>3. In describing conations we must not omit the word 'apparent', e.g. we must define 'desire' as 'a conation after the *apparently* pleasant'. If our opponent does this correctly, and is one who believes in Ideas, we must then confront him with the Ideas. For there is no Idea of anything apparent, and it is generally held that an Idea is spoken of in relation to an Idea, e.g. Desire itself is for the Pleasant itself. Desire cannot therefore be for the apparently pleasant, and it would be absurd for there to be an 'apparent pleasant itself'.

We are reminded here of Plato's difficulties in the *Parmenides*,<sup>5</sup> which lead to the conclusion that men, being in the phenomenal world, can have no knowledge of Ideas, and that God can have no knowledge of the world of becoming. I do not think, therefore, that Aristotle need, on the evidence of this passage, have been any more sceptical about the existence of Ideas than Plato himself was at this time.

(e) 148<sup>a</sup>13. This is another argument against those who believe in Ideas. Plato defines a living thing as mortal, but the Idea is not mortal, so that this

<sup>1</sup> *Das Ethische in Aristoteles' Topik*, p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> The first part of the *Parmenides* is largely concerned with this line of thought.

<sup>3</sup> *τὸ γένος. πᾶν γένος* is a variant reading.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-8.

<sup>5</sup> 133 c-134 e.

definition will not do. Nor can words like *ποιητικόν* or *παθητικόν* be applied to the Ideas, for they are claimed to be *ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀκίνητοι*.

Aristotle's approach is here the opposite of that in 137<sup>b</sup>, where he accepts the distinction between attributes which belong to the Ideas *qua* Ideas, and those which belong to the related particulars. For Cherniss<sup>1</sup> this new approach is a proof that 'the "analysis" used in the earlier topic is a conscious dialectical trick'. It is certainly difficult to see in our present passage anything more than a trick, but I do not think it follows that the other must also be a trick.

I can complete this survey by pointing out that in the whole of the later part of the *Topics* and the *Sophistic Elenchi* there is only one reference to the Ideas, at 154<sup>a</sup>16, and that is a reference back to 148<sup>a</sup>13, our passage (e).

Of the arguments considered, two seem to be closely related to arguments in the *Parmenides*, and a third, 137<sup>b</sup>3, develops some of the implications of that dialogue. Of the remaining two, one is probably an early form of an argument found fully developed in the *Metaphysics*, while the last is a dialectical trick which can be paralleled elsewhere in the *Topics*.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the most striking general point of this survey is that Aristotle seems to be concerned only with the view that regards the Ideas as each one in number, motionless, and known only by thought, in fact with the theory of the Platonic dialogues. There is no mention of any number theory resembling the various views criticized in the *Metaphysics*. Some might see a hint of this in the mention of the theory of the soul elsewhere<sup>3</sup> ascribed to Xenocrates, which is referred to no less than four times,<sup>4</sup> as if it had only recently been propounded. But this has no necessary link with Plato's number-theory of the Ideas. Merlan,<sup>5</sup> for instance, believes that it was a parallel development by Xenocrates of the line of thought that led Aristotle to the view of the soul which he holds in the *Eudemus*, since Simplicius<sup>6</sup> says that both Xenocrates and Aristotle in the *Eudemus* wanted to show the intermediate position of the soul—between Ideas and the realm shaped by Ideas in the case of Xenocrates.<sup>7</sup> At the suggested date of the *Topics* he was a man of about thirty-five,<sup>8</sup> and there is no reason why he should not have begun to put forward ideas of his own.

Another curious point is that Aristotle does not speak of *Plato's Ideas*—though Plato is mentioned by name with the definition of a living thing as mortal,<sup>9</sup> but always of *οἱ τιθέμενοι* or *οἱ λέγοντες* *ἰδέας εἶναι*.<sup>10</sup> We are reminded of the Friends of the Forms of the *Sophist*,<sup>11</sup> who seem to have held very similar views. It is possible, then, that both Plato and Aristotle were arguing against a party in the Academy which held these views in a rigid form different from Plato's own.

In any case, a background of argument within the Academy seems to fit the facts at least as well as the implied suggestion of Cherniss,<sup>12</sup> that Aristotle was arming his Lyceum pupils for debates with members of the Academy. Cherniss is surely right in maintaining that Aristotle need not have approved

<sup>1</sup> Op. cit., pp. 3-5.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. 112<sup>a</sup>32.

<sup>3</sup> e.g. *Post. Anal.* 91<sup>a</sup>37.

<sup>4</sup> 120<sup>b</sup>3-6, 123<sup>a</sup>13-14, 25-26, 140<sup>b</sup>2-6.

<sup>5</sup> *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*, p. 46.

<sup>6</sup> In Arist. *De Anima* 404<sup>b</sup>27, 408<sup>b</sup>32, 429<sup>a</sup>10 (pp. 30. 4; 62. 2; 221. 25 Hayduck).

<sup>7</sup> I am not sure that Merlan's treatment of the passage dealing with Aristotle is quite

fair, but he at least points to a possibility.

<sup>8</sup> Diogenes Laertius 4. 14 says he died in 314 in his eighty-second year.

<sup>9</sup> 148<sup>a</sup>15.

<sup>10</sup> Always *ἰδέας*, never *εἶδη*.

<sup>11</sup> 248<sup>a</sup>4 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle's *Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, i. 18-19.

philosophically of all the lines of argument suggested in the *Topics*, but an *argumentum ad hominem* presupposes the existence of opponents who lay themselves open to this form of attack. We do not know how long the original theory of Ideas was debated in its pure form, but under Plato's successors we might expect to find complications entering in. Such a change is supported by the absence of any reference to the Ideas in what I take to be the later parts of the *Topics*, and the ramifications found in the *Metaphysics*. So I would maintain that the treatment of the Ideas is at least consistent with the early date suggested by the stylistic evidence, the prominence of the tripartite division of the soul, and the absence of the developed syllogism noted by Maier.<sup>1</sup>

*University of Liverpool*

PAMELA M. HUBY

<sup>1</sup> I must thank Mr. G. E. L. Owen for a number of helpful comments and references.

## ΤΕΝΟΣ AND ΕΙΔΟΣ IN ARISTOTLE'S BIOLOGY

It is not certain when or by whom *γένος* and *εἶδος* were first technically distinguished as *genus* and *species*. The distinction does not appear in Plato's extant writings, whereas Aristotle seems to take it for granted in the *Topics*, which is usually regarded as among his earliest treatises. In his dialogues Plato seems able to use *γένος*, *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, *μέρος* interchangeably to denote any group or division in a diairesis, including the group that is to be divided.<sup>1</sup> As Ritter showed, it is possible to see an increasing preference for *γένος* in the late dialogues, where diairesis is in full use, as compared with the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. *γένος*, as a 'kind' composed of related members, would be a natural choice for a class-word; it is indeed ready to mean the *genus* which is divisible into related species. But the restriction of *εἶδος* to mean species would be, in Plato, an unexpected development. Species is necessarily subordinate, implying a genus above it; moreover it is the group-concept nearer to particulars and therefore—for Plato—farther from certainty and reality. It seems improbable that, if he had wished to confine one word to the lower status, he would have chosen *εἶδος* with all its tremendous associations. If he did so distinguish *γένος* and *εἶδος*, it can only have been in the unwritten practice of the Academy. But those who have taken this view have had to rely mainly on the *Διαιρέσεις Ἀριστοτέλους* 64–65,<sup>2</sup> which is weak evidence. These two sections are given only in the Codex Marcianus version, not even in the version that Diog. Laert. says Aristotle attributed to Plato (D.L. 3. 80); § 64 contains the reference to ἄγγελοι which Rose pointed to as one of the marks of a Christian editor;<sup>3</sup> the statements about *γένος* and *εἶδος* in §§ 64–65 are commonplaces of Aristotle and his Greek commentators, and could have been extracted from these sources. While it is likely that parts of the *Διαιρέσεις Ἀριστοτέλους* descend from Academic origins,<sup>4</sup> only the thinnest chain of probability could connect any particular statement or terminology with Plato himself. That Plato's use of animal examples in the *Politicus* came from an extended interest in biological classification, has been inferred from the Epicrates fragment;<sup>5</sup> but this mentions only the separating of plants into *γένη*, and not only is there no use of the word *εἶδος* but there is no suggestion of hierarchical or systematic classification, which could have made rich material for a comedian.

Such classification may develop in two stages, which give rise respectively to the relative and the absolute distinction between genus and species. The relative use is seen at Arist. *Phys.* 227<sup>b</sup>11–14: *εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἄτομον καὶ γένη ἄμα καὶ εἶδη ἔστιν, . . . εἰ δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶδος μὲν ὑπολήψεως, γένος δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημάντων . . .* Here the classification provides a pattern as an aid to analysis, without implying that these concepts are permanently classified thus in relation to other concepts.

<sup>1</sup> Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen*, pp. 230 f.

<sup>2</sup> Hambruch, *Logische Regeln d. plat. Schule*, p. 7, also cites Arist. *Met.* 1039<sup>a</sup>24, but A. is using his own terminology there.

<sup>3</sup> Arist. *Pseudopigr.* p. 678.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Mutschmann, *Divisiones Arist.*, pp. vii f.

<sup>5</sup> Fr. 287 (K.); cf. J. Alexis fr. 1. Usener, *Preuss. Jahrb.* 1884; Wilamowitz, *Philol. Unters.* iv. 283; Stenzel, *Studien*<sup>2</sup>, 1931, p. 82; Herter, *Platons Akad.*<sup>2</sup>, 1952, p. 21. Cf. Diès, *Plat. Polit.* (Budé), p. xxvii, and the more cautious view of Jaeger, *Diokles v. Karystos*, p. 178.

The absolute use, on the other hand, does imply a permanent and more comprehensive scheme; this enables analogies to be drawn between one set of groups and another, and therefore has more significance for science. Thus we say that Dog is a species but Cat is a genus, referring to a scheme which gives those groups a precise status in the animal kingdom. This use can be seen at Arist. *de Sensu* 448<sup>a</sup>13-17 and *G.A.* 784<sup>b</sup>21. If Plato had wanted to make the distinction, either absolutely or relatively, he could have done so by restricting *εἶδος* to two of the senses that he already used, namely (i) a grouping of particulars, and simultaneously (ii) a division of a larger group: both senses can be seen, not simultaneously but separately, at *Soph.* 219 a and d—*τεχνῶν πασῶν εἶδη δύο* (two forms among the plurality of *τέχναι*), and *κτητικῆς δύο εἶδη* (two forms into which *κτητική* is divisible). But he would hardly have wanted to make it unless he were developing classification in some degree. It is much debated whether he intended diairesis for this purpose or not. The fact that he did not find it necessary to create a verbal distinction between genus and species is perhaps a straw on the side of those who hold that he did not use diairesis for systematic classification. Moreover, if it is right to think that he was latterly more concerned with the inter-relations between Forms than with the relations between Forms and phenomena, then a hierarchy of genera and species might not be the best conceptual framework for him but might even create difficulties.<sup>1</sup>

These considerations probably do not apply to Speusippus, who not only abandoned the theory of Forms but held that definitions can only be made as part of a comprehensive classification.<sup>2</sup> Yet the positive evidence that he distinguished *γένος* from *εἶδος* is hardly better than in Plato's case. Stenzel, already believing in Platonic classification, and following Lang, relies on frs. 8 and 16(L.):<sup>3</sup>

Fr. 8(L.): Athen. 3. 105 b Σπεύσιππος δὲ ἐν β' 'Ομοίων παραπλήσιά φησιν εἶναι τῶν μαλακοστράκων κάραβον, ἀστακόν, νύμφην, ἄρκτον, καρκίνον, πάγουρον.

Fr. 16(L.): Athen. 7. 318 ε εἶδη δ' ἔστι πολυπόδων ἐλεδώνη, πολυποδίνη, βολβιτίνη, ὁσμύλος, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἴστορει καὶ Σπεύσιππος.

With these compare fr. 10(L.): Photius, *Lexic.* s.v. *πηνίον*: ζῶον ὁμοιον κάνωπι . . . ὅτι δὲ κάνωπος εἶδός ἔστι, Σπεύσιππος ἐν τῷ β' τῶν 'Ομοιοτήτων φησὶν οὔτως πηνίον, ἐμπίς, κάνωψ.

In addition, the list of titles attributed to him by Diog. Laert. includes *περὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν*. This is all that can be called direct evidence; to it must be added the fair probability that Aristotle's criticisms of *αἱ γεγραμμέναι διαιρέσεις* and *οἱ διχοτομοῦντες* in *P.A.* 1. 2-3, where *γένος* and *εἶδος* seem to mean genus and species, were aimed at Speusippus. Yet Aristotle's evidence cannot be pressed over terminology, as is known from the way he reports other philosophers; and in any case it would be possible to take *γένος* and *εἶδος* in these passages as meaning nothing more technical than 'kind' and 'form'. The same

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Arist. *Met.* 1039<sup>a</sup>24, 1085<sup>a</sup>23; Cherriss, A.'s *Crit. of Plato*, p. 46, *Riddle of the Early Academy*, pp. 40, 54; but see Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, p. 241, on departmental hierarchies. Cornford's divided circle (*Plato's Th. of Knowledge*, p. 271) and Skemp's hachured map (*Plato's Statesman*, p. 74) are

better images than the family tree suggested by A.'s *γένη ὑπὸ ἀληθῆ*.

<sup>2</sup> Anon. in Arist. *An. Post.* 584. 17; Cherriss, A.'s *Crit.*, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Stenzel, R.-E. 'Speusippus', 1640, 1653; Lang, *De Speus. Acad. scriptis*, p. 9.

applies to D.L.'s attribution: if there was such a title, it still need mean no more than 'On kinds and forms' as Plato used the terms. It is doubtful, however, whether Diogenes' evidence should be accepted, since there are neither fragments nor testimonia for this book, and he attributes the same title to Xenocrates with equally little to show for it.<sup>1</sup> Photius' excerpt (fr. 10) does not attribute the word *εἶδος* to Speusippus, and his actual quotation fails to support his interpretation, since *πηγίον* is not shown as a species of *κάνωψ* but both are shown together with *έμπισ* in a list: comparison with the other fragments shows that this means that they form a group of *όμοια*. No generic or class name is suggested, and in fact the two classes named in frs. 8 and 16 (*μαλακόστρακα* and *πολύποδες*) are the only ones that Lang could find. The word *εἶδος* occurs only in fr. 16, and here Athenaeus claims to be quoting both Speusippus and Aristotle: but Aristotle does not speak of *εἶδη πολυπόδων* but of *γένη*.<sup>2</sup> In the other fragments Speusippus regularly says that animals are *όμοια*, *παραπλήσια*, *έμφερῆ*. The only other class-word to be found is *μέρος*, fr. 7 (also from Athenaeus). The Epicrates fragment uses only *γένος*. Therefore the positive evidence that Speusippus distinguished *γένος* and *εἶδος* in the technical sense comes really to nothing. It may well be that he was attempting a comprehensive 'natural' classification by grouping together similar animals and plants, and by arranging the groups dichotomously in sets, and that he called the groups indifferently by the same class-words that Plato used, including *διαιρέσις* for a complete set; but there is no evidence that he went farther and distinguished genus from species, or that he even reached the point where this distinction becomes useful.

There seems therefore to be no satisfactory evidence that anybody other than Aristotle originated this verbal distinction. It appears unmistakably in many passages of the *Organon* (especially *Top.* 4 and 6) and *Metaphysics*, and occasionally in other works.<sup>3</sup> In the same treatises the words sometimes seem also to be used without this technical sense, and to be interchangeable.<sup>4</sup> That the same words should have sometimes a technical and sometimes a non-technical use, is not necessarily significant. But some passages, such as *Met.* 1058<sup>b</sup>26–1059<sup>a</sup>14, exhibit both uses in a single discussion, in such a way as to cause confusion if the whole is read together. Here we may perhaps see one part written before Aristotle began to use the distinction, and another part added afterwards.<sup>5</sup>

In the *Topics* *εἶδος* as species tends to be applied to the subject of discussion.<sup>6</sup> As such, it is a group-concept whose members are formally indistinguishable for the purposes of the discussion. In order to define it, its *γένος* must be ascertained. So *γένος*, although it too has unity of concept, is essentially divisible into different *εἶδη*;<sup>7</sup> *εἶδος* is treated as indivisible, and is essentially a member of a

<sup>1</sup> D.L. 4. 2. 13. Xenocrates would probably have meant the non-technical sense, as used in his fr. 9 (H.): *κινήσεως εἶδη, φορᾶς εἶδη, τῆς εἰς εἰδὴν φορᾶς εἶδη*.

<sup>2</sup> H.A. 523<sup>b</sup>29, 525<sup>a</sup>13, 622<sup>a</sup>15; P.A. 685<sup>b</sup>13. At 9. 393 f (= Arist. fr. 271(R.), 1527<sup>a</sup>12) Athenaeus says even more precisely *Ἄριστορεῖται φησὶ περιστερῶν μὲν εἶναι ἐν γένος, εἶδη δὲ πέντε . . .*, and names the same five that A. gives at H.A. 593<sup>a</sup>15; but A. calls these *περιστεροειδῶν γένη* (544<sup>b</sup>1), never *εἶδη*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Bonitz, *Index* 151<sup>a</sup>12–40.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Met.* 1058<sup>b</sup>26, 28 (Ross), 1071<sup>a</sup>25, 27; *Cat.* 8<sup>b</sup>27, 9<sup>a</sup>14; *An. Post.* 97<sup>b</sup>24, 34; *Top.* 101<sup>a</sup>18, 105<sup>a</sup>11, 20, <sup>b</sup>14, 106<sup>a</sup>11, 24, 27 107<sup>b</sup>19, 109<sup>a</sup>2, *al.*

<sup>5</sup> Ross ad 1058<sup>b</sup>28. Cf. *Long. Vit.* 465<sup>a</sup>2–6, H.A. 497<sup>b</sup>9–12 (both discussed below).

<sup>6</sup> *εἶδος* vocat rem definiendam, Waitz ad 141<sup>b</sup>28.

<sup>7</sup> *παντὸς γένους εἶδη πλεῖστον* *Top.* 123<sup>a</sup>30; cf. 127<sup>a</sup>24; Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* iv. 355.

*γένος*. In a full analysis a hierarchy of *γένη ὑπὸ ἀληλα*<sup>1</sup> may be disclosed, while in the other direction the *εἶδος* may be found to be itself divisible into different forms: then what was *εἶδος* in relation to the higher group becomes the *γένος* of the lower groups,<sup>2</sup> and so on until a truly indivisible form is reached, and this is then the *ἄτομον* or *τελευταῖον εἶδος* whose members are particular individuals distinguished only by differences of *ὑλῆ*.<sup>3</sup>

As a method of analysis this contains nothing that cannot be found in Plato, except the distinction between *γένος* and *εἶδος*. But this very distinction, which might have served little purpose for Plato, becomes important for those who find reality in the *τόδε τι*. Genus and species then differ in epistemological status, and tend to be used not relatively but absolutely. The infima species is abstracted immediately from sense-perception, whereas all classes above it are abstracted from abstractions. In Aristotle's theory of substance the form that is actualized in the individual's matter is that of the *ἄτομον εἶδος*, while the successive ranks of genera are successively remote stages of potentiality which can only exist when the infima species is actualized. If the male sperma fails to inform the female matter fully, the offspring may not resemble its parents but only their genus, and this is a step on the way towards the monstrosity: the *τέρας* is *ζῷόν τι* but no more.<sup>4</sup> And by a similar argument Aristotle explains that the mule, which cannot resemble both horse and ass, resembles only their common *έγγύτατα γένος* and is unnatural and defective, *παρὰ φύσιν, ἀνάπτηρος*.<sup>5</sup> The stock example in the logical works of *γένος*-*εἶδος* is *ζῷον-ἀνθρώπος*, and the real significance of the distinction between genus and species lies not in its relative use at all levels, but in its absolute use at the level of the infima species.<sup>6</sup>

One would have expected Aristotle to use this distinction above all in biology, where it is most evident that the final differentia expresses the essence,<sup>7</sup> so that the immediate object of science must be species rather than genus. But the surprising fact is that he makes least use of it in this field. It does not occur in the explanations of family resemblances and *τέρατα*, nor of the mule, just quoted; there the distinction is between the universal (both *ζῷον* and *ἀνθρώπος*) and the particular (Socrates); he speaks of *γένος* and *καθόλου* as opposed to *ἴδιον, καὶ ἔκαστον*, and in the only paragraph where *εἶδος* occurs it is interchanged with *γένος*.<sup>8</sup> It is true that *P.A. 1* apparently distinguishes *γένος*, *διαφορά, εἶδος* in the same way as the *Topics* does. But *P.A. 1* is a book apart: it is not so much biology as a philosophical discussion of biology. Its usage is markedly different from that of the works in which Aristotle actually practises biology. There, in the strictly biological works, although it has been traditional to interpret *γένος* and *εἶδος* as genus and species in many passages, examination shows that there are only a few in which the technical sense is obligatory; in a few more it is possible but not demanded, while in others it even causes confusion (as D'Arcy Thompson pointed out) and in some it is impossible. Now in the case of the logical works the reader has a clear choice on each occasion between the technical and the non-technical senses: both have been established

<sup>1</sup> *Top.* 107<sup>a</sup>22; *Cat.* 1<sup>b</sup>21; Bonitz, *Ind.* 151<sup>a</sup>45.

<sup>2</sup> *Phys.* 227<sup>b</sup>14.

<sup>3</sup> *An. Post.* 96<sup>b</sup>15, 97<sup>a</sup>35-<sup>b</sup>6; *Met.* 1034<sup>a</sup>7.

<sup>4</sup> *G.A.* 4. 3 (cf. 769<sup>b</sup>9).

<sup>5</sup> *Met.* 1034<sup>a</sup>1; *G.A.* 2. 8.

<sup>6</sup> The contrast that N. Hartmann draws

between Plato and A. (*Zur Lehre v. Eidos bei P. u. A.*, 1941, pp. 12, 21) depends upon identifying *eidos* with *ἄτομον εἶδος*.

<sup>7</sup> *Met.* 1038<sup>a</sup>19-26; *P.A.* 644<sup>a</sup>3.

<sup>8</sup> *G.A.* 747<sup>b</sup>33-748<sup>a</sup>7. (At 770<sup>b</sup>17, 772<sup>b</sup>25 *εἶδος* means the formal cause opposed to *ὑλῆ*.)

in practice, and, where the technical sense is required, it is required because the context distinguishes certain concepts in the way in which genus and species are distinguished, and these examples can be pointed to in the text. In the biology, however, there is no such framework of reference. The traditional interpretation assumed that Aristotle did actually classify animals into genera and species, but this assumption is not supported by the evidence.<sup>1</sup> He accepts as data the animal kinds (*γένη*) that are presented to him by common parlance, but does not try to group them further by finding similarities, as Speusippus appears to have done. Such kinds are: *ἴππος, κύων, κτλ.*; a very few wider groups such as *τὰ σελάχη, τὰ λόφουρα*; and certain general groupings (*μέγιστα γένη*)<sup>2</sup> which comprise most—but not all—animals, namely *ὄρνις, ἵππος, ἔντομα, κτλ.* The extant treatises examine the common and peculiar characteristics of these *γένη*, their functions, their reproduction, but *not* their taxonomy; moreover there is no classification scheme in the background, and all attempts to construct one for Aristotle have failed.<sup>3</sup> Consequently the question is not so much why Aristotle usually fails to distinguish the words *γένος* and *εἶδος* in biology: it is rather, how does the distinction come to be there at all, in the few cases where it does appear?

In the zoological works excluding *P.A.* 1<sup>4</sup> the occurrences of the two words are, so far as I have observed:

	<i>γένος</i>	( <i>συγγενῆ</i> et sim.)	<i>εἶδος</i>	( <i>όμοειδῆ</i> et sim.)
<i>H.A. 1-9</i>	207	(13)	52	(5)
<i>P.A. 2-4</i>	64	(2)	8	(0)
<i>Inc. A.</i>	7	(1)	0	(0)
<i>G.A.</i>	122	(21)	33	(6)
<i>Parv. Nat.</i> <sup>4</sup>	13	(1)	3	(0)
	413	(38)	96	(11)

Of the 413 instances of *γένος*, 275 are applied to a named type of animal (e.g. *γένος ἵππων*), 79 to animals in general (e.g. *πολλὰ γένη ζώων*), 25 to other kinds of thing (e.g. *γένος φυτῶν, δόδοντων*), and the remaining 34 mean 'kind' in the abstract, including sometimes the sense of genus as opposed to species. That is to say, in 354 cases *γένος* denotes a kind of animal. On the other hand, of the 96 instances of *εἶδος* only 24 denote kinds of animal. Thus *γένος* is far the commoner word for a kind of animal, though it is of course by no means the case that Aristotle is concerned with genera rather than with species. He uses *γένος* indifferently for the type that is visible in nature and for all groupings of such types. Bonitz is mistaken in applying the usage of the *Topics* (where *παντὸς γένους εἶδη πλείω, 123<sup>a</sup>30*) to the biology, and inferring that *γένος* is never used of the *infima species*.<sup>5</sup> For not only is every visible type called a *γένος*, but if it has sub-types these are *γένη* too. Thus dog is a *γένος* 658<sup>a</sup>29, and so are the breeds of dog, *πλείω γένη κυνῶν* 574<sup>a</sup>16; similarly *τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν λεόντων* 579<sup>b</sup>5 and *γένη λεόντων δύο* 629<sup>b</sup>33; compare *βοῶν* 782<sup>b</sup>7 with 666<sup>b</sup>19,

<sup>1</sup> For details see my paper 'A.'s Use of *Differentiae in Zoology*, contrib. to 2nd Symp. Arist. (Louvain, 1960).

<sup>2</sup> *H.A. 490<sup>b</sup>7, 505<sup>b</sup>26*. Not a technical term: cf. *P.A. 683<sup>b</sup>26, H.A. 490<sup>b</sup>16 γένη μεγάλα, 534<sup>b</sup>13 γένη ἀ περιέχει . . .*

<sup>3</sup> Full examination in Meyer, *Arist.*

*Thierkunde*, on which see my paper, loc. cit.  
<sup>4</sup> i.e. *H.A. 1-9, P.A. 2-4, Inc. A., G.A., and Parv. Nat. 453<sup>b</sup>11-458<sup>a</sup>32 and 464<sup>b</sup>19-480<sup>b</sup>30 (de Somno, Long. Vit., and all from *Juv.* to end of *Resp.*). Mot. A. and *H.A. 10* can be ignored for this purpose.*

<sup>5</sup> *Arist. Stud. iv. 386; Index 151<sup>b</sup>57.*

506<sup>a</sup>9; τεττίγων 682<sup>a</sup>18, 25 with 535<sup>b</sup>8; καρίδων 525<sup>a</sup>33 with 34; καρκίνων ibid.; πολυπόδων 622<sup>a</sup>14 with 525<sup>a</sup>13; ὄφεων 511<sup>a</sup>14 with 15, 505<sup>b</sup>10; ἀκαληφῶν 531<sup>a</sup>31 with <sup>b</sup>10; μυῶν 676<sup>b</sup>31, 771<sup>a</sup>23 with 581<sup>a</sup>5; ἔχίνων 528<sup>a</sup>2, 683<sup>b</sup>14 with 530<sup>a</sup>34, 680<sup>a</sup>15. γένη is the word for the different types of δασυπόδων 507<sup>a</sup>16, κογχῶν 528<sup>a</sup>24, πορφυρῶν 547<sup>a</sup>4, κνιδῶν 548<sup>a</sup>24, σπόργυρων 548<sup>a</sup>32, φυχῶν 550<sup>b</sup>26, ἐλμύνθων 551<sup>a</sup>9, φθειρῶν 557<sup>a</sup>4, ἀετῶν 563<sup>b</sup>5, 618<sup>b</sup>18, ἵεράκων 564<sup>a</sup>5, 620<sup>a</sup>22, δελφίνων 566<sup>b</sup>12, κεστρέων 569<sup>a</sup>17, ἑραδιῶν 609<sup>b</sup>22, δρυοκολαπτῶν 614<sup>b</sup>7, κοτύφων 617<sup>a</sup>11, κολοιῶν 617<sup>b</sup>18, κορυδάλων 617<sup>b</sup>20, φαλαγγίων 622<sup>b</sup>28, ἀραχνίων ibid., ἀραχνίων γλαφυρῶν 623<sup>a</sup>25, σφηκῶν 627<sup>b</sup>23, σφηκῶν ἡμέρων 628<sup>a</sup>2, θοῶν 630<sup>a</sup>12. Each of these subdivisions is clearly the type visible in nature, i.e. the final differentiation known to Aristotle, what would now be called the species or variety, and what would in the *Organon* and *Metaphysics* be called the ἀτομον εἶδος.

Of the 96 instances of εἶδος, only 13 are applied to named types of animal, and a further 11 to animals in general; 4 refer to other things (εἶδος τριχῶν 490<sup>b</sup>28, 781<sup>b</sup>34; φωνῆς 536<sup>b</sup>10; κοιλίας 674<sup>a</sup>23, cf. 507<sup>b</sup>23), and the remaining 68 bear an abstract sense and occur largely in oblique cases (e.g. εἴδει διαφέρει). Of these 68 abstract instances, 16 (all in *G.A.*) mean the formal cause, and many others have a general sense of 'form', 'appearance', even 'nature'; but there are some that seem to demand the sense of 'species', and these will be discussed below.

Taking first the 13 references to named animal-types, we find that 5 of them refer to types that are also called γένη, so that the technical distinction is presumably excluded:

H.A. 532<sup>b</sup>14 τεττίγων εἴδη; cf. 556<sup>a</sup>14 τεττίγων γένη, 535<sup>b</sup>8 τεττίγων τι γένος.  
 H.A. 557<sup>a</sup>24 ἐν εἶδός ἐστι φθειρῶν θαλαττίων; cf. 557<sup>a</sup>4 ἐστι δὲ γένος φθειρῶν.  
 H.A. 617<sup>b</sup>16 κολοιῶν εἴδη τρία; cf. 617<sup>b</sup>18 ἄλλο γένος κολοιῶν.  
 P.A. 680<sup>a</sup>15 ὄντων δὲ πλειόνων γενῶν, οὐ γάρ ἐν εἶδος τῶν ἔχίνων πάντων ἐστί;  
 cf. H.A. 530<sup>a</sup>34 γένη πλείω ἔχίνων, <sup>b</sup>4-7 ἄλλα δύο γένη, ἄλλο γένος.  
 G.A. 758<sup>b</sup>9 δεῖ τὰς κάμπας εἶδος τιθέναι σκωλήκος; cf. 723<sup>b</sup>6 γένος τι σκωλήκων.

Three refer to sub-types, such as have been seen above to be most commonly called γένη: εἴδη γυπῶν 592<sup>b</sup>7, αἰγιθαλῶν 592<sup>b</sup>18, κιχλῶν 617<sup>b</sup>18.

In one case only do γένος and εἶδος appear to be distinguished: H.A. 593<sup>b</sup>8 τὸ τῶν ἀλκυόνων δὲ γένος πάρυδρόν ἐστιν. τυγχάνει δ' αὐτῶν ὅτα δύο εἴδη. In view of the overwhelming evidence of the other cases, it seems clear that εἴδη must be non-technical here, and is used to mean 'forms', mainly for literary variety.

The remaining four cases refer to more abstract groupings than the visible natural forms:

H.A. 486<sup>a</sup>24 εἴδη πλείω ἰχθύων καὶ ὄρνιθων. This occurs in a context where the distinction between genus and species seems to be really intended. It is discussed below.

P.A. 679<sup>b</sup>15 ἐστι δὲ γένη καὶ εἴδη πολλὰ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων. No further suggestion is made of a distinction between γένος and εἶδος among testaceans, and the word εἶδος does not again occur in connexion with them except in the non-technical use with ἔχινοι quoted above (680<sup>a</sup>15). Cf. H.A. 528<sup>a</sup>2 τὸ τῶν ἔχίνων γένος, 530<sup>a</sup>34 f. γένη πλείω ἔχίνων, ἄλλα δύο γένη, ἄλλο γένος; 528<sup>a</sup>24-26 κόγχων γένη ἔνα, τι γένος. The use of both words together here may show that they

have not completely lost their basic difference of meaning: i.e. *γένος* is the genetic 'kind', *εἶδος* is the morphological 'form'.

P.A. 683<sup>b</sup>26 ἔστι δὲ γένη μὲν τέτταρα τὰ μέγιστ' αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν μαλακοστράκων) . . . τούτων δ' ἔκαστον πλείω εἶδη ἔστι. The same applies to this passage as to 679<sup>b</sup>15 above. *εἶδος* is not again used in connexion with crustaceans, except once in the abstract sense of 'shape': H.A. 525<sup>b</sup>10 ἔτερον γένος μικρὸν μὲν ὥσπερ οἱ καρκίνοι, τὸ δ' εἶδος ὄμοιον τοῖς ἀστακοῖς. *γένος* is the word used otherwise for all groups of *μαλακόστρακα*: cf. 525<sup>a</sup>34 γένη πλείω καριδῶν καὶ καρκίνων . . . <sup>b2</sup> τὸ μικρὸν γένος.

G.A. 719<sup>a</sup>7 ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν τῶν εἶδῶν (sc. ζωοτόκων καὶ ὠτότοκων). The ovo-viviparous selachians and vipers have some of the characteristics of each group. *εἶδος* bears a general sense of 'class'.

The above evidence shows that, wherever it is possible to test the denotations of *γένος* and *εἶδος* by reference to actual animals, Aristotle's usage makes no taxonomic distinction between them. *γένος* means a 'kind' at any level from the most abstract group to the immediately visible type. *εἶδος* is far less commonly used, and represents no group that *γένος* does not also represent. If they differ in meaning, the difference is not that of higher and lower rungs on the same ladder. They belong to different ladders, and the original difference sometimes shows through, *γένος* being a statement about kinship and *εἶδος* a statement about shape or form.<sup>1</sup>

There remains, however, a number of passages in these biological works in which *εἶδος* is used with a more general reference in opposition to *γένος*, and in some of these the sense of 'species' appears obligatory. In the following pages I offer an examination of all passages that appear to be at least capable of bearing this sense (these include the 11 general references to animals, and some of the 68 abstract instances, referred to above).

H.A. 1. 486<sup>a</sup>16 ταῦτὰ δὲ τὰ μὲν εἶδει τῶν μορίων ἔστιν, οἷον  
 17 ἀνθρώπου ρίς καὶ ὄφθαλμὸς ἀνθρώπου ρίνι καὶ ὄφθαλμῷ,  
 18 . . . τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ  
 19 ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα τῷ εἶδει ταῦτὰ λέγομεν . . .  
 21 . . . τὰ δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ἔστιν,  
 22 διαφέρει δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ὅσων τὸ γένος ἔστι  
 23 ταῦτόν. λέγω δὲ γένος οἷον ὄρνιθα καὶ ἵθυν· τούτων γὰρ  
 24 ἐκάτερον ἔχει διαφορὰν κατὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ἔστιν εἶδη πλείω  
 25 ἵθυν καὶ ὄρνιθων. . . .

17 . . . ἔνια δὲ τῶν ζώων  
 18 οὔτε εἶδει τὰ μόρια ταῦτὰ ἔχει οὔτε καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ἔλ-  
 19 λειψιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον πέτονθεν ὁστοῦν πρὸς ἄ-  
 20 κανθαν καὶ . . . πρὸς  
 21 πτερὸν λεπίς· ὁ γὰρ ἐν ὄρνιθι πτερόν, τοῦτο ἐν ἵθυν ἔστι λεπίς.

488<sup>b</sup>30 ταῦτα δ' ἔστι ταῦτα καὶ ἔτερα  
 31 κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους, ἢ κατ' εἶδος ἢ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἢ  
 32 κατ' ἀναλογίαν . . .

491<sup>a</sup>18 τὰς εἰρημένας διαφοράς, εἶδει καὶ ὑπεροχῇ καὶ ἀναλογίᾳ . . .

These three passages together with 497<sup>b</sup>10-12 (see below) distinguish the levels of comparison in a way that is found in P.A. 1, and occasionally in logical

<sup>1</sup> As also perhaps in Plato's diairesis: cf. Diès, *Plat. Polit.*, p. xxi.

usage, but not elsewhere in the biology. There are three levels: between individuals, between species, and between genera. The language of these passages is over-condensed and confusing, but from other references<sup>1</sup> it is clear that Aristotle means the following:

(ἀριθμῷ ἐν	—the individual)
ἀριθμῷ διαφέροντα	}
εἴδει ταῦτά	—different individuals in one species
εἴδει διαφέροντα	}
γένει ταῦτά	—different species in one genus
γένει διαφέροντα	}
ἀναλογίᾳ ταῦτά	—different genera
(ἀναλογίᾳ διαφέροντα	—incomparables)

Since biology is not concerned with individuals, there are in effect only two standards of comparison, namely between species (*ὑπεροχή*) and between genera (*ἀναλογία*). Hence the expression at 488<sup>b</sup>30 is too condensed: *ταῦτα καὶ ἔτερα* does not apply *simpliciter* to each of the three levels mentioned, but *κατ'* *εἶδος* goes only with *ἔτερα*, *καθ'* *ὑπεροχήν* goes with both *ταῦτα* and *ἔτερα*, and *κατ'* *ἀναλογίαν* goes only with *ταῦτα*. At 491<sup>a</sup>18 the statement is further condensed and has become actually incorrect, for *διαφοράς* cannot apply to *ἀναλογίᾳ* at all.<sup>2</sup> At 497<sup>b</sup>10 the theory is correctly stated, but comes in the same sentence with an incompatible usage of *γένος* and *εἶδος*, as will be seen.

Now the terms *ἀναλογία* and *ὑπεροχή* (often called *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον*) are used throughout the biology, but they are not distinguished in this way. For example, both *ἀνάλογον* and *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον* are applied together to the comparisons between man and other animals at *H.A.* 588<sup>a</sup>25–28; *ἀναπνοή* is called *ἀνάλογον* to the use of *βράγχια* at *H.A.* 589<sup>b</sup>18 (also at *P.A.* 1. 5. 645<sup>b</sup>6) although this comparison is made within the *γένος ἵχθυών*; within a species, male sperma is called *ἀνάλογον* to female *καταμήνια*, *G.A.* 727<sup>a</sup>3; *ծστοῦν* and *χονδρός* are *ἀνάλογον* at *P.A.* 653<sup>b</sup>36 (cf. *H.A.* 511<sup>b</sup>7) but differ *τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον* at 655<sup>a</sup>32; *ծστοῦν* is *ἀνάλογον* to *άκανθα* according to the theory at 486<sup>b</sup>19, yet this comparison occurs within both the *γένος ἵχθυών* and the *γένος τετραπόδων φωτόκων*, *H.A.* 516<sup>b</sup>14–22: *ἀναλογία* is applied to the differences of hardness in the bones of *πεζὰ ζωοτόκα*, *H.A.* 516<sup>b</sup>4, although this type of comparison is distinguished from *ἀναλογία* and classed as *ὑπεροχή* at *P.A.* 1. 644<sup>b</sup>11 and correspondingly at *H.A.* 1. 486<sup>a</sup>25 f. In practice *ἀναλογία* is most often used to compare *ἴναμα* with *ἴναμα*, a difference that is wider than the *μέγιστα γένη*, while *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον* is used promiscuously.<sup>3</sup> The reason for this is that the distinction between genus and species is not drawn in practice, and hence the theoretical distinction between *ἀναλογία* and *ὑπεροχή*, which is made to depend upon it in 486<sup>a</sup>16, etc., is not and cannot be applied.

It is equally inapplicable to the hierarchical type of classification that is often envisaged in the logic. It could only apply where there are just the two levels of division, a genus and its member-species, of which the distinction can be used absolutely. Thus it could apply to the simple classification *ζῶον*—

<sup>1</sup> *Top.* 103<sup>a</sup>8, *An. Post.* 98<sup>a</sup>20, *Met.* 1016<sup>b</sup>33, 1018<sup>a</sup>13, *Phys.* 228<sup>b</sup>12, 242<sup>b</sup>4, *P.A.* 639<sup>a</sup>28, 644<sup>a</sup>16, 645<sup>b</sup>26. Cf. Bonitz, *Arist.* *Stud.* iv. 386.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Muskens, *De Vocis ἀναλογίας Significatione*, etc. (Groningen, 1943), p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Meyer, *Arist. Thierkunde*, pp. 335–44.

ὄρνεον-κόραξ (*Top.* 107<sup>a</sup>23) but not to any longer ladder of *γένη* ὑπ' ἀλληλα, such as would result if intermediate groups were inserted in that classification. Still less could it apply to Aristotle's flexible or indeterminate grouping of many animals.

Further, it sets the genus-species distinction at the level of *ὅρνις* καὶ *ἰχθύς*. This is a very simple degree of classification. It is used in the discussion at *P.A.* 1. 2-4, but does not appear elsewhere in biology except in the two statements about *μέγιστα γένη* that are discussed below (490<sup>b</sup>7 and 505<sup>b</sup>26). It is also rare in the logic (e.g. *An. Post.* 97<sup>a</sup>4, *Top.* 107<sup>a</sup>23); there, if an example of genus-species is wanted, the commonest is *ζῷον-ἄνθρωπος*; but in practice a more elaborate hierarchy is used, of which the biological counterpart would be a more advanced degree of classification than this.

These passages in *H.A.*, therefore, are strangely out of key. The concepts of *ἀναλογία* and *ὑπεροχή* proved useful to Aristotle, and led to the modern concept of homology; but they would have been useless if tied artificially to genus and species, as they are tied here but nowhere else. Seen against Aristotle's practice in biology, these statements are too doctrinaire. Yet if they are compared with his logic, with which they seem more akin, they are too primitive. This incongruity, coupled with their curious incorrectness, suggests that they are not integral parts of the biology.

*H.A.* 1. 490<sup>b</sup>7 *γένη* δὲ *μέγιστα τῶν ζώων*, εἰς ἀ διήρηται τάλλα  
 8 ζῶα, τάδ' ἔστιν, ἐν μὲν ὄρνιθων, ἐν δ' ιχθύων, ἄλλο δὲ  
 9 κήτους. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πάντα ἔναιμά ἔστιν. ἄλλο δὲ *γένος*  
 10 ἔστι τὸ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων, ὃ καλεῖται ὀστρεον· ἄλλο τὸ τῶν  
 11 μαλακοστράκων, ἀνώνυμον ἐν δύναμι, οίνον κάραβοι καὶ  
 12 *γένη* τιὰ καρκίνων καὶ ἀστακῶν· ἄλλο τὸ τῶν μαλακίων,  
 13 οίον τευθίδες τε καὶ τεῦθοι καὶ σηρπίαι· ἔτερον τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων.  
 16 . . . τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζώων οὐκέτι τὰ *γένη* μεγάλα· οὐ γάρ περιέχει  
 17 πολλὰ εἰδῆ ἐν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν ἔστιν ἀπλοῦν αὐτὸ οὐκ  
 18 ἔχον διαφορὰν τὸ εἶδος, οίον ἄνθρωπος, τὰ δ' ἔχει μέν,  
 19 ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμα τὰ εἰδῆ . . .  
 31 τοῦ δὲ *γένους* τοῦ τῶν τετραπόδων ζώων καὶ ζωτόκων εἰδῆ  
 32 μέν ἔστι πολλά, ἀνώνυμα δέ· ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔκαστον αὐτῶν  
 33 ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος εὑρηται, λέων, ἔλαφος, ἵππος,  
 34 κύνων καὶ τάλλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ἐπει ἔστιν ἐν τι *γένος* καὶ  
 491<sup>a</sup>1 ἐπὶ τοῖς λοφούροις καλούμενοις, οίον ἵππω καὶ ὄνω καὶ ὄρει  
 2 . . . καὶ ταῖς ἐν Συρίᾳ καλούμεναις ἡμίονοις,  
 3 αἱ καλοῦνται ἡμίονοι δι' ὄμοιότητα, οὐκ οὖσαι ἀπλῶς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος.

'The whole passage is very troublesome, and Aristotle seems to juggle with the terms *γένος* and *εἶδος*,' Thompson.

This is one of the only two discussions of *μέγιστα γένη* (the other is at 505<sup>b</sup>26, see below). It comes towards the end of the introductory section of *H.A.* (1. 1-6), in which Aristotle has explained that the treatise concerns the likenesses and differences between animals, and has analysed these *διαφοραί* generally under certain main headings, according to which the treatise will be arranged. Now finally he says that there are certain main groups<sup>1</sup> into which animals fall, implying that he will take the animals by these groups, as in fact he does.

<sup>1</sup> *μέγιστα*: not 'highest' but 'largest': not a vertical but a horizontal division. So Thompson: 'very extensive'.

But here lies a difficulty: not all animals fall into main groups; or, if they do, their groups are not all recognized (490<sup>b</sup>16–19). In lines 19–30 he discusses the connexions between four-footedness, viviparousness or oviparousness, hair or scales, and concludes that there are two further main groups, namely viviparous and oviparous quadrupeds, but that no more grouping can be done by combinations of these factors. Then comes l. 31 where he says that the group of viviparous quadrupeds contains unnamed *εἰδη*.

He has therefore made two chief points: (1) that these *μέγιστα γένη* do not include all animals (for the two reasons given in ll. 16–19); (2) that the *γένος τετραπόδων ζωοτόκων* includes *εἰδη ἀνώνυμα*. The difficulty in the passage concerns the meanings of *εἶδος* and *ἀνώνυμος*.

It is first clear that *εἶδος* is not being used absolutely: *οὐ γὰρ περιέχει πολλὰ εἰδη ἐν εἶδος* (16). Thompson suggests that *γένος* and *εἶδος* are used as relative terms here, but even this does not solve the difficulty, since *ἐν εἶδος* represents *γένη μεγάλα* (16) while *πολλὰ εἰδη* is on the same level as *γένη καρκίνων* (12). Hence *γένος* and *εἶδος* are being used interchangeably, 'kind' and 'form'.

Thompson also notes that *περιέχει* is technical, and compares *de Caelo* 312<sup>a</sup>12 and *Phys.* 207<sup>b</sup>1, where *εἶδος περιέχει* *ὑλην*. But perhaps a better comparison lies in the logic where classes embrace classes: *Top.* 121<sup>b</sup>25 *περιέχει τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος . . . τὸ λοιπὸν περιέχει . . . δοκεῖ γάρ, ὅταν ἐν εἶδος ὑπὸ δύο γένη* *ἥ,* *τὸ ἔτερον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔτερου περιέχεσθαι . . . 140<sup>a</sup>2 ἡ ἀρετὴ τὴν συμφωνίαν περιέχει . . . 144<sup>a</sup>12 περιέχουσιν ἄλληλα . . . τάγαθὸν τὴν ἔξιν περιέχει . . . 144<sup>b</sup>13 μὴ περιεχομένου μηδὲ περιέχοντος . . . al. (Cf. *P.A.* 1. 644<sup>a</sup>14, <sup>b</sup>5.) This usage seems to be Platonic: cf. *Soph.* 250 b, 253 d, *Parm.* 138 a, b, 145 b, 151 a, b. *διαφορά* is also technical here in the manner of the *Topics* rather than in the looser sense of 'difference' that is common in *H.A.* This technical use too may derive from Plato: cf. *Theaet.* 208 c f., *Polit.* 285 b, and the Academic *Definitiones* 414 d, 416.*

This passage, then, is concerned with an elementary degree of classification, and uses terminology familiar from the *Topics* and from Academic usage. But it does not consistently distinguish *γένος* and *εἶδος*. It becomes manageable if these words are translated not 'genus' and 'species' but 'kind' and 'form'.

*ἀνώνυμος.* What, then, are the *εἰδη ἀνώνυμα* at line 32? In order to preserve the sense 'species' here, Schneider<sup>1</sup> altered Scaliger's translation from 'nomine caret' to 'uno aliquo communi nomine caret', understanding *ἐνὶ ὀνόματι* with *ἀνώνυμα*, and compared Aristotle's statement that the *δοτρακόδερμα* are called *δοτρέα* while the *μαλακόστρακα* have no single name (ll. 10–11 above). In taking *ἀνώνυμος* to mean *ἐνὶ ὀνόματι ἀνώνυμος*, Schneider is surely on good ground: cf. 490<sup>a</sup>13, <sup>b</sup>11 (above), 623<sup>b</sup>5, *P.A.* 642<sup>b</sup>15, *de An.* 419<sup>a</sup>4. But I can find no parallel to his translation 'lacking a common name', meaning that things which have single names of their own lack a name shared jointly with each other (unless *H.A.* 505<sup>b</sup>30 has this sense: but see below). All the other instances cited by Waitz ad *Int.* 19<sup>b</sup>6 and by Bonitz, *Index* 69<sup>b</sup>2–26, have the straightforward meaning 'nameless', i.e. the object referred to has no *ὄνομα* (cf. *Int.* 19<sup>b</sup>6 *ἢ ὄνομα ἢ τὸ ἀνώνυμον*). The same is true of the following instances which they do not cite: 492<sup>a</sup>15, 493<sup>a</sup>28, 494<sup>a</sup>3, 14, 515<sup>b</sup>10, 552<sup>b</sup>31, *P.A.* 669<sup>b</sup>9, 683<sup>b</sup>24. When Aristotle means that a *common name* is lacking he says, as at 669<sup>b</sup>9, *ἀνώνυμον τὸ κονόν*; cf. *H.A.* 531<sup>b</sup>23, *Phys.* 226<sup>a</sup>30, 32, *Pol.* 1275<sup>a</sup>30. At *An. Post.* 74<sup>a</sup>21 διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὀνομασμένον τι πάντα ταῦτα ἐν, the subject is *πάντα ταῦτα* and *όνομασμένον τι* is complement with *ἐν*; cf. *ibid.* 8 *ἀνώνυμον*

<sup>1</sup> Following Camus, and followed by Thompson; so Waitz ad 19<sup>b</sup>6.

ἐπὶ διαφοροῖς εἶδει πράγμασιν (sc. τὸ ἀνώτερον). At 490<sup>b</sup>11 it is not the κάραβοι καὶ γένη καρκίνων κτλ. that are ἀνώνυμοι ἐν ὄνόματι, but the μαλακοστράκων γένος: the reason is that an adjective is not an ὄνομα even when used 'substantively', unless it has really become a noun; cf. 490<sup>a</sup>13 (τὰ πτιλωτὰ καὶ τὰ δερμόπτερα . . .) ἀνώνυμα ἐν ὄνόματι, 623<sup>b</sup>5 γένος τι τῶν ἐντόμων ἐν ὄνόματι ἀνώνυμοι . . . ὅσα κηριοποιά, P.A. 642<sup>b</sup>15 ἀνώνυμοι, οἷον τὸ ἔναιμον καὶ τὸ ἄναιμον ἐφ' ἐκατέρω γὰρ τούτων οὐ κεῖται ἐν ὄνομα, and 669<sup>b</sup>10, *de An.* 417<sup>b</sup>32, 418<sup>a</sup>27. At 491<sup>a</sup>1 τὰ λόφουρα can count as a named γένος (if this passage is genuine in spite of the contradiction at *Met.* 1034<sup>a</sup>1) because it has become a noun: L.S.J. quote it only in the neuter plural and give no instance of its use as an adjective; therefore it differs from the adjectives which Aristotle calls ἀνώνυμα (cf. 601<sup>a</sup>17 for adjectival μαλακόστρακος and δοτρακόδερμος). It may be also that a descriptive phrase or periphrasis is not a name: cf. above examples, and *Met.* 1056<sup>a</sup>25 τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν ἀνώνυμον, *E.N.* 1107<sup>b</sup>1, 7, 30. This would explain why the αἰσθητήριον of touch is ἀνώνυμον at 489<sup>a</sup>18: it can only be expressed by the phrase σὰρξ ἡ ἀνάλογον (unless Aristotle here refers to his more accurate doctrine that the αἰσθητήριον is not the flesh but τι ἐντός<sup>1</sup>).

If εἶδη ἀνώνυμα means εἶδη that have no ὄνόματα, it cannot refer to λέων, ἔλαφος, κτλ. It must refer to groups that contain these types and are themselves contained within τετράποδα ζωοτόκα. What, for example, is the name of the group that contains the lion? We have one ('Cat'), but Aristotle has not. All that he has at this level is τὰ λόφουρα, and the rest are nameless. εἶδη ἀνώνυμα therefore denotes the same missing groups as at l. 19 above, i.e. groups intermediate between the main groups and the types visible in nature.

At 491<sup>a</sup>3, τὸ αὐτὸν εἶδος, the sense 'species' would be possible, but the context demands no more than 'form'. This type is elsewhere called only a γένος: 577<sup>b</sup>24 (αἱ ἐν Συρίᾳ ἡμίονοι . . .) ἔστι τὸ γένος ὅμοιον μὲν ἔτερον δέ, 580<sup>b</sup>1 ἐν Συρίᾳ οἱ καλούμενοι ἡμίονοι, ἔτερον γένος.

H.A. 2. 497<sup>b</sup>9 σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅσα γ' ἔστι γένει ἔτερα τῶν ζώων, καὶ  
10 τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν μερῶν ἔχει ἔτερα τῷ εἶδει, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατ'  
11 ἀναλογίαν ἀδιάφορα μόνον, τῷ γένει δ' ἔτερα, τὰ δὲ τῷ  
12 γένει μὲν ταῦτα τῷ εἶδει δ' ἔτερα.

Thompson, ad loc.: 'In the opening sentences, which must be read together with those of Book I, brevity leads to a certain appearance of confusion: we are reminded that a generic difference between two animals carries with it generic difference between certain parts *as well as specific difference between many others.*' But the words which I have italicized are not in accord with 1. 486<sup>a</sup>16 f. (above). γένει ἔτερα are, for example, ὅρνις and ἵχθύς (486<sup>a</sup>21). Their parts are to be compared οὐτε εἶδει οὐτε καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν . . . ὃ γὰρ ἐν ὅρνιθι πτερόν, τοῦτο ἐν ἵχθύι ἔστι λεπίς. κατὰ μὲν οὖν μόρια ἀ ἔχονται ἔκαστα τῶν ζώων, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔτερά ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα (486<sup>b</sup>18-23). The expression ἔτερα τῷ εἶδει, if used technically, is applicable only to γένει ταῦτα (e.g. the difference between μακρὸν ρύγχος and βραχὺ ρύγχος 486<sup>b</sup>10). Hence at 497<sup>b</sup>10 εἶδει cannot mean 'species' but must either mean 'form' or be equivalent to γένει (as at *Cat.* 1<sup>b</sup>16 τῶν ἔτερογενῶν . . . ἔτεραι τῷ εἶδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ, cf. *Top.* 107<sup>b</sup>19). The rest of the sentence, from καὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀναλογίαν, summarizes exactly the doctrine of 1. 486<sup>a</sup>16, etc. Therefore εἶδει

<sup>1</sup> Düring thinks not (*Arist.*'s P.A., *Critical and Literary Commentaries*, p. 130).

in l. 12 requires the sense of 'species', which in l. 10 is impossible. This suggests that the two parts of the sentence originated separately.

*H.A. 2. 504<sup>b</sup>13 τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων γένος . . . πολλὰς περιέχον ἴδεας.*

Thompson translates *ἴδεας* 'forms', but comments: 'ἴδεα, frequent in Aristotle of a *logical* species, is not used of the species of animals or plants. It may here mean the *sensible* species.' It is true that *ἴδεα* is not used of animal or plant species, but I cannot find it used of any other sort of species either. In the *Topics* it is used always, I think, *sensu Platonico*. Bonitz, *Index s.v. ἴδεα* 338<sup>b</sup>34-48 'logice i.q. species generis' cites various passages, of which none is from the logical works and none supports his interpretation. They are as follows: *E.N.* 109<sup>b</sup>16, 25 *ἴδεα* is meant *sensu Platonico*; *de Caelo* 274<sup>b</sup>2 *ἴδεας τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων* means 'kinds' (Stocks) or 'forms' (Guthrie); 'form' is also the meaning at 276<sup>b</sup>2, 285<sup>a</sup>25, *Meteor.* 380<sup>a</sup>17, <sup>b</sup>30; *de Caelo* 268<sup>a</sup>21 *ἴδεα* as 'form' is distinguished from *ὑλη*; *P.A.* 656<sup>a</sup>3 *ἴδεα φυτῶν* means 'configuration' (Ogle) or 'formation' (Peck); *Poet.* 1458<sup>a</sup>26 *αἰνίγματος ἴδεα* 'the essence of a riddle'; 1449<sup>b</sup>8 and 1458<sup>b</sup>18 'form'. Now Bonitz, loc. cit., refers to Waitz ii. 406 and may have made an error of recording, for there Waitz quotes four of the above passages to demonstrate precisely the reverse, namely that *ἴδεα* can mean (a) *οὐσία*, *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*, or (b) outward form ('externa species') in distinction from the sense of 'species generi subiecta' which Waitz proposes tentatively ('haud scio an') in only two passages. These two passages are *de Caelo* 285<sup>a</sup>25 and *H.A.* 504<sup>b</sup>14 (above). But at *de Caelo* 285<sup>a</sup>25 *ἴδεαι* is used of *τὸ ἄνω*, *τὸ κάτω*, *τὸ δεξιόν*, *κτλ.*, i.e. the 'forms' of position (Stocks, Guthrie): cf. *Phys.* 205<sup>b</sup>32 *τόπου εἰδη καὶ διαφοραί*, 208<sup>b</sup>13 *τόπου μέρη καὶ εἰδη*, clearly non-technical, in the Platonic usage. There remains therefore only the present *H.A.* passage as a support for Bonitz's sub-heading. But the other instances of *ἴδεα* in *H.A.* all mean external 'form': 615<sup>b</sup>8 *ἴδεαν μακρὸς καὶ λεπτός*, cf. 530<sup>a</sup>30, 577<sup>a</sup>10, 580<sup>a</sup>28, 592<sup>b</sup>10, 615<sup>b</sup>28, 616<sup>b</sup>1, 630<sup>b</sup>13. The mere use of the word *περιέχειν* here is not enough to give to *ἴδεα* a meaning which would be unique, and the passage translates perfectly well without that. It is a general introductory statement that the class of Fishes comprises many animal forms.

*H.A. 2. 505<sup>b</sup>26 τούτῳ γάρ διαφέρει τὰ μέγιστα γένη πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ*  
 27 *τῶν ἄλλων ζώων*, *τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔναιμα τὰ δ' ἄναιμα εἶναι*.  
 28 *ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα ἄνθρωπός τε καὶ τὰ ζωτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων*,  
 29 *ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ φωτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων καὶ ὄρνις καὶ ἰχθύς*  
 30 *καὶ κῆτος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀνώνυμον ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι*  
 31 *γένος ἀλλ' ἀπλοῦν τὸ εἶδος ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον, οὐνος ὄφις*  
 32 *καὶ κροκόδειλος.*  
 29 *ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ φωτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων* om. D<sup>a</sup>.  
 31 *ὄφις καὶ κροκόδειλος*] *ἔχις καὶ κορδύλος* ci. Dittmeyer.

The natural reading makes *εἶδος* opposed to *γένος* in l. 31; but it is not clear what *εἶδος* denotes, nor what ll. 30-31 mean from *καὶ εἴ τι το ἔκαστον*.

What is *ἀνώνυμον*? Obviously not *ὄφις καὶ κροκόδειλος*, but the missing *γένος* of which they are *εἰδη*. In that case the meaning is: 'and anything else (i.e. any other *μέγιστον γένος*) that is nameless because of there being no *γένος* but only the *εἶδος* which is simple and is predicated of the individuals'. There is a slight oxymoron: the (group) is nameless because there is no group—i.e. there is nothing but unrelated simple *εῖδη*.

*είναι* (30) surely means 'exist'. If it were copulative, with subject supplied from *τι ἄλλο* and with *γένος* as complement, then Aristotle would be saying that the *τι ἄλλο* is not a *γένος* but is the *εἶδος* by itself, e.g. snake; but if he were saying this he could not also say that it is *ἀνώνυμον*, since *ὄφις* is its *ὄνομα*. Camus, followed by Schneider, Wimmer, B. St-Hilaire, Thompson, takes *είναι* as copulative<sup>1</sup> and *ἀνώνυμον* 'lacking a common name'. So Thompson translates: 'and all the others that come under no general designation by reason of their not forming genera, but groups of which simply the specific name is predictable', and refers in his note to the relative use of *γένος*—*εἶδος*, comparing his interpretation of 490<sup>b</sup>16 (on which see above). But this interpretation leads to difficulties:

1. There is the objection, explained above, to translating *ἀνώνυμος* 'lacking a common name'.

2. Schneider himself objected that *ὄφις* has in fact already been called a *γένος* (no doubt thinking of 490<sup>b</sup>24, 505<sup>b</sup>5), and concluded that the word is corrupt. Dittmeyer conjectured *ἔχις*, to which Thompson (followed by Tricot) replied: 'As Meyer, *Arist. Thierk.* p. 155, says, the serpent as *γένος* contains many *εἶδη*, but is also, as here, a single *εἶδος* in the great *γένος*, *τετράποδα ωτόκα φοιδωτά*.' That is, he appeals to the relative sense of *γένος*—*εἶδος*. But this answer raises a further difficulty:

3. If *ὄφις καὶ κροκόδειλος* are members of the *γένος τετραπόδων ωτόκων*,<sup>2</sup> then how can Aristotle say *διὰ τὸ μὴ είναι γένος*? For he has just named the *τετράποδα ωτόκα* among his list of *μέγιστα γένη*. Meyer answered: the *γένος* that is missing and nameless is the intermediate group between *ὄφις* and *τετράποδα ωτόκα*. But this answer would equally apply to the majority of animals, since there are extremely few intermediate groupings to be found. Moreover, Aristotle is speaking here of *μέγιστα γένη*, and the plain implication of the sentence is that some animals are not contained within the *μέγιστα γένη* that he has just listed.

The traditional interpretations therefore fail to solve the problem, and in addition they depend upon an unlikely sense of *ἀνώνυμος*. Dittmeyer's emendation does not suffice, since *ἔχις* is certainly a *γένος* within the *γένος ὄφεων*<sup>3</sup> (even though *κορδύλος* is admittedly in an ambiguous position).

If *τι ἄλλο* is a missing *μέγιστον γένος*, as seems likely, then what is *τὸ εἶδος*? And what is exemplified by *οὸν ὄφις καὶ κροκόδειλος*? This is the crux of the problem. *εἶδος* may be either technical (species) or non-technical (form, group), while *τὰ καθ' ἔκαστον* is used by Aristotle to mean either *ἄτομα εἶδη* or individual particulars. Since it is stated not to be a member of a *γένος* (*διὰ τὸ μὴ είναι γένος* 30), *εἶδος* cannot be used technically here, unless by a sort of metaphor, but more probably means *εἶδος ζώου*, form of animal. It refers, according to the meaning of *καθ' ἔκαστον*, either to a group of types or to a type of individuals. Either could be exemplified by *ὄφις* (assuming that Meyer is wrong in grouping *ὄφις* under *τετράποδα ωτόκα*) since *ὄφις* is the name both of a type and of a group of types, while not itself falling under a *μέγιστον γένος*. The fact that it is elsewhere called a *γένος* (Schneider's objection) does not matter, if the words *γένος* and *εἶδος* are not being used technically. On the other hand,

<sup>1</sup> Karsch, Külb, Tricot also take *είναι* copulative, but *ἀνώνυμον* as simply 'nameless'.

<sup>2</sup> This is true of *κροκόδειλος* (cf. 506<sup>a</sup>20,

509<sup>b</sup>8), but doubtful of *ὄφις*; cf. my paper quoted above.

<sup>3</sup> 511<sup>a</sup>14–16; Meyer, p. 312.

κροκόδειλος must be wrong on any interpretation.<sup>1</sup> It is certainly a member of τετράποδα φωτόκα, and is itself a γένος possessing γένη.<sup>2</sup> There is no sense in which it exemplifies τὸ μὴ εἶναι γένος κτλ., whether it be regarded as an individual, a type, a group of types, or a member of a μέγιστον γένος.

There is evidently an error here, and with it, I suggest, should be linked another difficulty in the passage, namely the position of ἄνθρωπος, l. 28. Although his characteristics are taken as standard and compared with those of entire μέγιστα γένη, Aristotle nowhere else says that Man is himself a μέγιστον γένος; and if this term means not a 'top' group in a hierarchy but a 'most extensive' group in a horizontal division, he could hardly call Man one. In the only other discussion of μέγιστα γένη (490<sup>b7</sup>), ἄνθρωπος is twice mentioned as an example of a type that belongs to no named group and to no γένος μέγα, but is ἀπλοῦν εἶδος and must be dealt with separately. The same is stated in a very similar passage at P.A. 1. 644<sup>b4</sup>: ὅρνις καὶ ἰχθύς καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἔστιν ἀνώνυμον μέν, τῷ γένει δ' ὁμοίως περιέχει τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδος· ὅσα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα, καθ' ἔκαστον, οὐλὸν περὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερόν ἔστιν. Both passages (490<sup>b7</sup> and 644<sup>b4</sup>) distinguish two cases: (i) unnamed groups which comprise sub-groups, (ii) (named) groups which do not comprise sub-groups, e.g. Man. But 505<sup>b30</sup> telescopes the statement and produces only the second of the two cases. If the text is genuine, it shows a threefold misunderstanding: (1) it has confounded two distinct cases; (2) it wrongly puts ἄνθρωπος as a μέγιστον γένος; (3) the example κροκόδειλος is false (if not ὄφις too). The whole passage may simply be an interpolation by an inferior student: its removal, in fact, would not only not upset the argument but would even improve the sequence.

Alternatively, it must be corrupt. The right place for ἄνθρωπος is after οἰον, whence ὄφις καὶ κροκόδειλος should be removed. Possibly ἄνθρωπος in its present position has displaced an original τὰ φωτόκα; this loss would then have necessitated the addition of the words ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ φωτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων to make up the missing μέγιστον γένος; these words are not read in D<sup>a</sup>, which may therefore be preserving an older tradition.

If the passage is so emended, it still only states one of the two cases; but this one is now correct, and agrees with 490<sup>b7</sup>. It would seem that in both passages γένος and εἶδος are used non-technically (or confusedly), and it is worth noting that the similar passage at P.A. 1. 644<sup>b4</sup> occurs in a context where the technical distinction has not been successfully preserved: cf. 644<sup>a17</sup> ὅσα διαφέρει τῶν γενῶν καθ' ὑπεροχήν . . . ταῦτα ὑπέζευκται ἐν γένει. In all three passages the genus is only to be found at the level of Bird and Fish, the μέγιστα γένη, if at all.

H.A. 4. 523<sup>b12</sup> τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων (γένος) ὁ πολλὰ περιεληφε εἶδη ζώων.

Note ζώων: not, therefore, 'species of the genus Insects', as every translator since Camus has it, but 'forms of animals'. In the context, γένος is used of various groups: 523<sup>b2</sup> γένη πλειῶ (ἀναίμων ζώων), . . . <sup>b11</sup> τὸ τῶν κοχλιῶν γένος . . . <sup>b19</sup> γένος οὐλὸν μύρμηκες. The only insects named elsewhere as εἶδη are certain forms of τέττιγες and φθεῖρες, on which see above (532<sup>b14</sup>, 557<sup>a24</sup>). The distinction here is simply that between 'kind' and 'form'.

H.A. 4. 531<sup>b21</sup> τὸ γένος (ἐντόμων) πολλὰ ἔχον εἶδη ἐν αὐτῷ.

εἶδη: sc. ζώων, as at 523<sup>b12</sup> (above). Only ἕνα of them are ουγγενικά, ibid. 22.

<sup>1</sup> 'Num ὄφις genuina lectio sit, incertus haereo; . . . at κροκόδειλος certe mutandum censeo', Dittmeyer.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 506<sup>a20</sup>, 508<sup>a5</sup>, 509<sup>b8</sup>, 558<sup>a15</sup>, 609<sup>a1</sup>.

*H.A. 5. 539<sup>a27</sup> ἐν δὲ τῷ ἰχθύων γένει ἔνια γίνεται οὐτε ἄρρενα οὐτε θήλεα, τῷ γένει μὲν ὅντα ἐτέροις τῶν ἰχθύων τὰ αὐτά, τῷ εἶδει δ' ἔτερα, ἔνια δὲ καὶ πάμπαν ἕδια.*

Evidently the technical distinction. The same information is given with more detail at 569<sup>a</sup>17, 570<sup>a</sup>3, *G.A.* 741<sup>b</sup>1, 762<sup>b</sup>22, from which it appears that the fish here referred to as *τῷ γένει μὲν τὰ αὐτά, τῷ εἶδει δ' ἔτερα* is one of the *κεστρέις*, while the *πάμπαν ἴδια* are the *έγχελος*. But the distinction between genus and species in *κεστρέις* occurs only here; no use is made of it elsewhere, and the fish is quoted only as *γένος τι κεστρέων οἱ ἔνοι τῶν κεστρέων*. This statement (from l. 28 *τῷ γένει μὲν* to 30 *ἴδια*) is the only one in this chapter that is not paralleled in *G.A.* (apart from certain introductory matter and references). Its removal would not affect the sequence of thought. It could therefore be a later addition.

**G.A. 5.**  $784^b$  τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ γένει τὸ δὲ τῷ εἰδεῖ ταῦτόν ἐστιν, ἢ μὲν πάχνη τῷ γένει (ἀτμὶς γὰρ ἄμφω), ὁ δὲ εὐρώς τῷ εἰδεῖ (σῆψις γὰρ ἄμφω).

The technical usage of *γένος*—*εἶδος* is invoked to justify calling grey hair both *εὐρώς* and *πάχνη*. But this has already been justified above by another logical metaphor: 784<sup>b</sup>16 *ώσπερ γὰρ ἀντεστραμένον τῇ πάχνῃ ὁ εὐρώς ἔστιν· ἀν μὲν γὰρ παγῇ ἡ ἀνιοῦσα ἀτμός, πάχνη γίνεται, ἐὰν δὲ σατῆ, εὐρώς.* διὸ δὴ ἐπιπολῆς ἔστιν ἄμφω . . ., i.e. the process can go in opposite directions but still produce the same effect. (Cf. *Phys.* 207<sup>a</sup>23 where *πρόσθετις* is ἀντεστραμμένη to *καθάρεις*, which is explained by 206<sup>b</sup>3 f. *τὸ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθετον τὸ αὐτό ἔστι πως καὶ τὸ κατὰ διαιρέσιν κτλ.*, i.e. an equivalent result is obtained either by indefinite division or by indefinite addition.) The use of this device is satisfactory and pointed here. But the further explanation in terms of genus and species imports a quite different metaphor, which has no biological significance here and, although it is correctly used, is otiose. It is the only appearance of the technical usage of *γένος*—*εἶδος* in *G.A.*<sup>1</sup> Its removal would not disturb the sequence. It may well be a later addition.

Long. Vit. 465<sup>22</sup> εστι δ' ἔχοντα

3 τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην ὅλα τε πρὸς ὅλα γένη, καὶ τῶν ὑφ' 4 ἐν εἴδος ἔτερα πρὸς ἔτερα. λέγω δὲ κατὰ γένος μὲν δια- 5 φέρειν οἷον ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἄππον (μακροβιώτερον γὰρ τὸ 6 τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ἡ τὸ τῶν ἄππων), κατ' εἴδος δὲ ἄν- 7 θρωπον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώποι οἱ μὲν μα- 8 κρόβιοι οἱ δὲ βραχύβιοι ἔτεροι καθ' ἔτερους τόπους διεστῶ- 9 τε· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς τῶν ἔθνων μακροβιώτερα, 10 τὰ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς βραχυβιώτερα. καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν 11 δὲ τόπον οἰκούντων διαφέρουσιν ὁμοίως τινὲς ταύτην πρὸς 12 ἄλληλους τὴν διαφοράν.

Ross, ad loc., discusses the difficulty, and concludes that *γένος* and *εἶδος* are used without distinction in 2–4, but in the technical sense in 4–6. The latter is then unique in treating *ἀνθρώπος* as a genus whose species are the *ἔθνη*<sup>2</sup> (for *Rhet.* 1427<sup>b</sup><sup>34</sup> *εἶδος ἀνθρώπων* is non-technical, 'sorts of men').

<sup>1</sup> Interchangeable at 725<sup>b</sup>27 ἐν τῷ γένει τῷ αὐτῷ τοῖς ὁμοειδέσι, 746<sup>b</sup>30 τοῖς ὁμογενέσιοις . . . ἀδιαφόροις τῷ εἶδει; 746<sup>b</sup>3 ἴερακες διαφέροντες εἶδει, cf. *H.A.* 620<sup>a</sup>22 γένη ἴερακών, 564<sup>a</sup>5 γένος τι; interchangeable at 747<sup>b</sup>30–748<sup>b</sup>15.

564<sup>a</sup>5 γένος τι; interchangeable at 747<sup>b</sup>30–  
748<sup>a</sup>15.

<sup>2</sup> Bonitz, *Index* 218<sup>a</sup>41 'non videtur concinere'.

Theiler<sup>1</sup> quotes this interpretation together with *P.A.* 645<sup>b23</sup> f. to support his view of *de An.* 402<sup>b2</sup> *εἰ μὴ ὁμοειδής (ἢ φυχή), πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσα ἡ γένει;* where he regards the specific (*εἴδει*) differences as being those between races of men. But the immediately following lines 402<sup>b3-8</sup> show that Aristotle is criticizing those who deal only with the human soul, and is asking whether the soul is the same for all *ζῷα* (e.g. as distinct from *φυτά*) or whether it differs as between *ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, κύων*. The *γένος* is *ζῷον*, the *εἴδη* are *ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, κτλ.* Nor does *P.A.* 645<sup>b23</sup> f. support his view, for it distinguishes *Bird* as a *γένος* from *Man* as an *εἶδος ὁ κατὰ τὸν καβόλου λόγον μηδεμίαν ἔχει διαφοράν*. It seems therefore that *de An.* 402<sup>b2</sup> does not agree with the above interpretation of *Long. Vit.* 465<sup>a4-6</sup>.

It may also be doubted whether the reference to *ἔθνη* at 465<sup>a9</sup> is sufficient to give them the status of species upon which this whole passage would depend. Elsewhere Aristotle uses *τὰ ἔθνη* mostly to denote foreigners and especially those foreigners who live in primitive conditions and not in a *πόλις* (cf. *G.A.* 775<sup>a33</sup>; *Pol.* 1252<sup>b20</sup>, 1261<sup>a28</sup>, 1276<sup>a29</sup>, 1324<sup>b10</sup>; *Meteor.* 350<sup>a34</sup>, 351<sup>b11</sup>; compare 'tribesmen' in popular English). The nearest parallel to the present passage is probably *Pol.* 1327<sup>b23</sup> f.: *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη . . . τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ασίαν . . . τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος . . . τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη*; but this cannot mean 'species', for if it did it would have to imply generic-specific groupings of the Greek *γένος* with its member-species and the barbarians with theirs. The context, however, shows that no technical sense is intended: 1329<sup>a20</sup> *τὸ βάναυσον . . . οὐδὲ ἄλλο γένος, . . . ,* <sup>a27</sup> *τὸ τῶν ἵερέων γένος . . . ,* <sup>a41</sup> *διηρήσθαι κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν, τὸ τε μάχιμον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.*<sup>2</sup> Moreover, 465<sup>a10-12</sup> adds (as a further example of *ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον διαφέρειν*): *καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον οἰκούντων . . . ,* and these presumably belong to one *ἔθνος*.

Lines 7-12 are therefore quoting examples of individuals, not of species. Hence if *κατὰ γένος* and *κατ’ εἶδος* bear their usual meaning 'in respect of *γένος, εἶδος*' (as seen at *H.A.* 486<sup>a24</sup>, *P.A.* 645<sup>b22-25</sup>),<sup>3</sup> then 465<sup>a4-7</sup> from *λέγω δὲ κατὰ γένος τὸ ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον* is wrong on two counts: (1) it does not fit the examples that follow; (2) it conflicts with Aristotle's theory of *ἄνθρωπος*. Once again, these are lines that could be removed without affecting the argument, which would connect smoothly from l. 4 *πρὸς ἔτερα* to l. 7 *εἰσὶ γὰρ . . . ,* and would be making the point that is developed at 466<sup>b16</sup> f. Lines 4-7 may therefore be an addition by somebody who misunderstood the usage.

The technical distinction between genus and species appears obligatory, therefore, in only seven of the above passages, while in two more it would seem the natural meaning were it not that this involves difficulties. These passages are: *H.A.* 486<sup>a16-b21</sup>, 488<sup>b30-32</sup>, (? 490<sup>b7-491<sup>a4</sup></sup>), 491<sup>a18-19</sup>, 497<sup>b9-12</sup>, (? 505<sup>b26-32</sup>), 539<sup>a28-30</sup>, *G.A.* 784<sup>b21-23</sup>, *Long. Vit.* 465<sup>a4-7</sup>. The last two appear to be inferior interpolations, and are in any case insignificant. *H.A.* 539<sup>a28-30</sup> is also suspicious, and the distinction it suggests is never referred to again. These three passages may be disregarded, but the others require explanation. They are really concerned with two points: the levels of comparison, and the definition of *μέγιστα γένη*. They share certain features, in which they

<sup>1</sup> *Arist. ü. d. Seele* (Grumach series), (Berlin, 1959), p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> The pygmies are a *γένος* at *H.A.* 597<sup>a8</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> But see above on 488<sup>b30</sup> and 491<sup>a18</sup>:

such misstatements might cause an unwary reader to take *κατ’ εἶδος* as 'within a species'.

disagree with the rest of the biological works but agree with *P.A.* 1 and to some extent with the logical works:

1. They draw an absolute technical distinction between *γένος* and *εἶδος* which is neither absolutely nor relatively used elsewhere in the biology.

2. They distinguish accordingly two levels of comparison (*ἀναλογία* between *γένη*, *ὑπεροχή* between *εἶδη*) which, though much used in practice, are not so distinguished.

3. They apply the genus-species distinction only to the *μέγιστα γένη*. (An exception to this would be 539<sup>a</sup>28 if genuine.) This is a simplification which does not correspond to Aristotle's practice either in biology or in logic; elsewhere it is found only in *P.A.* 1 and in a few logical passages. When the *H.A.* passages discuss the possibility of intermediate groups, the verbal distinction between *γένος* and *εἶδος* becomes blurred (490<sup>b</sup>16, 505<sup>b</sup>31). They state the standards of comparison wrongly (488<sup>b</sup>30, 491<sup>a</sup>18), and confuse the technical and non-technical uses (497<sup>b</sup>9). So the degree of classification is more elementary, and the terminology less precise, than in the logical works.

4. The position of *ἄνθρωπος*. Throughout the logical works Man is a stock example of species, whose genus is *ζῷον*; often he is accompanied by *ἴππος* or *κύων*, as though they were all species on a level together.<sup>1</sup> But only here in the biological works is this the case, namely at 486<sup>a</sup>17-19, 490<sup>b</sup>18, 33, and by possible emendation at 505<sup>b</sup>31.<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere he is always a *γένος*;<sup>3</sup> nor is he treated as one with *ἴππος* and *κύων*, but they are two among many members of the *γένος τετραπόδων ζωοτόκων* while Man is a type on his own. This is an enhancing of his status; for in the logic and metaphysics, where there is a tension between the superior substantiality of the concrete individual and the superior knowability of the abstract, and where we are often reminded that genus is *ἀπλᾶς γνωριμώτερον*, Man is but one (even if a special one) of the species of the genus *ζῷον*. In the simpler outlook of the biology, where the actualized form is more important than general groups, Man's higher position is perhaps characteristic of Aristotle's more developed view of *ψυχή* and of nature's teleology.

The effect of these passages is to provide a bridge between the biology and the logic. Yet their treatment of genus and species is less elaborate than the hierarchy envisaged in the logic, and may therefore be more primitive, while on the other hand such biology as there is in the logic (e.g. the position of Man) looks more primitive than the view in the biological works. If that were all, the explanation might be simply that Aristotle took his logic farther in the logical works, and his biology farther in the biological works, without any too careful accommodation of the two. But this explanation, which may yet be right, does not answer the difficulty that these quasi-logical passages in the biology are at variance with the rest of the biological works: their genus-species doctrine with its theory of comparisons is never carried out. What then is their provenance? And what happened to the theory of classification?

To attempt an answer in terms of Aristotle's development would require an assessment of many more factors than this. But any answer will have to take

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Top.* 103<sup>a</sup>14, 108<sup>a</sup>15, 133<sup>b</sup>2, *An. Pr.* 26<sup>a</sup>8, 28<sup>a</sup>32, *Met.* 1016<sup>a</sup>27, 1038<sup>b</sup>18, 1058<sup>a</sup>4, <sup>2</sup> Cf. *H.A.* 584<sup>b</sup>29, *P.A.* 655<sup>b</sup>15, 656<sup>a</sup>7, 16, <sup>3</sup> *al.*; *P.A.* 1. 639<sup>a</sup>25.

<sup>2</sup> At *G.A.* 730<sup>b</sup>35 *εἶδος* means 'kind' in general, not species as opposed to genus: A.

account of Theophrastus, whose practical use of *γένος* and *εἶδος* seems no more technical than Aristotle's.<sup>1</sup> This suggests that Aristotle's *Peripatos* got no farther in developing genus-species classification in biology than is to be seen in these passages. If that is so, it would seem that, contrary to what is often said, Aristotle must have developed the technical distinction from logic and not from biology.<sup>2</sup> He must have intended to apply it to biology, for it is incredible that he should have abandoned systematics in the very field where it has proved most fruitful, and proved so for the very reasons that he himself predicted in *An. Post. B* 13-14. In that case his biological work is incomplete. This is indeed self-evident: what is missing is a straight descriptive zoology, together with the classification system that a descriptive zoology needs if only for orderliness. The *H.A.* does not primarily describe animals but the likenesses and differences between them; as such, it must be a preliminary study. If one asks to what it is the preliminary, a likely answer will be that an analysis of differentiae is necessary to any descriptive zoology, but it is necessary above all to systematics.

The passages that use the genus-species distinction all occur in introductory sections of *H.A.*. The general introduction extends from the beginning to 491<sup>a</sup>26 and thus includes the first three (? four) passages. 497<sup>b</sup>9 comes in the introduction to the external parts of animals, while 505<sup>b</sup>26 is in the introduction to the internal parts of animals (and 539<sup>a</sup>28, if it has to be considered at all, comes in the chapter introducing the whole section on *γένετος*, books 5-7). Introductions are naturally written last, and it may be that in preparing the treatise for school use Aristotle—or an editor—wished to give it its proper systematic basis, connecting it with the doctrines of logic. He may have written these passages then, but perhaps more probably he incorporated older notes: this might account for their somewhat elementary and doctrinaire character. However that may be, they seem to represent an intention that was never fulfilled.

Queen Mary College, London

D. M. BALME

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Schneider ad Theophr. *H.P.* 6. 1. 2. *Logique et méthode chez A.*, p. 72, *A. philosophe de la vie*, p. 59, note 3.

<sup>2</sup> So I venture to differ from le Blond,

## THE INDEFINITE DYAD AND INTELLIGIBLE MATTER IN PLOTINUS

THE role and precise significance of Intelligible Matter in the philosophy of Plotinus has been neglected or dismissed with many questions unanswered. In view of the fact that, unless this role can be properly understood, the whole doctrine of the procession of the Second Hypostasis must remain mysterious, this paper is intended to shed light on two important aspects of that Hypostasis: the nature of Intelligible Matter itself and the relation of that Matter to the Forms. In order to show how puzzling these questions have appeared in the past, I may quote from Professor Armstrong's *The Architecture of the Intelligible World in the Philosophy of Plotinus*. Armstrong (pp. 66-68) finds many difficulties in the Plotinian doctrine of Intelligible Matter and remarks as follows:

'This account [in *Enn. 2. 4. 4*] which makes of the intelligible world simply a duplicate of the Aristotelian sense-world, with the differences as regards permanence expounded in Chs. 3 and 5, is difficult to reconcile with Plotinus's ordinary account of the world of *Noûs*. *Noûs* here does not seem to function as Mind. . . . The principle of unity in the intelligible world is simply its matter. This is not only difficult to fit in with Plotinus's general thought . . . .'

'This doctrine [that the Ideas are produced because when *Noûs* contemplates the One, it sees it as a multiplicity], however, . . . will not enable us to reconcile with Plotinus's normal thought the representation of the Ideas as principles of division and multiplicity in *Noûs* and "matter" as a principle of unity.'

Throughout these pages Armstrong maintains that the difficulties that for him arise in *Enn. 2. 4. 4* are the result of a taking-over by Plotinus of various Aristotelian ways of thinking which he is unable properly to assimilate to his own thought. This paper is intended to show that, on these questions at any rate, Plotinus is able to make use of his Aristotelian material in a way that harmonizes most satisfactorily with the remainder of his philosophy.

To understand Plotinus' thought on Intelligible Matter, it is necessary to make a few brief remarks on the process of generation of the whole hypostasis of *Noûs*. We may take it for granted that the One, in its super-abundance and from its self-contemplation, displays the chief characteristic of perfection as seen by Plotinus, namely creativity. It is our business here to consider the nature of the effluence from the One when it first appears, before it has returned in contemplation upon its source and become informed. We remember, of course, that, although it is necessary to use temporal terms in describing this sequence of events, those events are in fact only prior and posterior in a metaphysical sense, since the Intelligible World is outside the command of Time.

The characteristic—if such it may be called—of this first effluence from the One is Otherness (*étrepor̄n̄s*). In *Enn. 2. 4. 5*, Plotinus speaks of this 'otherness' and 'motion' away from the First (the One) as Unlimited (*áópiot̄s*). The

expression 'otherness' is common throughout the *Enneads*<sup>1</sup> and its aspect of unlimitedness must be pressed so that it may be seen to mean 'neither simple nor multiform'. It is most important at this stage not to regard this Unlimited Dyad as itself multiplicity in the way that Speusippus appears to have done when he replaced the Platonic phrase *άδριστος δύάς* by his own term *πλήθος*.

Sir David Ross has rather misleadingly implied<sup>2</sup> by his remark that 'the "great and small" is simply another name for what one of his [i.e. Plato's] followers (probably Speusippus) called, perhaps more happily, *πλήθος*, bare plurality', that the difference between the views of Plato and Speusippus on this point is only a difference of words. This impression is most misleading when allowed to bear upon Plotinus. Plotinus does not speak of the Dyad or Intelligible Matter as *πλήθος*. In this, as we shall see, he follows the doctrine of Plato and rejects that of Speusippus, which is very probably distinct.

In *Metaphysics* 1091<sup>b</sup>30 ff., we read that the material principle must, according to Aristotle, be bad, whether it be called *πλήθος* or *τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν*. The *εἴτε . . . εἴτε* construction here leaves no doubt that 'plurality' is the name given by one group of thinkers to what others call 'the unequal' and 'the great and small'. Similarly in 1092<sup>b</sup>1 we are told that one thinker regards the One as the opposite of 'plurality' while another, neglecting the term 'plurality', uses the phrase 'the unequal'. Finally in 1085<sup>b</sup>5 ff. it is said that the generation of numbers is as difficult for those who speak of the One and the Dyad as for those who speak of the One and Plurality. Admittedly Aristotle here continues by saying that the two views have little to choose between them since, whereas one party (Speusippus and his supporters) speak of Plurality in general, the other (Plato and Xenocrates) select 'the first plurality, that is the number two'. Here, however, Aristotle is led into misjudging the difference between the parties by his belief that the Indefinite Dyad is two things, or, as he often puts it, the Great and the Small. Had he realized that this was an error, he would have recognized the greater importance of the distinction of terms employed by Plato and Speusippus. For Plato the Great and Small was neither two things, nor indefinite plurality, but the potentiality of plurality. To call it *πλήθος* would thus be completely erroneous. Speusippus' position differed from that of Plato on essentials. He may well have thought fit to use the word *πλήθος* for his own purposes, but this is no help towards an understanding of what role Plato may have intended his Indefinite Dyad to play.

Normally, when speaking of the function of the Great and Small in the latest Platonic theory, Aristotle refers to it as *δυοποιόν*.<sup>3</sup> This is apparently in accordance with his own mistaken view of the Platonic generation of Ideal Numbers. In 1083<sup>a</sup>13, however, instead of *δυοποιόν*, we find the form *ποσοποιόν*. This reading, given by Syrianus and E<sup>2</sup>, has been rightly preferred by Bonitz and Ross to *ποσὸν ποιόν* and is most helpful. It shows that the function of the Dyad was not to be plurality but to *make* plurality. The difference between the views of Plato and Speusippus thus becomes clearer. It seems extremely likely that the word *ποσοποιόν* was used by Plato and his adherents, but that Aristotle, misunderstanding the whole theory, thought the function of the Dyad was 'doubling' and employed *δυοποιόν* instead, under the mistaken impression that he was giving a less woolly account.

Taking care then to avoid regarding the Dyad in Plato as plurality, and

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *ENN.* 6. 9. 8.

(Oxford, 1953), p. 184.

<sup>2</sup> W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>3</sup> e.g. 1082<sup>a</sup>15, 1083<sup>b</sup>36.

recalling that Platonic usage should be a guide to the understanding of Plotinus, we can now return to what we have described as an 'effluence' from the One in the *Enneads*.

The most interesting account of the indefinite nature of this effluence is in *Enn. 2. 4. 3*—and this must be given a detailed examination. Plotinus begins by telling us that even the undefined must not be altogether disregarded, even if its very nature implies that it is shapeless (*ἀμορφόν*), provided that it 'offers itself' (*παρέχειν*) to what is metaphysically prior to itself. By way of explaining what he means by 'offers itself', he cites the relation between Soul and *Noûs*. The conclusion we are to draw is that the Indefinite Dyad—as we may describe the effluence—returns to the One in a similar fashion and is informed by it. In the chapter under discussion the Dyad is referred to as Intelligible Matter and further information is given about it. We learn both that it has a certain sameness about it—as Plotinus strangely puts it, it has the same 'form' (*εἶδος*)—and that it is in a sense all things at once, so that it cannot change into anything which is not itself. These aspects make it the complete opposite of Plotinian matter in the world of sense.

We are still very far from grasping the nature of this Matter or Dyad at the moment of its generation, but we can now see that its importance lies in its 'offering itself' back to its Source, in its being a kind of potency. Fortunately we are helped to understand it further by the fact that Plotinus on several occasions uses the same metaphor to describe it—the metaphor of sight. Intellecction, he says (5. 4. 2), which is the act of the hypostasis of *Noûs*, is indeterminate like sight (*οὐρανός*)—this last phrase is rendered by MacKenna as 'a vague readiness for any and every vision'<sup>1</sup>—and is determined by its object. Similarly in 5. 3. 11 we are told that the effluence—I use this word designedly, though Plotinus speaks rather confusingly of *νοῦς* that is not *νοῦς*—sets out upon its return to the One not as *Noûs* but 'as sight (*οὐρανός*) which has not yet seen'. And when it has seen the One it becomes an *οὐρανός ἴδοντα* (line 10), the meaning of which will later be explored. For the present we can say that the Dyad in its original state is like the faculty of seeing enclosed in a dark room. Although it is a potency, it is a sight that has had no impression made upon it. It is *ἀτίτωτος*, as though staring into darkness, for all light and impression must come from the One.

The Dyad or Matter then is a potentiality and, as 5. 3. 11 puts it, an *ἔφεσις* or proclivity. This proclivity may, I believe, be compared with what Plotinus elsewhere describes as unconscious contemplation. In the eighth treatise of *Ennead 3* he asserts that all things, even down to the vegetable world, are striving (the word is *ἔφεσθαι* which brings us back to *ἔφεσις*) after contemplation. If such an urge is the symbol of existence even among inferior beings of the world of sense, it would be foolish to deny it to the substrate (*τὸ οὐποκείμενον*) of the Second Hypostasis. The likelihood is that the Dyad or Matter betrays in its *ἔφεσις* towards the One that symbol of existence shared by all things with the smallest claim to reality.

It may be objected that we have here reached a very strange conclusion if we assert that Matter, even Intelligible Matter, in its simple state, is endowed with some sort of contemplative force. And yet this is indeed the only kind of distinguishing feature we can find for it, and distinguishing feature it must have, for, as Plotinus tells us in *Enn. 2. 4. 5*, it has a life that is defined and intellectual

<sup>1</sup> The *Enneads*, trans. MacKenna-Page<sup>2</sup> (London, 1956), p. 401.

(ἀριστερήν καὶ νοεράν). Thus we may say that this urge to contemplate, this seeing that awaits a sight, is the fundamental aspect of the Dyad—an active conception which underlies the whole Plotinian view of the Second Hypostasis. With this grasp of the nature of the earliest 'moment' in the extra-temporal act of the production of the Second Hypostasis, we should not be surprised that the urge for the supreme is the metaphysically prior aspect of the whole complex of reality which goes under the collective name of *Noûs*. It is in the light of this base that we should regard such passages as *Enn.* 5. 8. 12, where the Second Hypostasis as Mind not only is regarded as prior to the Forms, but is actually said to generate (*γεννᾶν*) them.

Further evidence of an outlook where *Noûs* is prior to *τὰ νοητά* is given by *Enn.* 3. 8. 11. Plotinus begins by again comparing the Second Hypostasis with sight, and explaining that like sight it must have both Potentially and Actuality. Since it has these, he continues, it must be a complex of Form and Matter, as are all kinds of seeing. The next piece of reasoning is the key to the passage. The text reads *ὑλη δὲ ἐν νοητοῖς*. There can be no doubt that this means that the material element of the Second Hypostasis is not in Mind as seer but in the Forms as the objects of vision. There can further be no doubt that this again implies a certain priority of *Noûs* to the *νοητά*. As we have already suggested, the Second Hypostasis regarded as Mind is in a sense the representative at a more advanced stage of Intelligible Matter which itself looks back at the One. Nevertheless, it is a curious though understandable reversal of terms to associate *τὰ νοητά*, which must mean the *Forms*, with the *material* aspect of the hypostasis. MacKenna's translation<sup>1</sup> of the phrase *ὑλη δὲ ἐν νοητοῖς* as 'the Matter in this case being the Intelligibles' is perhaps based on a text inferior to that of Henry and Schwyzer, but nevertheless it brings out this reversal of terminology, albeit in too heightened a form, for Plotinus does not say that Matter is the Intelligibles, but that Matter is *in* the Intelligibles. The importance of the passage is simply that if the Second Hypostasis be studied as a completed whole, the Forms stand in an inferior position to Mind.

The explanation of this superiority of the contemplative aspect of the hypostasis lies not only in the fact that it is concerned more with the highest entity, the One, but also that the Dyad, the metaphysically 'earlier' aspect of the whole hypostasis is, if anything, purely active, and a subject rather than an object of contemplation. In more general terms, if for the purposes of argument we regard the One, *Noûs*, and the Forms as all admitting of analysis 'themselves by themselves', we may say that the contemplation of the One by *Noûs* in the form of Intelligible Matter is the cause of the very existence of the Second Hypostasis, whereas the contemplation of the Forms by *Noûs* is simply a description of the essence of that hypostasis. And for Plotinus the cause of existence is always more important than the essence, except in the case of the One in whom a quasi-existence and essence coincide, since he (or it) is *sui causa*.

When the Dyad, the Intelligible Matter, turns towards the One, it has, we are told (5. 3. 11), some vague presentiment (*φάντασμα*) of the Unity it seeks, but is unable to grasp this unity and succeeds only in making for itself a vision of multiplicity out of what is eminently simple. The Dyad receives the One *πληθυόμενον* (the reading of Henry and Schwyzer); it itself is the cause of this *πλῆθος* (*ἐπλήθυνεν*). It appears that, although the Dyad is not *πλῆθος*, it is the cause of the element of multiplicity in the Second Hypostasis merely by being

<sup>1</sup> MacKenna, op. cit., p. 249.

'other' than the simplicity of the One. Here we should recall our remarks about the role of the Indefinite Dyad in Plato, which we saw as an element bringing an end to the simple and introducing the multiplex. Further, we should emphasize that in the case of Plotinus to call the Dyad 'plurality' is doubly misleading. The objections to the term formulated with reference to Plato are also valid for Plotinus, while in addition the Plotinian Dyad is said to be in a sense every real thing and thus to retain a shadow of the unity of the One which is its source. Even plurality, for the Second Hypostasis, comes from the One. In *Ennead* 6. 7. 15 it is said that the One gives what it does not itself possess: multiplicity. The Dyad, in its attempt to return to Unity, cannot support the Unity it is permitted to see. It can only accept this Unity in the form of multiplicity, thus allowing the *Noûs-vontrá* complex, that is the fully developed Second Hypostasis, to come into existence. The sight that sees no impressions now sees the One, but only through the medium of its own 'otherness', and thus not as pure Unity but as the World of Forms.

It appears then that, in a sense, both the complex of Forms taken as a whole and the One may be described as *τὸν νοητόν*. This becomes clearer if we look again at *Enn.* 3. 8. 11. We recall that in this chapter the operation of the Divine Mind is compared with that of sight. Plotinus points out that, for the act of seeing to take place satisfactorily, there is required an object of sight (*τὸν αἰσθητόν*). One would suppose that, since he has previously been discussing the relationship between the Divine Mind and the Forms, he would here say that for the act of intellection to take place satisfactorily, the Forms are required as objects of Intellection. But instead of speaking of the Forms, he says that it is the Good (i.e. the One) that is needed. This should remind us that the One is the real object of the Divine Mind's Intellection and that the Forms are only a second-best. *Noûs* sees the One as the Forms, but the intelligibility of those Forms is supplied by the One.

This notion of the One as source of intelligibility is the normal Plotinian version of Platonism, and that may be thought to account for it sufficiently. Nevertheless the whole passage from 3. 8. 11 is strongly tinged with Aristotelianism, and it seems no coincidence that Alexander of Aphrodisias had interpreted certain doctrines of the *De Anima* of Aristotle in a manner which would have suited Plotinus very well. In his *De Anima* Alexander offers a very novel and unorthodox interpretation of the *νοῦς ποιητικός*. On pp. 88-89 (Bruns) he expounds his view that the role of the *νοῦς ποιητικός* is to give what is intelligible its intelligibility. In other words he holds that the *νοῦς ποιητικός* exerts its effects not on the seeing mind, but on the objects of intellection. That the doctrine of Alexander is not Aristotelian has long been recognized; the account of it given here is that of Moraux, to whom I may refer for further elucidation.<sup>1</sup> As Moraux explains, the theory is an erroneous expansion of Aristotle's suggestion that the *νοῦς ποιητικός* may be compared with light (*De An.* 3. 430<sup>a</sup>15-17). Nevertheless, put the comparison with light together with Alexander's interpretation that the *νοῦς ποιητικός* is a light which shines on the objects of intelligence and makes them intelligible, and we have a doctrine very much to Plotinus' liking. With his quite obvious delight in seeing as much agreement between Platonism and Aristotelianism as can be made consistent with a fundamentally Platonic approach, he would find Alexander's account of

<sup>1</sup> P. Moraux, 'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exégète de la Noétique d'Aristote', *Bibliothèque de la Fac. de Phil. et Lettres de l'Univ. de Liège* ic (1942), esp. pp. 87-93.

the *νοῦς ποιητικός* fitting in very well with his own interpretation of the role of the Platonic Form of the Good in relation to the other Forms. Even the analogy with light would be shared by both Alexander and Plato. Clearly, in Plotinus' view, Alexander is in error in his belief that the source of intelligibility is a *νοῦς*, but with the replacement of this by the One Plotinus can turn Alexander's interpretation of Aristotle to his own purposes.

To revert to more general questions, it is plain that the return of the Dyad to the One is the cause of the existence of the Second Hypostasis. In 5. 1. 5 it is said that from the Dyad and the One arise the Numbers that are Forms—the word *όψις* again occurs here—and in 5. 4. 2, a quotation from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* corroborates this. What is important at this point is to try to establish the condition of the Dyad when it has been 'informed' by its return to the One, for here lie the solutions to the difficulties before us of seeing how the Aristotelian Intelligible Matter is associated with the Platonic Indefinite Dyad.

The Dyad, as has been observed, can only grasp the One as multiplicity. This multiplicity constitutes the World of Forms, and these Forms can be said to define the previously undefined Dyad. The cause of the Dyad's being defined is the One (2. 4. 5), but what existentially defines it are the Forms. Hence Plotinus' elliptical statement in *Enn.* 5. 1. 5 that the Second Hypostasis is shaped in one way by the One and in another by itself becomes somewhat clearer. Armstrong<sup>1</sup> has observed that this double 'informing' of the Matter of the Intelligible World can be seen by placing the teachings of 2. 4. 4 and 2. 4. 5 side by side, and professes himself baffled by it. Our previous discussion should have shown that this apparent paradox is normal Plotinian doctrine. We must now proceed to show that it is neither contradictory nor muddle-headed.

We have seen how, in the timeless sequence of the procession of the Second Hypostasis, the Forms are in a sense posterior and the products of Intelligible Matter. This means that Matter in the Intelligible World is in some respects in a very different position *vis-à-vis* Form from matter in the world of sense. This, however, is what Plotinus tells us to expect, for in *Enn.* 2. 4. 3 he says that there are ways in which the natures of the two kinds of matter are opposite to each other. Intelligible Matter, we recall, has within itself the presentiment of Unity. Perhaps we may say that, although it is *δόριστον*, it is *one δόριστον*, and that an all-embracing one. As such it must to some extent be a principle of unity in the Intelligible World, where the Forms stand for differences and differentiations. This view of the roles of Intelligible Matter and Form, when found by Armstrong in 2. 4. 4, is held to be hard to reconcile with Plotinus' normal thought about the Second Hypostasis. Since, however, we have found it to be a valid account of Plotinus' doctrine in a selection of tracts excluding 2. 4. 4, we can turn to that disputed essay with more confidence.

We have observed that Forms arise from the One and the Dyad, and 2. 4. 4 begins by taking their existence for granted and asking what conclusions are to be deduced from it. If there are Forms, we read, these Forms must have both an element in common and a particular characteristic which distinguishes them one from another. The distinguishing characteristic is, says Plotinus, the feature of shape (*μορφή*). And if they have shape, he continues, there must be something to receive the shape—plainly this is the common element mentioned above—and this 'something' must be matter or substrate. Thus it has

<sup>1</sup> A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 67.

become clear that, if there is Form in the Intelligible World, there must be Matter too, and the argument has, admittedly, been Aristotelian. The conclusion is backed up by a second argument which suggests that, since the world of sense is an image of the Intelligible World and is based on matter, there must be Matter in the Intelligible World likewise. A third argument holds that an ordered system involves both Form and a place wherein Form may be lodged, while a fourth—most relevant to the present discussion—adds that, since in a sense the Intelligible World is diversified, there must be a basic shapelessness which can be the 'unity' which accepts diversification, and that this 'unity' must be Matter. We may take it as proven, therefore, that a simple analysis of the *status quo* of the Intelligible World, which makes no allusion to the cause of generation of that World or to the Dyad, reveals that, since Forms are 'there', Matter too must be in evidence.

The last of the arguments cited above is particularly instructive, since it states that the divisions in the Intelligible World are an experience (*πάθος*) of Matter. The element that undergoes transformations is Matter—certainly an Aristotelian doctrine and again in direct opposition to Plotinus' account of bare matter in the sensible world, where *ὕλη* is more akin to Aristotelian prime matter than to anything more real.

After all the arguments Plotinus tells us in passing that in a sense Matter is the principle of unity in the Intelligible World. This remark, however, must be seen in its context. Plotinus is not examining at this point the *generation* of the Second Hypostasis, but the constitution and elements of it once it has been generated. Armstrong's remark that 'Noûs here does not seem to function as Mind'<sup>1</sup> is irrelevant, for the role of the hypostasis as Mind is not under discussion. We can thus say that Plotinus thinks of Intelligible Matter in two aspects, and that these aspects must be kept apart. First, it is that effluence from the One which we may call the Dyad, from whose return to its Source is generated the 'fully-fledged' Second Hypostasis; secondly, it is that same Matter now viewed as the base of the World of Forms constructed on semi-Aristotelian lines as a complex of Form and Intelligible Matter. Provided one accepts the theory taught by Plotinus to explain the generation of the Second Hypostasis from the One, these two aspects of Intelligible Matter are thus seen to be not contradictory but complementary.

The feeling of uncomfortableness about the doctrine of 2. 4. 4 is, despite our arguments, liable to centre itself around the idea that in making Matter the principle of unity, Plotinus, led astray by Aristotelian analogies, is being false to his own general thought. We shall therefore add two further arguments: the first will show that in the *Intelligible World* Matter has a specifically Plotinian claim to a certain precedence over Form; the second will discuss the role of *ὕλη νοητή* in the Aristotelian tradition and show how, in the sphere of Intelligibles, Aristotelianism and Plotinism are not as divergent as is frequently supposed.

The first point is soon evident. Intelligible Matter, the first effluence from the One, possesses by its very indeterminacy a kinship with the One which the Forms do not possess. As we read in *Enn.* 2. 4. 3, Matter 'there' is everything at the same time. It has nothing into which it can change, for it already possesses everything. This indeterminacy which can, on its return to its Source, yield any one of the eternal Forms, has of itself something more akin to the One

<sup>1</sup> Armstrong, op. cit., p. 66.

than have these later determinations. The Forms are perfectly what they are; they are perfect Being. Intelligible Matter has a shadow of the superiority of  $\tau\delta\ \epsilon\pi\kappa\epsilon\omega$  in its potential of becoming *all* Real Beings.

Turning now to the Aristotelian account of  $\bar{\nu}\lambda\eta\ \nu\eta\tau\eta$ , we find an unfortunately small number of texts that help our inquiry. The phrase occurs in three passages only: two in *Met. Z* (1035<sup>a</sup>9, 1037<sup>a</sup>4) and the other in *Met. H* (1045<sup>a</sup>34, 36). Alexander identifies it with extension (510. 3, Hayduck), and Ross<sup>1</sup> admits that this explanation would cover the examples from *Met. Z*. The passage in *Met. H*, however, is clearly, as Ross points out, of a different kind. Here intelligible matter is the generic aspect of a definition, as, in the example given, the intelligible matter of the circle is 'plane figure'. Ross rightly concludes that  $\bar{\nu}\lambda\eta\ \nu\eta\tau\eta$  'in its widest conception is the thinkable generic element which is involved both in species and in individuals, and of which they are specifications and individualizations'. Accepting this account as correct, and recalling that the Plotinian Form is more akin to an Aristotelian species than to a sensible individual, we can proceed to the assumption that, if we understand the relation in the philosophy of Aristotle between genus and species, we may well shed some light on the importance of Plotinian Intelligible Matter. Fortunately this relation is not in doubt.

Just as one reason why the right angle is prior to the acute is that it is involved in the definition of the acute, while the latter is not involved in *its* definition (*Met. 1084<sup>b</sup>7*), so a genus, whose definition does not involve a discussion of its own species, is prior to those species, since *their* definition must involve a reference to their genus. The priority of genus to species is stated directly in the *Categories* (13. 15<sup>a</sup>4), where the genus 'animal' is regarded as intelligible even if there is no species 'aquatic animal', while conversely the intelligibility of this latter species depends on the genus 'animal'. Similarly in the *Topics* species is said to partake of genus while genus does not partake of species.<sup>2</sup> The implication is that genus is prior.

It might seem at first sight as though this doctrine were contrary to the general trend of Aristotelian thought. As it is, it introduces a rather curious paradox, for, if genus is prior because it is prior in definition, one might suppose that it is prior not only to species but to individuals as well. Although Aristotle is certain that the individual does not admit of definition (*Met. 1036<sup>a</sup>5*), it can only be discussed philosophically in terms of its species, and more widely of its genus. Hence one might suppose a superiority of both genus and species to the individual. This is not, of course, the way in which Aristotle's mind works. Genus and species are one thing, individuals another. Philosophical rules about priority by definition do not apply to individuals, which are in a realm where definitions do not exist. Hence Aristotle draws a sharp distinction between individuals and what Plotinus would regard as Forms. Above this line, that is in the realm of universals, priority of definition means priority *per se*. Genus being thus prior to species, and intelligible matter being the generic element present in a species, there is surely a sense at least in which intelligible matter is prior to the species of which it is the base.

For Plotinus, therefore, looking at the Aristotelian doctrine as expounded above, and regarding many of what Aristotle would call species as Forms, the natural conclusion would be to follow Aristotle in allowing a certain priority

<sup>1</sup> W. D. Ross, *A Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1953), p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> *Topics* 4. 1. 121<sup>a</sup>12. Cf. *Topics* 4. 5. 126<sup>a</sup>18.

to the *ὑλη νοητή*. What for Aristotle is the relation between *ὑλη νοητή* (representing genus) and species thus becomes for Plotinus the relation between *ὑλη νοητή* (representing the first effluence from the One and now seen as the base of Form) and Form itself.

There remains one minor difficulty. It has already been observed that Alexander of Aphrodisias regarded the Aristotelian *ὑλη νοητή* not as the generic element in species, but as extension (*διάστασις*). As Ross reminds us in the passage already cited,<sup>1</sup> this account of Alexander's is careless and inadequate in that it neglects the clear implications of *Met. H* 1045<sup>a</sup>34 ff. It would not take much acumen for a careful reader of Aristotle to realize that Alexander, in the two passages where he alludes to intelligible matter (510. 3; 514. 27 Hayduck), has not understood the doctrine fully. The problem is, how carefully did Plotinus read Aristotle?

Fortunately light has been shed on this question in a recent article by Fr. Henry.<sup>2</sup> Henry has shown how certain passages make it clear that Plotinus must have studied Aristotle and Alexander's comments simultaneously. He further shows that Plotinus sometimes rejects Alexander's manner of treating a problem and returns to the Aristotelian original. The conclusion of all this is that there is no reason to assume that Plotinus must have accepted Alexander's erroneous interpretation of *ὑλη νοητή*, even if other Aristotelians knew no better. Plotinus would certainly have been only too pleased to have found in Aristotle an account of the relation of *ὑλη νοητή* and species which so well tallied with his own view of the relation of the Dyad and the Forms. We have noticed earlier how Alexander's doctrine of the *νοῦς ποιητικός* probably pleased Plotinus more than the Aristotelian original. With both Aristotle and Alexander at his disposal, Plotinus could select what best suited his own thought.

It may be said in conclusion that *Ennead 2. 4. 4* offers no serious difficulties to an understanding of Plotinus' view of the Indefinite Dyad or Intelligible Matter. On this topic the thought of Plotinus is consistent. It is skilfully woven together from sources both Platonic and Aristotelian in such a way as to be, if not exactly straightforward, at least defensible within the framework of ancient metaphysical theory.

University College, Toronto

JOHN M. RIST

<sup>1</sup> Ross, *Commentary*, p. 199.

<sup>2</sup> P. Henry, 'Une Comparaison chez Aris-

tote, Alexandre et Plotin', *Entretiens Hardt* v (Vandoeuvres-Génève 1960), 429-49.

## EMENDATIONS TO JOSEPHUS FLAVIUS' *CONTRA APIONEM*

JOSEPHUS' pamphlet commonly known under the title *Contra Apionem* makes rather interesting reading, not only because it represents a more mature stage in the author's stylistic evolution, which shows so many points worth considering, but also and chiefly because it gives us a direct insight into a vehement polemic<sup>1</sup> in which the writer played a leading role.

The work has come down to us in several manuscripts, all of which are descended from the *testis unicus* Laur. plut. lxix. 22 (saec. xi): this is, unfortunately, very corrupt. The indirect tradition of the text is of great importance; in particular, the *versio Cassiodorea* of Josephus' writings includes, of course, a translation of our pamphlet which has preserved to us the Latin rendering of a considerable portion of the Greek text, now lost in the original because of the fact that several leaves are missing in the archetypus (2. 52-113). The Latin version of the *Contra Apionem*, ascribed to Rufinus, 'est l'œuvre d'une ou plusieurs personnes qui savaient mal le latin et très mal le grec' (Reinach, in his Budé edition, Paris, 1930, p. x): it could hardly, in fact, be called a translation, but nevertheless it is particularly useful, because the rendering is often a verbatim one and, since the Greek text taken as a basis by Cassiodorus' friends in their work represents a stage in the manuscript tradition which is anterior to that preserved in the Laurentianus, we may not seldom infer from the Latin words, when the Greek is corrupt, what Josephus must have written, at least with considerable probability.

Thanks to the monumental labours undertaken by Niese<sup>2</sup> and Boysen<sup>3</sup> our information regarding the *recensio* of the work and of the Latin translation mentioned above is now complete: on the other hand, since the Laurentianus is, as I have said, very corrupt, there is still room for attempts at restoring the text by *divinatio*. Since the appearance of Niese's edition, the *Contra Apionem* has been published by Naber (Teubner, 1896), Thackeray (Loeb, 1926), and Th. Reinach (Budé series, 1930): the importance of these editions lies in the fact that they contain numerous conjectures made by scholars at different times or by the editors themselves. The excellent commentary on the pamphlet by A. von Gutschmid (*Kleine Schriften*, hrsgg. von F. Ruehl, Leipzig, vol. iv [1893], pp. 336 ff.) is unfortunately not complete: he dealt with the first 185 paragraphs of Book 1. In the following pages I have listed a few observations that came to my mind whilst reading Josephus' opuscule: it goes without saying that not all the corrupt or suspected passages are discussed here: in spite of the spadework done by such authorities as Bekker, Dindorf, von Gutschmid, Niese, Herwerden (not to mention any others) there still remains much to investigate, interpret, and restore by conjecture.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. R.E., s.v. 'Antisemitismus' (Suppl. v. 33 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> *Flavii Josephi opera*, ed. B. Niese, vol. v, *De Judaeorum Vetustate sive Contra Apionem libri 2*, Berlin, Weidmann, 1889.

<sup>3</sup> *Flavii Josephi opera, ex versione latina antiqua*, ed. C. Boysen, Pars 6, *De Judaeorum*

*Vetustate sive Contra Apionem libri 2, C.S.E.L.* xxxvii. 6 (Vienna, 1898).

<sup>4</sup> It must be noted that, on the other hand, more than one passage has been wrongly suspected. For instance at 1. 224 (*τούτων ὀνειριότης*) Spanheim proposed *τῶν ἱερῶν* and Reinach puts a *crux* before *τούτων*,

1. 139. The Babylonian emperor, *Ναβοκοδόρος*, after leading a successful campaign against the Egyptians, returned to Babylon, whose temples he adorned magnificently; then he fortified the town against any attempt at an invasion on the part of the enemy:

αὐτὸς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου λαφύρων τό τε Βῆλου ἱερὸν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κοσμήσας φιλοτίμως, τὴν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πόλιν καὶ ἔτεραν ἔξωθεν τροσχαρισάμενος καὶ ἀναγκάσας πρὸς τὸ μηκέτι δύνασθαι τοὺς πολιορκοῦντας τὸν ποταμὸν ἀναστρέφοντα ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν τακτασκενάζειν τὸν περιβάλετο τρεῖς μὲν τῆς ἔνδον πόλεως περιβόλους, τρεῖς δὲ τῆς ἔξω, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐξ ὅπτης πλίνθους καὶ ἀσφάλτου, τοὺς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πλίνθου.

It is a quotation from Berosus, which is obviously corrupt: many attempts have been made to restore the passage—they will be mentioned in the course of our discussion—but none of them seems convincing. Not only modern scholars, however, but also ancient διορθωταὶ tried to make sense of these lines, as we can see from *Antiq.* 10. 223, where the same passage is quoted and the text runs as follows (cf. Müller, *F.H.G.* ii. 506-7; I am giving Niese's text): *τὴν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πόλιν καὶ ἔτερα καταχαρισάμενος καὶ ἀναγκάσας . . . τὸν ποταμὸν ἀναστρέψαντας . . . περιβάλετο τρεῖς μὲν κτλ.*


The *Antiquitates* were more widely read than the *Contra Apionem*, and therefore we can easily catch the διασκενασταὶ in the act: we find what seems at first an evident restoration, *περιεβάλετο*, some variants that do not help very much (ἀναστρέψαντας, καταχαρισάμενος—other manuscripts read καταχρησάμενος, καταχειρισάμενος, προσκαταχρησάμενος) and a clear case of παραδιόρθωσις, ἔτερα, that must be discarded as such. The ancient editor, in fact, was certainly puzzled by the ἔτερα πόλις ἔξωθεν and—rather drastically—got rid of it; to the same tendency could be ascribed the athetesis of κατασκενάζειν, which infinitive appears to have been *sic et simpliciter* eliminated in some manuscripts, and the modification of ἀναγκάσας into ἀνακανίσας, which we find in some *deteriores*. As for modern critics, Niese, whose edition is extremely conservative, does not make any alterations in the text, and only mentions the conjectures propounded by other scholars in his apparatus; Reinach goes to the other extreme, following Dindorf and Naber; he would restore *τὴν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πόλιν* *⟨ἀνακανίσας⟩ καὶ ἔτεραν ἔξωθεν τροσχαρισάμενος* [καὶ ἀναγκάσας] πρὸς τὸ κτλ.

First of all, let us consider a few archaeological data. Various points have been clarified by von Gutschmid, op. cit., pp. 506 ff. The ὑπάρχουσα ἐξ ἀρχῆς πόλις is the 'Altstadt', contained within the old town-limits (i.e. pre-Nebuchadnezzar

wondering if one should read *τῶν ἔθων* or *θρησκειῶν*. Upon closer examination the pronoun that seemed impossible to maintain reveals itself to be a perfectly legitimate form: the neuter plural *τῶντα* means here 'things in everyday life' (cf. Kühner-Gerth i. 645. 5). I had conjectured *τῶν αὐτῶν* (from *ταῦτων*) before realizing this. At 2. 283 (*τῶν ὄντων διάδοσιν*) the word *διάδοσις* seems 'suspectum' to Reinach, who thinks that the whole expression is in contrast with 'la mise en commun des biens' of 2. 291 (*τὴν τῶν ὄντων κοινωνίαν*); but it is a fact (which seems to have escaped the attention of all critics) that *κοινωνία* means, in the latter passage, *charitable disposition*

(cf. L.S.J., s.v., III). The reverse of the medal is represented by the right emendations that have been undeservedly forgotten: for instance, nobody seems to remember Boysen's excellent restoration at 2. 2 καὶ τοῖς τῆς . . . ἀντιρρήσεως . . . τετολμημένοις which is confirmed by Josephus himself, *Antiq.* 2. 3. 1 (τὰ τολμηθέντα) and by Herodian 2. 9. 9 (ἐπὶ τοῖς . . . καὶ αὐτοῖς τετολμημένοις), 2. 14. 2 (τὰ τολμώμενα), 6. 3. 1 (τὰ . . . ὑπὸ τοῦ βαρβάρου τολμώμενα), 7. 5. 1 (τὰ τολμηθέντα). Exhaustive information as to the *usus auctoris* can be found in W. Schmidt, 'De Fl. Josephi elocutione', *Neue Jahrb., Suppl.* xx (1894), 245 ff., an exemplary study.

walls<sup>1</sup> on three sides, and river bank on the fourth), the 'innere Stadt', η ἔδον πόλις, situated on one bank of the river ('auf der Westseite' of the Euphrates; Baumstark, *R.E.*, s.v. *Babylon*, 2693, locates it 'links des Euphrat'); the ἐτέρα ἔξωθεν (πόλις) is the 'Neustadt', the 'äußere Stadt', founded by the king outside the old town-limits, i.e. located on the opposite bank of the river. Both the 'Altstadt' and the 'Neustadt' constitute Nebuchadnezzar's 'Gesamtstadt', which the king surrounded with the treble *περίβολος* ('Umfassungsmauern'; cf. Baumstark, op. cit. 2696: 'die Gesamtstadt Nebukadnezzars war nach den Inschriften von drei Mauerbauten umschlossen'; however, he makes things rather confused by disregarding ἔξωθεν (2692) and identifying the ἐτέρα πόλις with the ἔδον πόλις (2695)). A schematic plan of Nebuchadnezzar's 'Gesamtstadt' as resulting from Berosus' description will help the reader:



(1 = Euphrates; 2 = 'Altstadt'; 3 = 'Neustadt'; 4 = τρεῖς περίβολοι).

Against what kind of invasion was the 'Gesamtstadt' thus walled? Dindorf (cf. von Gutschmid, p. 508) thought of the 'Art der Einnahme Babylons durch Kyros', as described in *Hdt.* 1. 191, *Xenoph.* *Cyr.* 7. 5, and *Polyaen.* 7. 6. 5-8;<sup>2</sup> indeed Ernesti must have made the same assumption as Dindorf, because he altered ἀναστρέφοντας to ἀποστρέφοντας: this emendation is accepted by Reinach. However, von Gutschmid raises an irrefutable objection to this hypothesis (op. cit., p. 508): 'gegen ein Seichtmachen des Bettes konnten alle . . . Mauerbauten Nichts helfen.' Von Gutschmid himself, nevertheless, cannot offer a satisfactory solution to the problem: he maintains that Nebuchadnezzar must have erected the treble *περίβολος* to somehow prevent the enemy from occupying Babylon by making the river turn back ('durch Umkehrenmachen') and flood the town. But, even assuming that the course of the river could be effectively blocked to the south of the capital ('durch Aufstauung', writes von Gutschmid, an operation difficult to visualize), how could the *περίβολοι* prevent the inundation? The Euphrates flowed right through the walls. As for the text, von Gutschmid defends κατασκευάζειν, which he refers to τὸν ποταμόν ('den Strom anstiften, subornare', by giving it 'eine solche Richtung, daß er die Stadt überschwemmte'; hence ἐπί with the accusative, = 'durch Ablenken gegen die Stadt'). The idea of the river 'suborned' is not as surprising as may be thought at first: in *Diod. Bibl.* 2. 26-27 (a passage which escaped von Gutschmid) we find an oracle warning

<sup>1</sup> Nebuchadnezzar's three *περίβολοι* around the 'Altstadt' seem to have been not new constructions, but merely restorations of the already existing old walls. Cf. von Gutschmid, p. 511.

<sup>2</sup> In *Polyaen.* 7. 6. 5 we read ἀποστρέφεις τὸν ποταμόν; *Hdt.* 1. 191. 4 mentions the sinking of the water after the course was diverted: ὑπονοστήσαντος τοῦ ποταμοῦ.

Sardanapallus against the Euphrates turning into 'the city's (i.e. Nineveh's) enemy', which in fact the river became, by overflowing and knocking down part of the town walls, thus opening a breach for the invaders. Berosus is alluding to some definite event that had already happened, as the *μηκέτι* indicates (cf. von Gutschmid, p. 509): he might also have alluded, with his 'subornation', to a similar piece of oracular imagery. Von Gutschmid's interpretation is, however, untenable because the idea of the *περίβολοι* being erected by Nebuchadnezzar as a defence against the 'Umkehrenmachen' and flooding is, as has just been observed, excluded by the position of the town as shown by the context itself: consequently, *ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν* cannot be made to depend upon *κατασκευάζειν*. What type of invasion did Nebuchadnezzar want to prevent with his *περίβολοι*? It is possible to surmount every difficulty by taking into account what we know about Babylon's early history, and we must accordingly conclude that Berosus' allusion—directed, as we have just noted, to some event which occurred in earlier times (cf. also Baumstark, op. cit. 2677)—refers to the period when the town was only located on one bank and had no walls along the Euphrates, because the river was considered to be a sufficient protection (cf. F. Wetzel, 'Die Stadtmauern von Babylon', *Wiss. Veröff. der deutschen Orient-Gesell.* xlvi (1930), 75): in some old saga (cf. Baumstark, *ibid.*) the enemy was said to have diverted its course and thus occupied the town, by attacking the side of Babylon left unprotected when the water withdrew from the river-bed. The point which we have now established helps us to throw some light on Berosus' thought: he means that Nebuchadnezzar erected the walls not only on the bank where the 'Altstadt' was, but also on the other one, around the 'Neustadt': thus the whole town, the 'Gesamtstadt', was surrounded by three *περίβολοι* which made it impregnable, in contrast with the 'Altstadt', whose border on the river was unwalled. Only by presupposing such a meaning can we make sense of the passage, because, as we have seen, Berosus cannot have in mind the mode of occupying the town as described by Herodotus, Xenophon, and Polyaenus. It may be that the article is omitted by Berosus because he wants to emphasize the contrast between the well-known 'Altstadt' (which had been the subject of the saga already mentioned) and the new town, which he introduced for the first time to his readers (therefore he says *τὴν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πόλιν καὶ ἐτέραν ἐξωθεν* 'the old town existing from the beginning and another one outside it'), but the main reason for the omission, I think, is that the historian alludes here to the situation existing at the inception of Nebuchadnezzar's reign, when the 'Neustadt' did not exist as such yet: we shall soon see this more clearly. To return to the text, our analysis shows that *ἀναστρέφοντας* is perfectly defensible: in the eyes of those besieged, if the course of the river was actually diverted by means of a canal dug upstream, the water appeared to *withdraw, turn back*: it is this diversion produced up-stream, and not the 'Aufstauung' down-stream invoked by Gutschmid, that enables us to retain *ἀναστρέφοντας* in the text.

Another word which is proved by our analysis to be correct is the much suspected *ὑπερεβάλετο*: the preverb *ὑπερ-* is used by Berosus because he implies that Nebuchadnezzar *ἐβάλετο* on either bank three *περίβολοι* which extended *beyond the river*,<sup>1</sup> *over to* the other bank, so as to encircle the town: the *περίβολοι*

<sup>1</sup> The structure of the sentence is clear, in so far as the words *τρεῖς τῆς πόλεως περιβόλους* depend upon *ὑπερεβάλετο*: with

*περιεβάλετο* we should expect something like *τρεῖς περιβόλους τὴν πόλιν, τῇ πόλει, περὶ τὴν πόλιν* or *τὴν πόλιν τριοὶ περιβόλοις*.

on one bank were the continuation of those on the other (cf. von Gutschmid, p. 511, on the position of the 'Ringe'). Von Gutschmid (p. 509), though affirming that the vulgate correction *περιεβάλλετο* was 'das allein Richtige', could not but admit that, since in Synkellus' quotation of this passage we read *ὑπερεβάλλετο*, 'die Übereinstimmung beider Stellen [i.e. the reading in the *Contra Apionem* and Synkellus' text] beweist jedoch, daß Josephus wirklich *ὑπερεβάλλετο*<sup>1</sup> geschrieben und den Fehler bei Berossos vorgefunden hat, wenn es ein Fehler ist': he argues, in fact, that Berossus may have wanted to write *ὑπερεβάλλετο* as an admittedly clumsy and incorrect variation to *περιβόλους*. Our scrutiny of the passage shows that Berossus knew what he was saying, and that he was neither clumsy nor incorrect.

Up to now, we may sum up, the text has proved sound, and both *ἀναστρέφοντας* and *ὑπερεβάλλετο* have been shown to be perfectly legitimate readings. The same, however, cannot be said of the impossible *κατασκενάζειν*, which has been the subject of various unsuccessful emendations.<sup>2</sup> What we need is a verb expressing the idea of 'assaulting, attacking' the town, and governing *ἐπί τὴν πόλιν*. By a process of palaeographical eliminations and attempts I think the original verb can be enucleated. The prefix *κατα-* is appropriate here ('down upon', with a verb of *attacking, moving towards . . .*), and the ending *-άζειν* looks *prima facie* incorrupt (verbs in *-άζειν* are very numerous, and one of them, something like *προσπελάζειν*, might well be semantically suitable to our passage). The corruption is likely to lurk in the middle of the word *κατασκενάζειν*. Both palaeographical probability<sup>3</sup> and semantic appropriateness lead us to *κατασπιλάζειν*. This verb, in its meaning 'swoop down upon' (like a sudden storm, cf. L.S.J., s.v.), was a military *terminus technicus*, used to denote sudden or unexpected attacks. The author quoted by 'Suidas', s.v. *κατεσπίλασεν*, describes an assault of such a nature made at dawn: *οὐ δὲ ἀδοκήτως τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐώθινὸς κατεσπίλασε, καὶ εὐδοκίμει τῷ δόρατι*. Theophyl. Simoc. 2. 10. 10 echoed the author in question (*ἀτὰρ ἀδοκήτως . . . κατεσπίλασεν ἀφράκτους τε εὐρόμενος ἐνεδοκίμει τῷ δόρατι*, cf. Bernhardy's commentary on 'Suidas', s.v. *κατεσπίλασεν*). *κατεσπιλάζω* appears, as a military term, in two other passages of Theophylactus, 4. 5. 10 and 7. 3. 2: the latter of these (*περὶ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν . . . οἱ βάρβαροι κατεσπιλάζον*) had also a different redaction, preserved to us by 'Suidas', s.v. *σπιλάδεις*: *ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν . . . οἱ βάρβαροι κατεσπιλάζον*, which wording seems fully to justify my conjecture *ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν κατεσπιλάζειν*.

By diverting the Euphrates, Cyrus was able to attack the Babylonians *ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου* (Hdt. 1. 191. 6), because they did not expect the river-bed to make them vulnerable; the diversion up-stream discussed above, which left one flank of the town unprotected, must have been an equally unexpected blow to the besieged Babylonians of earlier times, and therefore *κατεσπιλάζειν*, which, as already noted, implies the idea of unexpectedness,<sup>4</sup> is a welcome verb.

Let us now proceed to the rest of the passage which we are examining. The

<sup>1</sup> Von Gutschmid, who on the one hand speaks of 'der allein statthafte Aorist', on the other seems to believe that the form used by both Berossus and Josephus was the imperfect *ὑπερεβάλλετο*.

<sup>2</sup> Reinach would venture to read *τὴν πόλιν κατασκάπτειν* or *καταδιψᾶν*, but both his attempts are far from convincing.

<sup>3</sup> In the minuscule writing, an open *π* can be confused with *κ*, and the ligature *ιλ* can be mistaken for *ευ*.

<sup>4</sup> 'Suidas' explains *κατεσπίλασεν* as *ἀπροσδοκήτως ἐπεφάνη*; apart from the already quoted passage *οὐ δὲ ἀδοκήτως . . . κατεσπίλασε*, cf. also Philo, *fragm.* p. 28 Harris, *τὰ ἀδοκήτως κατεσπιλάζοντα*.

Latin translation is useful for our purposes, because it will, I think, confirm one emendation: *ipse vero de belli manubiis templum Beli et reliqua loca munificissime exornans et antiquam civitatem et alteram extrinsecus adiens cogitans quatenus nequaquam possent obsidentes fluvium convertere et ad civitatem accedere, tres quidem in interiori civitate per circuitum porticus, tres vero in exteriori constituit, quarum alias quidem ex cocta latere et bitumine, alias vero ex ipso latere fecit.* It would not be legitimate to try to draw an exact parallel between what Berosus says and what has been ascertained by those archaeologists who have deserved so well of Babylon (Koldewey, Unger, Wetzel): agreements between literary sources and archaeological data can hardly be established, as everyone knows. We know, however, that Nebuchadnezzar did erect the triple *περίβολοι* mentioned by Berosus, and that he did found the 'Neustadt', whether or not there was already a village on the site. First of all, he must have delimited the area of the 'Neustadt' by erecting the new *περίβολοι* on the still not built-up bank opposite the 'Altstadt'. When Berosus says *τειχίσας ἀξιολόγως τὴν πόλιν* (1. 140) he obviously means the 'Gesamtstadt' (whose two parts he has mentioned just before) thus created by Nebuchadnezzar.<sup>1</sup>

Now let us examine the structure of the sentence: what is hiding in the corrupt words *προσχαρισάμενος καὶ ἀναγκάσας* is, in all probability, a *participium coniunctum* referring to *ὑπερεβάλετο* and in a parallel position to *κοσμήσας* (on the 'Verbindung mehrerer Partizipia coniuncta' cf. Kühner-Gerth, ii, § 492, Blaß-Debr., *Neutest. Gramm.*<sup>8</sup>, § 421, and the excellent *Grammatischer Anhang*, § 8, 1, h in *Xenophons Anabasis*<sup>2</sup>, hrsgg. von K. Matthiä, Quedlinburg, 1859). However, besides this participle, one would expect another one paralleling *ὑπάρχουσαν* and referring to *έτέραν ἔξωθεν*: not only for formal reasons, but also because the rather vague *έτέρα* (*πόλις*) *ἔξωθεν* could certainly do with some more precise definition.

This being premised, it will become plain that all the alterations proposed (*προσχαρακωσάμενος* by Reinach, *προσκαθιδρυσάμενος* by von Gutschmid, *προσοχυρισάμενος* by Herwerden) are unsatisfactory. Considering what has been noted about the 'Neustadt', I should read *αὐτὸς δὲ . . . τό τε Βῆλον ἱερὸν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κοσμήσας φιλοτίμως, τὴν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ἔξ ἀρχῆς πόλιν καὶ ἔτέραν ἔξωθεν προσχωρησομένην κατανοήσας, πρὸς τὸ μηκέτι δύνασθαι τοὺς πολιορκοῦντας τὸν ποταμὸν ἀναστρέφοντας ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν κατασπλάζειν, ὑπερεβάλετο τρεῖς . . . περίβολους κτλ.*

*κατανοήσας* may have here the meaning indicated in Bauer, *Wörterb.* s.v. 2 ('mit Überlegung beschauen, betrachten, beobachten, nachsehen' and in L.S.J., s.v. 1, 5 ('view', of a house): the verb, in this sense ('examine, inspect, study, view') is attested, besides other authors (Hermas, *Simil.* 3. 5. 6 *κατανοεῖν τὸν πύργον*, Athen. 5. 179 a *κατανοεῖν τὴν οἰκίαν*), twice in Josephus himself, *Antiq.* 3. 302 *πέμψαμεν δὲ κατασκόπους, οἱ τῆσδε τῆς γῆς ἀρετὴν κατανοήσουσι κτλ.*, and 5. 5 *οἱ κατάσκοποι . . . ἀπασαν τὴν πόλιν κατενόησαν*, in which latter passage the usage closely resembles our reconstruction. If the elucidation under discussion is correct, the sentence must mean that Nebuchadnezzar, upon his return, viewed, inspected the old town and the site (or village) destined to become the 'Neustadt', and decided to surround both of these with his new walls. However,

<sup>1</sup> In Ctesias, summarized by Diod. *Bibl.* 2. 7. 3 (cf. Gilmore's edition of Ctesias, pp. 38-39) the wording is clear (the erection of the walls is erroneously ascribed to

Semiramis instead of to Nebuchadnezzar): *ἀπολαβοῦσα δὲ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμὸν εἰς μέσον, περιεβάλετο τεῖχος τῇ πόλει κτλ.*

it is simpler to understand *κατανοήσας* as 'considering': Nebuchadnezzar, considering that there existed the old town and that a new one was going to join it, to be added (by himself), erected his new walls on either side of the river. The connexion *τήν τε . . . καὶ ἐτέραν* clearly emphasizes that the two 'Stadt-hälften' were visualized as a whole, as a unit.<sup>1</sup>

We can follow without great difficulty the process by which the corruption originated: the passage from *κατανοήσας* to *καὶ ἀναγκάσας* is very easy. The letters *τ* and *ι*, *ο* and round *a*, *HC* and *ΓΚ* can be confused with each other; the accent over *H* was misread for the tachygraphical sign representing *as*. This is, however, not all: what is of special interest is the fact that the Latin version has preserved a precious relic, a form that reflects the transmission-stage prior to the arising of the corruption: *cogitans*, which has found no explanation so far, evidently translates the *κατανοήσας* that originally stood in the text. This indirectly corroborates our reconstruction. As for *προσχωρησομένην*, the tachygraphical signs for *ω* and *a* are constantly misread for each other, and the sign for *-μενην* can resemble that used for *-μενος*.

1. 236. The Pharaoh Amenophis, upon the suggestion of a priest who bore the same name, tried to get rid of all his subjects suffering from leprosy by sending them to the stone quarries situated to the east of the Nile: however, amongst the lepers there were some priests as well, and their colleague Amenophis feared the wrath of the Gods: *τὸν δὲ Ἀμένωφιν ἔκεινον . . . ὑποδεῖσαι . . . χόλον τῶν θεῶν, εἰ βιασθέντες ὀδθήσονται, καὶ προσθέμενον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συμμαχήσουσι τινες τοῖς μαροῖς καὶ τῆς Αἰγύπτου κρατήσουσι . . . μὴ τολμήσαι μὲν αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν ταῦτα τῷ βασιλεῖ, γραφὴν δὲ καταλιπόντα . . . έαντὸν ἀνέλεῖν.*

*προσθέμενον* does not make any sense: Thackeray translates 'he (Amenophis) added a prediction that . . .'; but to what statement should the prediction have been added? Reinach reads *καὶ προορώμενον* [*εἰπεῖν*] *ὅτι κτλ.*, but his correction of the passage is too violent. Niese is right in thinking that the context requires a plural genitive absolute depending upon *τολμήσαι* and referring to the *ἱερεῖς*: he suggests, in his apparatus, *ὑποδεμένων* (i.e. 'and, the priests urging him to state that . . .'). Independently of Niese I had come to the same conclusion, as regards the need for a genitive absolute, when examining the passage: this coincidence is perhaps a proof, if one is needed, that his reflections are not far from the truth. The most likely emendation of the word under discussion is, I think, *προσθεμένων*: the whole sentence may be rendered 'and, since they [i.e. the priests] went on saying that . . . he [their colleague Amenophis] dared not tell the king about it', etc. On *προστίθεμαι* in the sense *continue, repeat* an action, cf. L.S.J. s.v., B iii, where attestations from the LXX—whose Greek was well known to Josephus: see, for instance, Thackeray on *Antiq.* 1. 324 and 3. 299—and the New Testament are quoted (the infinitive depending upon the verb is usually an aorist, as is the case here with *εἰπεῖν*).

The use restored by us is, to all appearances, a hebraism in Josephus' Greek, cf. Bauer, *Wörterb.* s.v. *προστίθημι*, 1, c.<sup>2</sup>

1. 307. The Pharaoh Bocchoris is ordered by Ammon's oracle to try a quick

<sup>1</sup> The difference in the material used (cf. Unger, *Babylon* [Berlin-Leipzig, 1931], p. 60) points, however, to the 'Altstadt' receiving more consideration.

<sup>2</sup> On hebraisms in Josephus, cf. W. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, *Index Verborum*, s.v.

*Hebraismi* (p. 547). The same scholar has shown (*ibid.*, p. 435) that Josephus very often uses a participle in the genitive absolute without any subject, when this can be supplied from the context, as is the case here.

method of getting rid of lepers and other sick people living in his kingdom: *τὸν δὲ Βόκχοριν . . . τούς τε ἱερεῖς καὶ ἐπιβαμίτας . . . κελεῦσαι ἐπλογὴν ποιησαμένους τῶν ἀκαθάρτων τοῖς στρατιώταις τούτοις παραδοῦναι κατάξειν αὐτούς εἰς τὴν ἔρημον.*

*κατάξειν* is emphatically rejected by Niese: with good reason, because this particular kind of final-consecutive infinitive may be in the present or aorist, never in the future (cf. Kühner-Gerth ii. 16 f., Blaß-Debrunner, *Neustest. Gramm.*<sup>8</sup>, § 390; many attestations collected by Stahl, *Krit.-Hist. Syntax*, pp. 608 f.). Naber and Thackeray are therefore wrong in not following the editor: it would be unfair to lay such a conspicuous anomaly to Josephus' charge, since we find nothing of the kind elsewhere in his writings, as far as we can see from the above-mentioned work by W. Schmidt. Reinach wonders if the form to be restored could be *κατάγειν*, but, apart from the fact that the origin of the corruption would not be easy to explain palaeographically, there remains another perplexity: the repetition *αὐτούς* after *τούτοις* is suspect, because the kind of infinitive in question obviously does not require the object to be reiterated:<sup>1</sup> in other words, *τούτοις* is the only pronoun for which there would be room in the sentence. The two obstacles are overcome if we simply read *κατάξονοι*: the participle of the future is not out of place here, and the presence of *αὐτούς* is now fully justified. The corrupt form that has come down to us can be explained without difficulty from *καταξίν*.

2. 23. Apion maintained that the Jews, suffering from leprosy and other diseases, after battling their way through the desert were attacked by tumours in the groin; Josephus confutes him: *δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι πάντες ἔβουβανίασαν ἐνδεκα μυριάδες ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἡσαν ἐκείνοις τυφλοὶ καὶ χωλοὶ καὶ ἀπαντα τρόπον νοσοῦντες, ὅποιος αὐτούς εἶναι φησι Άπιων, οὐδὲ ἀν μᾶς ἡμέρας προελθεῖν ὅδον ἡδυ-νήθησαν· εἰ δὲ οἷοι βαδίζειν διὰ πολλῆς ἔρημιας καὶ προσέτι νικᾶν τοὺς αὐτούς ἀνθ-ισταμένους μαχόμενοι πάντες, οὐκ ἀν ἀθροί μετὰ τὴν ἔκτην ἡμέραν ἔβουβανίασαν.*

Reinach rightly notes that *πάντες* is 'suspectum'; in fact, it is an addition to the sentence that is out of place. *ἐκείνοι*, the subject of the sentence, refers directly to *πάντες . . . ἀνθρώπων*. Besides, the position of the adjective in the sentence is suspicious: why should it have been necessary to stress that all the men took part in the fighting? This is quite obvious not only grammatically, but logically as well: if they were able to *βαδίζειν* across the desert, surely they were fit for the battle. The original text can be regained, I think, if we read *μαχόμενοι, πάντως οὐκ ἀν κτλ.* On the expression *πάντως οὐ*, an *elegantia* of Homeric flavour, cf. L.S.J. s.v. *πάντως*, I. There is a climax in the usage of the two negations that is certainly not fortuitous, but an intentional rhetorical contrivance: *οὐδὲ ἀν μᾶς~πάντως οὐκ ἀν κτλ.*<sup>2</sup>

2. 131 ἔώ βασιλέας τοὺς ἐπ' εὐσεβείᾳ διαβοηθέντας, ὃν ἔνα Κροῖσον, οἵας ἔχριστο συμφοραῖς βίου, κτλ.

Niese, joined by Reinach and the other editors, remarks that *όν* *ἔνα Κροῖσον* is 'valde suspectum', and corrects *ἔχριστο* to *ἔχρισαν* from the Latin text, which runs as follows: *relinquo etiam reges pietate famosissimos, quorum summi diversis vitae sunt calamitatibus sauciati*; Boysen, on the basis of the Latin text,

<sup>1</sup> Of course the infinitive under discussion takes an object, when this is other than the one depending upon the leading verb, cf. e.g. Thuc. 2. 27.

<sup>2</sup> The *ώντες* is so disturbing that the Latin translator wrote *si vero ambulare per*

*multum desertum poterant et experegentibus re-pugnabant, non omnes repente post diem septimum inguinibus vulnerati sunt: Boysen rightly notes that 'interpres πάντες cum sequentibus iunxit, et ἀθροί pro adverbio habuit'.*

would read *ῶν ἔχαιρετοι παντοῖαις ἔχρισαντο συμφορᾶις βίον*: he is, as we shall see, not far off the mark.

Since Josephus is explicitly alluding to the *βασιλέας διαβοηθέντας*, Niese's objection to *ἔχρισαντο* as it is in the context is valid; besides, *ῶν ἔνα Κροῖσον* is really very dubious, not so much because the text presupposed by the Latin version does not have it, as principally, I believe, because it is grammatically clumsy (Thackeray brackets the words as a 'gloss'). We should expect, in fact, *ῶν εἰς Κροῖσος*, because the accusative and infinitive would only be used in the *oratio obliqua*, cf. Kühner-Gerth, ii. 550, 5. It is true that in the previous sentence we read *οὗτε τὰς Ἀθηναίων τύχας οὗτε τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων ἐνενόσσεν, ὃν τοὺς μὲν ἀνδρειοτάτους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ εὐσεβεστάτους τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπαντες λέγουσαν*, but it is impossible to understand into our sentence a *ἀπαντες λέγουσαν* from there: the sense of the whole passage is clearly (Thackeray's translation): 'Apion never thought of the misfortunes of the Athenians or the Lacedaemonians, the latter, by common consent, the bravest, the former the most pious of the Greeks. I pass over the calamities in the lives of monarchs renowned for piety.' The adjectives *ἀνδρειότατοι* and *εὐσεβέστατοι* are aptly governed by the *verbum dicendi*, whereas such a rection would be inept in the case of the participle *διαβοηθέντες*, itself a *verbum dicendi*; moreover, even considering *διαβοηθέντες* as an equivalent of the adjective *διαβοήτοι*, a sentence like 'of whom everyone says Croesus was one' would be uncalled for in the context.

What must be restored is, I think, *ῶν ἐν ἄκροις ὄνόματα*. '*Ἐν ἄκροις* is an attributive determination referring to *ὄνόματα*, a substantive without the article (cf. Kühner-Gerth ii, § 462, m, β), 'of whom eminent *ὄνόματα* . . .'. Josephus, instead of saying *ἐν πρώτοις*,<sup>1</sup> uses, as a Herodotism (cf., on *ἄκρος* = 'eminent', Thackeray, *A Lexicon to Josephus*, s.v.), the adjective *ἄκρος*, which was (cf. Plat. *Epist.* 7. 344 d *τῶν . . . ἄκρων καὶ πρώτων*, Aristid. *Orat.* 26. 342-608 Dind. *πρώτον Ἑλλήνων . . . καὶ ἄκρον ἐν λόγοις*) a synonym of *πρώτος*. *οῖαις* is, of course, exclamatory.

We can explain how the corruption originated if we remember that *ὄνόματα* was written, in abbreviation, *ὈΝ* (cf. Bast, *Comm. Pal.*, p. 827, and Gardthausen, *Gr. Pal.*<sup>1</sup>, p. 255). On *ὄνομα* used as here cf. Thes., s.v., 2028 b-c, e.g. Plat. *Hipp. Mai.* 281 c *ῶν ὄνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ*: for the plural, cf. also Bauer, *Wörterb.* s.v. III (where also the singular *ὄνομα* in Jos. *Antiq.* 14. 22 is quoted), and Sophocles, *Greek Lex. Rom.-Byz. Per.*, s.v., 2 ('in the sense of person, usually in the plural'). Now we can leave *ἔχρισαντο* undisturbed.

2. 215. Josephus says that the Jewish legislation knows no indulgence (and therefore is superior to those of other peoples, in his opinion): *ζημία γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν παραβανόντων ὁ θάνατος, ἀν μοιχεύη τις, ἀν βιάσσηται κόρην, ἀν ἄρρενι τολμήσῃ πείραν προσφέρειν, ἀν ὑπομείνη παθεῖν ὁ πειρασθείς. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ δοῦλοις διοίως ὁ νόμος ἀπαράτητος.*

After this, there is a short parenthesis about minor offences (*ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . μεῖζον*) and then he continues *περὶ μὲν γὰρ γονέων ἀδικίας ἡ τῆς εἰς θεὸν ἀνεβείας, καν μελλήσῃ τις, εὐθὺς ἀπόλλυται*.

Why mention the *δοῦλοι* in this context? It is, without any doubt, exclusively a list of *crimes* for which the Jewish legislation foresees the death penalty. In

<sup>1</sup> *ἐν πρώτοις* 'among the first' may refer to rank, status (cf. Hom. *Il.* 15. 643, Luc. *Seyth.* 3; this is the meaning required by our conjecture), chronological order (cf. Isaeus 7. 40), or

the place occupied in a multitude (cf. Luc. *Paras.* 49). *ἐν πρώτοις* was the usual form (cf. also Hdt. 8. 69. 1 and Plato, *Resp.* 7. 522 c); *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις* occurs only in Luc. *Seyth.* 3.

particular, the δοῦλοι are completely out of place, because Josephus is quoting from the Jewish code,<sup>1</sup> which considers, naturally enough, only the Jewish citizens, and not their slaves.<sup>2</sup> The laws to which allusion is here made are quoted by Reinach and Thackeray (in their respective translations): let us note that the offence against the κόρη is contemplated by *Deuteronom. 22. 23*.<sup>3</sup>

From what we have observed it follows that Reinach is right when he states that the text is 'sans doute altéré' (p. 97, note 4). It is very easy, however, to unmask the intruding slaves and ascertain their real identity: we must try to detect which kind of crime is hiding in the impossible ἐπὶ δούλοις. ἐπὶ is, in a certain sense, baffling at this point: in the previous passage (ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις κτλ.) its meaning is clear (cf. L.S.J., s.v. ἐπὶ, B I 1 c, on the type νόμος κείται ἐπὶ τυν), and Thackeray translates correctly 'the penalty for most offences against the law is death', but the preposition, in ἐπὶ δούλοις, can mean neither 'against' nor 'in favour', because penalties against the slaves—let alone protection for them—were, as we have already noted, not considered by the Jewish law.

Josephus is alluding, it seems to me, to the case of treacherous assault as described in *Deuteronom. 22. 25-27*: the inappropriateness in the context of the preposition ἐπὶ and this latter consideration reveal the true reading, which in all probability must be καὶ ἐπίβουλοις ὄμοιως κτλ. Confusion between uncial *B* and *Δ* is not unlikely if, in the former letter, the upper bulge is particularly small, whilst the lower one has a triangular shape: this feature is visible, for instance, in the *Sinaiticus* or the *Alexandrinus*. The substantivized adjective (which has no article because 'der Begriff wird ganz allgemein aufgefaßt', cf. Kühner-Gerth i. 266) is synonymous with ἐπίβουλευτής 'plotter':<sup>4</sup> this use of ἐπίβουλος is well attested in late Greek, cf. e.g. *Luc. Tim. 36* ἐπίβουλος ἐπαγαγών ('insidiatores immittens' Reitz), and the examples given in *Thes.*, s.v., *Greg. Nyss. 3. 595 b* οἶνον . . . τῶν φρενῶν ἐπίβουλον and *Chron. Pasch.* ed. Bonn. p. 696, 16 οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι . . . ἀπετμήθησαν, ὡς εὐρεθέντες ἐπίβουλοι τοῦ βασιλέως Φωκᾶ, p. 707, 14 ὁ τῆς 'Ρωμαϊκῆς πολιτείας γενόμενος ἐπίβουλος κτλ., 'Romani imperii insidiator Focas'. ἐπίβουλος is used, in the passage emended by us, of an erotic *insidiator*; it is interesting to see that Eros himself is called ἐπίβουλος ('insidiator' Dübner) in *A. Plan. 199. 2.* ἐπὶ δούλοις originated by assimilation to the previous ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν παραβανόντων, but Josephus is in reality using different constructions in variation: there is also a third construction, namely περὶ μέτρων and περὶ γονέων ἀδυκίας (the latter περὶ retained by Naber, although Niese conjectured ἐπὶ): ἐπίβουλος is, of course, *dativus incommodi*, just as τοῖς βιοῦσι is *dativus commodi*, at the end of § 217.

ἐπίβουλοις, it may be added, is an exact parallel to καν μελλόση τις.<sup>5</sup>

*King's College, Cambridge*

GIUSEPPE GIANGRANDE

<sup>1</sup> As he does in *Antiq. 3. 224 ff.* and especially *4. 196 ff.*, Josephus does not make mention of any penalties regarding the slaves, who in fact are not taken into consideration by the Jewish laws.

<sup>2</sup> The δοῦλοι are, of course, not considered to be legal persons: they cannot bear witness, for instance (*Antiq. 4. 219*); no free Jew is allowed to marry a δοῦλη 'for decorum and the proprieties of rank' (Thackeray, *Antiq. 4. 244*).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also *The Jewish Encycl.*, s.v. 'Capital Punishment'.

<sup>4</sup> This did not escape glossators, who (cf. *Thes.*, s.v.) translated ἐπίβουλος *insidiator*. The nominal nature of the word is shown by the objective genitive which often accompanies it.

<sup>5</sup> Both ἐπίβουλος and μέλλω denote the idea of *trying*, *attempting*; the absence of the article gives to ἐπίβουλος a hypothetical value ('any attempters'), corresponding to καν.

## NON-PHYLARCHEAN TRADITION OF THE PROGRAMME OF AGIS IV

It is generally held that Plutarch's authority in his *Vita Agidis* was Phylarchos and that, consequently, our knowledge of Agis' programme derives solely from the Phylarchean, pro-Spartan, and generally unreliable tradition. There is little doubt that Plutarch's biography of Agis is based on Phylarchos.<sup>1</sup> However, our knowledge of the programme of Agis does not depend solely on the Phylarchean tradition. There exists other evidence for most points of the programme. The Phylarchean tradition is in a large degree borne out by sources, both contemporary with Agis and later—all independent of Phylarchos.

The purpose of this paper is to set this evidence out and to show that it corroborates on several points the tradition embodied in Phylarchos—Plutarch.

The main points of the programme of Agis as known from *Vita Agidis* were:

1. Redivision of land (*γῆς ἀναδασμός*)—*Ag.* 8. 1-2; 7. 8; 13. 1-5; 14. 1-2; 16. 4; *Comp. Ag. Cleom. Gracch.* 4. 1.
2. Abolition of debts (*χρεῶν ἀποκοπή*)—*Ag.* 8. 3; 7. 8; 12. 1; 13. 1-4; 14. 1-2.
3. Filling up of the citizen-body (*ἀναπλήρωσις*)—*Ag.* 8. 3; 6. 1; 10. 5.
4. Restoration of ancient Spartan discipline and way of life (*ἀγωγή, δίαιτα*)—*Ag.* 8. 4; 4. 1-2; *Comp.* 1. 3; 2. 4.

The result of these reforms was to be equality (*ἰσότης*).<sup>2</sup> The resulting *ἰσότης* is not referred to in the non-Phylarchean evidence, but most of the actual points of the programme, and also some events connected with the struggle for its realization, are to be found in it.

### (a) TELES, *περὶ φυγῆς*

In his diatribe *περὶ φυγῆς*, Teles, a Cynic philosopher who lived in Megara in the third century B.C., gives examples of people who rose to prominence in exile.<sup>3</sup> He mentions Lykinos, who fled from Italy to Macedon, Chremonides and Glaukon the Athenians, who found refuge in Alexandria, and Hippomedon the Lacedaemonian. Hippomedon is said to have been made by Ptolemy governor of Thrace.<sup>4</sup> Hippomedon son of Agesilaos is mentioned in an inscription from Samothrace as: ὁ ταχθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου στρατ[ηγὸς ἐφ' Ἑλ]λησπόντου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης τόπων.<sup>5</sup> There can be no doubt that the man spoken of in Teles' diatribe and in the Samothrace inscription is Hippomedon, the prominent supporter of Agis known to us from Plutarch's *Vita Agidis*. He is said there to have been instrumental in bringing his father Agesilaos over to the reform party. Hippomedon 'had won fair fame in many wars and had great influence because he stood in favour with the young men'.<sup>6</sup> Thanks to this general love and esteem he succeeded in saving the life of his

<sup>1</sup> See the recent study by E. Gabba, *Athenaeum* xxxv (1957), 3 ff., 193 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See my forthcoming 'Agis, Cleomenes, and Equality' in *C.P.*

<sup>3</sup> *Teletis Reliquiae*, recognovit O. Hense,

editio secunda (Tübingen, 1909), p. 23.

<sup>4</sup> ὁ νῦν ἐπὶ Θράκης καθεστάμενος ὑπὸ Πτολεμαίου . . . Teles, loc. cit.

<sup>5</sup> Dittenberger, *Sylloge*<sup>2</sup>, no. 502.

<sup>6</sup> *Ag.* 6. 5.

father and carrying him off from Sparta after the débâcle of 241/0 B.C.<sup>1</sup> The references in Teles and in the inscription carry Plutarch's story a step farther: in them we see Hippomedon in exile, or rather in his self-exile. They seem to be a neat authentication of the Phylarchean tradition on Hippomedon.

The reference in Teles to Hippomedon's Thracian appointment helps to date the *περὶ φυγῆς*. Hippomedon did not leave Sparta before 241/0 B.C. Thus 241/0—or more practically c. 240/39, since the Thracian appointment would not necessarily be immediate—is to be regarded as the *terminus post quem* for the diatribe. Wilamowitz, who established this date, argues for 229 B.C., before the death of king Demetrios, as the *terminus ante*; he inclines to a date close to the upper limit, i.e. to 239 B.C.<sup>2</sup>

Thus in all probability the *περὶ φυγῆς* was written some few years after Agis.

A passage in the diatribe which mentions the liberality of the Spartans with regard to inclusion of men of foreign origin in the citizen-body may very well be a reference to Agis' views and proposals. It reads: *τὸ δὲ μέτοικον εἶναι ὄνειδος ἡγούμεθα; . . . Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ὄνειδος ἡγοῦνται: ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν μετασχόντα τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ ἐμμείναντα, κανένας κανένας εἰλωτος, ὅμοιως τοῖς ἀρίστοις τιμῶντι τὸν δὲ μηδὲν ἐμμείναντα, κανένας εἰλωτος τοῦ βασιλέως, εἰς τοὺς εἰλωτας ἀποστέλλονται, καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐ μετέχει.*<sup>3</sup>

The point of the speaker—who delivered his diatribe to a Megarian audience—is that Spartan citizenship is open to *μέτοικοι* and *ξένοι* (and even to men of helotic origin) if they undergo the *ἀγωγή*, while in Megara the attitude to the metics is abominable. Now, in so far as Sparta is concerned, the prevalent tradition is exactly the reverse. Exclusiveness—*ξενηλασία* and all—was one of the main features of the Spartan way, and it is one of the most common and generally recognized points in Greek tradition about Sparta.<sup>4</sup> To a Greek audience Sparta would normally be the example *par excellence* of exclusiveness, not of liberality of approach. In view of this, it seems to be a plausible supposition that we have in Teles not a reference to Sparta in general, but a sympathetic allusion to the opening of the citizen-body proposed by Agis, which was to include *perioikoi* and *xenoi* who had received the rearing of free-men (i.e. *ἀγωγή*) and were, besides, vigorous of body and in the prime of life.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ag.* 16. 5.

<sup>2</sup> U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Antigonos von Karystos* (Berlin, 1881), pp. 300 ff.; cf. also J. G. Droysen, *Gesch. d. Hell.*<sup>2</sup> iii. 1. 407 f., 435; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*<sup>3</sup>, no. 502 ad loc.; P.W. s.vv. Hippomedon, Teles. On Teles in general see Hense, op. cit., *Prolegomena*, ix ff.; Wilamowitz, op. cit., pp. 292 ff., D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* (London, 1937), pp. 85 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Teles, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

<sup>4</sup> On the *ξενηλασία* see especially Plut. *Lyc.* 27. 3-4; *Inst. Lac.* 19-20; Arist. *Frags.* 543; Plat. *Leg.* 950 b; *Prot.* 342 c; [Xen.] *Lac. Resp.* 14. 4; Thuc. 1. 144. 2; 2. 39. 1; Aristoph. *Av.* 1012-13; also Plut. *Ag.* 10. 3-5. On the extreme rareness of inclusion of non-Spartans in the citizen-body see, e.g., Hdt. 9. 35; cf. also Plut. *Dion* 17. 3; Demosth. 23. 212; Dion. *Halic.* 2. 17.—According to

Arist. *Pol.* 1270<sup>a</sup>34-37 there existed a tradition that under the kings of old non-Spartans were admitted to the body-politic (cf. also *Inst. Lac.* 22 for a similar tradition). This may have some connexion with the question of citizen-rights in the time of the second Messenian war (see W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, ii [Oxford, 1887], 331; Busolt-Swoboda, *Griech. Staatsk.*, p. 658, n. 1.). The suppressed clause in the sentence of Aristotle is 'but they now do not' or 'though they do not now' (Newman, loc. cit.). To Aristotle exclusiveness was a characteristic of Sparta as he knew her (cf. *Frags.* 543). [Xen.] *Lac. Resp.* 14 says that Spartans started going abroad, not that they opened their citizen-body.

<sup>5</sup> *Ag.* 8. 3-4. Teles speaks also of inclusion of former helots, not mentioned in the *rheta*: *ἀναπληρωθῆναι δὲ τούτους ἐκ τε*

Teles is, of course, innocent of quoting the *rhetra* or the views of Agis on opening the citizen-body,<sup>1</sup> but we seem to have in his diatribe a contemporary allusion to Agis' new approach.<sup>2</sup>

(b) CICERO, *DE OFFICIIS* 2. 78-80

In the *de officiis* 2. 78-80 Cicero violently attacks those politicians who, in order to win the goodwill of the masses, propose redivision of land and abolition of debts. By such measures they are, according to Cicero, undermining the foundations of the state, viz. the undisturbed control of one's private property. After having elaborated on the iniquity of such proposals and their ruinous effects (para. 79), Cicero adds: *ac propter hoc iniuriae genus Lacedaemonii Lysandrum ephorum expulerunt, Agim regem, quod numquam antea apud eos acciderat, necaverunt* (para. 80). *Γῆς ἀναδασμός* and *χρεῶν ἀποκοτή* are easily recognizable.<sup>3</sup> They are the evils which proved the undoing of Agis. Thus Cicero knew that Agis proposed redivision of land and abolition of debts, and that Lysandros was instrumental in connexion with these proposals.<sup>4</sup> Phylarchos was not his source here: Cicero's version, in sharp contrast to the Phylarchean, is distinctly inimical to Agis, whose action is said to have started a revolutionary process which proved the undoing of Sparta (para. 80). Also, while Agis is so condemned, Aratos is extolled for having avoided in Sicyon just such measures as those for which Agis was responsible in Sparta (paras. 81-83). The information on Lysandros' ultimate fate is independent of the tradition embodied in the *Vita*, in which Lysandros' fate after the débâcle of 241/0 is not mentioned.

Cicero's account and interpretation are probably based on Panaitios;<sup>5</sup> not impossibly this tradition goes back to Polybios, or is even earlier. Whatever the exact derivation, there exists a tradition independent of Phylarchos which corroborates points of Agis' programme and his collaboration with Lysandros for its realization.

περιοίκων καὶ ξένων. . . . Ag. 8. 3—κἄν ξένων κἄν ἐξ εἴλατος . . . Teles, loc. cit.; cf. also Wilamowitz, op. cit., p. 303, n. 16; Tarn in *The Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 134; Porter, *Plutarch's Life of Aratus* (Cork University Press, 1937), pp. lxii f. Can it be supposed that Teles' words *τὸν δὲ μὴ ἐμμείναντα* (viz. *τῇ ἀγωγῇ*) κἄν ἐξ αὐτοῦ *τὸν βασιλέως εἰς τὸν εἴλατας ἀποστέλλοντι*, καὶ *τῆς πολιτείας ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐ μετέχει* (Teles, loc. cit.) have some connexion with Agis' attack on king Leonidas: *μὴ θαυμάσειν τὸν Λεωνίδαν, εἰ τεθραμμένος ἐν ξένῃ . . . ἀγνοεῖ τὸν Λυκούργον* (Ag. 10. 4), supported by Lysandros with a reference to an alleged ancient law which οὐκ ἐξ *τὸν Ἡρακλεῖδην ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνοῦσθαι, τὸν δ' ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπὶ μετοικισμῷ πρὸς ἔτερους ἀποθνήσκειν κελεύει* (Ag. 11. 2)?

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ag. 10. 3 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Tarn, commenting on Agis' reforms in *C.A.H.* vii. 743, remarks: 'The proposed inclusion of metics excited great interest in Greece, for some might even be Asiatics.'

He quotes (ibid., note 1) Alexander of Aetolia, *Anth. Pal.* 7. 709. This epigram is a fictitious epitaphion on Alkman in which the poet is made to eulogize himself on becoming a Spartan in spite of his Asiatic origin, and being made by Heliconian Muses 'greater than the tyrants Daskyles and Gyges'. It is hard to see how it echoes Agis' proposals unless it is supposed that in such an oblique way Alexander of Aetolia wanted to remind his readers that granting citizenship to foreigners was once a Spartan practice. That would not seem a very likely supposition. (Alkman might well have been an Asiatic Greek who was granted Spartan citizenship; cf. Crates ap. 'Suid', s.v. Άλκμάν; see Schmid-Stählin, *Griech. Literaturgesch.* i. 1. 457, n. 2.)

<sup>3</sup> Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum, Cicero de officiis und das Lebensideal des Panaitios* (Berlin, 1934), p. 116.

<sup>4</sup> On Lysandros' role see Ag. 8. 1; also 6. 3-4; 9. 1; 11. 1-2; 13. 3; 19. 6.

<sup>5</sup> See Pohlenz, op. cit., p. 118.

## (c) POLYBIOS 4. 81. 12-14

Agis' name is not mentioned in Polybios. However, there is a passage in which Agis is alluded to without being named and in which his γῆς ἀναδασμός is implied.

According to Polyb. 4. 81. 12-14, the Lacedaemonians enjoyed the best form of government and had the greatest power until the battle of Leuktra. Sparta's decline set in after Leuktra: τέλος πλείστων μὲν πόνων καὶ στάσεων ἐμφυλίων πείραν είχον, πλείστοις δ' ἐπάλαισαν ἀναδασμοῖς καὶ φυγαῖς, πικροτάτης δὲ δουλείας πείραν ἔλαβον ἕως τῆς Νάβιδος τυραννίδος. He goes on to say that the progressive decline of Sparta was most conspicuous after the entire subversion of the 'ancestral constitution' by Kleomenes (ἀφ' οὐ *Κλεομένης* ὀλοσχερῶς κατέλυσε τὸ πάτριον πολίτευμα). Agis is not mentioned here. But since there were no γῆς ἀναδασμοί—nor, to my knowledge, φυγαί—after 371 and before Agis—and since to Polybios Kleomenes' revolution was already an advanced stage with regard to redivisions of land (ἐναργέστατα . . . ἀφ' οὐ κτλ.), it would seem to follow that to him the revolutionary process started with Agis, and went through Kleomenes up to Nabis.<sup>1</sup> This interpretation is supported by a passage in the *de officiis*. After having told about Agis' death, Cicero goes on to say: *exque eo tempore tantae discordiae seculae sunt, ut et tyranni existerent et optimates exterminarentur et praeclarissime constituta res publica dilaberetur* (2. 80).

Both passages have the same idea of the continuity of the Spartan revolution. They are quite similar and Cicero may be using Polybios. However, while Polybios does not refer to Agis by name, Cicero mentions only Agis, further stages of the revolutionary process, Kleomenes and Nabis, being alluded to without names.

To sum up: though for details of Agis' reforms and story we are dependent on Phylarchos-Plutarch, the main points of Agis' programme of reform, and some important historical events connected with it, emerge from a body of non-Phylarchean evidence.

*The Hebrew University, Jerusalem*

ALEXANDER FUKS

<sup>1</sup> For φυγαί starting after Agis' death see Polyb. 4. 34. 3-9; Ag. 16. 4-5; Cleom. 1. 1; 18. 3.

## THE DEFENCE OF OLYNTHUS

DEMOSTHENES prophesied<sup>1</sup> that, unless Athens stopped Philip in the north, she would have to deal with him in Greece itself, and the events of 346 proved him right. Right in this much, he has been presumed right in general, and the policies of those he opposed have received only scant consideration before being dismissed as the selfish pursuit of peace by the rich, who were so blinded by their material interests that they could not see the real issues involved.<sup>2</sup> It is the purpose of this article to question, from a purely military standpoint, the soundness of Demosthenes' policy.

First, however, as always with Demosthenic questions, it is necessary to answer some questions of fact.

### I. THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

Ever since 1893, when Schwartz<sup>3</sup> delivered his attack on the dating of the first Philippic by Dionysius of Halicarnassus,<sup>4</sup> scholars have been divided on the question, and Schwartz has had a considerable following.<sup>5</sup> His attack was twofold; first, a destructive criticism of Dionysius' methods and limitations, and then an attempt to date the speech in 349 after Philip had begun the war which ended in the destruction of Olynthus.

Whatever may be said of Dionysius' dating, it should be clear that the speech does not belong where Schwartz sought to put it. First, Demosthenes alludes only once to Olynthus, and in a casual fashion at that (*ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας εἰς Πόλας καὶ Χερρόνησον καὶ Όλυνθον καὶ ὅποι βούλεται* § 17). If the occasion of the speech had been Philip's attack on

I wish to thank Mr. P. A. Brunt, Mr. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, and Mr. A. R. W. Harrison for helpful criticism. They should not be supposed, however, necessarily to accept any of the views expressed.

For convenience, whenever I have named a month of the Athenian calendar I have inserted in Roman numerals which month of the year it is.

<sup>1</sup> 1. 25, 3. 8, 4. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, ii<sup>2</sup>, speaks of a 'wretched peace-party and bribed orators' (p. 51) and 'der selbstsüchtigen Partei, welche unter Eubulus Leitung den Staat beherrschte'. Schwarz, 'Demosthenes erste Philippika' in *Festschrift Theodor Mommsen*, speaks of 'die Partei des Besitzes und die Besitzenden' (cf. pp. 13, 35, 39, 49) and of 'die Friedenspartei'. Cf. Cloché, *La politique extérieure*, p. 219, and Jaeger, *Demosthenes*, p. 142 ('the same rich politicians of the peace party'). The double accusation of pacifism for personal profit is almost *communis opinio*. The alleged pacifism is, by implication, called in question by this article. What is the ground for supposing that Eubulus and his supporters were rich and the 'patriots' poor? Demosthenes likes to talk about the riches of his opponents (e.g. 3. 29) but we do not have their replies. Demosthenes was a rich man

himself, and indeed most of *οἱ πολιτευόμενοι* must have been fairly well off.

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit.

<sup>4</sup> *Ad Amm.*, pp. 725 and 736.

<sup>5</sup> Amongst those who commit themselves Kahrstedt, *Forschungen*, p. 121, n. 211, Pokorny, *Studien*, pp. 125 f., and Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone*, pp. 110 and 112, n. 1, follow Schwartz. Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, p. 184, Cloché, op. cit., p. 203 (cf. *Un fondateur d'empire*, p. 111), and Jacoby, *Commentary on Philochorus frag. 47*, favour the early date. Jaeger, *Demosthenes*, pp. 120 f., believes in the early date and a later (and so misleading) edition (cf. p. 123, n. 5 below). Focke, *Demosthenesstudien*, pp. 21 f., dates the speech in October 350. Sealey, *R.E.G.* lxviii (1955), 77 f., attempts a general defence of the accuracy of Dionysius' dates for Demosthenes.

Olynthus, surely that fact would have dominated the speech just as it dominates the Olynthiacs, and Demosthenes could not have treated it as just another incident. Indeed once Olynthus was attacked the city had every reason to seek Athenian alliance to which earlier it had professed itself not disinclined,<sup>1</sup> but neither does the speech contain any hint of an appeal from Olynthus, nor, more seriously, does Demosthenes suggest that Athens should now send an embassy to make an alliance, although it is clear from the Olynthiacs that there was a strong body of opinion at Athens in favour of alliance before Olynthus offered it.<sup>2</sup> The explanation must be that the war had not yet begun. Secondly, the emphasis of the speech is on preparation: the proposals are designed to enable Athens to act in time whenever a major crisis arises, and in the meantime to harry Philip with a small force which can admittedly do no more than make piratical raids (*οὐκ ἐν τῷ ίμιν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνῳ παραταξομένην ἀλλὰ ληστεύειν ἀνάγκη* § 23). But if Philip had already attacked Olynthus, there was already a major crisis, and one far more serious than Methone, Pagasae, or Potidaea, calling not for preparation against possible future dangers, but action in the present. The whole nature of Demosthenes' proposals shows that the attack on Olynthus had not yet begun. Thirdly, Demosthenes is very vague about how his standing light force is to act. Apart from the general commission to pillage just mentioned, there is nothing at all specific. *Ποιὶ οὖν προσορμούμεθ'*; *ηρετό τις. εὐρήσει τὰ σαθρά, ὃ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τῶν ἐκείνου πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ὁ πόλεμος, ἣν ἐπιχειρῶμεν* (§ 44). After the war between Olynthus and Macedon had begun, such vagueness is inconceivable. The most important thing would have been the defence of Olynthus and the maintenance of its port, Mecyberna, and the next thing would have been the distraction of Philip by co-operating with Olynthian forces in attacking Macedonian territory. Demosthenes had sufficient strategic sense not to furnish silly answers to silly questions. The strategic situation he is discussing is not war between Olynthus and Philip. Finally, the attack on Olynthus in 349 was precisely what Athens had hoped for:<sup>3</sup> it gave her an ally of great value both in military power and as a base of operations and the news of that attack could hardly have produced despondency in Athens. Yet it is with an attack on a mood of despondency that Demosthenes begins his speech. *Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀθυμητέον, ὃ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τοῖς παρονοῖς πράγμασι, οὐδὲ εἰ πάνυ φαῦλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ.*<sup>4</sup> For these reasons Schwartz's attribution of the speech to 349 should be abandoned. The attack on Olynthus, to which the speech alludes, cannot be that which began the war, and, despite all the words that have been spent on the silence of our sources, there must have been an earlier attack.<sup>5</sup>

There is one point which Schwartz thought confirmed his dating and which must be reconsidered. In § 34 Demosthenes speaks of attacks on Lemnos and Imbros, and on shipping off the southern end of Euboea, and finally of a raid at Marathon as a result of which the Sacred Trireme was captured. These

<sup>1</sup> Dem. 23, 109.

<sup>2</sup> 1, 7, 3, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> § 2.

<sup>5</sup> Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 120 f., admirably set out reasons for dissociating the speech from the attack on Olynthus in 349, but, believing that the reference to a sudden attack on Olynthus in § 17 must concern the

events of 349, explained it as the insertion of a later edition. His promised special study (p. 238, n. 35) has never, as far as I know, appeared. If it is merely a question of choosing between the hypothesis of a later edition and that of an otherwise unattested attack on Olynthus, in view of the nature of the sources the latter is far preferable.

operations Schwartz referred to the very situation described by Aeschines (2. 72 f.) and alluded to by the speaker in [Demosthenes] 59. 3; and from this latter passage he inferred that Aeschines was talking about events of 349/8. Thus he found confirmation for his date for the first Philippic. This argument rests on a misunderstanding of the passage in [Demosthenes]. The speaker there is contrasting the two alternatives before Athens at the time when she was debating whether to intervene *πανδημεῖ*, as he claimed, in Euboea and Olynthus (§ 4): either she could gain victory, recover *τὰ ὑμέτερα* (i.e. Amphipolis, etc.), wholly defeat Philip, and become the greatest power in Greece, or she could be too late to save Olynthus, abandon her allies to destruction, gain the reputation of faithlessness, and run the risk of losing what remained of her possessions, Lemnos, Imbros, Scyros, and the Chersonese. Clearly the speaker means that the danger of losing these places was consequent on the failure to save Olynthus, and the natural interpretation is that, once Philip had dealt with Olynthus, he turned to other matters which touched Athens more directly. That is, he is speaking of the period between the fall of Olynthus and the Peace of Philocrates, the period which Aeschines was discussing.<sup>1</sup> So, unless one is prepared to accept Dionysius' ascription of the second half of the first Philippic to 347/6, there is no reason to identify the raids of § 34 of that speech with the dangers spoken of by Aeschines, and certainly under no conditions is there reason for referring them to 349/8. Indeed there is some positive evidence that they belong earlier. Both Philochorus<sup>2</sup> and Androtion<sup>3</sup> appear to have recounted the incident concerning the Sacred Trireme, and, although there is no precise indication of date in the case of Philochorus, Androtion is of some help: he dealt with this incident in his sixth book, and the seventh covered 350/49 and possibly even 353/2. So this Marathon incident<sup>4</sup> at least has nothing to do with the period to which Schwartz assigned it, and, if he could land at Marathon, he could certainly manage the other raids listed in § 34 in the earlier period. So Schwartz's identification and dating of the events of § 34 is singularly unfounded and should neither detain us nor deter us from rejecting his date for the first Philippic.<sup>5</sup>

It is easy to reject Schwartz's date, but to find the true date is at least difficult. One minor obstacle may be removed. Schwartz remarked:<sup>6</sup> 'I will leave to the supporters of the so-called tradition the unenviable task of giving a consistent account of how the speech *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* which is set by the tradition in the archonship of Theellus (351/0) can be later than

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Justin 3. 8. 11 f. who recounts the fall of Olynthus, then Philip's activities in Thessaly and Thrace, and ends 'et ne quod ius vel fas inviolatum praetermitteret, piraticam quoque exercere instituit'. It is also to be noted that the decree which Aeschines went on to describe in 2. 73 suits the period of Philip's campaign against Cersobleptes in 346, when Chares was in command at the Hellespont (Aesch. 2. 90).

<sup>2</sup> F.G.H. 328 F 47.

<sup>3</sup> F.G.H. 324 F 24.

<sup>4</sup> Although the landing at Marathon is cited last by Demosthenes in § 34 and prefaced by *τὰ τελευταῖα* it is not clear that it was the latest in time of the events mentioned.

As Jacoby pointed out (Commentary on Androt. frag. 24), the order is perhaps deliberately geographical and *τὰ τελευταῖα* may simply denote 'the crowning instance of Philip's privateering'. What is clear from Androtion is that Philip was active with piratical raids earlier than the Olynthian war.

<sup>5</sup> Schwartz, op. cit., p. 34, also related the reference in § 37 to the troubles in Euboea in 349/8. However, Philip does not appear to have been involved in these troubles (cf. section II of this article) and the letters cannot be dated.

<sup>6</sup> Op. cit., p. 31.

the first Philippic.' In the course of that speech, while belittling the menace of Persia, Demosthenes remarked ὅρῳ δ’ ὑμῶν ἐνίοις Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ’ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις ὀλιγωροῦτας, βασιλέα δ’ ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν οἰς ἀν προέληται φοβούμενος (§ 24), and Schwartz implied that after the first Philippic, in which 'the Macedonian appears for the first time as the national menace' and which 'opened the long series of classic attacks by the great orator who reached the height of his art and powers only when he had found his great opponent',<sup>1</sup> it is not possible that Demosthenes could refer to Philip in so casual a fashion. This is no real difficulty. Schwartz himself unwittingly supplies the answer in his next sentence: 'Demosthenes was much too good an orator to adopt this tone against Philip, if he had not been sure that he was echoing popular opinion.' By the date of the Rhodian appeal in winter 351/0<sup>2</sup> fourteen months<sup>3</sup> had passed without a new move by Philip, whereas the danger of Persia had begun to make itself felt once more. Not only had Artaxerxes, shortly before the campaign to Egypt, sent money to Thebes<sup>4</sup> wherewith to continue the Sacred War, but the prospect of a Persian victory in Egypt was truly alarming. For if he restored his own house, the King, whose threat had ended the Social War to Athens's disadvantage,<sup>5</sup> and whose preparations three years earlier had caused great uneasiness in Athens,<sup>6</sup> would be free to reassert himself as patron of a new King's Peace. These were the real fears in winter 351/0 against which Demosthenes had to argue; a tirade against Philip would by no means have served his purpose. It is in any case naïve to suppose that once Demosthenes had begun to attack Philip he could never relax. After all, after the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs he undertook the defence of Philocrates who was prosecuted for his proposal to negotiate with Philip for peace in mid 348,<sup>7</sup> and presumably on that occasion he tempered his abuse. The politician who could in 346 propose a decree about special seats for the Macedonian embassy at the Dionysia<sup>8</sup> knew how to trim the sails of his oratory before the winds of his own passion, if indeed they blew constantly.

Unless the dating of Dionysius for the first Philippic is accepted, no solution of the problem is likely to command universal assent; there is no overwhelming case against a date in 350. Yet there are grounds for associating the speech, as Focke suggested,<sup>9</sup> with the expedition of Charidemus in October 351. The latest event mentioned in the speech that can be dated is Philip's march to

<sup>1</sup> Op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> The speech *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* is dated to 351/0 by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *ad Amm.* p. 726, under which year Diodorus (16. 40) set the Persian attack on Egypt alluded to in § 11 of the speech. Since the date of the Persian attack must have been readily available in what Dionysius calls the *κοινὴ ἱστορία* (*ad Amm.* pp. 724 and 740), 351/0 is commonly accepted as the date of the speech. Focke, op. cit., pp. 18 f., tried to upset this largely with regard to the dates of the dynasty of Caria (cf. §§ 11 and 27 of the speech), but see Kahrstedt, op. cit., pp. 22 f.

<sup>3</sup> For date of Philip's attack on Heracum Teichos cf. Hammond, *J.H.S.* lvii (1937), 57.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 16. 40. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Histoire grecque*, iii. 200.

<sup>6</sup> Demosthenes' speech, *On the Symmories*, dated to 354/3 by Dionysius (*ad Amm.* pp. 724-5), dealt with the danger of Persian attack. Beloch's rejection of this date (*Gr. Gesch.* iii. 2. 261) rests on his dating of Pammenes' mission to 354 and is not justified (cf. Hammond, op. cit., pp. 58 f.). The Persian preparations, the rumour of which occasioned Demosthenes' speech, may well have been the first step towards invading Egypt. The Persian force which wrested from Sparta the supremacy of the sea at Cnidus in 394 was being collected in 397/6 (*Xen. Hell.* 3. 4. 1).

<sup>7</sup> Aesch. 2. 14.

<sup>8</sup> Aesch. 2. 55, and 110 f.

<sup>9</sup> Op. cit., pp. 21 ff., esp. p. 25.

Heraeum Teichos in November 352,<sup>1</sup> but some time has evidently elapsed since that crisis and Demosthenes is speaking at a time when there is no question either of urgent aid to any particular danger-point<sup>2</sup> or of alliance and when Athens seems to be doing very little about the war in the north. The lull between the decree of November 352 and the departure of Charidemus ten months later seems a suitable context for the speech. A force is, however, to be sent out (*τῇ νυνὶ βοηθείᾳ* § 14). Is this Charidemus' expedition? He sailed out with ten triremes for which he had to find his own crews without the help of the state,<sup>3</sup> and the demand for service in person is central to the speech. Although it cannot be proved, it seems reasonable to suppose that Demosthenes is attacking a proposal to send out a force with 'empty' ships. In §§ 43 f. he says: *καὶ τριήρεις κενάς καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῦ δεῖνος ἐλπίδας ἀν ἀποστεῖλητε, πάντ' ἔχειν οἰεσθε καλῶς; οὐκ ἐμβησόμεθα; οὐκ ἔξιμεν αὐτοὶ μέρει γέ τινι στρατιωτῶν οἰκείων νῦν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πρότερον;* In § 45 he speaks of sending out *στρατηγὸν καὶ φήμισμα κενόν*. That is, he is opposing the *φήμισμα κενόν* which would send out a general but no citizens, and he has accordingly to defend himself against the charge of delaying the expedition. Such was the interpretation of Focke, and it seems reasonable if not sure. The speech concerns an expedition sent out when nothing much appeared to be happening, and this could well be the expedition of Charidemus.

If the speech is to be related to Charidemus' expedition of 351/0, how does this affect the credit of Dionysius? He describes<sup>4</sup> the speech as *ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ, περὶ τῆς ἀποστολῆς τοῦ ξενικοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ τῶν δέκα φυγαδικῶν τριηρῶν εἰς Μακεδονίαν*. Although this appears to refer to Demosthenes' own proposals, it would also be a suitable description of Charidemus' expedition and, in case Dionysius did know what he was talking about, it is to be noted that the relating of the speech to Charidemus does not conflict with Dionysius' description. The difficulty is in the dating. Charidemus went out in the third month of 351/0,<sup>6</sup> whereas Dionysius dates the speech in 352/1. Despite what has recently been said in defence of Dionysius' date,<sup>7</sup> few will feel sufficient confidence in the Dionysian datings to say that the speech cannot be concerned with the expedition of Charidemus and that the credit of Dionysius must prevail. Yet there is a way out of the difficulty. Demosthenes says that the Athenians actually sent Charidemus out in Boedromion (III)<sup>8</sup> but it may be safely presumed that this was the date of departure and not necessarily of the decree. For the first part of the Attic year the Etesian winds effectively prevented ships sailing northwards; the length of time that they blew varied and the figures given by ancient sources range from twenty-three to sixty days, but the commonest is forty days.<sup>9</sup> If

<sup>1</sup> § 17. Cf. Dem. 3. 4 f. The date is probable, if not certain.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. § 1. Of course, Demosthenes would be speaking in relation to a *προβούλευμα* concerning *ἡ νυνὶ βοηθεία* (§ 14), but what he means is that the situation has not been changed by some new development.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably this is the meaning of *κενάς* in Dem. 3. 5. By the law of Periander trierarchs ceased to be responsible for finding their own crews (Dem. 21. 155), but the *δῆμος* must on occasion have provided no citizens *ἐκ καταλόγου* and thus left the general to find his own crews entirely. Cf. the con-

trast in Philochorus, *F.G.H.* 328 F 49 between the ships of Chares and *ἀς συνεπλήρωσαν*.

<sup>4</sup> *Ad Amm.*, p. 725.

<sup>5</sup> Three manuscripts have *φυγαδικῶν* and two *γαδικῶν* and the emendation of Boehneck, *ταχικῶν*, changed by Morell to *ταχεῖῶν*, has found general acceptance.

<sup>6</sup> Dem. 3. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Sealey, *R.E.G.* lxviii (1955), 77 f.

<sup>8</sup> See n. 6 above.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. P.-W. vi. 1. 714. Focke, *op. cit.*, p. 10, suggested that the date of Charidemus' expedition was related to the Etesians.

Charidemus' expedition was voted late in Scirophorion (XII) 352/1, he then had to find crews and he may well have been unable to leave Athens until the Etesians stopped blowing; if no new trouble had threatened in the meantime, there would be no great reason for haste.<sup>1</sup> Thus the first Philippic might both have been delivered in 352/1 and have concerned the expedition of Charidemus. Whether Dionysius (or his sources) could have gathered such precise information from the general histories, which he professed to use,<sup>2</sup> it is hard to say and his misdating of the second half of the speech is very suggestive. On the other hand, it should not be assumed that the general histories left him in as great ignorance as our own.

For the present purpose it is not necessary either to salvage or to abandon Dionysius. What is reasonably clear is that the first Philippic was not concerned with the effort to save Olynthus, but was a criticism of the conduct of the long-standing war against Philip, and so the proposals it contains are to be judged in relation to that war.

## II. EUBOEA 349/8

The history of the Athenian intervention in Euboea needs reconsideration. The view developed by Parke<sup>3</sup> that there were two expeditions, the second of which was *πανδημεῖ*, has found its way into some accounts of the period.<sup>4</sup> As a result Athens is represented as having spent six months or more in fruitless operations, part of the time with all the strength she could send out, while the really important business of the defence of Olynthus was ruinously neglected. The Athenian part in the war in the north itself needs consideration, but it is necessary first to deal with Euboea.

The principal source for the Athenian intervention in Euboea is Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*, chh. 12–14. His account is as follows. When Plutarch of Eretria called on the Athenians to help him, Phocion was sent *ἔχων δύναμιν οὐ πολλήν*, since the Athenians expected that there would be ample support for him from the island itself. When he got there he found that this was not so and all he could do was to occupy a position at Tamynae where he held together the best part of his force; the rest slipped back to Athens. In due course he was attacked, Plutarch deserted him, and he was in a position of considerable danger, but when his troops broke out of their camp and attacked, the enemy were routed. After this Phocion expelled Plutarch from Eretria, took possession of a fortress, Zaretra, and sailed home. His successor, Molossus, was less successful and was actually taken captive. Thus by this account there was only one expedition to Euboea during Phocion's period of command.

Parke, however, has argued for two expeditions. In his view three passages

<sup>1</sup> The Great Mysteries ended on 22 Boedromion (Deubner, *Att. Feste*, p. 72), and the Etesians would have ceased earlier, but, if Philip had not acted under cover of the season, there would have no longer been need for haste. If the debate to which the first Philippic belongs was held not long before the Etesians, there was good reason for the haste of *οἱ ταχὺς καὶ τήμερον εἰπόντες* (§ 14). It should be added, however, that Demosthenes' allusion to the Etesians (§ 31)

does not suggest that Philip may shortly exploit the seasons.

<sup>2</sup> *Ad Amm.*, pp. 724 and 740.

<sup>3</sup> J.H.S. xlix (1929), 246 f. Parke follows Kahstedt, op. cit., pp. 56 f., in postulating two expeditions, although he differs in detail.

<sup>4</sup> e.g. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone*, p. 111, n. 1, and Cloché, *Un fondateur d'Empire*, pp. 131 f.

combine to show that Athens sent out a large force to relieve the small force under Phocion marooned at Tamynae.

- (a) Dem. 39. 16, where the speaker says that the defendant was left in Athens for the Choes, *ὅτ' εἰς Ταμύνας παρῆλθον οἱ ἄλλοι*. 'The use of *οἱ ἄλλοι*', according to Parke, 'implies that this was an expedition of all the citizens'.
- (b) [Dem.] 59. 4, where in talking about the crisis in which Apollodorus brought forward his financial proposal the speaker says it happened *μελλόντων στρατεύεσθαι ὑμῶν πανδημεῖ εἰς τε Εὐβοιαν καὶ Ὀλυνθον*. This shows that an expedition *πανδημεῖ* was under consideration.
- (c) Dem. 21. 162, where speaking of the Athenian reaction to the news that Phocion was in danger Demosthenes says that the Council promptly decided to recommend to the People that all the remaining cavalry should go out (*πάντας ἔξιέναι τοὺς ὑπολοίπους ἵππεας*). Parke takes this to confirm that an expedition *πανδημεῖ* actually took place.

It is melancholy that a theory based on evidence so handled should find acceptance. Not one of the three passages justifies Parke's use of it. First, Dem. 39. 16. The inference from *οἱ ἄλλοι* is weak; the speaker may mean no more than 'the others who were called on to go'. It neither proves nor disproves. What is interesting in the passage is the word *παρῆλθον*. This is commonly used to describe the march of an army along a coast,<sup>1</sup> and it is used by Aeschines,<sup>2</sup> who distinguished himself in the campaign,<sup>3</sup> to describe the advance of the infantry in Phocion's force along the coast from where they landed to Tamynae. So this passage may well refer to the original expedition (and, incidentally, provide the date for it). Secondly, Dem. 21. 162. One has only to read the whole of §§ 162 and 163 to see that what the Council proposed was never ratified by the People. When the meeting of the Assembly began, the situation was still felt to be serious as is seen from the action of Midias in volunteering to equip a trireme, but *οὐκ ἔδοκει, προϊόντης τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ λόγων γηγομένων, τῆς τῶν ἵππεων βοηθείας ηδη δεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνεπεπτώκει τὰ τῆς ἔξόδου*. So how could the Council's proposal show that there was a second expedition to Euboea? Thirdly, [Dem.] 59. 4. This does, indeed, show that an expedition *πανδημεῖ* was under consideration in 349/8, but the passage as a whole also suggests that the expedition never went. In this passage, already discussed above, the speaker is seeking to show that Apollodorus was wrongly prosecuted and punished for his proposal concerning the use of the Theoric Fund; his method is to describe the situation at the time the proposal was made and to suggest that the collapse of Athenian plans to save Olynthus was due to the prosecution of Apollodorus. He says that

- (i) Athens was in the position where
  - (a) she could either save Olynthus or come to disaster, *δι' ἀπορίαν χρημάτων καταλυθέντος τοῦ στρατοπέδου* § 3, and
  - (b) she was actually on the point of sending out a large expedition to Olynthus (*μελλόντων στρατεύεσθαι ὑμῶν πανδημεῖ εἰς τε Εὐβοιαν καὶ Ὀλυνθον*),
- (ii) Apollodorus proposed the measure that would have financed the expedition (§ 4).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Thuc. 8. 16, 22, 32, Xen. *Hell.* 2. 1.  
18, 4. 5. 19.

<sup>2</sup> 3. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Aesch. 2. 169.

We are left to infer that the reason for the breaking-up of the armament was the prosecution. Probably this was mere pleading and the expedition was abandoned for the good reason that it was no longer needed at Tamynae,<sup>1</sup> but in any case it seems that one of the facts which the speaker was distorting was that this expedition *πανδημεῖ* never went out. That is, the passage confirms the very opposite of what Parke maintained.

Of course it is clear that some of those from the original expedition who had been allowed to return to Athens when no hostile force at first appeared, like Midias and Demosthenes himself,<sup>2</sup> were recalled by Phocion; there were notably the knights who had never gone farther than Argura but who were needed to relieve those who were being sent on to Olynthus.<sup>3</sup> But that was all, and the dating is quite plain.<sup>4</sup> The expedition to help Plutarch went out, as Dem. 39. 16 shows, just before the festival of the Choes on 12 Anthesterion (VIII), the battle of Tamynae was fought about a month later shortly before the Dionysia<sup>5</sup> (which began on 9 Elaphebolion (IX)), and presumably the cavalry that crossed from Chalcis to Olynthus went not long after the battle, perhaps late in Elaphebolion (IX).

Despite the arguments of Pokorny,<sup>6</sup> modern writers<sup>7</sup> continue to treat the trouble in Euboea as a distraction for the Athenians arranged by Philip. This view is based on the statement in our manuscripts of Aeschines (3. 87) that Callias of Chalcis sent to Philip for help (*παρὰ Φιλίππου δύναμιν μεταπεμφάμενος*). This reading, as Pokorny pointed out, is doubtful. The scholiast on § 86 gives a short account of the trouble in Euboea and includes the statement that for his campaign against Plutarch Cleitarchus took *παρὰ Φαλαίκου τοῦ Φωκέων τυράννου δύναμιν* but has nothing whatever to say about Philip. Further, a few lines later Aeschines himself speaks of Callias' brother transporting *τοὺς Φωκικοὺς ξένους*. On these grounds alone the case for changing *Φιλίππου* to *Φαλαίκου* is fairly strong, but, considered from a more general standpoint, it becomes very strong indeed. For it would be difficult to say why, if Philip had been involved in any way in the trouble in Euboea in 349/8, Demosthenes was both opposed to the expedition and proud of having been so,<sup>8</sup> and still more difficult to understand why, in the charges and counter-charges with which the speeches of the period are filled, his policy is never attacked or defended. Nor do the passages which might be used to support the manuscript reading of Aeschines afford any real help. The letters of Philip to the Euboeans alluded to in the first Philippic<sup>9</sup> belong to 351 or earlier, and hardly provide evidence of an appeal in 348. Again, the words with which Plutarch in his life of Phocion introduces his account of the war (*παραδομένου δὲ εἰς τὴν Εὐβοιαν τοῦ Φιλίππου καὶ δύναμιν ἐκ Μακεδονίας διαβιβάζοντος κτλ.*) may be no more than a retrojection of later events.<sup>10</sup> Certainly the references of Demosthenes to Philip's

<sup>1</sup> Schaefer, *op. cit.* ii<sup>2</sup>. 82, is probably right in supposing that the news about Tamynae arrived in the course of the *εκκλησία*.

<sup>2</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 12. 3, Dem. 21. 132, 133.

<sup>3</sup> Dem. 21. 164 (cf. 132) and 197.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iii. 2. 278 f.

<sup>5</sup> So Demosthenes stayed to produce his chorus and was subsequently charged by Midias with desertion (Dem. 21. 110).

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 132 f.

<sup>7</sup> e.g. Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 208

f.; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iii. 1. 495 n. 1, *Histoire grecque*, iii. 135; Cloché, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>8</sup> Dem. 5. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Dem. 4. 37.

<sup>10</sup> Beloch, *loc. cit.*, regards Plutarch's introduction here as decisive confirmation of the manuscripts' reading in Aesch. 3. 87, but in view of the later connexion of Cleitarchus and Philip (Dem. 9. 58, etc.) it is not surprising that Plutarch should write inaccurately.

intervention in Euboea<sup>1</sup> give no hint of any Macedonian troops being there before 343 and Plutarch must be at least exaggerating. More probably he is merely borrowing from the later period a suitably dramatic background for Phocion's expedition. The Euboeans certainly were in diplomatic communication in 348 with Philip, as the message they delivered to Athens in the middle of the year testifies,<sup>2</sup> but this is far from proving that the movement against Plutarch of Eretria was initiated by Philip, or that Philip was seriously involved in Euboea so early. All in all, it seems better to emend the text of Aeschines than to suppose that Demosthenes could pride himself on opposing an expedition against troops sent by Philip. Yet, even if Aeschines did write παρὰ Φιλίππου, there is little reason to think that he was telling the truth, and it will be assumed in what follows that the Euboean war was not part of the war against Philip but an isolated local struggle.

### III. THE ATHENIAN AID TO OLYNTHUS IN 349/8

Under the archonship of Callimachus (349/8) Philochorus<sup>3</sup> recorded the three Athenian expeditions to Olynthus. The first was of 2,000 peltasts, 'the 30 triremes with Chares and the 8 ἀσ συνεπλήρωσαν'; the second was of 4,000 peltasts, 150 knights, and 18 triremes under the command of Charidemus, 'the general at the Hellespont'; the third was of a further 17 triremes, 2,000 hoplites, and 300 knights with Chares in command of the whole force.

These three expeditions can be dated fairly precisely. The first is the least satisfactory. Olynthus fell during the Macedonian Olympia<sup>4</sup> which were held shortly after the end of the third month of the Attic year,<sup>5</sup> and Demosthenes<sup>6</sup> says that all the Chalcidian cities were taken in a year. So this would mean that the war began early in 349/8, and since it is unlikely that Olynthus delayed appealing to Athens, the first expedition, which, as Philochorus<sup>7</sup> shows, followed closely on the alliance, must have left Athens early in 349/8 also. This date is confirmed, if Jacoby<sup>8</sup> is correct in his theory that of citations from Philochorus those that begin, like this one, with an archon's name followed by ἐπὶ τούτου . . . concern the first entry in the Attis for the year; the alliance and the first expedition would thus be the first events mentioned in 349/8. So if the first expedition of Chares is put in early Boedromion (III), i.e. shortly after the Etesian winds, that will not be far wrong.

The third expedition is presumably the one that was too late to save Olyn-

<sup>1</sup> 9. 57 f., 19. 83, 87, 204. Cf. Schaefer, op. cit. ii<sup>2</sup>. 81, n. 2, who rejects the possibility of Philip actually sending help but keeps the manuscript reading in Aesch. 3. 87, and dismisses Aeschines' account as 'lügenhaft'.

<sup>2</sup> Aesch. 2. 12.

<sup>3</sup> F.G.H. 328 F 49-51.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 16. 55, Dem. 19. 192 ('Ολύμπιον ἔτοις').

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the narrative of Arrian, *Anab.* 1. 10 and 11. 1. For the Macedonian Olympia see P.-W. xviii. 1. 46. The usual view is that Olynthus fell during the Greek Olympia (cf. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iii. 2. 280), but neither does this allow sufficient time for the events of Aesch. 2. 12 f. nor is there any reason to sup-

pose that the Greek Olympia were celebrated in Macedon also. Cf. R.E.G. lxxiii (1960), 417, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> 19. 266, presumably more or less correct if not exact. The fact that Diodorus (see p. 132, n. 7) splits the war into two archon years does not affect the question of the accuracy of Demosthenes' statement as to the duration of the war.

<sup>7</sup> F.G.H. 328 F 49 συμμαχίαν το ἔποισαντο . . . καὶ βοήθειαν ἐπεμψαν. (The lacuna of about eighteen letters does not affect the close connexion between the making of alliance and the dispatch of the expedition.)

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Commentary to Philochorus, p. 532, lines 9 f.

thus. There were at any rate only three expeditions recorded in Philochorus<sup>1</sup> and it is most unlikely that he omitted a further expedition. Olynthus fell shortly after Boedromion (III) 348/7 and it seems likely that the bad weather which delayed Chares<sup>2</sup> was caused by the Etesian winds. So the final Olynthian appeal and the voting of this last expedition, both of which were put by Philochorus under 349/8, should be set as late in 349/8 as possible, i.e. in Scirophorion (XII). As to the second expedition, that of Charidemus,<sup>3</sup> the cavalry that went from Euboea to Olynthus<sup>4</sup> about the time of the Dionysia of 348 must have gone under him. So his expedition should be put in spring 348.<sup>5</sup>

The citations from Philochorus concerning the expeditions are suggestive. In the first there is a distinction between the thirty ships with Chares (*τὰς μετὰ Χάρητος*) and eight for which the Athenians helped to provide crews (*ἀς συνεπλήρωσαν*).<sup>6</sup> The latter are presumably the triremes which, Demosthenes<sup>7</sup> says, were equipped by volunteer trierarchs, but the former are spoken of as a force already in existence. One may infer that the response to the Olynthian appeal was to send the regular squadron in the north supplemented by what patriotic citizens cared to add. That was all that happened in autumn 349. As to the second force, that of spring 348, Charidemus is spoken of as *τὸν ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ στρατηγόν* as if this was a regular appointment, and it may be suggested that the eighteen ships of his force were the ten he sailed out with in 351 together with the eight volunteered triremes that had sailed north the previous autumn. That is, once again the response to the Olynthian appeal was to use the force already out on active service. Of the third expedition Philochorus says that they sent out *τριήρεις ἑτέρας ἐπτακαΐδεκα*. Why *ἑτέρας*? The word does not occur with reference to Charidemus' ships, and the explanation is that apart from *ἀς συνεπλήρωσαν ὅκτα* these are the only ships Athens specially sent out during the war (and they were too late). They must have been added to the forces already operating, and the description of Chares as general *τοῦ παντὸς στόλου* suits this: he was to take command of both Charidemus' ships and the reinforcements as well as having his own ships, *τὰς μετὰ Χάρητος*.<sup>8</sup>

Thus the city appears to have sent out very little special help to Olynthus. Nor was what was available constantly employed around Olynthus, if we may judge by the mysterious inscription, *I.G. ii<sup>2</sup>. 207*. This consists of four fragments of which the first, containing the name of the archon for 349/8, is lost. The matters referred to in the second large fragment appear to be concerned with current affairs,<sup>9</sup> and it is necessary to reckon with the decree in dealing with

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Scholiast to Dem. 2. 1 (Dindorf, viii. 74, line 10), quoted by Jacoby, *F.G.H.* iii B, p. 113 (i.e. beneath F 49 and 50).

<sup>2</sup> 'Suidas', s.v. *Κάραος*: *βοηθούς ἐπεμψαν Αθηναῖς ταῦς μ' καὶ Χάρητα στρατηγὸν σ' χειμῶνι ἀποληφθέντος, προδότων δὲ τὴν "Ολυνθὸν Εὐδυκράτους καὶ Λασθένους, τὴν μὲν ἀνάστατον ἐποίησε (Φίλιππος) . . . .*

<sup>3</sup> *F.G.H.* 328 F 50.

<sup>4</sup> Dem. 21. 197.

<sup>5</sup> Those who, like Kahrstedt, op. cit., p. 61, place the third expedition in spring 348 do so because they suppose that Olynthus fell at the time of the Greek Olympia. For the whole question of the dating of the expeditions cf. Schaefer, op. cit. ii<sup>2</sup>. 118 f.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Schaefer, op. cit. ii<sup>2</sup>. 76 n. 4.

<sup>7</sup> 21. 161.

<sup>8</sup> It is not clear whether Chares was in Athens to go with these reinforcements. The explanation commonly given of the haste with which he sought to render account of his conduct of the Olynthian war (Dion. Hal. *ad Amm.*, p. 734, and Ar. *Rhet.* 1411<sup>a</sup>) is that he was hurrying to get off with the last expedition. Cf. Schaefer, op. cit. ii<sup>2</sup>. 143.

<sup>9</sup> Accame, *La legge ateniese*, p. 196, took the mention of syntaxis in line 13 of fragment b (*τῶν συνάρκεων τῶν ἐλ. Λέσβου*) to refer to an earlier period, because Mytilene was not in the Athenian Confederacy in 349/8, but the phrase could well refer to the other cities of

349/8. It appears that in the month of Thargelion (XI) Chares, Charidemus, and Phocion were all in some way involved with Orontes, satrap of Mysia, and were drawing on the *ouvrages* of Lesbos for whatever they were doing. Nor is it likely that some minor affair like the purchase of corn for the fleet is in hand. For, while Chares and Charidemus might have been seeking provisions from Orontes, the presence of Phocion is suggestive. He had been in command in Euboea in Elaphebolion (IX) and must have been called away from that war for this business in the north-east.<sup>1</sup> So the three generals must have been engaged on something which we do not know about but which was far removed from Olynthus.

Athens and her generals appear to have done little to save Olynthus, but, before attempting explanations, it is important to consider what militarily speaking the situation of Olynthus was.<sup>2</sup> The evidence is scanty but two points do emerge. First, the actual siege of the city did not begin until late in 349/8. In spring 348, when Charidemus arrived to help, the Olynthians joined with him in an attack on Pallene and Bottiae and ravaged the land.<sup>3</sup> This implies that the Macedonians controlled much of the territory of the Chalcidic League, but that Olynthus itself was still open. The siege began after the capture of Torone and Mecyberna (*διὰ προδοσίας*) had stopped easy access to the sea and the Olynthians had been twice defeated in battle.<sup>4</sup> Presumably these were the events that occasioned the last appeal to Athens, that of Scirophorion (XII) 349/8 (*μὴ περιδεῖν αὐτὸν καταπολεμηθέντας*).<sup>5</sup> Till then the city had been free and open. Secondly, the war was in two distinct phases as regards Philip's expressed intentions. Before the final pressure on Olynthus, he was thought to be aiming at reducing the city to terms, not at destroying it.<sup>6</sup> That is, Athens was led to fear that Olynthus might return to the position she was in before she made peace with Athens in 352, but no worse than that. In the earlier stage Philip picked off Chalcidic cities one by one<sup>7</sup> but, serious as things were, perhaps there was no likelihood of a sudden collapse. The betrayal of Torone and Mecyberna transformed the situation.<sup>8</sup> In this way, Philip, by good luck

the island that remained in the Confederacy in that year, and although the inscription is too fragmentary to allow of certainty, the various matters touched on in fragment b appear to be concerned with operations in progress. Until fragment a is rediscovered, doubt will remain as to whether fragments b, c, and d really belong to it, but the considerations advanced in the *editio minor* of *I.G.* seem sufficient.

<sup>1</sup> The troubles in Euboea continued almost until the Olympic truce of 348 (Aesch. 2. 12). Presumably the recall of Phocion (Plut. *Phoc.* 14. 1) was connected with the subject of *I.G.* ii<sup>2</sup>. 207.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Focke, *op. cit.*, p. 23 n. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Philochorus, frag. 50.

<sup>4</sup> Diod. 16. 53.

<sup>5</sup> Philochorus, frag. 51.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Dem. 1. 4 . . . τὰς καταλλαγάς, ἃς ἀνέκεινος ποιήσατ' δομένος πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους. Also 9. 11, 8. 59, and 2. 1.

<sup>7</sup> The account of Diodorus gives the attack on Olynthus in two stages. In 16. 52. 9 under

349/8 he records the destruction of *Γείρα* (probably a corruption of *Στρατέπα*) and the subjection of other places. In 16. 53 under 348/7 Philip μετὰ πολλῆς δυνάμεως attacks and captures Torone, Mecyberna, and Olynthus. Thus Diodorus' account is perhaps chronologically correct, is consistent with the situation in the first Olynthiac (cf. § 17, where the aim is said to be 'to save the cities for the Olynthians'), confirms that Olynthus was not immediately besieged, and reflects the two stages of Philip's expressed intentions.

The attempt of Focke (*op. cit.*, pp. 10 f.) to date the attack on *Γείρα* in 350 (to which he supposes that Dem. 4. 17 refers) has nothing positive to recommend it. Cf. Momigliano, *op. cit.*, p. 112, n. 1. The notice about *Γείρα* is not inevitably linked with the notice about Pherae (probably a repetition of the notice at Diod. 16. 37. 3 and 38. 1).

<sup>8</sup> It is not clear where the treachery of Lasthenes and Euthycrates (Dem. 9. 56 and 19. 265 f.) fits in. One would expect that it

or by good generalship, grabbed the city before the Athenians could save it.

It remains to date the third Olynthiac in relation to these events. About the first two speeches, which both clearly belong to the first appeal from Olynthus,<sup>1</sup> there is no debate, but opinions have differed as to the third. Kahrstedt<sup>2</sup> maintained that it must have been spoken before Athens intervened in Euboea; Pokorný<sup>3</sup> denied this and argued for a date late in 349/8; and in considering Athens' conduct of the war in the north it is important to determine which view is right. The main point urged by Pokorný for the late date is that the cautious manner in which Demosthenes made his proposal for the change of the law about the Theoric Fund suggests that Apollodorus had already come to disaster in proposing the same change.<sup>4</sup> This is not as strong as it might at first sight seem. In the first Olynthiac also Demosthenes touched on the Theoric Fund and with equal caution declined to initiate any change,<sup>5</sup> and, if Pokorný's point were valid for the third oration, it would be equally so for the first, to which it clearly cannot apply. It might happen to be true that Demosthenes used such words after Apollodorus was prosecuted, but they do not require the late dating of the speech.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, Kahrstedt's argument about the complete silence of Demosthenes with regard to Euboea is of the greatest weight. Once Athens had sent a citizen army to Euboea, which operated to such poor effect, Demosthenes could hardly have maintained silence as to the contrast between what Athens was prepared to do for the worthless Plutarch and what she was doing to fight Philip in Chalcidice. In particular, one should attend to his detailed attack on Eubulus and his supporters in §§ 21 and ff. In §§ 27 and 28 they are blamed for neglecting the war in the north and in § 29 he goes on to pour scorn on the public works which were an important part of their home policy, but of the intervention in Euboea, in which Eubulus' supporters played so prominent a part, there is not a word. Is it really possible that Demosthenes kept silence because, as Pokorný argued,<sup>7</sup> he did not want to exacerbate feelings? He had said enough, and that most directly, to give great offence. Why should he have foregone his most telling point? The only proper answer is that he was speaking before the troubles in Euboea had begun.

This much has been widely accepted, but opinion has divided as to whether the third Olynthiac followed the two earlier speeches at a long enough interval for the situation to have changed considerably.<sup>8</sup> In support it has been urged that Thessalian affairs are touched on in the first two<sup>9</sup> but not in the third. In itself this proves little; news from Thessaly within a short time could have rendered Demosthenes' proposal of an embassy pointless. Nor does the supposed allusion to a victory of a force of mercenaries<sup>10</sup> necessarily indicate that belonged to the period of the two battles (Diod. 16. 53) before the siege began, but Diodorus says that it was the cause of the fall of the city. Perhaps the Greek sources grossly exaggerated or even misrepresented the act of Lasthenes and Euthycretes in surrendering.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 1. 2 and 2. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Op. cit., p. 61.

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit., pp. 119 f.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Dem. 3. 10 f. and [Dem.] 59. 3 f.

<sup>5</sup> § 19. "Τί οὖν;" ἀν τις εἶποι, "οὐ γράφεις ταῦτ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά;" μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔγωγε.

<sup>6</sup> Focke, op. cit., pp. 27 f., errs in the other direction in claiming that, because Demosthenes does not mention Apollodorus, the speech must have been before the latter's proposal.

<sup>7</sup> Op. cit., pp. 123 f.

<sup>8</sup> The arguments in favour of a long interval between the second and third Olynthiacs have been mustered by Pokorný, op. cit., pp. 119 f.

<sup>9</sup> 1. 21 f., 2. 11.

<sup>10</sup> § 35.

the first of Philochorus' expeditions is in the field; mercenary forces had been fighting the war against Philip for years. Again it has been alleged that the third speech is markedly different in tone,<sup>1</sup> but even in the first speech Demosthenes took the extreme view of what was at issue,<sup>2</sup> and in any case it would not be surprising that, if Athens was proposing to answer the Olynthian appeal with no more than a mercenary force, Demosthenes should adopt a more gloomy tone as he contemplated the preparation of a mere eight 'volunteer' triremes.<sup>3</sup> So nothing compels a considerably later date for the third speech, while there is positive evidence for associating it with the first Olynthian appeal. In § 6 he says *νῦν δ' ἔτέρου πολέμου καιρὸς ἡκει τις*, and in § 7 *ἐκπολεμῶσαι δεῖν φόμεθα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου, καὶ ὁ πάντες ἐθρύλουν, πέπρακται νῦν τοῦθ' ὄπωσδήποτε*. These passages are closely akin to the first two speeches and appropriate only to the early stages of the Olynthian war.<sup>4</sup> Thus there is a strong case for dating the third speech close to the other two.<sup>5</sup> In any case, since the speech was delivered before the Euboean affair and since Demosthenes was recommending a full-scale citizen expedition, he presumably spoke within the navigating season of 349, and that is all that is necessary for the present discussion.<sup>6</sup>

#### IV. THE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

In the war against Philip there were two strategic necessities for Athens. First, she had to keep Philip from breaking into Greece and co-operating with Thebes in an attack on Attica itself, and the second matter, of equal or even greater importance, was to protect her lifeline through the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, clearly in constant danger through Macedonian expansion eastward.<sup>7</sup> The war in the north was in itself far less important and it acquired interest for serious Athenian statesmen in so far as it became a possible means of preventing Philip from ruining Athens by attack or by starvation. Demosthenes saw all

<sup>1</sup> Cf. esp. §§ 1 and 9.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. § 25.

<sup>3</sup> This would also explain why in the third Olynthiac he has ceased to demand mere *εἰσφορά*: he now saw that only a regular war-fund would make possible an expedition of the sort he demanded, and that the difficulty of getting an *εἰσφορά* voted was a brake on sustained major efforts against Philip.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, iii. 1. 320.

<sup>5</sup> Momigliano (op. cit., p. 112, n. 1) is a supporter of this view. Its most extreme form is to be found in H. Erbse, *Rh. Mus.* xcix (1956), 379 f., who supposes that all three Olynthiacs were delivered at one and the same ἀκκλησία! This both argues an importance of Demosthenes which he probably did not possess, and is a strange notion of Athenian assemblies. (Are there any clear cases known where the same man made two set speeches on the one day on the one subject?) But Erbse's analysis of the speeches effectively shows their close connexion.

<sup>6</sup> As noted above, the first appeal of Olynthus came very early in 349/8, and it was the first matter recorded in Philochorus for that year (cf. p. 130, n. 8), but in view of uncer-

tainty about the procedure of *νομοθεσία* it would be unsafe to argue from Demosthenes' demand for the appointment of nomothetes (§§ 10 f.) that the third Olynthiac belongs in the first prytany of 349/8.

<sup>7</sup> How important was the possession of the Chersonese for the safety of the Athenian corn supply? Athens had managed her supply despite the hostility of Byzantium since 364 (cf. Accame, *La lega*, p. 179, n. 3) and down to 353 the Chersonese was not entirely under her control. So it might be argued that the Chersonese was only of value to Philip if he could use his fleet which in 349/8 was still much too weak. This is in some degree true, but ports were necessary; Sestos was a regular stopping place (cf. [Dem.] 50. 20 and Ar. *Rhet.* 1411<sup>14</sup>, where Sestos is described as the corn-table—*τηλία*—of the Peiraeus) and indeed from 365 it was in Athens's possession (Nep. *Tim.* i. 3). If Philip took Sestos and persuaded or obliged the Byzantines to act against Athenian ships at Hieros ([Dem.] 50. 17, Philochorus F 162—for its site, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, see P.-W. iii. 752), the corn supply would have been at least seriously affected.

this clearly.<sup>1</sup> The question to be discussed is whether the strategy he advocated was the best possible for attaining the two main aims.

First, it must be confessed that it is not certain how Demosthenes thought Olynthus was to be defended. The precise proposals of the first Philippic were made with no thought of alliance with Olynthus but sought merely a more effective prosecution of the long struggle for Amphipolis. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the two later expeditions to save Olynthus satisfied Demosthenes any more than the first had done.<sup>2</sup> He was very much in a minority in opposing intervention in Euboea, by his own account the only dissentient voice,<sup>3</sup> and it is unlikely that the man who had demanded an expedition *παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*<sup>4</sup> approved of the raiding force of Charidemus or the final expedition of Chares. Indeed, although Demosthenes had been eminent in the courts in the 350's, he appears to have had practically no success whatever in initiating policy<sup>5</sup> until under cover of having defended Philocrates in 348 he rose to eminence in 346 first as champion of the peace in concert with Philocrates and then as its and his embittered opponent. Until then he probably counted for very little, and the speeches of 349/8 survive because of his reputation as an orator, and not because of his power and influence as a statesman. Thus what Athens actually did is no guide to what Demosthenes demanded and his ideas on strategy in 349/8 must remain to some degree conjectural.

There is, however, in the first Olynthiac, one statement that is sufficiently close to Demosthenes' concrete proposals of 351 to suggest that the entry of Olynthus into the war did not seem to him to call for more than the prompt application of his earlier proposals. In §§ 17 f. he says that two forces are necessary, one to ravage Macedonian territory, the other to save the cities of the Olynthians, and this recalls the two forces proposed in 351, the one of 10 ships, 2,000 foot, and 500 horse, the other of 50 ships manned by the Athenians

<sup>1</sup> Cf. I. 25.

<sup>2</sup> It is sometimes asserted that Dionysius of Halicarnassus related the three Olynthiac speeches to the three expeditions, but, though he may well have done so, this is not a necessary inference from the Letter to Ammaeus X (*μετὰ γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλίμαχον, ἐφ' οὐν τὰς εἰς "Ολυνθὸν βοηθείας ἀπίστειλαν Αθηναῖον πεισθέντες ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους . . .*). Cf. Sealey, *R.E.G.* lxviii (1955), 85. It is a more serious question whether Philochorus did so; for in the Scholiast's introduction to the second Olynthiac (Dindorf, viii. 74, line 10) occur the words *ἰοτέον δὲ διὰ φρονὸν ὁ Φιλόκορος διτρεῖς βοηθείαις ἐπέμφθησαν, καθ' ἔκστον λόγον μᾶς πεμπομένης, ὡς τῆς πρώτης μὴ οὐσῆς ἴκανης*. Did Philochorus record speeches of Demosthenes and assign them so precisely? It would be most surprising if he did and the words *καθ' ἔκστον κτλ.* may well be added by the Scholiast. In any case this is a matter affecting the credit of Philochorus, not the importance of Demosthenes.

<sup>3</sup> It is true that Demosthenes' defence of Philocrates on trial for proposing to negotiate with Philip came early in 348/7 (i.e. before

Olynthus fell, cf. Aesch. 2. 14 and *R.E.G.* lxxiii [1960], 417, n. 2) and the debate that led to the dispatch of the third expedition belonged to 349/8 (cf. Philochorus F 51); so it may have been the delay of this expedition that led him to despair, and we cannot be sure that he had not spoken in support of the last expedition. Yet in general it would seem that it was Eubulus and his supporters who were in power in 349 (v.i.) and it is notable that neither Aeschines (3. 54 and 58 f.) nor Demosthenes (18. 17 f.) in discussing the latter's career has anything to say about Demosthenes' political record before 346. The theory of Glotz (*Rev. Hist.* clxx [1932]) that Demosthenes succeeded in establishing a war-fund, *τὰ στρατιωτικά*, in 349/8 has been widely accepted, but it is extremely ill founded, as I hope to show elsewhere. Rather, the failure of Apollodorus ([Dem.] 59. 5) shows that Demosthenes and his supporters were not in a position of power in 348.

<sup>4</sup> 5. 5.

<sup>5</sup> 3. 6.

<sup>6</sup> See n. 2 above.

themselves (*αὐτοῖς ἐμβάσιν*).<sup>1</sup> The emphasis of 349/8 was still on citizen service, but he may have wished to send even larger numbers (*εἰ γὰρ μὴ βοηθήσετε παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, θεάσασθ’ ὃν τρόπον ὑμεῖς ἐστρατηγηκότες πάντ’ ἔσεσθ’ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου*).<sup>2</sup>) However, it is sure that he would not have wanted to do less than he had earlier proposed.

The raiding force is hardly serious. It was too small to do much real damage and Philip would hardly abandon the assault on Olynthus to deal with it when he had sufficient numbers of infantry and cavalry to afford a reserve which could make raiding a dangerous and unprofitable occupation. For if Demosthenes was still, militarily speaking, in the fifth century, Philip was not, nor should it be assumed that the failure of Demosthenes' opponents to agree with him on this point was due to other than common sense. However, the real point of difference in his proposals, viz. that large numbers of citizens should be sent to save the cities of the Chalcidic League, is most important and there are certain considerations which perhaps did not escape his opponents.

First of all, how reliable were the Olynthians? The history of their relations with Athens gave little cause for confidence. They had defected from the Athenian Confederacy, presumably about the time that Athens persuaded the Hellenes and Amyntas to recognize her claim to Amphipolis,<sup>3</sup> and faced by the threat of a resumption of power by Athens in the north of the Aegean they had struggled on until Philip came to their aid, his first act being to deprive the Athenians of Potidaea by which Olynthus was threatened.<sup>4</sup> As Philip's power grew the Olynthians were not able to agree whether Macedon was more formidable than Athens. The peace they made with Athens in defiance of the terms of their treaty with Philip<sup>5</sup> indicated no more than a temporary success of the phil-Athenian party: even this may have been due not to agreement about Philip but rather to exhaustion by nearly two decades of naval war; unlike Philip, Olynthus shared fully in the trade of the Aegean.<sup>6</sup> Shortly after the peace with Athens, perhaps not long after the 'sudden campaign' alluded to in the first Philippic (§ 17), the leader of the phil-Athenians, Apollonides, was exiled<sup>7</sup> and it is notable that that speech gives no hint that Olynthus might be brought into alliance. By the time that Philip attacked Olynthus in 349 the situation had changed again. The city was sheltering the pretender to the Macedonian throne,<sup>8</sup> and there was a general demand in Athens that it should be drawn into the war.<sup>9</sup> How far, then, could the Olynthians be trusted? If Athens committed a large number of her citizens to the defence of the Chalcidic cities, what guarantee was there that their very presence would not stimulate those who feared Athens so greatly to seek a fresh agreement with Philip and so to endanger a large proportion of the Athenian citizen body? And what, if in seeking such an agreement treachery played a part? Such questions must have occurred to Athens's statesmen. Torone and Mecyberna fell, if Diodorus<sup>10</sup> is to be trusted, by treachery, and the action of Lasthenes and Euthycrates, whatever it was, played a decisive part in the fall of Olynthus.<sup>11</sup> Would these things

<sup>1</sup> 4. 16 f.

<sup>6</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 16. Cf. [Dem.] 35. 35.

<sup>2</sup> 3. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Dem. 9. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Accame, op. cit., p. 178.

<sup>8</sup> Justin. 8. 3. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. P.-W. xviii. 328.

<sup>9</sup> Dem. 3. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Dem. 23. 109, and § 2 of Libanius'

<sup>10</sup> 16. 53.

Hypothesis to *Ol.* 1.

<sup>11</sup> Dem. 8. 40, 9. 66, and Diod. 16. 53. 2.

not have happened if Athens had intervened in large numbers? In the first Olynthiac<sup>1</sup> Demosthenes was at pains to say that Olynthus could be trusted to fight it out with Philip. The course of the next twelve months was to prove him too optimistic. Perhaps his opponents had clearer vision and harder political heads.

Secondly, if there was a danger of arriving too late, there was a danger of committing large forces too early. The discussion of the course of operations above has shown that the early stages of Philip's attack on Olynthus were in a sense non-committal; the siege of the city itself did not begin until it could be so quickly carried through that Athens could not possibly send adequate help in time. The truth is that the choice of a time for attack lay with Philip. His earlier 'sudden campaign'<sup>2</sup> had been followed by two or more years of waiting. Was Athens in 349 to commit a large force to Olynthus and keep it there summer and winter for a similar period until the attack came? If so, the cost would have been heavy.<sup>3</sup> Five thousand men could not have been kept content in Olynthus for any length of time with the mere allowance for buying food that Demosthenes had proposed in 351 for the small active force. Now it is true that Athens's failure to provide adequately for her armies in the fourth century was a serious factor in the decline of her power, and it may be true that Eubulus and his supporters were unduly concerned with saving money, but there certainly could be no question at this period of spending as much money as a long garrisoning of Chalcidic cities would require.<sup>4</sup>

Thirdly, if Athens committed herself heavily to the defence of Olynthus, it was by no means clear that Philip would be confined to Macedon. Geography was on his side; he could have been well on his way to the Chersonese before Athens could act. In 346 the Athenian ambassadors left Philip in Pella barely more than two weeks before the Dionysia began on 9 Elaphebolion (IX),<sup>5</sup> but by the 24th day of that month Philip had wrested from Cersobleptes his kingdom, and captured the Holy Mount near the shores of the Propontis.<sup>6</sup> Such lightning movement no doubt surprised all Athenians, but that Philip could and would move quickly must have been realized. To stop such an attack on the Chersonese, even as large a force as 5,000 hoplites in Olynthus would have been ineffective, for they would have been too few to invade Macedonia; presumably Philip no more committed all his forces in these years than Alexander did against Persia. So another large force was needed for the Chersonese. Yet if Athens was to rush out large bodies of citizens every time an attack was feared, her strength would be dissipated, even if not endangered, with serious consequences for Greece itself. What would happen if Philip again tried to force the Gates?

All in all, there were strategic considerations which counselled against intervening with a large body of citizens to save Olynthus, and if Demosthenes' opponents declined to take his advice, their attitude was not entirely unreasonable. Nor would it be just to suppose that the help sent by Athens was

<sup>1</sup> § 5.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the attack mentioned in Dem. 4. 17.

<sup>3</sup> The Potidaea campaign seriously affected Athens in the Archidamian war. Even if pay was only half what it had been then, Athens could hardly afford such large sums.

<sup>4</sup> The small force of ten ships proposed in 351 was to cost 92 T a year (Dem. 4. 28); a

larger force would have cost, perhaps, four times as much. Such expenditure would have assisted Philip in itself, for Athens could not keep it up indefinitely.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Cloché, *Étude chronologique*, etc., pp. 122 f.

<sup>6</sup> Aesch. 2. 90.

sent in cynical neglect of the city's real interests. Indeed, but for treachery, Mecyberna might have been kept open and the second expedition of Chares might have saved Olynthus, if only temporarily. Statesmen are not necessarily at fault whenever their country's forces are defeated. Basically the control of Olynthus was a difficult military problem, which a united and powerful Macedon was likely to solve to its own satisfaction. Philip was able to operate on short lines of communication with the advantages of the seasons and with a specialized national army against the outmoded military conceptions of the city-state.<sup>1</sup> In war chance always plays a part, but it is at least doubtful whether Demosthenes would have succeeded where others failed. He saw clearly the menace of Philip, but his powers as a strategist did not match his oratory.

By contrast there is much to be said in favour of what Athens actually did do. First, when there was any question of Philip coming into Greece, energetic measures were taken. Not only in 352 did Athens send a substantial force to support the Phocians,<sup>2</sup> but also in 347/6 Eubulus and Aeschines reacted with great vigour to the possibility of Philip intervening in the Sacred War<sup>3</sup> and Athens was prepared to send out a fleet of fifty ships and a large proportion of the citizen body;<sup>4</sup> Philip might have been excluded by force of arms had not the shifting policy of Phocis forced the Athenians to seek peace.<sup>5</sup> The expedition to Euboea was perhaps part of this policy. Philip had not yet intervened, but, if the island had fallen completely under the control of Athens's enemies, the result might have been that either Philip or the Thebans could have used the island as a base and the chances of stopping Philip at the Gates been considerably weakened. The strategic importance of Euboea was shown when the Macedonians fixed one of the fetters of Greece at Chalcis, and, despite Demosthenes' dissent, the Athenians probably did right to intervene in 348. Although the campaign miscarried to some extent,<sup>6</sup> it is to be noted that the island did not come under Philip or Thebes before the Peace of 346. Secondly, the Athenian attitude to Philip's threatening advance to Heraeum Teichos in 352 was sensible enough despite the scorn of Demosthenes.<sup>7</sup> As long as the Chersonese

<sup>1</sup> How far did Demosthenes understand the change in the conditions of warfare? From 9. 47 it is clear that he was aware, at least by 341, that warfare had become professional and specialized, but his own proposals in the First Philippic and elsewhere hardly suggest that he fully appreciated the change in both tactics and strategy. In the fifth century when Macedon was weak and Athens strong, it had proved hard to guarantee the security of the Macedonian sea-board (cf. *S.E.G.* x. 66 = *A.T.L.* D. 3; [Dem.] 7. 12 is not to be taken too seriously), and in the fourth, when the balance of power had so greatly shifted, the difficulties of fighting Philip close to his base at the farthest stretch of Athens' communications were probably too great for Athens.

<sup>2</sup> The Athenian success in stopping Philip in 352 was greater than has been generally realized. Diodorus 16. 37 records the Phocian recovery after the battle of the Crocus Field, including the assembly of a large allied force

of which the 5,400 Athenians under Nausicles was barely more than half, but at the end of chapter 37 he leaves his narration of the Sacred War and returns to Philip. Chapter 38 recounts the check to Philip at Thermopylae καλυσάντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων with no mention of the Spartans, etc. The reasonable explanation is that only the Athenians got there in time. This is confirmed by Dem. 19. 319 where in speaking of the check to Philip Demosthenes says τότε τῶν ὄντων ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων οὐδενός, οὕτος Ἐλληνος οὐτε βαρβάρου, Φωκεῖος βοηθόσαντος πλὴν ὑμῶν. Cf. Justin 8. 2. 8. That Athens saved Phocis so easily must have had a grave effect on the ideas of Athenian statesmen: Philip learnt his lesson.

<sup>3</sup> Dem. 19. 9 f. and 303 f. Cf. *R.E.G.* lxxiii (1960), 418 f.

<sup>4</sup> Aesch. 2. 133, Dem. 19. 52, 322.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. art. cited in n. 3 above.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 14. 1.

<sup>7</sup> 3. 4 f.

was directly threatened, the Athenians prepared to intervene with a large armament, but, when Philip was found to be unable to press on with his attack, the expedition was dropped, reasonably enough. What point would there have been in sending out a large proportion of the citizen body to meet an attack that might never develop, but leaving Athens less able to apply herself to the defence of the Gates? The fact that the Chersonese remained safe justified the policy adopted. Nor should we let Demosthenes mislead us with his lists of scandalous failures.<sup>1</sup> How could Athens have saved Methone indefinitely against a strong Macedon? Even in the fifth century when the Macedonian kingdom was weak and the power of Athens enormous, the condition of Methone was highly insecure. To have committed large numbers of Athenians to the salvation of this city in the 350's would have been madness.<sup>2</sup> And what was really to be done for Pagasae, the port of Pherae? All Thessaly had joined with Philip in destroying the Pheraean power, and if Athens had got large forces involved over such a trifle, disaster might have come upon her very much more quickly than it did. After all, the war for Amphipolis was an absurdity, both militarily and politically, which had to be maintained since public opinion at Athens would not suffer the only sensible solution, viz. to abandon the quest. After a decade of fruitless and debilitating struggle followed by the reverses of the Social War Athens was not likely to win and the sane alternative was adopted of virtually leaving the war to take care of itself. If chance took a hand with an assassination or treacherous betrayal of the city, all might be well, but the mistake was not made of becoming ruinously involved in the vain struggle. Chares appears to have been out almost constantly from 353 to 346 on operations in the north<sup>3</sup> and after the operations of Iphicrates, Timotheus, and lesser men like Timomachus had produced no real gain these activities of Chares were probably as much as any sensible man could justify. Ampler forces were sent to help the Olynthians and they might have saved the city had the port of Olynthus not been handed over to Philip; the objections to committing more were at least in part strategic.

Although Eubulus is rather a shadowy figure, he and his supporters were probably responsible for Athenian policy between the Social War and the Peace of Philocrates. This is certain with regard to the Euboean expedition,<sup>4</sup> and the direction of affairs in 347/6 was clearly the work of Eubulus and Aeschines. Possibly this is true of the expeditions of 352; the general who commanded at Thermopylae, Nausicles, may be the man who was later

<sup>1</sup> 4. 35, 1. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 138, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Theopompos, *F.G.H.* 115 F 249 (of 353 cf. Schaefer, op. cit. ii<sup>2</sup>. 443, n. 3); Polyaenus 4. 2. 22, Diod. 16. 34. 3 and 35. 5 (all of 352); Philochorus, *F.G.H.* 328 F 49 (of 349—'the thirty ships under Chares', i.e. he was already provided with a force); *I.G.* ii<sup>2</sup>. 207, line 12 (of early 348). One might guess that just as Charidemus was in 348 and probably earlier δέ Ἐλλησπόντων στρατηγός, Chares was throughout the period 353 to 348, and perhaps to 346 (cf. Aesch. 2. 73 and 90 but note *I.G.* ii<sup>2</sup>. 1620, line 19), the general in command of the war for Amphipolis, δέ

στρατηγός ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν (Aesch. 2. 27), and that the thirty ships of 349 were the size of fleet he normally had (in Polyaenus, loc. cit., he has only twenty ships).

<sup>4</sup> Midas, who as ξένος καὶ φίλος of Plutarch of Eretria played a leading part in the dispatch of the expedition (Dem. 21. 110, 200), was a close associate of Eubulus (Dem. 21. 205-7). Phocion appears with Eubulus in support of Aeschines in 343 (Aesch. 2. 184). Hegesileos, who mysteriously ἐπεστράτηγησεν in Euboea (Schol. Dem. 19. 290 = Dind. p. 443 l. 24) was a cousin of Eubulus (Dem. 19. 290).

associated with Aeschines.<sup>1</sup> There is less precise information about the war in the north, but we may still be fairly confident that Eubulus was ultimately responsible. For, when Demosthenes was inveighing in the third Olynthiac<sup>2</sup> against those who had influence over the  $\delta\eta\mu\sigma$ , he specially alludes to the public works programme which played a large part in Eubulus' financial schemes,<sup>3</sup> and goes on to attribute what he regards as lack of enterprise to the domination of those who control the city's finances, clearly Eubulus and his group. So in the sense that Eubulus prevented the sending out of large forces of citizens by keeping a tight rein on the city's finances, he was responsible for what was not done in the north.

Why Eubulus followed this policy is largely a matter for conjecture. The one thing that is clear is that in early 346 he was prepared to make a serious attempt to unite Greece against Philip;<sup>4</sup> there is no direct evidence of what he thought about the defence of Olynthus. He may have simply failed to perceive what Demosthenes perceived so clearly, viz. that Philip was a real danger to Greece. It is equally possible that he was aware of the danger of Philip,<sup>5</sup> but was aware also of the strategic considerations that counselled against risking a second Sicilian disaster and neglecting Athens' primary concerns. We do not know enough about him to say. The argument of this article is in brief this, that in so far as Eubulus opposed Demosthenes' proposals for the conduct of the Olynthian war, whether for the right reason or the wrong, Eubulus happened to be, strategically speaking, right.

*University College, Oxford*

G. L. CAWKWELL

<sup>1</sup> For Nausicles, Diod. 16. 37. 3. There are several bearers of the name (cf. *Pros. Att.*), but there are two main candidates for the generalship of 352. First, Nausicles, son of Clearchos, who appears in the period after Chaeronea (*I.G. ii<sup>2</sup>* 1496 col. ii *l.* 40 f., 1628 *l.* 71, 1629 *l.* 707) and who is the associate of Demosthenes (*Aesch.* 3. 159, *Plut. Dem.* 21, *Dem.* 18. 114, *Plut. Mor.* 844 f.). Secondly, the Nausicles who supported Aeschines in 343 (*Aesch.* 2. 184), presumably the man who had proposed Aeschines for the embassy in 346 (*Aesch.* 2. 18) and who was himself one of the ambassadors (§ 4 of 2nd Hyp. to *Dem.* 19). Since the former only appears after 338, the latter, the associate of Aeschines, called in 343 because he was an important man, is to be preferred.

Confirmation of Eubulus' connexion with the defence of Thermopylae is perhaps pro-

vided by Diophantus of Sphettus, who proposed the decree of thanksgiving in 352 (*Dem.* 19. 86 and *schol.*). He was an associate of Aeschines (*Dem.* 19. 198, where Demosthenes says he will compel him to give evidence against Aeschines) and also associated with the financial administration (*Aesch.* 3. 24 and 25 and *schol.*).

<sup>2</sup> §§ 28–32.

<sup>3</sup> *Aesch.* 3. 25, *Dinarchus* 1. 96, *I.G. ii<sup>2</sup>* 505, 1668.

<sup>4</sup> See p. 138, n. 3.

<sup>5</sup> As Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 108, insisted, the march of Philip to Heraeum Teichos made Demosthenes aware of the real danger. Considering that Athens was at war with Philip and that she depended so much on the safety of the corn supply, it would be surprising if Demosthenes was the only person to regard Philip seriously in 349/8.

## PERSIAN ACCOUNTS OF ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS

J. KAERST,<sup>1</sup> following a suggestion made by Ranke, conjectured that Diodorus' source for Alexander, whom he identified with Clitarchus, derived information from the mercenaries who served Darius. This conjecture has been developed into an elaborate theory by Sir William Tarn,<sup>2</sup> a theory that has found some favour.<sup>3</sup> He holds that the 'mercenaries' source', which I shall henceforth call M, was Diodorus' *'principal guide* [my italics] down to Issus', and also 'largely used' by Curtius (p. 71); from certain texts in Curtius Tarn infers (pp. 105-6) that M went down to Darius' death, and he thinks that till that point both Diodorus and Curtius continued to draw upon him, as well as upon other authorities. M was 'an unknown Greek who wrote from the point of view of the Greek mercenaries in Darius' service. He was a capable and tolerably accurate writer, well versed in military matters; he does not abuse Alexander, who is merely the opponent of Darius: his object is to tell the story of the mercenaries' (p. 72). His hero is Memnon, but he also takes a favourable view of Darius. This hypothesis enables Tarn to accept as well authenticated a number of statements in Diodorus and Curtius and also to reject others on the ground that they were respectively known or necessarily unknown to M. This theory has been recently criticized by L. Pearson;<sup>4</sup> but his criticisms, though mainly valid in my view, may not be thought decisive. I shall try to show that there is no warrant at all for adopting Tarn's hypothesis. But negative arguments must not stand alone. Tarn's theory obscures an important truth, that the Alexander historians did derive information from those who had fought on the Persian side, possibly indeed from mercenaries, as Kaerst maintained, but not exclusively from them. Nor is such information only to be found in Diodorus and Curtius: it is also in Arrian, who in Tarn's opinion (p. 106) had no access to M.

It is true that Arrian's use of such information is less obvious than that made by Diodorus and Curtius. Arrian's method, whether or not he inherited it from his main authorities, was to follow the movements and describe the activities of Alexander himself rather than to give a comprehensive account of the war as a whole, in which the plans and doings of Darius and his generals were also fully expounded. Except by allusions in Alexander's letter to Darius (2. 14), Arrian does not even tell us that the war had begun in Philip's reign, nor anything of

<sup>1</sup> *Gesch. des Hellenismus* (Berlin, 1927), i<sup>3</sup>.

544.

<sup>2</sup> *Alexander the Great*, ii (Cambridge, 1948), see index, s.v. 'mercenaries' source'. I refer to this in the text by pages.

<sup>3</sup> See for instance A. H. M. Jones, *C.R.* lxiii (1949), 122; C. A. Robinson, *A.J.P.* lxx (1949), 195-6 (with some reserve). F. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der grosse* (Graz, 1949), n. 69, virtually reverts to Kaerst's position, as does A. R. Burn (*J.H.S.* lxxii [1952], 82, n. 4), but his objections to Tarn's thesis of a written 'mercenaries' source' are characterized by R. Andreotti (*Historia* i

[1950], 554, n. 2) as 'rather weak'.

<sup>4</sup> *The Lost Historians of Alexander the Great* (American Philological Association, 1960), pp. 78-82. I must dissent from one objection raised by Pearson. He asks: 'in what Greek city could a Greek mercenary expect a favourable reception for an account that was sympathetic to the Persian cause?' The answer is: 'in most, for most Greek cities showed their hatred of Alexander either in Agis' revolt or in the Lamian war'. But Pearson has, I think, made the most valuable contribution to the criticism of the Alexander-historians we yet have.

its causes or pretexts, of the accession of Darius and the internal troubles that may have hindered his military preparations; for all this we must go to Diodorus (16. 89; 91. 2; 17. 2. 4; 5-7), supplemented by some Oriental evidence.<sup>1</sup> He does not record, as Diodorus does (17. 2. 4-4. 9; 8. 2 ff.), the anti-Macedonian movements of 336-335 in Greece which were perhaps fostered by Persian intrigues; to these Alexander's letter refers later, though Charidemus' flight to Darius (1. 10. 6) provides an earlier hint. Equally he is silent about the circumstances in which eminent Macedonians such as Amyntas, son of Antiochus (1. 17. 9; 25. 3), and Neoptolemus, son of Arrhabaeus (1. 20. 10), had sought refuge with the Persian king; he gives indeed a detailed story of the alleged treason of Alexander the Lyncestian *during* the campaign of 334 (1. 25). These silences may be explained to some extent by the bias of his sources; they probably desired to conceal the extent of the opposition to their hero in Greece and even in Macedonia. So too there are only passing allusions to the anti-Macedonian movement in Greece which culminated in Agis' revolt. But the chief explanation may lie in Arrian's desire to focus attention on the doings of Alexander himself. This can be seen in the economy of his narratives of Alexander's campaigns from 334 to 331.

He has nothing to say of Persian activities, except for their naval operations in 333-332 (2. 1-2; 13. 4-6; 3. 2), until the moment when their forces are about to come into conflict with Alexander. We hear nothing of Persian dispositions by land at the time when Alexander crossed into Asia, nothing of their fleet till it appears off Lade (1. 18. 5); the fact known from Diodorus that Philip's generals had already secured at least a bridgehead in Asia is thus obscured, though Arrian was not in fact ignorant of the operations prior to Alexander's crossing (cf. 1. 17. 11-12; 20. 3; 23. 7-8), and the failure of the Persians to mobilize their superior fleet in good time remains unaccountable. Arrian brings Alexander up to and through the Cilician Gates before briefly mentioning the abortive attempt of the Persian satrap to hold them (2. 4); similarly the defencelessness of Egypt in autumn 332 is remarked only when Alexander actually arrives there (3. 1), and the previous escapade of the deserter, Amyntas, in the country (2. 13. 3)<sup>2</sup> is merely noted, without any indication that it could be relevant to Alexander's decision (2. 25. 4) to invade a land which had so often in the last sixty years repelled foreign attacks. Again, Arrian describes Darius' preparations and plans in 333 only when Alexander has already reached Cilicia (2. 6); he ignores his activities in 332 except in the diplomatic field (2. 14 and 25), and postpones mention of his mobilization of forces from the eastern parts of his realm until Alexander has made contact with them at Gaugamela (3. 8). This method has patent disadvantages for the understanding of the war. We cannot see from Arrian's story why Darius himself was not in position to hold the Cilician Gates; and only reflection enables us to perceive, *after* we have read the account of Gaugamela, that the strategy of taking Persian naval bases, imposed on Alexander by his naval inferiority, or rather by his hasty decision at Miletus to disband a fleet which in 333 he had to reassemble, had given Darius time to muster troops from his most distant provinces and to confront Alexander with an army numerically superior on terrain that was best fitted to render that superiority decisive.

<sup>1</sup> For trouble in Egypt 338-335 see F. K. Kienitz, *Die polit. Gesch. Agyptens* (Berlin, 1953), pp. 109 ff. <sup>2</sup> Cf. also Diod. 17. 48. 2-5; Curtius 4. 1. 27-33 for further details.

It would of course be too much to claim that Diodorus or Curtius shows more insight into strategy than Arrian. Yet, in principle, both deserve credit for looking at the course of the war partly from the Persian standpoint. As already observed, it is only from Diodorus that we know of the operations in Asia before Alexander landed, and of Darius' efforts in 336/5 to stir up trouble for Alexander in Macedon and Greece. Diodorus at least remarks, though with excessive brevity he does not explain, the Persian failure to impede the crossing (17. 18. 2). Further, he and Curtius enable us to see why it was that Darius permitted Alexander to enter Cilicia in 333 almost unopposed.<sup>1</sup> Diodorus has given us what purports to be an account of a council of war held by Darius after news of Memnon's death reached him; Curtius has a similar story, with some discrepancies. Hitherto, according to Diodorus, Darius had planned that Memnon should carry the war into Europe (17. 30. 1); it was only now that he decided to take the field himself, and to recall the Greek mercenaries from the Aegean to join his grand army. Memnon's death may be put in April or May; the news which reached Alexander either on his march to Cilicia or after his arrival there will have been carried post-haste to Darius, who was apparently at Babylon, and he may have known of it by early June or before. But it was only then that he mobilized his army with a rendezvous at Babylon; he was therefore naturally too late to hold Cilicia himself against Alexander; perhaps he at first expected that Alexander would be diverted from advancing by the reports of Persian naval successes in his rear. (It may well be that Darius had not even begun to move before Alexander was already in Cilicia. Mr. Cawkwell has pointed out to me, moreover, that the Persian kings were always reluctant to leave the centre of their realm: to engage in Cilicia might result in eastern revolts.) Again Diodorus alone shows us that in 332 Darius was inactive only in appearance: he was mobilizing an army from the upper satrapies, a hard task; both Diodorus and Curtius give us more details<sup>2</sup> than Arrian of the new army which Darius had mustered at Gaugamela, though both reserve their full description until they come to the campaign of 331; and both therefore give us more insight into the nature of the military problem with which Alexander was now faced.

Such differences, however, between Arrian and our other two main sources are essentially differences of literary presentation: they do not prove that Diodorus and Curtius had access to reliable information from the Persian side which Arrian lacked. On the contrary, it is clear that Arrian too, or rather his authorities, claimed to be well informed about Persian matters. Arrian, no less than Diodorus, purports to know of the debate in the Persian council of war before the Granicus; he can tell us the names of the chief officers present (1. 12. 8-10), and those of Persians who distinguished themselves or were killed in the fighting (1. 15. 6-8; 16. 3); in some points he differs from Diodorus and is probably more accurate.<sup>3</sup> I shall show later that he actually has more to say of

<sup>1</sup> For what follows see the Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. 17. 39 records that Darius (a) re-armed survivors from Issus (cf. Curt. 4. 9. 3); (b) mustered forces from the upper satrapies which there had been no time to mobilize in 333 (cf. Curt. 4. 9. 1—note 'aegre'); in 53 he adds (c) that he had his men armed with longer spears and swords than in the past (cf. Arr. 1. 15. 5) and

(d) collected 200 scythe-bearing chariots (cf. Curt. 4. 9. 4-5; Arrian 3. 11); Curtius adds (e) that he provided his men with better defensive armour (cf. Arrian 3. 13. 4 for the Scythians) and (f) that he increased the number of horses (4. 9. 3).

<sup>3</sup> Arrian (like Plutarch) writes Spithridates and (like Curtius) Arsames where Diodorus has Spithrobates and Arsamenes

its causes or pretexts, of the accession of Darius and the internal troubles that may have hindered his military preparations; for all this we must go to Diodorus (16. 89; 91. 2; 17. 2. 4; 5-7), supplemented by some Oriental evidence.<sup>1</sup> He does not record, as Diodorus does (17. 2. 4-4. 9; 8. 2 ff.), the anti-Macedonian movements of 336-335 in Greece which were perhaps fostered by Persian intrigues; to these Alexander's letter refers later, though Charidemus' flight to Darius (1. 10. 6) provides an earlier hint. Equally he is silent about the circumstances in which eminent Macedonians such as Amyntas, son of Antiochus (1. 17. 9; 25. 3), and Neoptolemus, son of Arrhabaeus (1. 20. 10), had sought refuge with the Persian king; he gives indeed a detailed story of the alleged treason of Alexander the Lyncestian *during* the campaign of 334 (1. 25). These silences may be explained to some extent by the bias of his sources; they probably desired to conceal the extent of the opposition to their hero in Greece and even in Macedonia. So too there are only passing allusions to the anti-Macedonian movement in Greece which culminated in Agis' revolt. But the chief explanation may lie in Arrian's desire to focus attention on the doings of Alexander himself. This can be seen in the economy of his narratives of Alexander's campaigns from 334 to 331.

He has nothing to say of Persian activities, except for their naval operations in 333-332 (2. 1-2; 13. 4-6; 3. 2), until the moment when their forces are about to come into conflict with Alexander. We hear nothing of Persian dispositions by land at the time when Alexander crossed into Asia, nothing of their fleet till it appears off Lade (1. 18. 5); the fact known from Diodorus that Philip's generals had already secured at least a bridgehead in Asia is thus obscured, though Arrian was not in fact ignorant of the operations prior to Alexander's crossing (cf. 1. 17. 11-12; 20. 3; 23. 7-8), and the failure of the Persians to mobilize their superior fleet in good time remains unaccountable. Arrian brings Alexander up to and through the Cilician Gates before briefly mentioning the abortive attempt of the Persian satrap to hold them (2. 4); similarly the defencelessness of Egypt in autumn 332 is remarked only when Alexander actually arrives there (3. 1), and the previous escapade of the deserter, Amyntas, in the country (2. 13. 3)<sup>2</sup> is merely noted, without any indication that it could be relevant to Alexander's decision (2. 25. 4) to invade a land which had so often in the last sixty years repelled foreign attacks. Again, Arrian describes Darius' preparations and plans in 333 only when Alexander has already reached Cilicia (2. 6); he ignores his activities in 332 except in the diplomatic field (2. 14 and 25), and postpones mention of his mobilization of forces from the eastern parts of his realm until Alexander has made contact with them at Gaugamela (3. 8). This method has patent disadvantages for the understanding of the war. We cannot see from Arrian's story why Darius himself was not in position to hold the Cilician Gates; and only reflection enables us to perceive, *after* we have read the account of Gaugamela, that the strategy of taking Persian naval bases, imposed on Alexander by his naval inferiority, or rather by his hasty decision at Miletus to disband a fleet which in 333 he had to reassemble, had given Darius time to muster troops from his most distant provinces and to confront Alexander with an army numerically superior on terrain that was best fitted to render that superiority decisive.

<sup>1</sup> For trouble in Egypt 338-335 see F. K. Kienitz, *Die polit. Gesch. Ägyptens* (Berlin, 1953), pp. 109 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also Diod. 17. 48. 2-5; Curtius 4. 1. 27-33 for further details.

It would of course be too much to claim that Diodorus or Curtius shows more insight into strategy than Arrian. Yet, in principle, both deserve credit for looking at the course of the war partly from the Persian standpoint. As already observed, it is only from Diodorus that we know of the operations in Asia before Alexander landed, and of Darius' efforts in 336/5 to stir up trouble for Alexander in Macedon and Greece. Diodorus at least remarks, though with excessive brevity he does not explain, the Persian failure to impede the crossing (17. 18. 2). Further, he and Curtius enable us to see why it was that Darius permitted Alexander to enter Cilicia in 333 almost unopposed.<sup>1</sup> Diodorus has given us what purports to be an account of a council of war held by Darius after news of Memnon's death reached him; Curtius has a similar story, with some discrepancies. Hitherto, according to Diodorus, Darius had planned that Memnon should carry the war into Europe (17. 30. 1); it was only now that he decided to take the field himself, and to recall the Greek mercenaries from the Aegean to join his grand army. Memnon's death may be put in April or May; the news which reached Alexander either on his march to Cilicia or after his arrival there will have been carried post-haste to Darius, who was apparently at Babylon, and he may have known of it by early June or before. But it was only then that he mobilized his army with a rendezvous at Babylon; he was therefore naturally too late to hold Cilicia himself against Alexander; perhaps he at first expected that Alexander would be diverted from advancing by the reports of Persian naval successes in his rear. (It may well be that Darius had not even begun to move before Alexander was already in Cilicia. Mr. Cawkwell has pointed out to me, moreover, that the Persian kings were always reluctant to leave the centre of their realm: to engage in Cilicia might result in eastern revolts.) Again Diodorus alone shows us that in 332 Darius was inactive only in appearance: he was mobilizing an army from the upper satrapies, a hard task; both Diodorus and Curtius give us more details<sup>2</sup> than Arrian of the new army which Darius had mustered at Gaugamela, though both reserve their full description until they come to the campaign of 331; and both therefore give us more insight into the nature of the military problem with which Alexander was now faced.

Such differences, however, between Arrian and our other two main sources are essentially differences of literary presentation: they do not prove that Diodorus and Curtius had access to reliable information from the Persian side which Arrian lacked. On the contrary, it is clear that Arrian too, or rather his authorities, claimed to be well informed about Persian matters. Arrian, no less than Diodorus, purports to know of the debate in the Persian council of war before the Granicus; he can tell us the names of the chief officers present (1. 12. 8-10), and those of Persians who distinguished themselves or were killed in the fighting (1. 15. 6-8; 16. 3); in some points he differs from Diodorus and is probably more accurate.<sup>3</sup> I shall show later that he actually has more to say of

<sup>1</sup> For what follows see the Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Diod. 17. 39 records that Darius (a) re-armed survivors from Issus (cf. Curt. 4. 9. 3); (b) mustered forces from the upper satrapies which there had been no time to mobilize in 333 (cf. Curt. 4. 9. 1—note 'aegre'); in 53 he adds (c) that he had his men armed with longer spears and swords than in the past (cf. Arr. 1. 15. 5) and

(d) collected 200 scythe-bearing chariots (cf. Curt. 4. 9. 4-5; Arrian 3. 11); Curtius adds (e) that he provided his men with better defensive armour (cf. Arrian 3. 13. 4 for the Scythians) and (f) that he increased the number of horses (4. 9. 3).

<sup>3</sup> Arrian (like Plutarch) writes Spithridates and (like Curtius) Arsames where Diodorus has Spithrobates and Arsamenes

the mercenaries than either Diodorus or Curtius. He knows too, or at least professes to know, of Darius' councils of war before Issus (2. 6. 3-7). If he ignores the earlier discussions on strategy at Babylon, this can be ascribed to his method of concerning himself with Persian plans only when a clash between Alexander and the Persians had become imminent. At Issus, too, he names the leading Persians killed (2. 11. 8) and describes the movements of Darius and the mercenaries after the battle (2. 13). He also gives the composition of Darius' army and the principal generals at Gaugamela (3. 8), tells something of Darius' plans (3. 8. 7, cf. 3. 11. 1; 3. 13. 2), and reports in detail the Persian battle order (3. 11).

Aristobulus obtained this battle order from a Persian document, and Alexander had had advance information about Darius' plans and the composition of his army from captured Persian scouts.<sup>1</sup> But neither documentary material nor such prisoners could have been the sources for the debates before the Granicus or Issus as reported by Arrian. However, from the time of the capitulation of Mithrines at Sardis (Arrian 1. 17. 3), a succession of highly placed Persian officers, cognizant of military and political secrets, surrendered to Alexander or even took service under him. It would be absurd to suppose that Alexander and his entourage had too little curiosity to question them about the past proceedings of Darius and his generals. Memnon's brother-in-law, Artabazus, for instance, who remained loyal to Darius until his death and must have been in his confidence, but who had once been a refugee at Pella and came to enjoy Alexander's favour, must surely have provided much valuable information.<sup>2</sup> One would naturally guess that such data were placed at the disposal of Callisthenes as the official historian, or of others, perhaps (for instance) the rather mysterious Anaximenes, who were already engaged in recording the campaigns. It need not be discussed here how far such material was filtered through their works to writers like Ptolemy and Aristobulus who composed their histories much later, or whether it was even incorporated in official journals, which Ptolemy is commonly held to have used.<sup>3</sup> It may also be that later writers often depended on their fallible recollections of such oral evidence, and that it is in this way that we can explain the occasional divergencies in the statements of our extant authorities, especially about names.<sup>4</sup> One thing is clear: the

(Berve, *Alexanderreich*, ii, nos. 715, 149). Diodorus makes out that the son-in-law of Darius whom Alexander killed was 'Spithro-bates', not Mithridates, and that Clitus thereafter saved his king from 'Rhoses', not from Spithridates after he had already killed Rhoses. He also kills off Atizyes both at the Granicus and (rightly) at Issus (cf. Arr. 2. 11. 8). But even if he drew on M., who should have got such facts right, any errors could be imputed to his own carelessness.

<sup>1</sup> Arr. 3. 8. 2; 3. 9. 1; I judge that 3. 8. 3-7, sandwiched between these references to the prisoners' reports, derives from them. (Cf. p. 153, n. 2.) Darius' plans got abroad or were guessed by contemporaries. Before Issus he hoped καταπατήσεων τῇ ἵππῳ τῶν Μακεδόνων τὴν στρατίαν (Arr. 2. 6. 5). Demosthenes, according to Aesch. 3. 164, was then

predicting that Alexander ἔμελλεν . . . συμπατηθῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς Περσικῆς ἵππου.

<sup>2</sup> Residence at Pella and relation to Memnon, Diod. 16. 52. 3-4; Curt. 5. 9. 1; 6. 5. 2; his loyalty to Darius and subsequent reception by Alexander, Arr. 3. 23, etc. (cf. Berve, ii, no. 152).

<sup>3</sup> But see L. Pearson (*Historia* iii [1954-5], 429 ff.).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. p. 143, n. 3. Curtius 4. 12. 7 makes Ariobarzanes and Orontobates (Berve, ii, nos. 115, 594) commanders at Gaugamela of Persians, Mardians, and Sogdians, but Arrian 3. 8 rightly associates the Sogdians with the Bactrians under Bessus, while the Mardians should have been associated with the Tapurians (Berve, i. 265). Note also discrepancies over names of Alexander's oriental officials, Curtius' Abistamenes (3. 4. 1) for Arrian's Sabictas (2. 4. 2) as satrap

Alexander-historians claimed to know much of what went on in the Persian camp, and even though there were obvious opportunities for invention and embellishment (which Curtius naturally exploited),<sup>1</sup> we have no right to deny that such knowledge was available to them, and could have been supplied not only or mainly by Greek mercenaries but by Persians, who were better acquainted with the *arcana imperii*. It is in the light of this general conclusion that we must examine Tarn's hypothesis that a 'mercenary source' underlies much in Diodorus' and Curtius' narratives.

This hypothesis is complicated by Tarn's belief that not only Curtius—that would be generally conceded<sup>2</sup>—but Diodorus too used more than one source for Alexander's reign. Thus he supposes that Diodorus used 'a separate source', probably Diyllus, for events in old Greece, and Dinon's work for Persian history (p. 78), and that from Issus Aristobulus 'begins to come in as a source' for the main narrative of the campaigns (p. 75). I shall not discuss whether it is likely that Diodorus combined so many (and perhaps more) diverse sources in this way,<sup>3</sup> but it is clear that on Tarn's own conception of his mode of writing the assignment of any particular statement in Diodorus' work to a named source must be highly subjective. It is hard, for instance, to see why Tarn should be so confident that Diodorus' 'oft-repeated statement that the Macedonians fought in relays' must come from M (p. 72). We hear of this seven times in all, once at Miletus and twice in the story of the siege of Halicarnassus, but twice in that of the capture of Thebes, where it should come from Diyllus, and twice in reference to operations in Iran or India, which M cannot have described. Yet Tarn assumes that the first two instances which relate to Thebes were taken from M and that in the last two Diodorus is probably 'himself putting in what he has learnt'. If this is right, then it follows that M, though his object was 'to tell the story of the mercenaries', recounted operations in which they were not engaged. It might indeed be suggested (though Tarn has not done so)<sup>4</sup> that he told the story of the anti-Macedonian movement in Greece for apologetic reasons. When it suited him, Alexander arraigned Greeks in Persian service for treason to the Greek cause:<sup>5</sup> M might have wished to show that many Greek cities were actually fighting in these years for Greek freedom from Macedon. Diodorus makes it clear that both Thebes and Sparta rose against domination by Alexander in the name of Greek liberty, and that both avowed that their cause was linked with that of Persia (17. 9. 1; 17. 12. 1; 17. 62).<sup>6</sup> The frequent mention of Demosthenes and of his connexion with Persia (17. 3. 1; 17. 4. 7; 17. 5. 1; 17. 8. 5-6; 17. 15) served the same purpose; his name alone identified the cause for which he stood. But there is no vestige of such a defence of the mercenaries when their own conduct is under consideration; Diodorus does not even seize the occasion, when mentioning the mercenary leader, Ephialtes, at Halicarnassus,<sup>7</sup> to note that he had been among the

of Cappadocia, and Arsaces (Curt. 8. 3. 17) for Atropates (Arr. 4. 18. 3) as satrap of Media. Yet in general Curtius' information on appointments seems to be sound.

<sup>1</sup> See for instance 3. 2. 10-19; 3. 8. 1-11; 4. 10. 25-34.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. E. Schwartz, *R.E.* iv. 1873 ff. = *Gr. Geschichtsschreiber* 158 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Pearson, op. cit. (in p. 141, n. 4), ch. viii, has powerfully restated the view that Dio-

dorus depended on Clitarchus.

<sup>4</sup> But cf. p. 151 on M's alleged partiality for the Thessalians which Tarn ascribes to their part in the Lamian war.

<sup>5</sup> Arr. 1. 16. 6 (but cf. 1. 19. 6; 3. 23. 8 with 3. 24. 5).

<sup>6</sup> Identity of source for both Theban and Spartan revolts might be surmised.

<sup>7</sup> 17. 25. 6 ff.

'patriotic' statesmen at Athens, whose extradition Alexander had demanded.<sup>1</sup> Moreover the story of the Theban revolt is told with apparent impartiality; Diodorus remarks on their courage (17. 11. 4; 17. 13. 2), but also on their folly in rejecting Alexander's conciliatory overtures (17. 9-10), and if he attributes to Alexander the resolution to strike terror into Greece by the exemplary punishment of Thebes (17. 9. 4 and 17. 6; 17. 14) and taxes the Macedonians with barbarities in the sack of the city (17. 13. 1), he brands Alexander's Greek allies with even worse atrocities (17. 13. 5-6) and admits that it was they who gave vent to old grudges by formally voting for the razing of Thebes (17. 14). I can discern then in his narrative no trace of an attempt to exculpate the mercenaries from a charge of treason, and can see no other reason why M should have recounted the capture of Thebes at all. And it is hardly plausible to hold that Diodorus could have learned of the Macedonian practice of attacking in relays only from a writer whom he used at most in three of the seven relevant cases, especially as his earliest allusions to it come from a section of his narrative which is unlikely to depend on M.

Again it may seem superfluous to posit M as a source for any part of Diodorus' account of Persian affairs or for his portrait of Darius. Tarn himself conjectures that the history of Ochus (17. 5. 3 ff.) and some other Persian material comes from Dinon, and that might be true, even if what Dinon wrote was known to Diodorus only through the medium of Dinon's more famous son, Clitarchus. We do not in fact know at what point Dinon's *Persica* ended, but it is perfectly conceivable that it included the accession of Darius, and his duel with the Cadusian (17. 6. 1) which Tarn (p. 72, n. 8) attributes, without reason, to M. But there is surely nothing in what Diodorus tells us of Persian affairs which the Alexander-historians, including Clitarchus, could not have known or invented for themselves. Both Diodorus and Curtius give a favourable view of Darius (Tarn, pp. 72, 105). Tarn regards this as unjustified ('he was really a coward') and assumes that it must be the picture drawn by M, who was partial to the 'mercenaries' paymaster'. Yet both Diodorus (17. 30) and Curtius (3. 2) tell that he rejected the advice of the mercenary general, Charidemus; and Curtius (3. 8. 1), like Arrian (2. 6. 3-5), that he disregarded the warnings of a mercenary commander (Thymondas according to Curtius, Amyntas according to Arrian) against marching into Cilicia. On Tarn's view these reports should be from M,<sup>2</sup> and one would have expected M to have no high opinion of Darius' competence; yet Diodorus seems to justify his decision to fight at Issus (17. 32. 3, cf. Tarn, p. 72). It is surely strange that M should have whitewashed Darius, if in fact he flouted the military advice tendered him by mercenary officers, and (as Tarn thinks) lacked even personal courage. A different explanation can be supplied of the discrepancy between the pictures of Darius presented by Arrian and the 'vulgate'. Arrian, it may be, reflecting the views of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, gives us the version of his conduct which was to be found in the contemporary records (or perhaps in the

<sup>1</sup> Arr. 1. 10. 4; other evidence in Berve, ii, no. 329.

<sup>2</sup> Amyntas, Berve, ii, no. 58; Thymondas, ibid., no. 380. It would seem that they shared the command of the mercenaries with Aristomedes and Bianor (ibid., nos. 128, 214). Probably Arrian and Curtius are both right;

the mercenary commanders concurred in their advice, but different historians singled out different persons for mention. Arrian, however, makes Amyntas recommend Darius not to leave Syria, and Curtius makes Thymondas urge withdrawal to Mesopotamia.

history of Callisthenes), the version which we may think with Tarn corresponded most closely to the truth, Diodorus and Curtius that which arose later out of an attempt to magnify the glory of Alexander by representing Darius as no ignoble enemy. For such a transformation in the picture of Darius Alexander himself was in part responsible. He had once treated him as a usurper (Arrian 2. 14), yet later he gave him posthumous honours, punished his murderers, rewarded his loyal vassals, and posed as his legitimate heir.<sup>1</sup> An historian who wrote under the influence of Alexander's romantic honouring of Darius might well have drawn a portrait very different from that which had informed the earliest accounts—or that which was perhaps required by the truth, to which Ptolemy and Aristobulus here remained faithful.<sup>2</sup>

If in fact M does underlie much of Diodorus' story of the campaigns of 334-331 and part of Curtius', then clearly we should expect to find the mercenaries prominent in their narratives. It is indeed only from Diodorus that we know that Memnon commanded a mercenary force in the operations before Alexander himself landed in Asia (17. 7. 3). Thereafter we hear of mercenaries at the Granicus, at Miletus, at Halicarnassus, in the naval operations conducted by Memnon and his successors in 333, and at Issus. But how little of our information derives from Diodorus and Curtius, and how much from Arrian!

At the Granicus, according to Arrian, the Persians had nearly 20,000 mercenary foot (1. 14. 4), and after the defeat of the Persian cavalry they were surrounded and almost all massacred by the Macedonian horse, apart from 2,000 taken prisoners (1. 16. 2); the captives were sent to hard labour in Macedon (1. 16. 6). Diodorus estimates the number of the Persian infantry as 100,000 without revealing that they even included mercenaries (17. 19. 5); after the cavalry engagement a struggle followed between the infantry on both sides, but the Persians soon fled (17. 21. 5). This is, of course, not the only discrepancy between Arrian and Diodorus relative to this battle; according to Arrian (1. 13) Alexander scorned Parmenio's advice to bivouac for the night and cross by surprise at dawn, but attacked without delay; according to Diodorus (17. 19. 1-3), who does not mention the dispute with Parmenio, Alexander did encamp opposite the Persians and cross at dawn next day, anticipating Persian resistance. If in truth Diodorus reflects the account of M, and if M was 'a capable and tolerably accurate writer, well versed in military matters', we might prefer Diodorus' version; but I do not then see what credit would be left to Arrian's good sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who would stand convicted of grave and mendacious distortions of the real course of events.

At Miletus Arrian tells us of a small mercenary garrison (1. 18. 4; 1. 19. 1); Alexander admired their courage and took them into his service, 300 in number (1. 19. 6). But Diodorus mentions resistance only by 'Persian' refugees from the Granicus and by the citizens of Miletus (17. 22).

The defence of Halicarnassus was, according to Tarn (p. 73), 'the mercenaries' masterpiece'; and it is perfectly true that here for the first time in his narrative of the fighting in 334 Diodorus acknowledges their presence (17. 23. 4, etc.); but so does Arrian (1. 20. 3). Tarn argues that the two stories are complementary, that of Arrian (Ptolemy) written from the standpoint of the

<sup>1</sup> Arr. 3. 22; 3. 23. 7; 3. 25. 8; 3. 30. 4-5; 4. 7. 3, etc. (cf. E. Badian, *C.Q. N.S.* viii [1958], 144 ff.).

<sup>2</sup> The absurdly large figure for Persian

infantry in Diodorus in itself suggests a source whose author exaggerated in the Macedonian interest.

besiegers, that of Diodorus (M) from that of the besieged. He remarks, for instance, that 'Ptolemy gives details of the troops Alexander used . . . and Alexander's attempt on Myndus during the siege; these things would hardly be known to the garrison, and do not come in Diodorus'. But Diodorus is in general so much less detailed than Arrian that no special explanation is required of such omissions; Diodorus did know that at this time Alexander was winning over Greek and Carian cities (17. 24. 1-3) and actually supplies one detail—that the Carian cities sent golden crowns to Alexander—which Arrian has left out, and which was as unlikely to be known to the besieged mercenaries as the attempt on Myndus. It is undeniable that Diodorus purports to tell us of decisions or plans of the garrison commanders (17. 25. 3 and 6; 17. 26. 1-2; 17. 27. 5); but there is no reason why such matters should not have eventually become known to one of the Alexander-historians; Tarn's hypothesis that they could only have been published by M remains unproven. One would not have expected such a writer to have stated that Alexander brought the engines and grain he needed for the siege to Halicarnassus by sea (17. 24. 1); since he lacked control of the sea, that is unlikely. Diodorus also erroneously thinks that Neoptolemus who was killed in the siege was fighting for Alexander and not, as a deserter, against him (17. 25. 5, cf. Arrian 1. 20. 10). It is true that such errors can be imputed to the negligence of Diodorus himself, or of some historian through whom the evidence of M was mediated. But in that case, even if the existence of such a mercenary history as Tarn imagines and its use by Diodorus were securely attested, it would be hazardous to reconstruct its contents from Diodorus' summary. Could we, for instance, suppose that it was M who admitted that the Macedonians far surpassed the defenders (whom Diodorus calls 'Persians') in courage (17. 24. 6)? It may be that Tarn is right in believing that Diodorus has brought out the truth that the defenders had certain successes which Ptolemy concealed; certainly we need always to be on the watch for indications of Ptolemy's bias. But much in Diodorus' story of the siege seems to aim at dramatic or pictorial effects (e.g. 17. 25. 1 and 4); and such effects were strengthened the more that the fighting could be represented as evenly poised. Precisely the same characteristics can be discerned in his battle-pieces and in his account of the siege of Tyre.

Indeed, before Tarn's analysis of Diodorus on the siege of Halicarnassus could be accepted, his account of the siege of Tyre would demand attention. Here there were no Greek mercenaries among the defenders. Yet a great part of Diodorus' narrative concentrates on their activities, and some parts, if reliable, presuppose that he drew on a source well informed about the internal conditions in Tyre and the plans of the Tyrians (17. 40. 3; 17. 41). Here too Diodorus neglects to record Alexander's visit to Sidon to collect ships (Arrian 2. 19. 6-20. 1), and here too it could be said that this 'would hardly be known to the garrison'. Yet the arrival of the ships which deprived the Tyrians of their control of the sea and the establishment of a naval blockade were visible enough to the defence: Diodorus merely hints at it (17. 43. 3). His silences, as this shows, are so capricious that we can infer from them only that he was a careless epitomator, with little judgement in selecting material.

After evacuating Halicarnassus, Memnon raised more mercenaries, as Diodorus tells us (17. 29. 2), and embarked on a naval campaign of which we have accounts both in Diodorus (17. 29) and Arrian (2. 1). Tarn thinks that Memnon was the hero of M. Certainly Diodorus describes him as 'a man distinguished

in courage and military skill' (17. 7. 2) and stresses the anxiety Alexander felt about his naval successes at this time (17. 31. 3, cf. Curtius 3. 1. 21). But nothing in Diodorus' or Curtius' praise of Memnon, which Tarn ascribes to M, goes beyond Arrian's remark (2. 1. 3) that his death was the most damaging event at the time to Persian interests. He does not fill a larger role in the pages of Diodorus than in those of Arrian.

Both record that in 334 he vainly recommended to the satraps a 'scorched-earth' strategy. Diodorus says that he proposed to combine this with a direct attack on 'Macedon' or 'Europe' and that this was the best course that could have been adopted (17. 18. 2-3). Arrian does not credit him with the idea of a counter-offensive before 333 (2. 1). It seems probable that he is right. Since the Persian forces were probably not numerically superior to the Macedonian in 334, and since the peasantry could have had no motive for co-operating in the destruction of their own homes and crops in a cause to which they must have been indifferent—for them Alexander's victory meant no more than an exchange of foreign masters—the strategy of devastation would in any event have been hard to execute effectively,<sup>1</sup> and the difficulty would have been aggravated if a considerable proportion of the troops available had been put on board ship, to sail across the Aegean. But if this be true, Arrian was better informed than the hypothetical M about the debate in the Persian camp. It is significant too that only Arrian records that the rejection of Memnon's advice was prompted partly by jealousy on the part of the satraps. Diodorus has nothing of this; he says simply that they thought Memnon's proposals 'unworthy of Persian nobility'. This vague statement corresponds to Arrian's more precise report, that the satrap of Phrygia was unwilling to see any of his subjects suffer harm. But the effect of Diodorus' omission of the jealousy motif is worth noting: it lends an apologetic tone to the Persian decision, and like the constant references to 'Persians' and not mercenaries as forming the defence against Alexander, and the stress on the *aristeia* of the Persian nobles at the Granicus—it is only Arrian (1. 15. 2) who mentions Memnon in the fighting—it suggests that if Diodorus ultimately depended on information from the Persian side, that information is more likely to have come from Persians than from any Greek admirer of Memnon.

Diodorus alone mentions Memnon's presence at Miletus but has nothing to tell of his prowess there (17. 22. 1). He agrees (17. 23. 6) with Arrian (1. 20. 3, cf. 2. 1. 1) that before the siege of Halicarnassus Darius made Memnon commander-in-chief in western Asia. Yet like Arrian (1. 23. 1) he admits that Memnon shared the command in the defence of that place (17. 27. 5). It is only Arrian (1. 20. 3) who gives him the credit for having fortified it earlier. Tarn says that for Diodorus and therefore for M he is the hero of the siege. In truth that honour belongs to Ephialtes (26. 2 and 6). Tarn suggests that M exaggerates his intentions in 333 by making out that he planned 'to invade Macedonia itself, not Greece' (17. 18. 2; 17. 31. 3). In fact, Arrian (2. 1. 1) tells that he intended to carry the war into both countries, and Diodorus elsewhere refers vaguely to 'Europe' (17. 18. 2; 17. 30. 1); his narrative in chapter 29 plainly implies that he hoped to rouse the Greeks against Alexander.

<sup>1</sup> A 'scorched earth' strategy is said to have been proposed or designed on other occasions, Curt. 3. 4. 3 (Cilicia); 3. 8. 8 (Syria), 4. 9. 8 and 14; 4. 10. 13-14; 4. 13. 23 (Babylonia), Arr. 3. 19. 1 (Hyrcania); 3. 28.

8 (Bactria); it must always have been attended with great difficulties, but least so in Iran, where there was more popular resistance to Alexander.

besiegers, that of Diodorus (M) from that of the besieged. He remarks, for instance, that 'Ptolemy gives details of the troops Alexander used . . . and Alexander's attempt on Myndus during the siege; these things would hardly be known to the garrison, and do not come in Diodorus'. But Diodorus is in general so much less detailed than Arrian that no special explanation is required of such omissions; Diodorus did know that at this time Alexander was winning over Greek and Carian cities (17. 24. 1-3) and actually supplies one detail—that the Carian cities sent golden crowns to Alexander—which Arrian has left out, and which was as unlikely to be known to the besieged mercenaries as the attempt on Myndus. It is undeniable that Diodorus purports to tell us of decisions or plans of the garrison commanders (17. 25. 3 and 6; 17. 26. 1-2; 17. 27. 5); but there is no reason why such matters should not have eventually become known to one of the Alexander-historians; Tarn's hypothesis that they could only have been published by M remains unproven. One would not have expected such a writer to have stated that Alexander brought the engines and grain he needed for the siege to Halicarnassus by sea (17. 24. 1); since he lacked control of the sea, that is unlikely. Diodorus also erroneously thinks that Neoptolemus who was killed in the siege was fighting for Alexander and not, as a deserter, against him (17. 25. 5, cf. Arrian 1. 20. 10). It is true that such errors can be imputed to the negligence of Diodorus himself, or of some historian through whom the evidence of M was mediated. But in that case, even if the existence of such a mercenary history as Tarn imagines and its use by Diodorus were securely attested, it would be hazardous to reconstruct its contents from Diodorus' summary. Could we, for instance, suppose that it was M who admitted that the Macedonians far surpassed the defenders (whom Diodorus calls 'Persians') in courage (17. 24. 6)? It may be that Tarn is right in believing that Diodorus has brought out the truth that the defenders had certain successes which Ptolemy concealed; certainly we need always to be on the watch for indications of Ptolemy's bias. But much in Diodorus' story of the siege seems to aim at dramatic or pictorial effects (e.g. 17. 25. 1 and 4); and such effects were strengthened the more that the fighting could be represented as evenly poised. Precisely the same characteristics can be discerned in his battle-pieces and in his account of the siege of Tyre.

Indeed, before Tarn's analysis of Diodorus on the siege of Halicarnassus could be accepted, his account of the siege of Tyre would demand attention. Here there were no Greek mercenaries among the defenders. Yet a great part of Diodorus' narrative concentrates on their activities, and some parts, if reliable, presuppose that he drew on a source well informed about the internal conditions in Tyre and the plans of the Tyrians (17. 40. 3; 17. 41). Here too Diodorus neglects to record Alexander's visit to Sidon to collect ships (Arrian 2. 19. 6-20. 1), and here too it could be said that this 'would hardly be known to the garrison'. Yet the arrival of the ships which deprived the Tyrians of their control of the sea and the establishment of a naval blockade were visible enough to the defence: Diodorus merely hints at it (17. 43. 3). His silences, as this shows, are so capricious that we can infer from them only that he was a careless epitomator, with little judgement in selecting material.

After evacuating Halicarnassus, Memnon raised more mercenaries, as Diodorus tells us (17. 29. 2), and embarked on a naval campaign of which we have accounts both in Diodorus (17. 29) and Arrian (2. 1). Tarn thinks that Memnon was the hero of M. Certainly Diodorus describes him as 'a man distinguished

in courage and military skill' (17. 7. 2) and stresses the anxiety Alexander felt about his naval successes at this time (17. 31. 3, cf. Curtius 3. 1. 21). But nothing in Diodorus' or Curtius' praise of Memnon, which Tarn ascribes to M, goes beyond Arrian's remark (2. 1. 3) that his death was the most damaging event at the time to Persian interests. He does not fill a larger role in the pages of Diodorus than in those of Arrian.

Both record that in 334 he vainly recommended to the satraps a 'scorched-earth' strategy. Diodorus says that he proposed to combine this with a direct attack on 'Macedon' or 'Europe' and that this was the best course that could have been adopted (17. 18. 2-3). Arrian does not credit him with the idea of a counter-offensive before 333 (2. 1). It seems probable that he is right. Since the Persian forces were probably not numerically superior to the Macedonian in 334, and since the peasantry could have had no motive for co-operating in the destruction of their own homes and crops in a cause to which they must have been indifferent—for them Alexander's victory meant no more than an exchange of foreign masters—the strategy of devastation would in any event have been hard to execute effectively,<sup>1</sup> and the difficulty would have been aggravated if a considerable proportion of the troops available had been put on board ship, to sail across the Aegean. But if this be true, Arrian was better informed than the hypothetical M about the debate in the Persian camp. It is significant too that only Arrian records that the rejection of Memnon's advice was prompted partly by jealousy on the part of the satraps. Diodorus has nothing of this; he says simply that they thought Memnon's proposals 'unworthy of Persian nobility'. This vague statement corresponds to Arrian's more precise report, that the satrap of Phrygia was unwilling to see any of his subjects suffer harm. But the effect of Diodorus' omission of the jealousy motif is worth noting: it lends an apologetic tone to the Persian decision, and like the constant references to 'Persians' and not mercenaries as forming the defence against Alexander, and the stress on the *aristeia* of the Persian nobles at the Granicus—it is only Arrian (1. 15. 2) who mentions Memnon in the fighting—it suggests that if Diodorus ultimately depended on information from the Persian side, that information is more likely to have come from Persians than from any Greek admirer of Memnon.

Diodorus alone mentions Memnon's presence at Miletus but has nothing to tell of his prowess there (17. 22. 1). He agrees (17. 23. 6) with Arrian (1. 20. 3, cf. 2. 1. 1) that before the siege of Halicarnassus Darius made Memnon commander-in-chief in western Asia. Yet like Arrian (1. 23. 1) he admits that Memnon shared the command in the defence of that place (17. 27. 5). It is only Arrian (1. 20. 3) who gives him the credit for having fortified it earlier. Tarn says that for Diodorus and therefore for M he is the hero of the siege. In truth that honour belongs to Ephialtes (26. 2 and 6). Tarn suggests that M exaggerates his intentions in 333 by making out that he planned 'to invade Macedonia itself, not Greece' (17. 18. 2; 17. 31. 3). In fact, Arrian (2. 1. 1) tells that he intended to carry the war into both countries, and Diodorus elsewhere refers vaguely to 'Europe' (17. 18. 2; 17. 30. 1); his narrative in chapter 29 plainly implies that he hoped to rouse the Greeks against Alexander.

<sup>1</sup> A 'scorched earth' strategy is said to have been proposed or designed on other occasions, Curt. 3. 4. 3 (Cilicia); 3. 8. 8 (Syria), 4. 9. 8 and 14; 4. 10. 13-14; 4. 13. 23 (Babylonia), Arr. 3. 19. 1 (Hyrcaania); 3. 28.

8 (Bactria); it must always have been attended with great difficulties, but least so in Iran, where there was more popular resistance to Alexander.

Tarn's argument that an authority for whom Memnon was a hero underlies Diodorus therefore fails, and this hypothesis cannot be invoked to explain why Diodorus states (17. 29. 2) that it was Memnon who took Mytilene, whereas Arrian dates its fall after Memnon's death (2. 1). If on general grounds we prefer to accept Arrian's account (as Tarn does), the discrepancy must be explained by presuming carelessness in Diodorus or his source; it does not prove that that source had the special bias imputed by Tarn to M. (But if it did, how could we regard M as a 'tolerably accurate writer'?)

After Memnon's death Darius recalled his mercenaries from the Aegean. This we know from Arrian (2. 2. 1) and Curtius (3. 3. 1), but not from Diodorus, who does not even mention their presence at Issus in his narrative of the battle, though he alludes later to their escape (17. 48. 1). Yet the mercenaries at Issus, 30,000 strong according to Callisthenes (Polyb. 12. 18. 2), Arrian (2. 8. 6), and Curtius (3. 9. 2),<sup>1</sup> formed the 'robur exercitus, par Macedonicae phalangi acies' (Curtius, *l.c.*, cf. 3. 8. 1) and gave Alexander's men their hardest fighting. Once again, as at the Granicus, it is Arrian who has most to say of them (2. 10. 4 ff.); even Curtius (3. 11. 18) is content to report that they got away in good order. Diodorus' account indeed bears little relation to what Arrian tells us, and few marks of dependence on a reliable authority who was himself an eyewitness, or drew on eyewitnesses. M would have known that Alexander did not station his cavalry in front of the phalanx (ch. 33. 1); he would not have concentrated on the *aristeia* of the Persian nobility (ch. 34), ignoring the almost successful charge by the Greek mercenaries; nor actually stated that the 'Persian' infantry hardly took part in the battle (ch. 34. 9). Tarn holds (p. 80) that Diodorus superimposed 'material drawn from many quarters, few of which can be identified' on the accounts of M and of Aristobulus. This notion enables him to explain (p. 73) the manifest contradiction between Diodorus' statements that the Persians easily escaped from the battle, when night came on, and that over 110,000 were killed (ch. 35. 1; 36. 6). But we have no warrant for assuming that there was no previous historian who could contradict himself in this way or that such contradictions in Diodorus' narrative could not have originated from a single source. What is at least clear is that very little of Diodorus' story of Issus goes back to the two well-informed sources postulated by Tarn.

Tarn observes that 'Diodorus has very little about Alexander himself between his crossing to Asia and Issus, and that he dismisses the whole of the story in Asia Minor between Halicarnassus and Cilicia with the bald statement that "Alexander subdued the coast as far as Cilicia", thus omitting two incidents which bear strongly on Alexander's character, Mount Climax and the Gordian knot' (pp. 71-72). He accounts for this by supposing that here Diodorus was following M, who was not concerned with what was happening in Asia between Memnon's death and Alexander's arrival in Cilicia, as the mercenaries were taken by sea direct to Issus. But Diodorus' silence plainly becomes less easy to explain in this way when we consider that he is also silent about the shipment of the mercenaries to Issus and their participation in the battle itself! Moreover there are sections in Diodorus' narrative even here (chapters 28; 31. 5; 32. 1-2) as earlier (chapters 17. 1-3; 6-7; 18. 1; 22. 5;

<sup>1</sup> The number is probably much inflated, cf. H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 183-4, and therefore

originates with a Macedonian source, presumably Callisthenes.

24. 1-3) which M is as likely to have omitted as the operations in the winter of 334/3; at least he could not have known of them at first-hand.<sup>1</sup> It is indeed strange that Diodorus, careless though he was, should have ignored such romantic incidents as those at Mount Climax and at Gordium,<sup>2</sup> but Tarn's theory fails to cover all the data.

According to Tarn (pp. 110-11), Curtius (4. 1. 34-35) has preserved memory of the important fact, that after Issus Antigonos, satrap of Phrygia, rendered Alexander great service in defeating Persian generals in Cappadocia and Paphlagonia and thus keeping open his lines of communication. This may be so, but it is quite arbitrary to suppose with Tarn (p. 109) that Curtius here drew on M. Curtius says that the Persian troops were Cappadocians and Paphlagonians; the story of this campaign thus lay outside the interests of M (as defined by Tarn) and outside his direct knowledge. We have no right to assume that all the Alexander-historians were as narrowly concerned with Alexander's personal activities as Arrian was. Tarn himself rightly observes that Arrian's silence is probably due to his reliance on Ptolemy, who 'was not going to relate the *acta* of one who had been his most bitter enemy'.

After Issus only a small body of mercenaries remained in Darius' service.<sup>3</sup> Arrian says (2. 13. 1) that he collected 4,000 Persians and mercenaries and escaped with them to the Euphrates; Curtius, who perhaps carelessly distorted the same source, puts the total of Greeks at 4,000 (4. 1. 3); Diodorus does not mention them at all. Arrian speaks of 2,000 mounted Greek mercenaries out of a total of 3,000 cavalry holding the Euphrates when Alexander reached that river in August 331 (3. 7. 1), and he reports on the authority of Aristobulus that the Greek mercenaries were stationed near Darius in the battle of Gaugamela (3. 11. 7). Neither Diodorus nor Curtius has a word about them in their narratives of the preliminaries to the battle or of the battle itself. Doubtless they were so reduced in strength that they could not take any very important part in the fighting. However, 2,000 or 1,500 escaped, presumably in good order, and continued to escort Darius till his death.<sup>4</sup> It is surely improbable that M, supposing such a writer to have existed, would have had nothing to say of their conduct at Gaugamela, or that nothing would have been transmitted by Diodorus or Curtius if they had relied extensively on M. Yet Tarn believes that both Diodorus and Curtius got some of their details of the battle from M. For instance, he suggests that Diodorus' 'exaltation of the Thessalians above the Companions' (17. 33. 2), which comes out again in Diodorus' story that the Thessalians restored the situation on the left at Gaugamela without help from Alexander (17. 60. 8), is merely the patriotism of a Greek writer (p. 74). Oddly enough, Arrian (1. 25. 5) also refers to the Thessalians as the 'best part of the cavalry'. Diodorus' story may in my view be perfectly correct,<sup>5</sup> though

<sup>1</sup> This was remarked by Robinson, loc. cit. in p. 141, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, whose narrative is lost for the time of the Climax episode (which all Alexander-historians had, according to Josephus, *B.I.* 2. 348), certainly recorded Gordium (3. 1. 11 ff.); but this cannot be used against Tarn, since he allows that Curtius drew on other sources besides M.

<sup>3</sup> For the other survivors cf. Parke, op. cit. (in p. 50, n. 1), pp. 199 ff.; Arrian mentions

them in 2. 13, but more information is naturally found in Curtius and Diodorus, because their interest is less exclusively in Alexander's own doings.

<sup>4</sup> For 1,500 see Tarn, p. 184, n. 1. But Curtius 5. 8. 3; 5. 12. 4 (= M!) gives 4,000 much later.

<sup>5</sup> No ancient account of Gaugamela is fully intelligible, and every modern reconstruction is conjectural.

I cannot discuss that here, but there is no ground to derive it from M. Equally, though Curtius is no doubt right in assigning command of the Persian right to Mazaeus and of the left to Bessus (Tarn, p. 109), this would have been perfectly well known to the contemporary Alexander-historians: Arrian was well informed about such matters (3. 8 and 11), though he has not chosen to pass on all that he knew.

Tarn believes that the Persian cavalry at Gaugamela had orders to free Alexander's royal prisoners, and that Diodorus (17. 59. 7), though he fails to make this explicit, and Curtius (4. 14. 22), had this from M. He adds that Ptolemy 'naturally did not' know this (p. 74) or, more cautiously, that 'he might very well not have known' it (p. 110).<sup>1</sup> Similarly, he thinks that at the Granicus 'the Persian leaders had a plan to kill Alexander personally' (Diod. 17. 20. 1 f.) 'which Ptolemy could not know' (p. 73).<sup>2</sup> In view of the passages in Arrian, founded on his best authorities, in which he purports to reveal Persian deliberations,<sup>3</sup> and of the immense probability that Alexander and his friends did learn of Persian plans from captives and renegades, these conjectures have nothing to commend them.

Tarn also draws from his theory certain important inferences about Alexander's army. Because Diodorus and Curtius and therefore M treated the hypaspists 'as part of the phalanx', he argues that 'the men who had to face Alexander's line in the field could see no visible difference; if difference there was, it was in trifles' (p. 153). He concludes that the hypaspists were just as heavily armed as the phalanx. The truth of this conclusion may be doubted on other grounds,<sup>4</sup> but in any case it cannot be buttressed by the alleged authority of M. In fact Diodorus (17. 57. 1-3) does clearly distinguish the hypaspists from the phalanx regiments, and so does Curtius (4. 13. 27-28), though he has carelessly failed to enumerate all the latter; both anachronistically call the hypaspists Argyraspides.<sup>5</sup> Again, Tarn rejects the numbers given by Diodorus (17. 17. 3 ff.) for the Macedonian and Balkan formations in Alexander's expeditionary force on the ground that they must come from M and that he

<sup>1</sup> For criticism see G. T. Griffith (*J.H.S.* lxvii [1947], 84, n. 26); A. R. Burn (*ibid.* lxxii [1952], 89); Major-Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, *Generalship of Alexander the Great* (London, 1958), p. 174.

<sup>2</sup> Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 148 accepts this.

<sup>3</sup> 1. 12; 2. 6, cf. pp. 143-4.

<sup>4</sup> For recent discussions see J. R. Hamilton (*C.Q. n.s.* v [1955], 218-19; G. T. Griffith (*Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc. n.s.* iv [1956-7], 3 ff.). The hypaspists are included by Arrian in the 'phalanx' (3. 11. 9; 4. 28. 8-30. 3), but the very frequency with which they were used by Alexander suggests that they were more mobile than the *pezetairoi*, and in 2. 4. 3 they, together with other light troops, are contrasted with the more heavily armed regiments of foot, apparently including those of the phalanx; cf. also 3. 21. 7 (as interpreted by Hamilton); 4. 30. 6; 5. 23. 7. In 4. 25. 6, indeed, Alexander takes with him cavalry, light troops, and two phalanx regiments over rough country, but not the hypaspists; I am not clear that any contrast

is intended with 'the more heavily armed troops' mentioned just before, though all Macedonian troops are distinguished in 3. 18. 1-2 from the heavy-armed Greek infantry. Griffith has made out a good case for the view that even the *pezetairoi* lacked the breastplate worn by Greek hoplites; Mr. de Ste Croix (to whom I am indebted for material in this note) tells me that he conjectures that the hypaspists at this time did not carry the long *sarissa*.

<sup>5</sup> Details of the Macedonian battle order in Diod. 17. 57 (despite the substitution of Philippos for Simmias) and Curtius (4. 13. 26 ff. where they are incomplete) betray a source that is ultimately Macedonian (hence the description of the ethnic origin of the phalanx regiments). So too Curtius (4. 13. 32) was aware of Alexander's general plan, and both he (*ibid.* 4. 13. 33-34) and Diodorus (17. 57. 6) knew how he proposed to deal with the attack by the Persian chariots (cf. *Arr.* 3. 13. 5-6).

could not have discovered the truth about them, though for no obvious reason he admits that he could have ascertained by inquiry the true numbers of Greek units. This is quite arbitrary. Tarn himself thinks that Diodorus combined several sources, and the list of units comes within a section (17. 16-18. 1), which as a whole could hardly be ascribed to M. Its reliability may be in question but cannot justly be impugned for Tarn's reasons.

I hope that I need not pursue the matter farther, nor probe into the romantic stories of Darius' last days;<sup>1</sup> here too, though information from the faithful mercenaries and also from loyal Persians<sup>2</sup> may lie behind some statements in our sources, there is no justification for invoking a mercenary writer. The obscurity that still hangs over the question of the authorities summarized, amplified, and garbled by Diodorus and Curtius is not dispelled by Tarn's theory, and his attempt to certify or reject particular statements of these writers by the supposition that they did or did not derive from a hypothetical authority, who on his own showing could be capable of a gross perversion of the truth (Memnon's capture of Mitylene), must be pronounced totally without foundation, if only because neither Diodorus nor Curtius shows that pre-occupation with the mercenaries which we should expect, had they relied on a work whose 'object was to tell the story of the mercenaries'. It is, on the contrary, from Arrian that we learn most about the mercenaries, and Arrian, no less than the other historians, professes to have knowledge of what went on in the camp of Alexander's enemies, knowledge that must in fact have become available to contemporary Alexander-historians.<sup>3</sup>

## APPENDIX

1. The *neogamoi* could have joined Alexander at Gordium (Arr. 1. 29. 4) in May after a march from Pella of 800 km. (Beloch, *G.G.*<sup>2</sup> iii. 2. 312). Arrian seems to place after this event the beginning of Memnon's naval campaign (2. 1. 1—ἐκ δὲ τούτου). But it seems probable that he has merely interposed at this point in his narrative an account of the Persian operations by sea, which certainly goes down to a time after Alexander left Gordium and must have begun much earlier. It seems probable that Curtius 3. 1. 19 ff. is right in stating that it was at Gordium that Alexander appointed Hegelochus and Amphoterus (cf. Arr. 2. 2. 3; 3. 2) to counter the Persian naval offensive. Curtius says that Alexander had not yet heard of Memnon's death; but he implies that Lesbos, Chios, and Cos were all in Persian hands. Curtius may agree with Diodorus (29) that the whole of Lesbos as well as Chios had been

<sup>1</sup> Tarn says (p. 105) that Curtius' 'long writing up of Darius (3. 8-11) contains much which *no one could ever have known*' (my italics) 'but the loyalty of the mercenary leader Patron must be from' M. Why? On Curtius' own showing Patron and Artabazus were closely co-operating. But note discrepancies between Curt. 5. 8. 1-3 with Arr. 3. 19. 1 and cf. p. 151, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Artabazus especially might have been responsible for any marked admiration for Memnon that can be detected in any of our sources.

<sup>3</sup> Contrast the opinion of E. Schwartz, *Gr. Geschichtsschreiber*, p. 166: 'so far as events

in the Persian camp come in question, Arrian only repeats the news which successively reached Alexander, a clear proof that his authority, probably Ptolemy, would only consult official sources.' Schwartz based this on 3. 19, but such passages can be interpreted as evidence of a literary mannerism. The information given in texts cited in p. 152, n. 3, cannot have reached Alexander before the battles which followed the debates recorded.

I am indebted for helpful criticism to Mr. G. L. Cawkwell and Mr. G. E. M. de Ste Croix.

lost before Memnon's death, whereas Arrian puts the fall of Mitylene after it. However, since Mitylene was beleaguered and no relieving force had yet been mustered, its loss could have been assumed in advance by Alexander, and might indeed have been prematurely reported. Curtius' error, if error it be, does not invalidate the rest of what he tells us here. He also makes it plain (3. 1. 22 ff., cf. Arr. 2. 4. 1) that Alexander marched on without awaiting further news of the progress of the naval war. I agree, therefore, with Beloch that we need not suppose that he tarried long at Gordium, and that he probably reached Tarsus, after marching some 500 km., in about a month, i.e. in June. Here he fell ill. Beloch says that he was soon cured, but this is an error; his illness was prolonged and explains the delay in Cilicia (Arr. 2. 6. 4; Plut. 19. 1), which is otherwise unaccountable; the battle of Issus, as Beloch showed, must be put in September or early October. He heard of the death of Memnon either on his march for Cilicia (Plut. 18. 3) or after his arrival (Diod. 17. 31. 4), probably some time in June. We can well suppose that Memnon's operations began in March or April and that his death, still unknown to Alexander, was roughly coincident with Alexander's departure from Gordium (or before it).

2. Diodorus records Memnon's successes and death in chapter 29 and then tells that when Darius heard of his death he summoned a council to consider whether he should take the field himself with his whole force or send down other generals with an army to the coast (17. 30. 1). Charidemus advocated the latter course, and promised victory, if he himself were entrusted with 100,000 men of whom a third should be Greek mercenaries (17. 30. 2-3). Some of the king's friends insinuated that Charidemus would betray the Persian cause; Charidemus replied by taxing the Persians with cowardice, and Darius was so angry that he ordered his execution, of which he repented too late (17. 30. 4-6). Troubled by ominous dreams, Darius came to the conclusion that he had no general fit to oppose Alexander and that he must take the command himself (17. 30. 7). He therefore sent for forces from all parts of his empire, to meet at Babylon, and distributed commands among his friends. Eventually over 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse assembled at Babylon; with these he marched out to Cilicia (17. 31. 1-2).

3. Curtius' story shows some variants. His narrative of Memnon's successes is lost, but we find that in 3. 2 Memnon's death has become known to Darius, that he has already decided to fight in person and is engaged in mustering and reviewing his forces at Babylon; haste, however, has prevented him from mobilizing the troops of his eastern provinces (3. 2. 9), a detail that is almost certainly right as against Diodorus 17. 31. 1. The army includes 30,000 Greek mercenaries, a figure which corresponds to that which Charidemus asked for in Diodorus' version (3. 2. 9). It was then, according to Curtius (3. 2. 10-19), that Charidemus cast doubt on the ability of Darius' army to beat Alexander and urged him to recruit Greeks; the speech which Curtius puts into Charidemus' mouth makes sense of what Diodorus says about his invectives against Persian cowardice, but the occasion is different—in Curtius the king's decision to take the field in person has already been made—and Curtius has nothing of Charidemus' offer to defeat Alexander himself. It is not clear to me whether Curtius is at least in part following a source different from Diodorus, though related closely to it. It may be remarked that Curtius also gives lower figures for Darius' army (218,000 Oriental foot, 58,200 Oriental horse, and 30,000

Greeks, 3. 2. 4-9) and that he also refers to Darius' dreams (3. 3. 2 ff.) as occurring after his decision to take the command. But he agrees with Diodorus in making Darius repent of Charidemus' death and in the general outline of his story. It is not improbable that Curtius has embroidered and distorted in some particulars the same version of events which Diodorus knew. This version was not altogether disreputable. Some details in Curtius' picture of the Persian army (3. 3), for instance, seem to be accurate (cf. J. C. Rolfe's notes in the Loeb edition).

4. I am therefore inclined to believe that there is a basis of truth in the story as told by Diodorus and Curtius, and especially in Diodorus' account. We can well suppose that Darius considered whether or not to take the field himself on learning of Memnon's death; the news could have reached him post-haste at Babylon some time in June. It seems probable that some of his nearer subjects will already have received orders to muster there. But it must have been then that he ordered the Greek mercenaries with the fleet to join his army (cf. Arr. 2. 2. 1). This is in fact what Curtius says (3. 3. 1); he is here evidently following a different source from that which lies behind 3. 2. 9 (cf. Diodorus 17. 30. 3?), according to which the 30,000 Greeks who are said to have fought at Issus (cf. text to p. 150, n. 1) were already present at Babylon, whereas in fact the majority of the mercenaries who fought there were shipped from the Aegean and can only have arrived in Syria a little before the battle.

*Oriel College, Oxford*

P. A. BRUNT

## SPARTAN HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

THE Classical Spartans were noted for their austerity, which seemed already ancient to writers of the fifth century B.C. The early poetry and art of their country show a considerable aesthetic sense. This apparent contradiction has caused some students to conclude that the strict Lycurgan regimen was not introduced till the middle or even the end of the sixth century (when literature and art were dead or died) and that before that date Sparta had culturally been developing in much the same way as other important Greek states. The argument is unsound.

The first objection is that there need not be any relationship between Laconian art and Spartan austerity. It is not likely that at any time in the Archaic period Spartans worked at the aesthetic crafts, or Helots either. If so, since the strong continuity of style precludes casual immigrants, it is very likely that the practice of the arts was left to Perioeci. We know very little of the Perioeci, except that they were free subjects of the Spartans, lived in separate and municipally independent communities, and were contented enough not to revolt. Laconian art may not only have been undertaken by Perioeci, but also—anyhow in its private products—have taken account of the tastes and wants of Perioeci, whether or not it served Spartiates as well.<sup>2</sup> Presumably it was Perioeci too who ran Laconian commerce. This may not have been large, even by Greek standards, but throughout the sixth century pottery and bronzes were exported and something must have been received in exchange. The division of functions between Spartans and Perioeci may even explain why Sparta did not coin money: the Perioeci, as subjects, had no authority to coin, the Spartans no desire. The excavation of a town of Perioeci could be, historically, one of the more useful of archaeological enterprises.

In any case the record of Laconian art is quite creditable. Its school of vase-painting reached its peak about 560–550 B.C. and then decayed;<sup>3</sup> but this decay, on which much emphasis has been put, was not as complete as that of Corinthian vase-painting and can be explained as a normal effect of Attic competition in the mid sixth century.<sup>4</sup> Laconian bronze figurines of good quality were made till the first half of the fifth century,<sup>5</sup> and many of them were intended to decorate such articles of luxury as mirrors and mixing bowls.<sup>6</sup> In large sculpture Laconian achievement seems lower, but not contemptible.

<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Dr. M. I. Finley for suggesting and vetting this paper.

<sup>2</sup> This is perhaps the reason for the scenes of dinner parties and revels on Laconian pottery around the mid sixth century (for references see E. A. Lane, *B.S.A.* xxxiv, 158–9 and 160–1). These subjects are borrowed from Corinthian vase-painting, but cannot have been offensive to the Laconian craftsmen and their clients.

<sup>3</sup> E. A. Lane, *B.S.A.* xxxiv, 99–189, especially 150–4; B. B. Shefton, *B.S.A.* xl ix (1954), 299–310.

<sup>4</sup> That Laconian vase-painters felt such competition can be deduced from their

imitation of other schools.

<sup>5</sup> For references see G. Lippold, *Die griechische Plastik*, pp. 30–33, 89, 105–6; E. Langlotz, *Frühgriechische Bildhauerschulen*, pp. 86–98.

<sup>6</sup> See J. Charbonneau, *Les Bronzes grecs*, pp. 69–70; L. Politis, *A.E.* 1936, 147–74; W. L. Brown, *The Etruscan Lion*, p. 119. The great bowl sent in the 540's to Croesus (*Hdt.* i. 70) was also presumably of Laconian work. The Vix krater, of the last quarter of the sixth century, is probably Laconian; if not, it is under strong Laconian influence (R. Joffroy, *Mon. Piot* xl viii. 1 [1954]; A. Rumpf in *Charites*, pp. 127–35).

The Daedalic school of the seventh century, though known mostly from small terra-cottas, was one of the main schools of its time.<sup>1</sup> The early head of Hera at Olympia is a good provincial product a little later than 600 B.C.<sup>2</sup> The grave reliefs, which begin about the middle of the sixth century, are mediocre if effective.<sup>3</sup> Yet the so-called Leonidas,<sup>4</sup> found in Sparta and usually taken to be local work of the 470's, is a more than competent statue and suggests that the surviving reliefs of the later Archaic period may not represent the best work of their time. In general Laconian sculpture is of no worse quality than Boeotian. As for architecture we have, true enough, the simple temple of Artemis Orthia at Sparta,<sup>5</sup> built in the early sixth century, and the observation of Thucydides that the buildings of the Sparta of his day would make much less imposing ruins than those of Athens;<sup>6</sup> but the sanctuary of Orthia was not the principal sanctuary of Sparta and, though in the late fifth century Athens was architecturally the most sumptuous of Greek cities, it does not follow that Thucydides meant that Sparta was the least. Though unwalled, it had some notable buildings<sup>7</sup>—the Skias, the Bronze House, and the Persian Stoa, which was built soon after 479 B.C.<sup>8</sup>—and at Amyclae the Throne of Apollo, designed by a foreigner but for Spartans, was an elaborate and original creation of the late sixth century.<sup>9</sup> Before that, in the first half of the sixth century and perhaps later too, terra-cotta revetments<sup>10</sup> are evidence that Laconian architects were building temples of some size and importance.<sup>11</sup> In summary, the public arts of architecture and sculpture were practised in Laconia into the fifth century and, though they may have been laggard and occasional, it is not clear that the level was lower than in other communities that had not progressed much in urbanization. On the other hand, it is quite clear that those arts which served private clients were not abnormally retarded, anyhow before the fifth century.

It might be claimed that poetry is a better index to Spartan culture; Tyrtaeus and Alcman both belong to the later seventh century and, though in later times the Spartans may have enjoyed poetry, they composed nothing

<sup>1</sup> R. J. H. Jenkins, *B.S.A.* xxxiii. 66–79; and *Daedalica*.

<sup>2</sup> Lippold, *op. cit.*, pl. 8. 1; R. Lullies and M. Hirmer, *Greek Sculpture*, pl. 10.

<sup>3</sup> M. Andronikos, *Peloponnesiaka*, vol. A, pp. 253–314; Lippold, *op. cit.*, p. 89, n. 11; K. F. Johansen, *The Attic Grave-Reliefs*, pp. 82–88.

<sup>4</sup> Lippold, *op. cit.*, pl. 32. 4. Note also the relief from Geraki of the second quarter of the fifth century (Johansen, *op. cit.*, fig. 40).

<sup>5</sup> R. M. Dawkins in *Artemis Orthia*, pp. 20–22 and figs. 5 and 8.

<sup>6</sup> 1. 10. 1–3.

<sup>7</sup> See Paus. 3. 11–16. It is interesting to compare Pausanias' description of Sparta with his description of such other cities as Elis and Megara. Sparta, of course, was a small city (*Xen. R.L.* 1.1).

<sup>8</sup> On this remarkable building see Vitr. 1. 1–6; the building was extended greatly (Paus. 3. 11. 3), but the caryatids seem to have belonged to the original stage.

<sup>9</sup> Paus. 3. 18. 6–19. 5. For the excavation,

which was illuminating, see E. Fiechter, *J.d.I.* xxxiii (1918), 107–245; E. Buschor, *A.M.* lii (1927), 15–21; W. von Massow, *ibid.* 65–85.

<sup>10</sup> E. D. van Buren, *Greek Fictile Revetments*, pp. 18–20, 37–8, 45–46, 49–50, 60–61, and Catalogue *passim*; W. S. George and A. M. Woodward in *Artemis Orthia*, pp. 117–44.

<sup>11</sup> The temple of Hera at Olympia had Laconian revetments and a probably Laconian cult image (see n. 2, above); so it may well have been built by a Laconian. Three Laconian pots of the second quarter of the sixth century show, though not very elegantly, fountain houses with columned porch and one a building in construction (*C.V.A. Louvre* i, pl. 25. 12; *Boll. d'Arte*, xxxix [1954], 289–95, figs. 1 and 4; J. Boehlau, *Aus ionischen und italischen Nekropolen*, pl. 10. 4). Incidentally, the second of these makes a precocious attempt at perspective in the architraves.

that was remembered. This sort of evidence is very weak. Corinth had only one poet of note—Eumelus in the eighth century. Argos and Aegina had none. In general the incidence of literary personages in Greek states was too rare to be significant statistically.

Other general objections to dating a radical reform of Spartan life to the mid sixth century or later are obvious enough. First, such a reform would hardly have escaped the notice of historians of the fifth century. Secondly, the occasion for enforcing a new austerity is lacking. After all, the principal purpose of the Spartan system seems to have been to hold down the Helots and, so far as we know, there was no special danger from the Helots between the later seventh and the fifth centuries B.C.

Finally, though Spartan life was certainly austere, it may be asked whether tradition has not exaggerated its austerity. Our first detailed account is in Xenophon's *de Republica Lacedaemoniorum*, written about 375 B.C. That account was not strictly accurate for its time, since, as Xenophon states with regret,<sup>1</sup> the old severity had been relaxed. This seems suspiciously like a lament for the good old times. An interesting sidelight is provided by an inscription set up in Sparta by Damnon about the middle of the fifth century to record his unparalleled run of victories as owner-driver in chariot and horse races.<sup>2</sup> Granted that most if not all of these races were in Laconia,<sup>3</sup> yet racing was an expensive sport and Damnon must have had plenty of time to practise. Further, the connexions of some aristocratic families elsewhere with Sparta and Spartans suggests a freer intercourse than the conventional view permits.<sup>4</sup>

*Museum of Classical Archaeology, Cambridge*

R. M. COOK

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *R.L.* 14.

<sup>2</sup> H. J. Tillyard, *B.S.A.* xiii. 174–82; E. Schwyzer, *Dialectorum Graecarum Exempla*, pp. 4–5, no. 12; C. D. Buck, *The Greek Dialects*, pp. 268–9, no. 71; and, for a facsimile of part, H. Roehl, *Imagines Inscriptionum Graecarum Antiquissimarum*<sup>3</sup>, p. 100, no. 17. The date should be before 431 B.C. (Tillyard,

loc. cit. 181–2).

<sup>3</sup> The Parparonia may have taken place in the Argolid and Thuria is in Messenia.

<sup>4</sup> The Spartans were not without culture, even if it was of a liberal arts type; in particular they liked 'archaeology' (Plato, *Hp. Ma.* 285; I owe this reference to Dr. W. H. Plommer).

## L.S.J. AND CICERO'S LETTERS

FEW authors, I should suppose, get less expert treatment in this lexicon than Cicero, so far at least as his letters are concerned. That is largely because the editors chose to trust Tyrrell and Purser, to whom Cicero's Greek was no less full of pitfalls than his Latin. The following notes may be of help in the preparation of a tenth edition.

**ἀγών.** In *Att.* 1. 16. 8 Cicero says he will not retail the whole of his altercation with Clodius in the Senate, *nam cetera non possunt habere eandem neque vim neque venustatem remoto illo studio contentionis quem ἀγῶνα vos [sc. Athenienses] appellatis.* This passage, which L.S.J. do not notice, illuminates two which they do, *Longin.* 15. 1 ὅγκου καὶ μεγαληγορίας καὶ ἀγώνος and 26. 3 ἐμπαθέστερόν τε ἄμα καὶ προσεκτικώτερον καὶ ἀγώνος ἔμπλεων ἀποτελέσεις, where 'excitement' would come nearer than 'vehemence, power'.

**ἀκενόσπουδος.** See **κενόσπουδος** below.

**ἀκοινώνητος.** 'Inhuman, Cic. *Att.* 6. 3. 7.' Modern editors read **ἀκοινόνογοντον** (cf. 6. 1. 7), which is the paradosis. This word means 'tactless' rather than 'lacking in *savoir-faire*'.

**ἀκραής.** 'si ἀκραῆς erit if a brisk breeze spring up, Cic. *Att.* 10. 17. 9 [read 3].' **ἀκραῆς erit** is a once popular but useless conjecture of Bosius' for *cras erit*. The right reading is almost certainly either *transierit* (Ziehen) or *traxerit* (see *Cam. Phil. Soc. Proc.* 1954-5, p. 29).

**ἄλη.** For the metaphorical sense 'wandering of mind, distraction' L.S.J. cite only *Eur. Med.* 1285, on which Dr. Page has: 'I observe no parallel . . .; and *literal* wandering is by no means out of place here.' If Cicero's commentators were right, *Att.* 10. 1. 4 *haec est ἄλη in qua nunc sumus mortis instar* would be parallel, but they are wrong. **ἄλη** there means *fuga*: cf. 8. 3. 3 *turpissima in qua sumus fuga* (so I emend *turpissimamque sum fuga* of M; see *J.R.S.* xlvi [1956], 61), 10. 4. 6 *in hac vita et fuga*, 10. 11. 2 *in hac mea fuga*.

**ἀλογέω.** 'Pass., to feel slighted, Cic. *Att.* 12. 3. 3 [read 2].' **ἀλογέω** = 'slight, disregard' is normal, and *Diog. Laert.* 1. 32 ἐπειδὴ πρεσβευόμενοι ἡλόγουντο is cited for the passive. But there is a difference between being and feeling; and the passive is more common in quite a different sense, 'to be confused, nonplussed', 'to miscalculate' (in *Luc. Ogy.* 143 the doctor says, not what L.S.J. make him say 'I am out of my senses', but 'I am all confused'): cf. e.g. *Polyb.* 8. 36. 4 τὸ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀλογηθῆναι. So **ἀλόγημα** = 'miscalculation', **ἀλογία** = 'confusion'. Perhaps the origin of this meaning may be financial (cf. *λόγος*), and that is how I would explain the Ciceronian passage: *ac vereor ne iste iam auctiōnem nullam faciat, sed ludis factis Atypo subsidio currat, ne talis vir ἀλογηθῇ.* Popma's *Atypo* (= *Balbo*, the Stammerer<sup>1</sup>) for *clypo* vel sim. deserves the wide acceptance it has received. **iste** may be, as Schiche thought, the quaestor urbanus concerned in the sale of confiscated Pompeian property. If the letter was written, as is possible, not long before Caesar's return from Africa, the facetious suggestion that Caesar's chief financial expert (cf. 13. 52. 1 *rationes*,

<sup>1</sup> For this sense of **ἀτυπος** L.S.J. quote only *Gell.* 4. 2. 5.

that was remembered. This sort of evidence is very weak. Corinth had only one poet of note—Eumelus in the eighth century. Argos and Aegina had none. In general the incidence of literary personages in Greek states was too rare to be significant statistically.

Other general objections to dating a radical reform of Spartan life to the mid sixth century or later are obvious enough. First, such a reform would hardly have escaped the notice of historians of the fifth century. Secondly, the occasion for enforcing a new austerity is lacking. After all, the principal purpose of the Spartan system seems to have been to hold down the Helots and, so far as we know, there was no special danger from the Helots between the later seventh and the fifth centuries B.C.

Finally, though Spartan life was certainly austere, it may be asked whether tradition has not exaggerated its austerity. Our first detailed account is in Xenophon's *de Republica Lacedaemoniorum*, written about 375 B.C. That account was not strictly accurate for its time, since, as Xenophon states with regret,<sup>1</sup> the old severity had been relaxed. This seems suspiciously like a lament for the good old times. An interesting sidelight is provided by an inscription set up in Sparta by Damonon about the middle of the fifth century to record his unparalleled run of victories as owner-driver in chariot and horse races.<sup>2</sup> Granted that most if not all of these races were in Laconia,<sup>3</sup> yet racing was an expensive sport and Damonon must have had plenty of time to practise. Further, the connexions of some aristocratic families elsewhere with Sparta and Spartans suggests a freer intercourse than the conventional view permits.<sup>4</sup>

*Museum of Classical Archaeology, Cambridge*

R. M. COOK

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *R.L.* 14.

<sup>2</sup> H. J. Tillyard, *B.S.A.* xiii. 174–82; E. Schwyzer, *Dialectorum Graecarum Exempla*, pp. 4–5, no. 12; C. D. Buck, *The Greek Dialects*, pp. 268–9, no. 71; and, for a facsimile of part, H. Roehl, *Imagines Inscriptionum Graecarum Antiquissimarum*, p. 100, no. 17. The date should be before 431 B.C. (Tillyard,

loc. cit. 181–2).

<sup>3</sup> The Parparonia may have taken place in the Argolid and Thuria is in Messenia.

<sup>4</sup> The Spartans were not without culture, even if it was of a liberal arts type; in particular they liked 'archaeology' (Plato, *Hp. Ma.* 285; I owe this reference to Dr. W. H. Plommer).

## L.S.J. AND CICERO'S LETTERS

FEW authors, I should suppose, get less expert treatment in this lexicon than Cicero, so far at least as his letters are concerned. That is largely because the editors chose to trust Tyrrell and Purser, to whom Cicero's Greek was no less full of pitfalls than his Latin. The following notes may be of help in the preparation of a tenth edition.

ἀγών. In *Att.* 1. 16. 8 Cicero says he will not retail the whole of his altercation with Clodius in the Senate, *nam cetera non possunt habere eandem neque vim neque venustatem remoto illo studio contentionis quem ἀγώνα vos [sc. Athenienses] appellatis*. This passage, which L.S.J. do not notice, illuminates two which they do, *Longin.* 15. 1 ὅγκου καὶ μεγαληγορίας καὶ ἀγώνος and 26. 3 ἐμπαθέστερόν τε ἄμα καὶ προσεκτικώτερον καὶ ἀγώνος ἔμπλεων ἀποτελέσεις, where 'excitement' would come nearer than 'vehemence, power'.

ἀκενόσπουδος. See *κενόσπουδος* below.

ἀκονώνητος. 'Inhuman, Cic. *Att.* 6. 3. 7.' Modern editors read ἀκονόνοητος (cf. 6. 1. 7), which is the paradosis. This word means 'tactless' rather than 'lacking in *savoir-faire*'.

ἀκραής. 'si ἀκραής erit if a brisk breeze spring up, Cic. *Att.* 10. 17. 9 [read 3].' *ἀκραής erit* is a once popular but useless conjecture of Bosius' for *cras erit*. The right reading is almost certainly either *transierit* (Ziehen) or *traxerit* (see *Cam. Phil. Soc. Proc.* 1954-5, p. 29).

ἄλη. For the metaphorical sense 'wandering of mind, distraction' L.S.J. cite only Eur. *Med.* 1285, on which Dr. Page has: 'I observe no parallel . . .; and *literal* wandering is by no means out of place here.' If Cicero's commentators were right, *Att.* 10. 1. 4 *haec est ἄλη in qua nunc sumus mortis instar* would be parallel, but they are wrong. *ἄλη* there means *fuga*: cf. 8. 3. 3 *turpissima in qua sumus fuga* (so I emend *turpissimamque sum fuga* of M; see *J.R.S.* xlvi [1956], 61), 10. 4. 6 *in hac vita et fuga*, 10. 11. 2 *in hac mea fuga*.

ἀλογέω. 'Pass., to feel slighted, Cic. *Att.* 12. 3. 3 [read 2].' *ἀλογέω* = 'slight, disregard' is normal, and Diog. Laert. 1. 32 ἐπειδὴ πρεσβευόμενοι ἡλόγουντο is cited for the passive. But there is a difference between being and feeling; and the passive is more common in quite a different sense, 'to be confused, nonplussed', 'to miscalculate' (in Luc. *Ocyb.* 143 the doctor says, not what L.S.J. make him say 'I am out of my senses', but 'I am all confused'): cf. e.g. Polyb. 8. 36. 4 τὸ διὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἀλογηθῆναι. So *ἀλόγημα* = 'miscalculation', *ἀλογία* = 'confusion'. Perhaps the origin of this meaning may be financial (cf. *λόγος*), and that is how I would explain the Ciceronian passage: *ac vereor ne iste iam auctionem nullam faciat, sed ludis factis Atypo subsidio currat, ne talis vir ἀλογηθῇ*. Popma's *Atypo* (= *Balbo*, the Stammerer<sup>1</sup>) for *clypo* vel sim. deserves the wide acceptance it has received. *iste* may be, as Schiche thought, the quaestor urbanus concerned in the sale of confiscated Pompeian property. If the letter was written, as is possible, not long before Caesar's return from Africa, the facetious suggestion that Caesar's chief financial expert (cf. 13. 52. 1 *rationes*,

<sup>1</sup> For this sense of *ἀτυπος* L.S.J. quote only Gell. 4. 2. 5.

*opinor, cum Balbo*) needed this person's help to get his accounts in order is all the more in point.

**ἀναθεώρησις.** L.S.J. distinguish two senses, 'close examination' ('further reflection') and 'attention attracted by an event, *magnam à. res habet* Cic. *Att.* 14. 5. 1, cf. *ib.* 9. 19. 1, 14. 6. 2'. The first is well attested both for the noun and for *ἀναθεώρεω*, the second has no support outside Cicero. In *Att.* 9. 19. 1 it is quite inadmissible. Cicero had just travelled, in April 49, from Formiae to Arpinum, where *omnis et illas* (sc. *Arpinates*) *et qua iter feci maestos afflictosque vidi; tam tristis et tam atrox est ἀναθεώρησις huius ingentis mali.* TP comment 'The "coup d'œil", "the contemplation in all its enormity of the blow that has fallen on this state".' The other two passages are in effect one, and the correct references are 14. 15. 1 and 14. 16. 2. Of Dolabella's momentary lapse into grace in April 44 Cicero writes *magnam ἀναθεώρησιν res habet* and again *o Dolabellae nostri magnam ἀριστείαν! quanta est ἀναθεώρησις!* TP render *ἀν.* 'a sight to see', which would do well enough if Greek words were blank cheques. But usage should not be thrown to the winds except under compulsion, and one use of this noun, not recorded in L.S.J., will fit here. Take three passages from Cicero's contemporary Diodorus: 13. 35 *μεγάλης δὲ οὕτης κατὰ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναθεωρήσεως*, *ibid.* ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν σύντομος, καὶ πολλὴν τοῖς ἀναγνώσκουσιν ἀπολιπὼν ἀναθεώρησιν, 34 (exc. *de Virt. et Vit.*, p. 605) ἐκατέρα μὲν οὖν ἀπόφασις ἔδοκε τῷ συνεδρίῳ μεγάλην ἔχειν ἀναθεώρησιν (exactly parallel to Cicero's *magnam ἀν. habet*). In these *ἀν.* means 'cause for reflection, food for thought'; cf. also Longin. 7. 3 ὅταν . . . μήδ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ πλεῖον τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ ἀναθεωρούμενον. That will serve not only in *Att.* 14. 15. 1 and 14. 16. 2 but also in 9. 19. 1: 'so sad and terrible are the thoughts that arise from this vast calamity.'

**ἀνεξία.** 'Endurance, resignation, Sicilian word, Cic. *Att.* 5. 11. 5.' Cf. TP: 'If *Siculi* for *singuli* of the MSS. is the true correction, we must only suppose that the Sicilian Greeks used *ἀνεκτός* in the sense of "patient", "enduring", instead of the classical sense of "endurable".' If we look at the Ciceronian context we must suppose nothing of the sort. Writing from Athens on his way to Cilicia as governor, Cicero says that his staff, following his own example, have been careful to maintain his reputation by financial restraint in their dealings with the provincials, and he will see that they continue in the same way. But he cannot undertake to keep up this *ἀνεξία* (so MSS.) for more than his legal term of one year; so if Atticus does not want him to turn out a rascal after all, he had better see to it that his tenure is not extended (*sed ego hanc, ut Siculi dicunt, ἀνεξίαν in unum annum meditatus sum. proinde pugna ne, si quid prorogatum sit, turpis inveniar*). Neither *ἀνεξίαν*, supposing it could mean 'endurance', nor *ἀναξίαν* (Reid) ties up with *ne turpis inveniar*. What we want is something like 'incorruptibility'. *ἀνιξίαν* might be considered. *ἰξός* and *ἰξία* mean bird-lime. Hence probably *ἰξός*, 'a skin-flint', in Arist. *Frag.* 718 *ἴξοι, ρυποκόνδυλοι*. But the notion of sticky fingers suits the taker of illicit gains as well as the miser. Whatever be thought of this guess, *ἀνεξία* should go.

**ἀνηθοποίητος.** 'Unprincipled, Cic. *Att.* 10. 10. 5 [read 6].' Cicero writes of his nephew *nihil ego vidi tam ἀνηθοποίητον, tam aversum a suis, tam nescio quid cogitans . . . mirum est enim ingenium: ηθος ἐπιμελητέον*. The word means 'morally unformed': cf. *ηθοποιέω*, 'mould a person's character'. The remedy, as Cicero

thought, lay in moral education, which he intended to take in hand (cf. also 10. 12a. 4).

ἀντιμικτηρίζω. 'Answer mockery, gladio Cic. Fam. 15. 19. 4.' More accurately 'mock in answer, sneer back at'. The writer is C. Cassius, not Cicero.

ἀπάντησις. The sense 'obviam itio', which L.S.J. notice in their 'addenda et corrigenda' is regular in Cicero (e.g. Att. 8. 16. 1).

ἀρχέτυπον. Note Att. 12. 5 c *Nicasionumque ἀρχέτυπα fugienda*, where ἀρχ. apparently = 'ledgers'.

ἄτυφος. 'Not puffed up.' L.S.J. fail to quote Att. 6. 9. 2 *in quo [sc. triumpho], ut praecepis, nec me κενὸν in expetendo cognoscet nec ἄτυφον in abiciendo*, where the word for once is used pejoratively, = 'poor-spirited'. ἄτυφία is glossed *ταπεινοφροσύνη* in 'Suidas'.

αὐτόχθων. 'urbanitas, racy of the soil, Cic. Att. 7. 2. 3.' When Cicero says that Atticus' friend M'. Curius possessed this quality he means that Curius' wit and manners had the genuine *Roman* flavour: cf. Lys. *Epitaph.* 43 γνησίαν δὲ καὶ αὐτόχθονα τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπεδείξαντο.

βαθύτης. 'Of mental profundity'<sup>1</sup> Cic. Att. 4. 6. 3, al.' In 4. 6. 3 and elsewhere Cicero means 'imperturbability, self-control, reticence'—of one who does not allow his feelings to appear in his behaviour.

γενικῶς. L.S.J. quote no authority earlier than M. Aurelius. Cf. Att. 1. 14. 2 *locutus ita est in senatu ut omnia illius ordinis consulta γενικῶς laudaret*. So, according to the usual reading, 9. 10. 6 *cum tu ad me quaedam γενικώτερον scripsisses et ego mihi a te quaedam significari putassem ut Italia cederem. γεν.* is Victorius' conjecture for the paradoxos *ρενικώτερον*, whence *ἀρρενικώτερον* in *Oδ.* Perhaps *γεννικώτερον*.

δέρρις. 'In pl. screens of skin or hide hung before fortifications to deaden the enemy's missiles, Th. 2. 75, Cic. Att. 4. 19. 1,' e.q.s. The Ciceronian context has nothing to do with fortifications or enemy missiles: see TP.

διατροπή. 'Fiasco, débâcle, Cic. Att. 9. 13. 7.' Cicero writes of Lentulus Spinther, whom Caesar had captured and released at Corfinium a month previously: *Lentulus noster Puteolis est, ἀδημονῶν, ut Caecius narrat, quid agat. διατροπήν Corfiniensem reformidat. Pompeio nunc putat satis factum, beneficio Caesaris movetur, sed tamen movetur magis prospecta re.* Despite the commentators, *reformidat* should be taken 'is appalled by (lit. shies away from) the memory of': cf. Ov. *Tr.* 3. 6. 29 *mensque reformidat, veluti sua vulnera, tempus / illud, et admonitu fit novus ipse pudor.* But διατροπή = 'fiasco' is unsupported. Normally the meaning is 'confusion, consternation, animi perturbatio', and this makes adequate sense here. Lentulus could not bear to think of his (or perhaps the general) boulevard at Corfinium.

διφθέρα. διφθέρα = *libri* in Att. 13. 24. 1 *quattuor διφθέραι sunt in tua potestate*, a sense not recognized in L.S.J. It should not therefore be assumed that the books were in parchment or vellum. Apart from Herodotus' statement (5. 58) that from early times the Ionians called papyrus-sheets (*βύβλους*) 'skins' (*διφθέρας*), it is possible that a volume was so termed from the leathern wrapper in which it was bound.

έγγήραμα. 'Employment for old age, Cic. Att. 12. 25. 2, Plu. Cat. Ma. 24.' I have

<sup>1</sup> Amended in the 'addenda et corrigenda' to 'serene temper'—better, but still not correct.

shown elsewhere that in *Att.* 12. 25. 2, 12. 29. 2, and 12. 44. 2 ἐγγύραμα means 'a place to grow old in' as explained by Victorius: 'locus in quo senectus commode transigi possit et qui sit requies et oblectamentum eius aetatis' (see *Towards a Text of Cicero, Ad Atticum* [Cambridge 1960], pp. 86-88).

ἐκτένεια. '“Gush”, “empressemement”, *Cic. Att.* 10. 17. 1'—as distinct from 'zeal, assiduousness'. There is no cause to see anything pejorative in Cicero's use of the word: cf. also *Att.* 13. 9. 1 *nihil possum dicere ἐκτενέστερον, nihil φιλοστοργύστερον*.

ἐνδόμυχος. L.S.J. ignore ἐνδόμυχον, 'a domestic matter', with reference to Tullia's betrothal in *Att.* 5. 14. 3, 5. 21. 14.

ἐξακανθίζω. 'Pick out thorns: metaph., “pick holes in”, *Cic. Att.* 6. 6. 1.' To pick out thorns from a man is a strange way of picking holes in him. The passage concerns Cicero's prospective son-in-law Dolabella, a young man whose charm and social status compensated for certain notorious drawbacks: *mulieres quidem valde intellego delectari obsequio et comitate adolescentis, cetera noli ἐξακανθίζειν*. Just as ἐξανθίζω means 'deck as with flowers, paint in various colours' (L.S.J.) so ἐξακανθίζω means 'deck with thorns', i.e. 'paint in black colours'.

ἐπίτευγμα. '“Coup”, *Cic. Att.* 12. 37. 1.' 'Coup' is a flourish of TP's. As elsewhere ἐπιτ. is here contrasted with ἀπότευγμα and means simply 'success (hit)' as opposed to 'failure (miss)'.

εὐαγώγως. 'In an accommodating spirit, *Cic. Att.* 13. 23. 3.' L.S.J. do not mention that this adverb, not found elsewhere, is a conjecture of Bosius for εὐαγώς of the extant MSS. I have adopted it in my own edition, but I am not at all sure that I ought not to have printed εὐλαβῶς, which Lambinus (herein contradicting Bosius) definitely attributes to the lost Tornesianus ('plane scriptum').

εὐλογός. 'Probable . . . cf. *Cic. Att.* 14. 22. 2.' On Cicero's use of this adjective (and the noun εὐλογία) see my *Towards a Text*, etc., p. 88.

θετικός. 'Lat. *genus instituendi θετικώτερον*, addressed to reason rather than feeling, *Cic. Q.F.* 3. 3. 4.' This excerpt from TP can only mislead. Cicero opposes his own 'more abstract method of training' to Paeonius' *declamatorium genus*. Paeonius one gathers set his pupils to deal with historical or imaginary situations such as are found in the elder Seneca and 'Quintilian', Cicero preferred abstract themes (cf. *Or.* 46 *haec igitur quaestio a propriis personis et temporibus ad universi generis rationem traducta appellatur θεός*).

καταβίωσις. 'Decline of life, *Cic. Att.* 13. 1. 2.' Rather 'living out one's life', 'vitae decursus'. καταβίωσις is 'live out one's days'. There is no real difference between Cicero's use and that of Diodorus and Appian in the two passages cited by L.S.J. with the lemma 'residence'.

κενόσπουδος. 'τὰ κ. matters of mere curiosity, *Cic. Att.* 9. 1. 1.' Cicero begins his letter of 6 March 49 *Etsi cum h. has litteras legeres putabam fore ut scirem iam quid Brundisi actum esset . . . tamen angebar singularum horarum exspectatione mirabarque nihil adlatum esse ne rumoris quidem. nam erat mirum silentium. sed haec fortasse κενόσπουδα sunt, quae tamen iam sciantur necesse est. haec* = 'my anxieties', i.e. 'what is happening at Brundisium'; and this, so far from being a matter of mere curiosity, would determine the fate of Pompey and Rome. But these anxieties were κενόσπουδα because σπουδή about them was κενή; it is no use to

worry without data. Render 'But perhaps all this is worry to no purpose; and anyway we shall soon know the answer' (*tamen* implies not 'whether these events are important or not' (TP), but 'whether I worry or not'). Cf. 8. 14. 2 *dices* 'quid igitur proficis qui anticipes eius rei molestiam quam triduo sciturus sis?'. ἀκενόστοιδος in *Fam.* 15. 17. 4 ('shunning vain pursuits' L.S.J.) is similar; Cassius is told that in Cicero's opinion he will be wise not to concern himself idly, i.e. not to worry about politics under Caesar. Contrast *Att.* 13. 21a. 1 περὶ μικρὰ σπουδάζειν.

**κοιλιολυσία.** 'Looseness of the bowels, περὶ κοιλιολυσίαν γίνεσθαι to take laxative medicine, Cic. *Att.* 10. 13. 1, cf. *Sor.* 1. 46, *AB* 323.' This is moonshine. Antony told the municipal dignitaries who waited upon him at 9 o'clock in the morning to come back next day: *lavari se velle et περὶ κοιλιολυσίαν γίνεσθαι*—he wanted to take his bath *et faire ses besoins*. *κοιλιολυσία* is just as certainly *alvi solutio* here as in *Soranus* (μέθην, ἔμετον, κοιλιολυσίαν) and Bekker's *Anecdota* (ὑπότριμπα . . . φ πρὸς κοιλιολυσίαν ἔχρωντο). Cf. *Fam.* 16. 18. 1 εὐλυσίαν κοιλασ.

**μικροψυχία.** 'Littleness of soul, meanness of spirit' . . . Cic. *Att.* 9. 11. 4.' This is a conjecture found in early printed editions. The MSS., here supported by Cratander's margin, have μακροψυχίαν which Sjögren restored to the text. Probably he was right, for μικρ. makes little sense in the context. The date is 20 March 49. After conjuring up horrific visions of what the Pompeians would do if they won (*meras proscriptio*nes, *meros Sullas*), Cicero continues *quam vero* [sc. *putas*] μακροψυχίαν *Gnaci nostri esse? nuntiant Aegyptum et Αραβίαν εὐδαιμονα et Μεσοποταμίαν cogitare, iam Hispaniam abiecerisse. monstra narrant, quae falsa esse possunt: sed certe et haec* [sc. *Caesariana*] *perdita sunt et illa non salutaria.* If Pompey meant to retire to the East (and not merely to Greece), that would not be 'littleness of soul'; he would not be going there for refuge, but to gather forces *pour mieux sauter*, as Cicero well recognized (cf. 9. 10. 3). μακροψυχία can now be supported by μακροψυχέω and μακρόψυχος in papyri in the sense 'be patient, dilatory'. Of course it would not, as commentators used to think, be equivalent to μεγαλοψυχία, but might fairly and appositely be rendered 'length of view'. Pompey was planning for a long war from distant bases, if the rumours were true.

**νέκυια.** 'Rabble, used contemptuously of Caesar's entourage, Cic. *Att.* 9. 18. 2, cf. *Attic. ap. eund.* *Att.* 9. 10. 7.' This nickname originated with Atticus; Cicero borrows it (9. 11. 2, 9. 18. 2). Clearly more is meant than 'rabble'. Atticus must be thinking of the procession of ghosts in *Od.* 11, so that 'underworld' would be a tolerable translation. But why are Caesar's followers likened to ghosts? Not I think because they were 'mere shadows of real men', but because many of them had been cast out of respectable society. They now emerged from the shades of bankruptcy or disgrace like the ghosts from the house of Hades.

**πεπλογραφία.** 'Description of the *peplos*, or the subjects worked on it, title of work by Varro, being a sort of "Book of Worthies", Cic. *Att.* 16. 11. 3.' Cicero's words are 'πεπλογραφίαν *Varronis tibi probari non moleste fero*'; they are usually and no doubt rightly referred to the *Imagines*, a collection of 700 'portraits' of famous men. But πεπλ. is not a title but a description, deriving at any rate ultimately from the embroidered robe of Athene at the Panathenaea and perhaps directly from the pseudo-Aristotelian handbook of mythology called *Peplos*. Whether πεπλογραφία had become a recognized term for such collections

or whether Cicero or Atticus coined it for the occasion I cannot say. An Orphic description of the Ideal Forms is referred to by Damascius (v-vi cent. A.D.) as *πεπλοποιά* (*Princ.* 339) *τῆς παρ' Ὁρφεῖ κορικῆς ὑπερκοσμίου πεπλοποιᾶς*; Ruelle compares Porphy. *De Antro Nymph.* 14. 15 οὕτω καὶ παρὰ τῷ Ὁρφεῖ ἡ Κάρη . . . ἴστορυγὸς παραδέδοται. Was this the *Peplos* of Zopyrus or Brontinus (cf. *R.E.* xviii. 1413)?

**πραγματικός.** 'Pragmatici homines, men of the world, men of affairs, Cic. *Att.* 2. 20. 1.' *Pragmatici* ought perhaps to be written *πραγματικοί* (see *TP*); and Cicero means not 'men of affairs' but men of practical wisdom, in this case literary men, who *omnibus historiis, praeceptis, versibus denique cavere iubent et vetant credere.*

**πρόπλασμα.** 'Rough draft, Cic. *Att.* 12. 41. 4; sculptor's *clay model*, Plin. *H.N.* 35. 155.' The sense in Cicero is exactly the same as in Pliny; he does not say that Hirtius' attack on Cato appeared to him a *πρόπλασμα* of Caesar's but that it appeared 'a *πρόπλασμα* so to speak' (*quasi πρ.*).

**ῥάθυμος.** 'Slipshod, of literary style, Cic. *Q.F.* 2. 15 (16). 5 (Comp.).' Cicero writes of Caesar's reception of his verses *De temporibus suis*: *primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora legisse; reliqua ad quendam locum ῥαθυμότερα (hoc enim uititur verbo). Dic mihi verum, num aut res eum aut χαρακτήρ non delectat?* There are two objections to the rendering 'slipshod': (a) The verses are hardly likely to have been formally incorrect, and such a criticism would be little short of offensive; (b) The word made Cicero think that Caesar either did not care for the subject-matter or for the style (*χαρακτήρ* is *general* style, as *ἰσχνός*, *μεγαλοπρεπής*, etc.); an accusation of slipshodness would be relevant to neither. Surely Caesar meant *remissiora* (cf. *Sest.* 115 *remissiore uti genere dicendi*), 'languid'. The verses lacked drive and tension. This sense suits the general meaning of *ῥάθυμος* at least as well as the other.

**συμβίωσις.** 'Good fellowship, camaraderie, Cic. *Att.* 13. 23. 1.' The separate entry in *L.S.J.* is unnecessary, for *συμβίωσις* here belongs under the previous heading 'living with, companionship', as the context shows: *nunc, cum ita simus adficti ut non possimus plane simul vivere (intellegis enim profecto in quo maxime posita sit συμβίωσις), facile patiebar nos potius Romae una esse quam in Tusculano.* For two people to be constantly in one another's company without getting on one another's nerves they must not be in opposite frames of mind, as Cicero and Brutus were at this particular time. Incidentally *nunc* shows that there is no question of that general incompatibility between the two which is a recurrent hallucination of Tyrrell and Purser.

**ὑπηρέμιος.** Cicero writes to Atticus (14. 10. 1) in April 44 *haec et talia ferre non possum. itaque γῆν πρὸ γῆς cogito; tua tamen ὑπηρέμιος*, and is generally understood to mean that Atticus' *γῆ*, Epirus (where he had an estate), is 'windy', i.e. exposed to danger. *L.S.J.* have no example of *ὑπηρέμιος* = *vento expositus*, though they cite ὁ. ὥ from Aristophanes *Frag.* 186 and Pl. *Com.* 19 under the lemma 'full of wind'. This, however, is erroneous, as the following citations *κυήματα ν., ν. ταῖς* (of Hera) make evident; these 'wind-eggs' are eggs conceived under wind, *vento ineunte*. Neither is the supposed meaning satisfactory. Epirus could hardly be called Atticus' *γῆ*, nor was there any particular reason to expect trouble there; moreover the journey contemplated by Cicero at this time was to Athens, where his son was a student. Perhaps Tyrrell's

ὑπήνεμος, as interpreted by Reid, should be accepted: 'your land (Athens) is sheltered' (*tamen*, because wandering from land to land is after all unnecessary). Alternatively, Cicero may be supposed to have used ὑπηρέμος for ὑπήνεμος, as Dio Chrysostom and Alciphron, according to their MSS., did the converse (see L.S.J.).

**ὑποθήκη.** *'Instructions*, Cic. *Att.* 2. 17. 3.' Cicero asks Atticus to 'fish out' Pompey's sentiments towards him from Theophanes; *et ad me ab eo quasi ὑποθήκας adferes, quem ad modum me geram*. When TP comment 'The use of *quasi* shows that the word must be used to modify some unfamiliar expression', I take them to intend the sound observation that ὑποθήκας here has a technical sense. I would not, however, explain it with reference to didactic poems but to medicine. L.S.J. cite a number of medical references, and Cicero is particularly fond of medical Greek.

**φιλορήτωρ.** *'Fond of rhetoric*, Cic. *Att.* 1. 13. 5. 2. *loving rhetoricians*, Phld. *Rh.* 2. 218 S.' The distinction is baseless. In Cicero (*quoniam te amor nostri philorhetora reddidit*) as in Philodemus (ἀλλὰ καὶ Αθηναῖοι καίπερ ὄντες φιλορήτορες ἥδη προσκόπτοντων ταῖς περιόδοις) the adjective (not noun, as L.S.J.) means literally 'fond of orators', by implication 'fond of oratory'.

**χρηστομαθήσ.** *'An adept in polite learning*, Cic. *Att.* 1. 6. 2.' Cicero says that his brother had with him at Arpinum *hominem χρηστομαθῆ*, *D. Turraniū* (of whom no more is known). L.S.J. give no other references for the adjective (again not noun), but Stephanus shows that in later Greek it meant 'desirous of learning, scholarly'. So Cyrill. *Alex.* in *Joann.* 588 *χρηστομαθεῖς μὲν καὶ λίαν ἐπιεικῶς οἱ σοφώτατοι μαθῆται, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἀθεοὶ πρὸς τὸ βούλεοθα ταῦτα μαθεῦν παρωρμήθησαν*, *ibid.* 268 *χρ. λίαν ἡ ἐν τούτοις περιεργίᾳ κι. ζήτησις*. So Longin. 2. 3 ὁ τοῖς χρηστομαθοῦσιν ἐπιτιμῶν and 44. 1 ἔνεκα τῆς σῆς χρηστομαθείας.

Jesus College, Cambridge

D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY

## THE DATE OF THE *SATYRICON*

It is now generally agreed that the *Satyricon* was written in the age of Nero by the Emperor's *Arbiter elegantiae*. The view that it should be dated to the age of the Antonines has been reasserted since the war, and the work of scholars who have refuted it has produced several new arguments of value;<sup>1</sup> notably in the matter of the economic and social background in the *Satyricon*. H. C. Schnur has recently restated the economic arguments for the Neronian date, with some new points, and with convincing force.<sup>2</sup>

H. T. Rowell has advanced strong reasons for believing that the gladiator Petraites mentioned and admired by Trimalchio is a Neronian figure, and he states that this allusion is sufficient to prove the Neronian date.<sup>3</sup> That is not quite convincing; the possibility remains that there was a gladiator named Petraites at some other period of Roman history. But, given that there was a famous gladiator of that name under Nero, we can now devise a much stronger argument for the Neronian date, as follows.

In the *Satyricon* a singer Menecrates (73. 3) and a gladiator Petraites (52. 3, 71. 6) are referred to as contemporary with the action; and mention is made of another noted singer, Apelles (64. 4), whose *floruit* was some twenty to thirty years before the time of action. It so happens that we have a singer Menecrates and a gladiator Petraites attested as famous under Nero, and a singer Apelles under Gaius.<sup>4</sup> It is virtually impossible that such a coincidence should occur in a work written in the times of any emperor except Nero.

This argument, plus the evidence of social and economic background, is the only legitimate means of arguing and proving the Neronian date. Hundreds of other 'allusions' in the *Satyricon* have been detected, but they can all be attacked singly, the method of proof is logically unsound, and their 'bulk value' is disputable.<sup>5</sup>

It should be noted, incidentally, that Petronian scholars have been strangely reluctant to allow the time of action in the *Satyricon* to be contemporary with its composition. The only reasonable argument against this is that Trimalchio, who claims the name Maecenatianus on his tomb (71. 12), was once a slave of Maecenas (*obit 8 B.C.*)—hence that Trimalchio would be at least eighty in the latter part of Nero's reign. But in 30. 2 the name Maecenatianus is absent, and hence Trimalchio's claim to it is not only boastful but false.

Scholars have neglected to date the composition of the *Satyricon* more precisely.<sup>6</sup> It can be dated to the latter part of Nero's reign, because Petronius' poem on the Civil War shows familiarity with several passages of Lucan's *de*

<sup>1</sup> For the Antonine date, E. V. Marmorale, *La questione petroniana* (1948); with a few sad exceptions the reviews listed in 'Marouzeau' are rightly sceptical.

<sup>2</sup> *Latomus* xviii (1959), 790 ff., using the work of Studer, Rostovtzeff, Maiuri, Brown-ing, and Bagnani.

<sup>3</sup> *T.A.P.A.* lxxxix (1958), 14 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Menecrates, Suet. *Nero* 30. 5; Apelles, Suet. *Gaius* 33. 1, Dio 59. 5. 2, Philo, *Leg.* § 203. Presumably Ephesus (70. 13) is also

an actual Neronian entertainer.

<sup>5</sup> Individual criticism, Marmorale, pp. 63-92 (with many omissions); the method, G. Bagnani, *Arbiter of Elegance* (1954), pp. 3-14.

<sup>6</sup> The most accurate conjectures, N. Terzaghi, *Per la storia della satira* (1932), p. 119; E. Paratore, *Il Satyricon di Petronio*, i (1933), 28, n. 1. Bagnani, op. cit., p. 25, not taking account of the evidence set out below, dates the *Satyricon* to A.D. 60.

*Bello Civili*.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it has not been observed that the end of Petronius' poem is a clear echo of Lucan's ending:

'Quid porro *tu*, *dive*, *tuis cunctaris* in armis?  
non frangis portas, non *murus* op*ea* a solvis  
thesaurosque rapis? nescis *tu*, *Magne* tueri  
Romanas *acies*? *Epidamni* *moenia* quaere  
Thessalicosque sinus humano *sanguine* tingue.'<sup>2</sup>

290

Compare Lucan 10. 540 ff.:

Non *acie* *fusa* nec *magnae stragis* *acervis*  
vincendus *tum* *Caesar* erat sed *sanguine* *nullo*.  
*captus* *sorte loci* *pendet*; *dubiusque* *timeret*  
*optaretne* *mori* *respexit* in *agmine denso*  
*Scaevam* *perpetuae* *meritum* *iam* *nomina famae*  
*ad* *campos*, *Epidamne*, *tuos*, *ubi* *solus* *apertis*  
*obsedit* *murus* *calcantem* *moenia* *Magnum*.

Unless these echoes are a coincidence (and in both Petronius and Lucan the final passage deals with the resolution of doubt into decision) it can be deduced that Petronius knew the final passage of the *de Bello Civili* as Lucan left it. Thus the *terminus post quem* for the composition of Petronius' poem is the earliest date at which he can have known of Lucan's ending.

It has recently been argued by H. Haffter that Lucan did not intend to proceed further in his account of the Civil Wars, but died leaving some passages unpolished.<sup>3</sup> He stresses that Lucan's poem breaks off at almost precisely the same point as Caesar's account; hence that unless this is a coincidence, Lucan is 'pompeianizing' Caesar, with considerably more vigour than Livy did. This theory is possibly supported by the fact that the *vita Lucani*, while discussing the incompleteness of the *de Bello Civili*, mention only the lack of *emendatio*; however, Statius, *Silv.* 2. 7. 102-4 (*dum pugnas canis* . . . *tacebis*) seems to imply that Lucan wished to write more. If Haffter is right, then Lucan may have recited his intended final passage some time before his death. But only the first three books were published in his lifetime, and he was unable even to recite in public the remainder of his epic; it is unlikely that he would recite—even in private—passages from an unfinished book; and it is difficult to see why Petronius should introduce into his pastiche an allusion which would be obscure to those unfamiliar with Lucan's private recitations. Furthermore, Petronius shows little sympathy with Lucan, and at a time when Lucan was out of favour with the Emperor it is unlikely that Nero's Arbitr of Elegance would be invited to join the Stoic literary circle.

At all events it is usually believed that Lucan intended to proceed farther in his historical epic; in which case 10. 540 ff. was not his intended ending. From this it follows that Petronius' imitation of the 'ending' must have been written after Lucan's death, 30 April 65. (The same would appear to be true even granted Haffter's theory, as shown in the previous paragraph.) This is borne out by the tone of Petronius 118, which is obviously aimed at Lucan but which

<sup>1</sup> For most of the parallels cf. H. Stubbe (*Philologus*, Supp. xxv [1933], 74 f.).

<sup>2</sup> v. 295 is considered spurious by Ernout, following Heine and Mössler—probably rightly. It is retained (oddly!) by Müller.

It is so obviously an appendage to the poem that the present argument is scarcely affected even if the line is genuine.

<sup>3</sup> *Mus. Helv.* xiv (1957), 118 ff.

seems also to imply that Lucan is dead: *multos iuvenes carmen decepit . . . ecce belli civili ingens opus quisquis attigerit, nisi plenus litteris sub onere labetur . . . etiamsi nondum recepit ultimam manum.*<sup>1</sup>

It might be expected that Petronius' criticism and pastiche would be written soon after Lucan's death, when most of his poem was new to non-stoic literary circles. That this is so is confirmed by the interesting allusion in Petronius 128 to vain hopes of finding buried treasure. The verses in that chapter, given that Petronius 118-24 were written after the spring of 65, seem clearly to be a mocking reference to the scandal of Caesellius Bassus and the fabled treasures of Queen Dido. Tacitus (*Ann.* 16. 1-3) records that in the year 65 a long search was made in North Africa for these treasures; hence Petronius' allusion to the futility of the search will have been written not before late summer. Hence May/July is the date of Petronius' *Bellum Civile*.<sup>2</sup>

It is possible that Petronius' use of Seneca's Epistles gives us confirmation of this date. *Ep.* 91 was written after July 64, since it refers to the fire at Lugdunum, which occurred after the fire at Rome.<sup>3</sup> Hence *Epp.* 92-124 were written after July 64 and before May 65 (assuming, as is reasonable, that the Epistles are in chronological order). Petronius 118 contains several possible echoes of Seneca found in these later Epistles,<sup>4</sup> and Seneca can hardly have imitated Petronius!

There seems to be no way of dating precisely the composition of the *Cena* and the preceding episodes (some, possibly, from Book 14 of the *Satyricon*), but late 64-summer 65 is a reasonable estimate for the composition of what we possess of the *Satyricon*.

Exeter College, Oxford

K. F. C. ROSE

<sup>1</sup> It is usually thought that the omission of Lucan's name implies that Lucan was still alive. Cf., for instance, M. Enia, *Il Satyricon e il suo autore Petronio Arbitro* (1897), p. 93. It is only an assumption.

<sup>2</sup> It is possible that the earlier reference to buried treasure in the *Satyricon* (88. 8, *alias (donum promittit), si thesaurem effoderit*) was inspired by the reports of Bassus' supposed discovery; but the passage is full of common-places.

<sup>3</sup> O. Hirschfeld (*Rh.M.* lii [1897], 294-6).

<sup>4</sup> Petronius 118: Seneca, *Epp.* 94. 68; 100. 5, 8; 108. 10; 114. 8. Cf. also Petr. 116. 9: *Ep.* 95. 43 (a similar metaphor). For other echoes, A. Collignon, *Étude sur Pitrone* (1892), pp. 291 ff., P. Faider, *Études sur Sénèque* (1921), pp. 15-24. Faider suggests that Seneca 'retorts' to Petronius and his dissipated friends in *Ep.* 122, an attack on *lucifugae*. At that time Petronius was the most notable *lucifuga*, cf. Tac. *Ann.* 16. 18. 1, *illi dies per somnum, nox officiis et oblectamentis vitae transigebatur*.

## THE TEXTUAL TRADITION OF QUINTILIAN

10.1.46 f.

THIS article does not set out to cast doubts on the established textual basis of the bulk of Quintilian's *Institutio*, or on the history of the work's fortunes in the Middle Ages.<sup>1</sup> What I say about these things will be unoriginal and, I hope, uncontroversial. My object, however, is to show that what is true of the bulk is not true of 10. 1. 46–107; and to fill in some details in the history of the tradition.

The *Institutio* as a whole is transmitted to us by way of two hyparchetypes. One, which we may call  $\beta$ , was at some stage mutilated so badly that perhaps a third of the text disappeared, including, in Book 10, the first 107 sections of the first chapter. What remained can be reconstructed from a ninth-century manuscript, the Bernensis (B), with the help, primarily, of the slightly younger Nostradamensis (N). A transcript of the Bernensis, the Bambergensis (Bg), was, perhaps in the early tenth century, converted into a hybrid representative of the other, unmutilated hyparchetype (a) by receiving corrections (b) and supplements (G), probably from one and the same source. The only other witness we have to the second hyparchetype is the ninth-century Ambrosianus (A), which is very similar to, but not identical with, the manuscript that generated b and G. Unfortunately A, though originally complete, had by the fifteenth century lost a good deal of Books 10–12: and the result is that the celebrated sections on Greek and Latin literature beginning at 10. 1. 46 and running on to the end of that chapter are found<sup>1</sup> complete in only one of these primary manuscripts of the *Institutio*—namely G. The  $\beta$ -stream mutili contain merely 10. 1. 107–31.

It is a singular fact that though G generated at least four other complete Quintilians before 1400, neither these nor G itself nor A were generally known to the articulate reading public before the Renaissance. Scholars like Petrarch had merely mutili from the  $\beta$ -stream: they could only pray for a complete text, and the prayer was not answered until Poggio's discovery at St. Gall. All the same, it is quite certain that early humanists like Salutati knew 10. 1. 46 f.; and it is generally agreed that they possessed it in the form of unabridged excerpts, that circulated either separately or tacked on to the end of mutilated Quintilians. What has never been established is exactly what we can say about the relation of these excerpts to the tradition of the bulk of Quintilian; and that is what this article will try to show.

### G-VERSION AND S-VERSION

The text of 10. 1. 46–107 found in G and its descendants (which I shall call the G-version) has, among many other errors, a number of characteristic omissions—e.g. 55 *nulla-adfectus*: 56 *quid? Euphorionem-Vergilius*. Contrasting sharply with this version is the text found in the excerpts I have mentioned:

<sup>1</sup> For this see esp. P. Lehmann, *Philologus* bxxix (1934), 349 f.: P. S. Boskoff, *Speculum* xxvii (1952), 71 f.

this I shall call the S-version (after the now lost fifteenth-century *Codex Argentoratensis*, which, under the name S, was used by Halm, and which, as his apparatus clearly shows, contained this sort of text); it is marked by, for example, the omission of *dialogisive-ille* at 107. Mistakes common to both versions include 104 *remuti* for *Cremuti*.

Clearly, any critical edition of the passage must take account of both versions. Thus Halm used on the one hand G, and on the other various fifteenth-century manuscripts influenced in one way or another by the S-version. Radermacher, the only later scholar<sup>1</sup> to edit the passage on a new critical basis, used a slightly different set of Renaissance manuscripts to balance G, and added what he called E, the text of 10. 1. 46–107 found separately at the end of Stephen of Rouen's epitome of Quintilian in Paris. lat. 14146, the twelfth-century *Pratinensis*. Since E, too, gives the S-version, Radermacher triumphantly asserted that this proved what he held on other (no less disputable) grounds, that at least some fifteenth-century Quintilians are descended from earlier sources now lost to us. ('*Quid multa?*' wrote Radermacher Vol. ii. *praef.* IV, oddly ignoring his own use of E: '*Codices recentes nisi possideremus, decimus Quintiliani liber ille celeberrimus etiam plures lacunas haberet quam nunc habet.*') I shall show later that this is true even of 10. 1. 46 f. only in a limited and uninteresting way; and I hope to show elsewhere that of the great bulk of Quintilian's text it is not true at all.

#### THE S-VERSION: SIX EARLY REPRESENTATIVES

Our first concern must be to establish where the S-version can be found in its purest form. It appears (to my knowledge) in six extant pre-Renaissance manuscripts, which fall readily into three pairs.

(1) E (already mentioned), and what I call D, Paris. lat. 7719, where, following a  $\beta$ -stream mutilated but unepitomized text of the *Institutio*, we have, transcribed separately, 10. 1. 46–107, together with (as in E) 12. 10. 10–15. It is known that D was copied from, and E based on, the lost Beccensis,<sup>2</sup> and so we can with some certainty say of the Beccensis that it too had these two extracts bound up with it. Collation of the excerpts confirms that D and E are gemelli. Peculiar errors of DE include 49 *innuit* (for *nuntiat*); 73 *principua re* (for *praeclare*); 82 omission of *comoediae*. E (but not D) omits *docere* at 78 (D actually has *dicere*) and *veterum* at 97 (D has *verum*). D (but not E) omits *diligenter* at 69 and *orator* at 80.


(2) The same excerpts appear at the end of two (perhaps twelfth-century) manuscripts at Leyden,  $\rho$  (Voss. lat. q. 77) and  $\sigma$  (Voss. lat. f. 80). The main text in both these manuscripts does not, as in the Beccensis, finish at 10. 3. 32, but at 12. 10. 43, as in most  $\beta$ -stream manuscripts; and collation of the excerpts shows that  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  are independent of, though related to, the Beccensis. Peculiar errors of  $\rho\sigma$  include the omission of *formanda mens* at 59 and of *Cratinus-que* at 66. Errors shared with DE include the omission of *in bucolicis* at 56, *esse*

<sup>1</sup> Peterson's edition of Book Ten, despite his elaborate manuscript discussion and critical notes, is eclectic rather than critical:


and there is no formal apparatus.

<sup>2</sup> See esp. Peterson, *Introduction*, p. lxi.

at 57, and *tenebras* at 72.  $\rho\sigma$  are gemelli.  $\rho$  (but not  $\sigma$ ) omits *longe* at 73.  $\sigma$  (but not  $\rho$ ) omits *longe magis* at 70. I suggest then the following stemma:



(3) Finally we have two slightly longer sets of excerpts, 10. 1. 46-131 and 12. 10. 10-15, contained among other rhetorical material (not the same in both books) in Paris. lat. 7696 (which I call X) and 7231 (which I call Y). X is from Fleury: neither X nor Y is later than the twelfth century. X and Y avoid all the errors I have cited above from  $\text{DE}\rho\sigma$ , whether jointly or separately; but they have some (not many) errors of their own where  $\text{G}\delta$  gives the correct reading: e.g. 61 *credit* (for *creedit*); 96 *longo* for *longe*. At 84 X omits, Y includes *valuerunt* (cf. also 104 X *excitamus*: Y, correctly, *excutimus*). At 78 Y, but not X, omits *si*; further, Y has at 46 *dedit exemplum et ortum*, an inversion avoided by X; and there are other similar cases. X and Y then, too, are gemelli, and we can add them to the stemma (it is not, I think, quite out of the question that both X and Y are independent transcripts of  $\gamma$ , but practically speaking this would make little difference to an apparatus).<sup>1</sup>



#### THE S-VERSION: ITS SOURCE

The Beccensis, as we have seen, in all probability contained 10. 1. 46-107 and 12. 10. 10-15 separately transcribed at the end of a mutilated  $\beta$ -stream manuscript of the *Institutio*. The same can be said of the common ancestor of the Vossiani; and so, therefore, of  $\delta$ . And collation of the main bulk of D,  $\rho$ , and  $\sigma$  shows that they, like the excerpts appended to them, go back to one single


<sup>1</sup> Some of these conclusions were arrived at by C. Fierville in his edition of Book One (Paris, 1890): see especially his stemma on p. lxxvi. But he was badly misinformed

about the Vossiani, and he did not realize the superior quality of XY. Nor did he draw any wider conclusions.

lost manuscript (a copy, very likely, of the hyparchetype  $\beta$ : this account differs from the one given by Max Niedermann in the introduction to his edition of the grammatical chapters of the first book of Quintilian; but it accounts as well as his for the evidence he adduced and better than his for evidence that he did not cite). We must now ask about  $\delta$  why it contained these particular added excerpts; and where it got them from ( $\delta$  itself may have been copied, excerpts and all, from some other lost manuscript; but to say this is only to take the problem a further stage back).  $\delta$ , like all the *mutili*, omitted the passage 9. 3. 2-10. 1. 107; anyone therefore who had access to 10. 1. 46-107 had a clear motive for adding the passage to supply part of this lacuna. But  $\delta$  contained (for  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  have it, though the Beccensis did not) 12. 10 up to § 43: why then did the supplementer of  $\delta$  copy out the unwanted 12. 10. 10-15 after the sections from the tenth book? The answer must surely lie in the nature of his source. If he had been drawing on a manuscript of Quintilian that contained, in addition to the normal *mutilus* text, 10. 1. 46-107, he would have copied out *that* passage but *not* also the passage from 12. His source then must have been something that juxtaposed 10. 1. 46 f. with 12. 10. 10-15. But 10. 1. 107 is by no means a natural stopping place; it is midway through an elaborate (and for the Middle Ages important) discussion of Cicero. It is not clear why any manuscript source should have contained together with six sections from 12 merely a truncated fragment of the discussion of Greek and Latin literature. Is it not much more likely that the source juxtaposed the complete passage 10. 1. 46-131 with the sections from 12: the two together forming a handy epitome of Quintilian's judgements on literature? And when we observe that this is precisely what X and Y do, and when we remember the relationships established by collation, we can only conclude that  $\gamma$  was a set of excerpts of Quintilian containing all that X and Y now contain; and that whoever supplemented  $\delta$  was using  $\gamma$  or a descendant of  $\gamma$ . He correctly observed that 10. 1. 108-31 was not needed in  $\delta$ : he failed to notice that equally 12. 10. 10-15 was not wanted either; but because it was there in his source he copied it out again.

$\gamma$ , then, was a set of excerpts of Quintilian. From what manuscript was it taken? Here we have the guidance of the two passages, 10. 1. 108-131 (found in XY) and 12. 10. 10-15 (found in XYDE $\rho\sigma$ ), where the excerpts overlap with the oldest  $\beta$ -stream manuscripts, B and N, from which, for most practical purposes, the hyparchetype of this stream is to be reconstructed. Now the excerpts can be classed with the  $\beta$ -stream against the  $\alpha$ -stream (here represented only by the corrector of the Bambergensis, b): see, for example, 12. 10. 14 *alienigenam etrum* BN: *alienigena metrum* XYDE $\rho\sigma$ : *alienigenam et parum* b, correctly; 10. 1. 109 *extulit* om. BNXY: hab. b. But there are some mistakes of BN that the excerpts avoid: e.g. 10. 1. 121 *explicando* bXY: *plicando* BN; 12. 10. 10 *velis* bXYDE $\rho\sigma$ : *velit* BN; 12. 10. 13 *ingenii affluentia* bXYDE $\rho\sigma$ : *ingenia fluentia* BN.  $\gamma$ , then, cannot be identified with the common parent of BN: and so we have in  $\gamma$  something that takes us back beyond the mutilated hyparchetype—back, perhaps, to a time when the  $\beta$ -stream was not mutilated at all, or much less mutilated (it would be very odd if, when the original excerptor was at work, the lacuna ceased just at 10. 1. 46, at the start of so interesting and important a passage).  $\gamma$ , then, is a primary witness to the passages it covers; it can be reconstructed for 10. 1. 46-107 and 12. 10. 10-15 from XY $\delta$ : for 10. 1. 108-31 XY are the only witnesses. Thus the S-version has the same sort of

high authority against the G-version that in other parts of the *Institutio* is given to the  $\beta$ -stream against the  $\alpha$ -stream.



### THE RENAISSANCE: EXCERPTA

Even in the fifteenth century we find 10. 1. 46-107 sporadically leading a separate life alongside the complete texts of Quintilian now available. These late excerpts, as we should expect, give a pure S-version. There is, for example, the incomplete excerpt 10. 1. 46-91 (up to *doctius* at the end of a folio) in Bodley's MS. Rawlinson 48, which is dated as late as 1439. More interesting still, in Vaticanus lat. 1807 we have 10. 1. 46-107, and, obviously to fill the page, 12. 10. 10-11, ending in mid-sentence at *Calvi*. Closely related to this is the Naples codex V.B.34, where the same material reappears, here ending in mid-page as well as mid-sentence (suggesting very strongly that this is a copy of the Vatican fragment). To the Naples extract has been added in a contemporary hand a note in terms that suggest its writer had no access to a complete Quintilian but only to a *mutilus*: 'huic profecto coniungendus est textus ille qui nostris codicibus prius habebatur.' In view of the fragment from 12 there can be little doubt that the latter two excerpts descend from excerpts of the DE $\rho\sigma$  variety. And collation, while confirming this, shows that the Bodley excerpt is closely related to the other two.<sup>1</sup> These fifteenth-century excerpts have great affinity with DE $\rho\sigma$  when those manuscripts agree in error; sometimes strikingly with  $\rho\sigma$  against the rest (e.g. 51 *clarissima*  $\rho\sigma$  c. 15 exc. : *durissima* GXYDE correctly); sometimes, no less strikingly, with DE against the rest (e.g. 54 *superatum* DE c. 15 exc. : *superari* GXY $\rho\sigma$  correctly). Whatever their exact relation to the stemma (and they may well be based on fourteenth-century conflation of excerpts of the DE and the  $\rho\sigma$  variety) they are clearly technically eliminable, except as a possible source of conjecture; this enables us to keep out of the apparatus such blots on Radermacher's as 46 *tum brevitate tum copia*, 52 *lenitasque*, and 56 *frustra transibimus*, all readings that appear first in these excerpts and in fifteenth-century complete Quintilians (see below) that are clearly indebted to them; and that, if they go farther back, reflect merely an eliminable relation of excerpts we already possess.

<sup>1</sup> It may be added that  $\sigma$  was almost certainly known in the fifteenth century: Johannes Poulain copied it, I think, into his manuscript that is now Paris. lat. 7721, to

supplement what appears to be a copy of the Nostradamensis (or perhaps of the Salmantinus).

## THE RENAISSANCE: COMPLETE TEXTS

Examination of 10. 1. 46 f.<sup>1</sup> in complete fifteenth-century texts of Quintilian does nothing to upset the conclusion that the Renaissance has only conjecture to offer here. There are three main types of text:

(1) G-versions pure and simple, found in manuscripts descended from T (and so from G).

(2) S-versions pure and simple, found for instance in the lost *Argentoratensis* and in manuscripts related to *Guelferbytanus*. In these manuscripts, whatever the source of the rest of the text, the version given of 10. 1. 46 f. is closely related to that found in the fifteenth-century excerpts discussed above. This is easily explicable on the hypothesis that at some stage the excerpt from Book Ten was added to a fuller text of Quintilian at the appropriate point: either a mutilus text, or, after Poggio's discovery of T, a complete text. Such an addition would be the natural thing to do (even after the discovery of T, because T's G-version is hopelessly corrupt).

(3) Contaminated texts. These of course predominate, but we can distinguish two by no means all-inclusive types:

(a) Texts where an original G-version has been overlaid by c. 15 corrections from an S-version. These can be diagnosed on the assumption that correctors tend to fill gaps and alter words but not, on the whole, unless they are particularly conscientious, correct inversions. Among texts of this kind, we may place P and the numerous manuscripts descended from it.

(b) Texts descended from F, where the G-version (descended from G itself via H) was, perhaps before the c. 15, corrected from an S-text. Among such texts are L, the *Lassbergensis* used by Halm.

There is thus a very good reason why c. 15 manuscripts often have versions of 10. 1. 46 f. superior to that of the earliest available, G. They are making use of a tradition of excerpts outside, though intimately connected with, the general textual tradition of Quintilian. But we do not need their assistance, because pre-c. 15 excerpts, nearer the source than they, are still extant. No doubt the actual excerpts that generated the c. 15 versions directly are not now available; but we know all we need to know about them. Far more important, we can now see clearly that, even if in this limited sense some c. 15 manuscripts have access to sources lost to us in 10. 1. 46 f., this proves absolutely nothing about the general question of the relationship of c. 15 Quintilians to earlier complete or mutilated texts.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The S-version of 12. 10. 10-15 was not influential in the fifteenth-century (or any other) texts: naturally, because even the mutilated texts had included the passage (in a less corrupt form) in the body of the book.

<sup>2</sup> Radermacher, in fact, could have saved himself much trouble by pondering on a discussion by W. Kroll in *Satura Berolinensis* (1924), pp. 61 f., where it is suggested that only between 9. 4. 135 and 10. 1. 108 is there any sign of an independent tradition in c. 15

texts. In fact, however, the limits can be narrowed still further, to those that I have suggested—10. 1. 46-107. Outside these, Kroll cites only two passages, 9. 4. 144 and 10. 1. 42: in both of these, Renaissance conjecture is clearly at work. Kroll calls his demonstration 'eine Warnung für alle Stammbaumfanatiker'. But in fact a stemma is clearly profitable in sorting out the complexities of this part of the tradition.

## SOME CONCLUSIONS

The results arrived at above can be used materially to simplify the apparatus of 10. 1. 46–107; in particular they would enable an editor to avoid the main fault in Radermacher's, by allowing him (and the reader) to distinguish between variants and remote sub-variants. A considerable number of readings quoted by Radermacher can be formally eliminated: and c. 15 manuscripts can be ignored completely, except for one or two conjectures (e.g. 47 *nonus*). Apart from this, the text can be based on G, X, and Y, with DE $\rho\sigma$  as a control to establish peculiar errors of XY (and such peculiar errors are notably few: for example, in 10. 1. 46–59 there are none; DE $\rho\sigma$  in the same sections share no less than thirteen, besides many more private to each of them).

Thus, in the apparatus to 46 alone: *hic* and *capere* can be given the symbol  $\gamma$  alone. E's omission of *rebus*, its *superavit* and its *poeticas* are all eliminable errors. The order *brevitate tum copia*, not in itself preferable, has the support neither of G nor of  $\gamma$  and need not be mentioned.

I add some points of interest from other sections:

- 50 The order *Priami rogantis Achillem* is supported by GXY and so should be read in the text.
- 52 *medio*, besides being correct, is supported by Gy.
- 55 Read *parem credidit* supported by GXY (XY *credit*).
- 59 XY $\rho\sigma$  read *exi\*\** with lacunae of varying length (*exitum* D: *exemplum* E; two bad conjectures) and so all but anticipate Philander's correction *ēξw.*
- 70 *oratoriis*, given no support at all by Radermacher, is read by Y (X *oratioris*).
- 79 *compararat*, P<sup>2</sup>'s c. 15 correction, appears, as a correction, in X.
- 80 *mediocri* is supported only by DE, and besides being wrong is thus eliminable.
- 88 *hoc* is supported by Gy: G's *qua* then can safely be corrected to *quo*, the reading of all the excerpts except E.
- 90 *senectute maturuit*, given no support at all by Radermacher, is read by XY.
- 94 *non labor* G: *nisi labor* XY $\rho\sigma$ : *mihi labor* DE.  $\gamma$  clearly read *nisi labor*, and this is very probably right.
- 99 XY correctly read *aeli stilonis*.
- 102 *clari vir ingenii*, attributed by Radermacher to 'ed. vett.' is read by XY.
- 126 XY agree with b in omitting (surely correctly?) the awkward *in* before *quibus*.

PARRY ON SOPHOCLES, *OEDIPVS TYRANNVS*

1271-4

THE editors allow me four corrections of Mr. Parry's remarks in *C.Q.* n.s. x (1960), 268-70. Mr. Parry observes (p. 268, n. 4): 'Calder says that Jebb wanted to translate *νν* by *him*. That is not correct.' But Mr. Parry has just said that *νν* exemplifies 'the common "I know thee who thou art" construction' and has endorsed the view of Brunck, 'Est autem' etc. Brunck is saying that *νν* is the proleptic subject of the verb *έπασχεν* which is *αὐτός*, *he*, sc. *Oedipus*. *νν* therefore does not mean *her* nor *them* but *him* whether or not the word 'must be left out in translation'. And Mr. Parry's note tells us that Jebb endorsed this view. On *O.T.* 1271 Jebb puts the sentiment into direct discourse and *νν* becomes *με* (sc. *Oedipum*). I wrote (*A.J.P.* lxxx [1959], 302) that *νν* 'may be translated *him*, *her*, or *them*. Ellendt-Genthe . . . and Jebb . . . vote for *him*.' I submit that I was correct.

Mr. Parry observes (p. 268, n. 5): 'Calder says that the S.-N.-B. edition attributes this interpretation to a suggestion of Wilamowitz, but I could find no mention of Wilamowitz in the relevant passage of the 1910 edition.' Indeed he could not because there is none and that is why I quoted (p. 304) the tenth edition of 1897. Bruhn there writes (p. 4): 'Soweit es möglich war, sind die Bemerkungen, die er [Wilamowitz] mir nach Durchsicht des Manuskripts mitgeteilt hat, von denen meiner Vorgänger und den meinen gesondert und durch ein beigefügtes Wil. bezeichnet.' The note on 1271 ff. (p. 189) ends '(nach Wil.)'.

Mr. Parry observes (p. 269, n. 1): 'The notion [sc. 'of "seeing" with the mind's eye'] probably first appears in the Cave Allegory of Plato (*Resp.* 517 c) . . . . But the notion is implicit in *Il.* 15. 80-82 and explicit at, for example, Epicharm. 249 K. not to speak of Aeschylus (see Paley<sup>4</sup> on *Eum.* 104) and Sophocles (see *Tr.* 419 with Jebb). In any case the argument is the old one that *Il.* 12. 23 is not Homeric because *ἥμιθεος* 'first appears' at Hes. *Op.* 160.

Mr. Parry observes (p. 269, n. 3) on the translation of *τὸ λοιπόν* (*O.T.* 1273): '*in posterum* (from Brunck) is right; *for the rest (of time)* (Calder) is wrong.' Mr. Parry translates the same expression at *O.T.* 795 'thenceforward'. There is no demonstrable difference between any of these translations, certainly not enough for Mr. Parry to label one right and another wrong.

Columbia University

WILLIAM M. CALDER III

## MORE NOTES ON THE TEXT OF HESIOD

THESE notes are a supplement to those which formed the second part of my 'Hesiodea'.<sup>1</sup> In part they result from re-examination of manuscripts and papyri undertaken for a projected commentary on the *Theogony*.

In discussing the text of Hesiod a prime necessity is a new system of sigla. Rzach's system has the grave disadvantage that in the three extant poems the same manuscript is denoted by different letters, and conversely the same letter denotes different manuscripts. In these notes I shall use for the manuscripts of the *Theogony* the system which I propose to use in the projected edition, pleading, as revolutionaries will, that while confusion is necessarily attendant upon change, change is necessary to end an even worse confusion. The system is as follows:

- B Paris. suppl. gr. 663 (Rzach's C for *Th.*, B for *Sc.*)
- L Laur. conv. suppr. 158 (Rz. E for *Th.*, L for *Sc.*)
- M Paris. gr. 2833 (Rz. F for *Th.*, M for *Sc.*)
- N Ven. Marc. IX 6 (Rz. K for *Th.*, G for *Op.*, N for *Sc.*)
- O Paris. gr. 2708 (Rz. L for *Th.*, O for *Sc.*)
- P Paris. suppl. gr. 679
- Q Vat. gr. 915 (Rz. G for *Th.*)
- R Rom. Casanat. 356 (Rz. K for *Sc.*)
- S Laur. 32. 16 (Rz. D for *Th.*, I for *Op.*, E for *Sc.*)
- Tr Ven. Marc. 464
- U Matrit. 4607
- Z Est. a T9.14 (Russo's Z for *Sc.*)

For the papyri I follow the scheme initiated by Jacoby.

The advantages of these sigla are that the important manuscripts BLMNO (Rzach's CEFKL) keep in the *Theogony* the sigla that they already bear in the *Scutum*, while the letters CDE are left free to denote the principal manuscripts of the *Opera*, as hitherto. The only remaining manuscripts of importance which will require re-naming are Rzach's C and D in the *Scutum*; I leave this to the discretion of an editor of that poem.

### 1. *Th.* 38:

*εἰρεῦσαι τά τ' ἔόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔόντα.*

*εἰρεῦσαι*, though quoted from the *Theogony* by Hesychius, is a verb not found elsewhere. Schoemann conjectured *εἰρουσαι*. The ending may easily have been corrupted under the influence of *ὑμεῦσαι* immediately above and *όμηρεῦσαι* immediately below. I have to report that in S the *eu* in *εἰρεῦσαι* appears to have been altered from *ov* by the first hand.

### 2. *Th.* 88:

*τούνεκα γάρ βασιλῆς ἔχέφρονες, οῦνεκα λαοῖς . . .*

It seems to have escaped notice that *Π<sup>3</sup>* (Paris. suppl. gr. 1099) has *τ]ουνεκα καὶ*

### 3. *Th.* 169:

*ἄψ αὐτις μύθοισι προσηῦδα μητέρα κεδνήν.*

<sup>1</sup> *C.Q. n.s. xi* (1961), 130 ff.

Rzach fails to report the variant *aiψ'* which stands in L, M, Tr, and many lesser manuscripts. In Homer, *aiψ* is not used with verbs of speaking; for *aiψia* cf. E 242, I 201, etc. So at Th. 654, where the medieval manuscripts give *τὸν δ' ἔξαντις ἀμειβετο, Π<sup>6</sup>* (p. Ryl. 54) has *τονδαιψ[αντις]*, and P.S.I. 1191 has *τονδα[* (the alpha almost certain).

4. *Th. 173:*

ως φάτο· γήθησεν δὲ μέγα φρεσὶ Γαῖα πελώρη.

μετὰ φρεσὶ Tr (cj. Nauck). But cf. p. Harris 3 (= CAT 96 Traversa), line 5, ]ε μέγα φρε[σι, and Q.S. 6.124.

5. *Th. 277:*

ἡ μὲν ἔην θητή, αἱ δ' ἀθάνατοι καὶ ἀγήρω.

What S has in the margin is not a variant *μὲν οὖν* (Rzach), but a gloss *μέδονσα*.

6. *Th. 445-7:*

βουκολίας τ' ἀγέλας τε καὶ αἰπόλια πλατέ' αἰγῶν  
ποίμνας τ' εἰροπόκων ὄιων θυμῷ γ' ἔθέλουσα  
ἔξ οὐλίγων βριάει κάκ πολλῶν μείονα θῆκεν.

There are two possible ways of taking *βουκολίας* in 445. One is as an adjective qualifying *ἀγέλας*.<sup>1</sup> No such adjective is otherwise known; but there would be an analogue for the form in *ποιμένιος*, and the expression *βουκόλαις ἀγέλαι* for 'herds of cows' would be closely paralleled by S. O.T. 26, *ἀγέλαις βουνόμοις*. But despite this parallel such a phrase would be quite foreign to the style of early epic, which always says *βοῶν ἀγέλαι*.

The alternative is that *βουκολία* is a noun meaning 'herd of cows', like *βουκόλιον*.<sup>2</sup> Where the word occurs elsewhere, it is as a noun, though it means 'care of herds' (h. Herm. 498, A.R. 1. 627) or 'pastures' (Hdt. 1. 114. 1); the semantic extension would resemble that of *νομαί* (Xen. An. 3. 5. 2). The real difficulty of this interpretation, however, is not the sense of *βουκολίας*, but that of *ἀγέλας*, which becomes redundant. It cannot mean, for example, herds of horses, as D'Orville and others have supposed; unqualified, it would mean herds of cattle, compare A 678 with § 100.

The best solution is to expel *ἀγέλας* as a gloss. Cf. Hesych. *βουκολεα* [sic]. *ἀγέλη βοῶν*. So in h. Herm. 288,

ἀντῆς βουκολίοισι καὶ εἰροπόκοις ὀίεσσιν,

*βουκολίοισι* has been replaced in the tradition by *ἀγέλησι βοῶν*, and the rest of the line has been adapted to *ἀντήσης . . . καὶ πώεσι μῆλων*.

The true reading is probably

βουκολίας δὲ βοῶν τε καὶ αἰπόλια πλατέ' αἰγῶν.

Cf. A.R., loc. cit. (admittedly in a different sense),

τῆσι δὲ βουκολίαι τε βοῶν χάλκειά τε δύνειν | τεύχεα.

<sup>1</sup> In this case the first *τ'* must either be changed to *δ'* with Rzach (following Peppmüller, *Philologus* xxxix [1880], 388) or deleted (Bergk). Lenep's information that it

is absent in cod. Par. 2678 is false.

<sup>2</sup> *βουκόλαι τ'* is in fact a marginal variant in L; L and Q have *βουκόλας τ'* [sic] in the text.

The parallelism with *αἰπόλια αἰγῶν, ποίμνας δίων*, is just what is required; cf. again *A* 678 f.,

πεντήκοντα βοῶν ἀγέλας, τόσα πώεα οἰῶν,  
τόσσα συῶν συβόσια, τόσ' αἰπόλια πλατέ' αἰγῶν.

For δὲ . . . τε, cf. *Hdt.* 1. 74. 3 οἱ δὲ Λυδοί τε καὶ οἱ Μῆδοι . . .

7. *Th.* 448-52:

οὗτως τοι καὶ μουνογενῆς ἐκ μητρὸς ἐοῦσα  
πᾶσι μετ' ἀθανάτοισι τετίμηται γεράεσσι.  
θῆκε δέ μιν Κρονίδης κουροτρόφον, οἱ μετ' ἐκείνην  
οφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδοντο φάσι πολυδερκέος Ἡοῦς.  
οὗτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς κουροτρόφος, αἱ δέ τε τιμαὶ.

This conclusion to the section in praise of Hecate has long been felt unsatisfactory. 450-1 has the appearance of an afterthought, while 452 is a wretched cento of the preceding lines (del. Heyne). How much better with a simple transposition:

450	θῆκε δέ μιν Κρονίδης κουροτρόφον, οἱ μετ' ἐκείνην
451	οφθαλμοῖσιν ἴδοντο φάσι πολυδερκέος Ἡοῦς.
452	[οὗτως ἐξ ἀρχῆς κουροτρόφος, αἱ δέ τε τιμαὶ.]
448	οὗτως τοι καὶ μουνογενῆς ἐκ μητρὸς ἐοῦσα
449	πᾶσι μετ' ἀθανάτοισι τετίμηται γεράεσσι.

450 now forms the natural culmination of the train of thought in 444-7 (see above); while 448-9, responding as it does to 426-8,

οὐδ', ὅτι μουνογενής, ἥσσον θεὰ ἔμμορε τιμῆς  
καὶ γεράων γαίη τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἡδὲ θαλάσσῃ,  
ἄλλ' ἔπι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς τίεται αὐτήν

makes an excellent conclusion to the section. 452 was presumably added after the dislocation, to give a semblance of an ending.

8. *Th.* 503:

οἱ οἱ ἀπεμνήσαντο χάριν εὐεργεσιάων.

In S, *χάριν* is a correction from something else that looks like *τίσιν*. The latter can hardly be the right reading; but cf. *χ* 235, *Theogn.* 337.

9. *Th.* 538:

τῷ μὲν γὰρ σάρκας τε καὶ ἔγκατα πίονι δημῷ.

Schoemann's correction *πίονα* is certainly right. Triclinius at first wrote *πίονα*, then erased the alpha (which was above the line, like the final alpha of *ἔγκατα*) and wrote an iota (on the line).

10. *Th.* 591-2:

τῆς γὰρ ὀλούον ἔστι γένος καὶ φύλα γυναικῶν,  
πῆμα μέγα θνητοῖσι, σὺν ἀνδράσι ναιετάουσι.

ναιετάουσαι (cj. Bergk) S ante corr.

11. *Th.* 605:

χήτει γηροκόμῳ· δὲ γ' οὐ βιότου δ' ἐπιδενῆς

In *C.Q.* n.s. xi (1961), 138, I conjectured ὁ δ' οὐ βιότου γ'. I have not come across any manuscript with this text; but U has ὁ δ' οὐ βιότου τ', while Z has ὁ γ' οὐ βιότου γ'; LM have βιότου τ'.

12. *Th.* 615-16:

ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀνάγκης  
καὶ πολύδριν ἔόντα μέγας κατὰ δεσμὸς ἐρύκει.

615 γρ. ἀλλά μιν ἔμπης Z.

13. *Th.* 839-40:

ἀμφὶ δὲ γαῖα  
σμερδαλέον κονάβησε καὶ οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὑπερθε.

*Π*<sup>12</sup> (P.S.I. 1086) had a different verb, read by Vitelli as φω]γησε. This is not very suitable, and does not fit the traces.<sup>1</sup> There is the tail of an oblique stroke, separate from what follows, then the bottoms of three verticals. I suggest that the papyrus had σμαρ]αγησε, in reminiscence of 679,

γῆ δὲ μέγ' ἐσμαράγησεν, ἐπέστενε δ' οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς.

14. *Th.* 848:

θυῖε δ' ἄρ' ἀμφὶ ἀκτὰς περὶ τ' ἀμφὶ τε κύματα μακρά.

'Round the shores', natural as it seems to island-dwellers, is not an expression found in early Greek epic. The prepositions used with ἀκτή are ἐπί and παρά. We should read ἀμφὶ ἄκρας, cf. *Δ* 425 f.,

(κύμα) χέρσω ρήγνύμενον μεγάλα βρέμει, ἀμφὶ δέ τ' ἄκρας  
κυρτὸν ἔὸν κορυφοῦται.

15. *Th.* 890:

αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισιν ἔην ἐσκάτθετο νηδύν.

ἐγκάτθετο LM Chrysippus. I have persuaded the editor of p. Antinoop. 71 that the trace before κάτθετο could equally well be sigma or gamma.

16. *Op.* 84:

εἰς Ἐπιμηθέα πέμπε πατήρ κλυτὸν Ἀργειφόντην.

The normal formula is κρατὺς Ἀργειφόντης: *Π* 181, *Ω* 345, *ε* 49, 148, *h. Dem.* 346, 377, *Herm.* 294, 414, *Aphr.* 129. So κρατὺν should probably be restored here; κλυτὸν may have come from *γο*, κλυτὸς Ἀμφιγυήεις.

17. *Op.* 213:

ω Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ' Ὑβριν ὅφελλε.

ᾶιε Et. gen. s.v. *ᾶιω*. *Π*<sup>5</sup> (p. Vindob. 19815) seems to have agreed with the manuscripts: *α]κ[ου]ε* can be read.

18. *Op.* 248:

ω βασιλῆς, ὑμεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθε καὶ αὐτοὶ

βασιλῆς C, βασιλεῖς DΦ, βασιλῆς Rzach. *Π*<sup>5</sup> probably had an eta after the lambda, but epsilon is also possible.

19. *Op.* 789:

φεύδεά θ' αἰμυλίους τε λόγους κρυφίους τ' ὀδαρισμούς.

θ' codd., τ *Π*<sup>5</sup> (rather than γ).

<sup>1</sup> See now G. Arrighetti, *Athenaeum* n.s. xxxix (1961), 246.

20. *Sc. 258-60:*

Κλωθὼ καὶ Λάχεοίς σφιν ἐφέστασαν ἡ μὲν ὑφῆσσων  
Ἄτροπος οὐ τι πέλεν μεγάλη θεός ἀλλ' ἄρα ἡ γε  
τῶν γε μὲν ἀλλάων προφερής τ' ἦν πρεσβυτάτη τε.

The collocation ἀλλ' ἄρα ἡ γε τῶν γε μὲν is impossible. Paley, approved by Denniston, *Particles*, p. 388, suggested that a line had fallen out. An alternative remedy would be transposition of the ends of 258-9, thus:

Κλωθὼ καὶ Λάχεοίς σφιν ἐφέστασαν ἀλλ' ἄρα ἡ γε  
Ἄτροπος οὐ τι πέλεν μεγάλη θεός ἡ μὲν ὑφῆσσων,  
τῶν γε μὲν ἀλλάων προφερής τ' ἦν πρεσβυτάτη τε.

As for Atropos, she was there too, of course, but she was smaller than her sisters; smaller, but senior. There is some similarity to *B* 527-30:

Οὐλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας,  
μείων, οὐ τι τόσος γε ὅσος Τελαμώνιος Αἴας,  
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μείων ὀλίγος μὲν ἔην, λινοθώρηξ,  
ἔγχείη δ' ἐκέκαστο Πανέλληνας καὶ Άχαιούς.

21. *Sc. 430-1:*

γλαυκιών δ' ὄσσοις δεινόν, πλευράς τε καὶ ὥμους  
οὐρῆ μαστιών ποσσὶν γλάφει.

*μαστιά* is found nowhere else. If the author had written *μαστίζων* (or *μαστίων*, with *ι* metri gratia), corruption could have been caused by *γλαυκιών* above.

22. *Par. Ox. 1358 II (K2 Merk.) 19:*

]κρείοντος Ἐρικτύπου εἰσὶ γενέθληι.

*γενέθληι* is retained only by Traversa; Evelyn-White and Merkelbach follow Grenfell and Hunt in writing *γενέθλη*. I know no parallel for the nominative; in *Th.* 871 the correct reading is *γενέθην*, as in N and O. Here we must write *γενέθλης*. Cf. δ 232,

ἡ γὰρ Παιήονός εἰσι γενέθλης,

and A.R. 2. 521,

τοίτερ τε Λυκάονός εἰσι γενέθλης.

Similar, though no longer quite parallel, is ν 130, ἐμῆς ἐξ εἰσι γενέθλης.

## NOTES ON THE *PERSAE*

33-35 ἄλλους δ' ὁ μέγας καὶ πολυθρέμμων  
 Νεῖλος ἔπειμφεν Σουσικάνης,  
 Πηγασταγῶν Αἰγυπτογενῆς, . . .

AFTER the accusative *ἄλλους* the names of the officers of the Egyptian contingent are given in the nominative, with no connecting particle or relative and no main verb to follow. The editors offer various supplements for the sense, e.g. Dindorf *οὗτοί εἰσι*; but what we have here is not a simple case of ellipse but a harsh change in construction which it would be hard to parallel. Read *ἄλλ' οὐδεν*, omit *δ'*, and place a comma at *ἔπειμφεν*; the nominatives then depend loosely on *σοῦνται* 25.

93-96 δολόμητιν δ' ἀπάταν θεοῦ  
 τίς ἀνὴρ θνατὸς ἀλύξει;  
 τίς ὁ κραυπνῷ ποδὶ πηδή-  
 ματος εὐπετέος ἀνάσσων;

*δολόμητιν ἀπάταν* is not satisfactory. Besides being a little too pleonastic even for Aeschylus, it does not adequately prepare us for the metaphor in 95-96; jumping nimbly to escape deception was not a practice prevalent amongst the Greeks. The image in the antistrophe 97-100 is of hunting-nets spread around a thicket to trap game. If *δολόμητιν ἀπάταν* could be identified with *ἄρκνας* 98, then all would be well; *πηδήματος* would become intelligible and the metaphor in 93-100 would be uniform throughout. Broadhead properly balks at this retrogressive kind of interpretation, but the solution he favours, Stahl's *δηλήματος . . . ἀπάσσων*, with *εὐπιθῶν* for *εὐπετέος*, is unnecessarily drastic. The detail of 93-96 suggests that the hunting metaphor is already operative: *ἀλύξει* anticipates *ἀλύξαντα* (or some part of the same verb), *πηδήματος* anticipates *ὑπερθε φυγεῖν* (or something similar) and *κραυπνῷ ποδὶ* is apposite enough to game leaping over nets. We need only a key word in 93-94 to introduce the metaphor; read, therefore, *δὲ πάγαν* for *δ' ἀπάταν*, the corruption being due to the common confusion of *Γ* with *T*.

This emendation leaves the old problem of *ἀνάσσων* virtually unaltered. Brunck's *ἀνάσσων*, with Emper's *πῆδημα τόδ' εὐπετῶς*, has been rejected by Murray and Broadhead, but the traditional text, now back in fashion, has one grave drawback in that the force of the rhetorical question in 95-96 is impaired by the absence of verbal connexion with 93-94. The question, 'Who is the man who commands a light leap with nimble foot?' may very well be answered, 'Many men do. And how is this related to your hunting-net?' In short, *τόδε* is well nigh indispensable. Page's warning that *ἀνάσσειν* does not mean 'leap' but 'start up', 'get up in a hurry' (Broadhead, p. 256) is correct but not a fatal objection. It may be inferred from Xen. *Cyn.* 6. 17, where *ἀνάσσειν* is used of a 'netted' hare starting from its form, that this sense of the verb was established in fifth-century hunting parlance, and the extension of the cognate in *πῆδημα* *ἀνάσσειν* is no more startling than *τῆδημ* 'όρούσσας, said of the Trojan horse in *Ag.* 826. *πῆδημα* *ἀνάσσειν*, however, gives a slightly different image from *πῆδημα* *όρούειν*, i.e. a standing leap from the hiding-place over the net, as distinct from

a flying leap. Nevertheless, the reading *πήδημα τόδ' εὐπετῶς ἀνάσσων* suffers from two serious defects. First, *εὐπετῶς*, for a word which carries strong emphasis in sense, is standing in a weak position, and, second, the present participle *ἀνάσσων* is scarcely tolerable after the future *ἀλύξει*. Both defects could be eliminated by effecting a slight change to *εὐπετῶς ἀνάσσων*, giving stress to the adverb and matching the future with the equivalent of *ἀν* with the optative. Read, then,

δολόμητιν δὲ πάγαν θεοῦ  
τίς ἀνήρ θνατὸς ἀλύξει;  
τίς ὁ κραυπνῷ ποδὶ πήδη-  
μα τόδ' εὐπετῶς ἀνάσσων;

235-6 *Ba.* ὁδέ τις πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδροπλήθεια στρατοῦ;  
*Xo.* καὶ στρατὸς τοιοῦτος, ἔρξας πολλὰ δὴ Μήδους κακά.

This note is not concerned with the familiar difficulties of 236 (I believe Murray was right to obelize *καὶ στρατὸς τοιοῦτος*) but with the historical allusion. Marathon, say the scholiast and editors, and for Broadhead now the comment is superfluous; but is it Marathon? The stichomythia 231-45 serves as an historical introduction to Xerxes' invasion, brief and elliptical, since most of the audience knew the background as well as the poet. Marathon is clearly alluded to in 244; since summaries are not usually repetitious, 236 probably alludes to something else. Perhaps a Persian chorus *could* call the setback at Marathon *πολλὰ δὴ κακά*, representing an honestly won victory against an invader as an injury to *βασιλεύς*, but it is an apter description of that original act of aggression which provoked the Persian wrath, the burning of Sardis and, more particularly, the destruction of the temple of Cybebe (Hdt. 5. 100 ff.). When Mardonius used the identical phrase to Xerxes in Hdt. 7. 5, οὐκ οἰκός ἐστι Αθηναῖος ἐργασαμένους πολλὰ δὴ κακά Πέρσας μὴ οὐ δοῦναι δίκας τῶν ἐποίησαν, he was alluding to Sardis and not Marathon (cf. ibid. *ἴνα . . . τις* *ὑπερεορ* φυλάσσηται ἐπὶ γῆν τὴν σὴν στρατεύεσθαι). According to Herodotus the destruction of Sardis determined first Darius and then Xerxes to invade Greece and led to Persian retaliation against the temples of Ionia (Miletus, 6. 19; Ionia in general, 6. 32), Eretria (6. 101), the mainland (8. 32-33), and finally Athens (8. 53); hence he underlines the dispatch of the twenty ships by the Athenians to Miletus as the ἀρχὴ κακῶν "Ελλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι" (5. 97). With the single vague phrase *ἔρξας πολλὰ δὴ Μήδους κακά* Aeschylus passes over Persia's *έγκληματα* against Athens, just as in 472-7 he gives no hint that it was Persian indignation at the attack on Sardis which motivated the landing at Marathon and, in part, the expedition of Xerxes. The scant notice given to Persian charges is attributable not to ignorance or to blind patriotism but to dramatic design. Being a man of profound religious convictions, Aeschylus saw the Persian defeat on land and sea as punishment for acts of *ὑβρίς* which they had committed in both spheres, acts which no provocation could justify; Salamis is conceived to be the punishment for the bridging of the Hellespont (705 ff.) and Plataea the punishment for the plunder and destruction of Greek temples (805-22). To specify *πολλὰ δὴ κακά* would have been to weaken the moral of the piece by introducing a factor which could have been construed as partial justification of Persian sacrilege. Being unspecified, they are left outside the limits of the drama, and few members of the audience in 472 can have given a thought to the burning of Cybebe's temple or have seen that the ghost's

moralizing (805 ff.) on the retribution which strikes the sacrilegious had as much historical relevance for Athenians as for Persians.

The suppression of historical data which could embarrass the dramatic purpose is closely paralleled in the poet's treatment of the bridging of the Hellespont. The strictures on the folly of bridge-building, represented as an offence against all the gods but particularly Poseidon, are placed in the mouth of the ghost in 721-6 and 744-51, but not a word is said of the historical precedent, the bridge built for Darius himself across the Thracian Bosphorus as a preliminary to the Scythian campaign. Aeschylus cannot have been ignorant of a remarkable piece of engineering carried out by a Samian across a major waterway during his own lifetime (Rose finds it credible that he should have been ignorant of the Scythian expedition, but see the note below on 858-63). I should prefer to believe that he had the historical precedent fresh in his mind, and selected Darius' ghost for this dramatic office precisely because Darius had been the exponent of bridge-building as a prelude to invasion. But further than this he could not go without diminishing the enormity of Xerxes' *ὕβρις*. He could not represent Darius as a bridge-builder who had learnt wisdom in the school of military disaster, for the Scythian expedition was not disastrous, and in the final stasimon it is numbered amongst Darius' achievements. Darius, therefore, condemns Xerxes' bridge not from his own experience but as violating some convenient oracles (739 ff.)—which presumably date some time between the Scythian expedition and 481! And so another awkward historical precedent is quietly passed over.

413-16

ώς δὲ πλῆθος ἐν στενῷ νεῶν  
ηθροιστ', ἀρωγὴ δ' οὐτις ἀλλήλοις παρῆν,  
αὐτοὶ δ' ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐμβόλοις χαλκοστόμοις  
παίοντ', ἔθρανον πάντα κωπήσηστόλον, . . .

ἀρωγὴ . . . παρῆν is interpreted in landlubberly fashion by the editors, 'they could not help one another', but although his account of the action has commenced, Aeschylus is describing here nothing more than the Persians' difficulties due to lack of sea-room; he passes on to the advantage taken by the Greeks of their inability to manoeuvre at 417. ἀρωγὴ . . . παρῆν which, as Rose says, is illogically expressed, must be equivalent to ἀρωγὴ δ' οὐτις ἀλλήλων (obj. gen.) αὐτοῖς παρῆν, 'they could not fend one another off', with the results stated in 415-16. ἀρωγὴ is not found elsewhere in this sense in Aeschylus, but cf. ἀρηξον δαῖων ἀλωσιν, *Sept.* 119 and τῆς νόσου ταύτης ἀρωγή, *Plat. Legg.* 919 c.

546-7 κάγῳ δὲ μόρον τῶν οἰχομένων  
αἴρω δοκίμως πολυπενθῆ.

δοκίμως means 'acceptable', 'approved' (cf. 87), thence 'genuine' of currency (cf. δόκιμον ἀργύριον, *Dem.* 35. 24). Here 'genuinely' qualifies not αἴρω (*si vera lectio*) but πολυπενθῆ. To take δοκίμως πολυπενθῆ as in effect equivalent to δόκιμον (so Groeneboom, Conradt-Schiller, and Rose) is clearly wrong; it would be quite superfluous anyhow for this chorus to state that its grief for the war casualties is genuine. δοκίμως is not otiose but used in an etymological sense. Words such as ὄρθως, ἀληθῶς, ἐτίμως, and ἐτητύμως are regularly used in

lyric and tragedy (ὅρθως in prose too) for names 'properly' or 'truly' assigned (cf. Fraenkel on *Ag.* 682 and Pfeiffer cited there); sometimes they serve to confirm a conventional etymology, but more often draw attention to a new one suggested by the ironic working of fate. Here δοκίμως πολυπενθῆ instances the latter practice, pointing in the context to πολλῶν (ἀνδρῶν) πένθος. Early parallels for adjectives etymologized are hard to come by—the poets concentrate on nouns—but cf. *Suppl.* 736-7, περίφοβον μ' ἔχει τάρβος ἐτητύμως πολυυδρόμου φυγᾶς ὄφελος εἴ τι μοι, of the fifty daughters of Danaus, and Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 6. 7, ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως ἀν αὐτός τε καλὸς κάγαθὸς δοκίμως γένοιτο . . ., i.e. 'a gentleman in the proper sense of the word', cited but misinterpreted by Broadhead. It is possible that this hitherto unnoticed sense of δοκίμως underlies the well-known crux in *Parm.* fr. 28. 32 Diels; at least, it would be worth trying.

858-63 πρώτα μὲν εὐδοκίμους στρατιὰς τάπο-  
φαινόμει<sup>θ</sup> ἥδε νομίματα πύργινα  
πάντ<sup>α</sup> ἐπειθύννον·†  
νόστοι δ<sup>ε</sup> ἐπολέμων ἀπόνους ἀπ-  
θεῖς (πάλιν) εὐ πράσ-  
σοντας δύον [έ] οἰκους.

858 εὐδοκίμου στρατιᾶς codd.: corr. Wellauer      ἀποφαινόμεθ' γρ. ΣΦ: ἀποφαινόμε(σ)θ'  
codd. et ΣΦ      859 νομίσματα Α<sup>1</sup>: νομίματα vel νόμιμα τὰ rell.      860 ἐπεύθυνον  
sere codd.: ἐπέύθυνον Μ<sup>2</sup>Ω<sup>2</sup>: ἐπέύθυνε Ω<sup>1</sup>

Line 854 of the strophe, corresponding to 860, provides a firm basis for the criticism. There  $\epsilon\theta\theta'$  ὁ γεραῖς has the solid support of MΦ, while γηραῖς is the reading of only QTri. γεραῖς has three other points in its favour: it maintains the dactylic run of 852-6 (so Broadhead), it carries the requisite flavour of venerability lacking in γηραῖς (Rose wrongly comments that the sense is not affected by the issue), and while γεραῖς occurs five times elsewhere in the play, γηραῖς does not occur once (γεραῖς is used deferentially to Atossa in 156, 704, and 832, to the chorus in 682 and by the chorus of themselves in 264). Since, then, we must expect — — — in 860, ἐπηθύννον, accepted by Murray, is wrong, and the choice lies between ἐπέθυννον and ἐπέθυνεν; the epic use of θίνειν is sufficient guarantee for the compound, which is ἀπ. λεγ. Of the two alternatives ἐπέθυνεν is to be preferred; the whole stasimon is devoted to the achievements of Darius, the subject Darius being introduced with ἀρχε 857 and maintained without reintroduction even in 864-6, σσσας δ' εἴλε πόλεις πόρον οὐ διαβάσας Άλιος ποταμοῖο, οὐδ' ἀφ' ἔστις αὐθεῖς, where the conquests are those which he effected through his lieutenants. It is not to be expected that anyone but Darius is the subject of 858-63, with the exception of the easy variation of subject in νόστοι . . . δύον, if the reading is right. For these reasons ἀποφανόμεθ', too must be regarded with suspicion, not simply because its tense is uncertain but because it is in the wrong person. This is confirmed by another consideration: the proud display of armed might belongs properly to βασιλεύς, and no body of Persian elders would have usurped his prerogative or bracketed itself with him in a presumptuous 'we'. The manuscripts' reading may be explained as a corruption of ἀπέφαινον ἔθνη $\nu$ η δὲ, due to confusion of ν and μ and wrong division of words, ἀπέφαινον being a variant for the original ἀπεφαίνετ'; the number of ἀπεφαίνετο, as of ἐπε(v)θυνεν, wavered in the tradition.

To the question of the identity of the *ōm* there can only be one answer.

Since 865 ff. enumerate the conquests which Darius made by proxy, these are the foes he dealt with in person. He is said to have ranged against them, not conquered them or incorporated them in the Empire, and to have brought his troops safe home again. What else can be meant but the Scythian expedition, not mentioned elsewhere in the play but crying out for mention here? The Scythians were νομάδες, with one notable exception recorded by Hdt. 4. 108-9: in the territory of the Budini was the city of Gelonus, whose inhabitants were descended from original Greek stock and still maintained their Greek language in a barbarized form, their Greek way of life, and their religion. They tilled the soil and lived Greek-fashion in a fortified town, whose enormous walls of wood excited Herodotus' interest (*τοῦ δὲ τείχεος μέγαθος κῶλον ἔκαστον τριήκοντα σταδίων ἔστι, ὑψηλὸν δὲ καὶ πᾶν ἔνδυνον*). Darius' destruction of the town, deserted by its inhabitants, was the sole instance of a πόλεμος πυργοδάκτος in a campaign otherwise devoted to steppe-tramping. For this reason and probably also because of the Greek origin of the Geloni Herodotus gives the destruction of the town more notice than it really deserved (4. 123). There is no reason why Aeschylus too should not have known the story and considered it worthy of brief allusion for the same reasons. I propose, then, ἀπεφαίνετ', ἔθνη δὲ νομαία τε πύργινά τ' ἀντεπέθυνεν. ἔθνη πύργια, 'battlemented races', remains a trifle odd, since adjectives in -ιος generally indicate the *materies ex qua*, but a ἀπ. λεγ. of this sort is unlikely to be corrupt (could Broadhead's πέργαμα, for example, have been corrupted to πύργια?). ἀντεπέθυνεν suits the official reasons for the Scythian expedition particularly well: it was a war of vengeance for the Scythian incursion into Asia Minor (Hdt. 4. 1, 119; 7. 20).

897-900 καὶ τὰς εὐκτεάνους κατὰ κλῆρον Ἰαόνιον πολυνάνδρους  
'Ελλάνων ἐκράτυνε τοφετέραις φρεσίν.

The traditional text is suspect for two reasons: *σφέτερος* = 'his own' has no sure parallel in Aeschylus (so Wilamowitz) and the ἐπωδός down to πλαγαῖσι ποντίαισι 907 is dactylic with this single exception. It may be inferred from 887 ff., καὶ τὰς ἀγχιάλους ἐκράτυνε μεσάκτους, Λῆμνον, Ἰκαροῦ θ' ἔδος, καὶ Ρόδον ἡδὲ Κνίδον Κυπρίας τε πόλεις . . ., that ἐκράτυνε 900 is probably right. The same passage also shows that Davison's addition *⟨πόλεις⟩* after ἐκράτυνε is not indispensable, since τὰς ἀγχιάλους 887 is independent of πόλεις 892; and why should πόλεις have dropped out? I suspect that *σφετέραις* has glossed ἔαῖς and then ousted it; note that M alone of the manuscripts has ἐκράτυνεν (the variant is recorded by Sidwick, not by Murray), which suggests υ— commencing with a vowel to follow. ἔός is not attested for any of the three tragedians (ΣΦ's variant ἔόν in *Pers.* 13 has not recommended itself), and to replace one non-Aeschylean word with another is odd. ἔός, however, has the Homeric support which *σφέτερος* = 'his own' lacks (ἔω αὐτοῦ θυμῷ, *Il.* 10. 204-5; γῆσι φρεσίν, *Il.* 17. 260, is late), and could be tolerated in a tragedy so remarkable for its dialect forms and in a lyric so reminiscent of Homer in language and metre.

## THE GUILT OF AGAMEMNON<sup>1</sup>

IN recent years the general view of the theology and morality of Aeschylus which we still find expressed in the most popular handbooks of Greek tragedy has come under fire;<sup>2</sup> fire which its defenders have so far been unwilling or unable to return. That Aeschylus was a bold religious innovator propounding advanced doctrines can no longer be assumed without argument; neither can one take for granted that his outlook on morality in general and on justice in particular was as advanced as it was once usual to maintain. Aeschylean justice, it is now beginning to be realized, had more in common with the ancient Hebrew justice that demanded eye for eye and tooth for tooth than with the exalted conceptions attributed to the poet by modern theorists. But whatever view we take of Aeschylus' notion of justice, we are not likely to dispute the paramount importance of justice in his work, and especially in the *Oresteia*. If I begin, then, with the assumption that the *Oresteia* is concerned with justice, human and divine, I shall be on safe ground.

The first and greatest of its three plays shows how the leader of the Greek expedition against Troy, the chosen instrument of Zeus' chastisement of the Trojans, comes to a miserable end. The train of events that leads to this conclusion has been set in motion long before the play begins, when the Greek fleet is assembled at Aulis on its way to Troy. The goddess Artemis becomes incensed with Agamemnon, and sends unfavourable winds that prevent the fleet from sailing. Either the great expedition, ordered by Zeus, must be abandoned, or the king must sacrifice his own daughter to appease the goddess. He consents to the sacrifice. This action earns him the bitter enmity of his wife, who at home in Argos plans his murder. She has at hand an instrument ready to her purpose. Agamemnon's father, Atreus, has long ago massacred the children of his brother, and has served him at a banquet with their roasted flesh. One survivor has escaped, and he is now a grown man waiting for his revenge.

The constant preoccupation of the poet with guilt and retribution creates a strong impression in the hearer's mind that the exact assessment of Agamemnon's guilt must be important for the understanding of the play. And yet there is no agreement among scholars as to the nature of that guilt. Agamemnon has been sent against Troy by Zeus himself; and yet Zeus allows him to perish miserably. Why? Is it for having consented to his daughter's sacrifice? If so, how far is his punishment the work of Zeus, and how far is it the consequence of the wrath of Artemis? The motive for that wrath is itself a subject of acute controversy. Or is Agamemnon punished for his remorseless extirpation of the Trojans, and the destruction of their city together with its temples and its altars? What part is played in his destruction by the curse brought down upon his family by the monstrous action of his father, Atreus? Or is he punished for his own pride and arrogance? Most modern scholars, with the notable excep-

<sup>1</sup> This paper formed the first of my J. H. Gray Lectures given at Cambridge in 1961; it has also been given at other places I am grateful to those who have helped to improve it, and particularly to Professor E. R. Dodds

and Mr. G. E. M. de Ste Croix.

<sup>2</sup> See D. L. Page's preface to *Aeschylus, Agamemnon*, ed. J. D. Denniston and D. L. Page, 1957; and my article 'Zeus in Aeschylus' in *J.H.S.* lxxvi (1956), 55 f.

tion of Eduard Fraenkel, have seen him, if not as an arrogant and cruel despot, at least as something not far removed from one. Or can it be that several, or all of, these factors contribute somehow to his ruin? If so, how far can we hope to assign to each its proper degree of importance in working to this end?

All these questions are controversial. The most learned of Aeschylean scholars, to whom every serious student of the play must acknowledge a large debt, has even warned us that 'it would be absurd to attempt an exact calculation as to the degree of efficacy in each of the different elements that work together towards Agamemnon's fatal end'.<sup>1</sup> It is indeed important to guard against attacking the complicated task of unravelling these twisted strands with any excessive confidence that we shall reach a clear-cut answer. Yet it is agreed that the trilogy is concerned with justice, guilt, and retribution; and that seems to me to justify a fresh attempt to discover how the poet meant us to suppose these notions are exemplified in his work. Whether the results which are arrived at are absurd will be for the reader to judge.

The Chorus in its opening anapaests (60 f.) strongly asserts that the cause of the Atreidae against the Trojans is a just cause. They have been sent against Troy by Zeus, the guardian of the law of host and guest: Zeus, who has been outraged by Paris' crime against the sacred laws of hospitality. At the beginning of the first stasimon (367 f.), the point is further reinforced. The Chorus has just been told that Troy has fallen. 'They can speak of a stroke from Zeus', they begin; 'this, at least, one can make out.' Later in the play the same truth is strongly insisted on both by the Herald and by the King himself. And yet it is by the will of Zeus, as the loyal elders themselves finally acknowledge, that Agamemnon comes to his miserable end.

The reasons begin to emerge in the parodos, in that great choral ode which describes what has happened ten years earlier, when the Greek fleet lay encamped at Aulis on its way to Troy. The portent of the eagles that tore and devoured a pregnant hare has taught Calchas, the prophet of the Greek army, that Troy is destined to fall to the expedition; it has taught him also that Artemis is incensed against its leaders, the Atreidae. In the whole play nothing is more controversial than the reasons for Artemis' anger, but in an investigation of the guilt of Agamemnon the problem of her motive is not one that we can avoid.

'In time', says Calchas (126 ff.), 'this expedition captures Priam's city; and all the plentiful herds of the people before the walls shall Fate violently ravage. Only may no envious grudge from the gods strike beforehand and cast into darkness the great bit for Troy's mouth that is the host encamped. For in pity Artemis bears a grudge against the winged hounds of her father that slaughter the poor trembling hare with all her young before the birth; and she loathes the feast of the eagles. . . . The Fair One, kindly as she is towards the helpless offspring of ravening lions and pleasant to the suckling young of all creatures that roam the wild, demands fulfilment of what these things portend; favourable is the portent, yet fraught with blame. And I invoke the blessed Healer, that she prepare not against the Danaoi lengthy delays in port caused by adverse winds that hold fast the ships, striving to bring about another sacrifice, one without song or banquet, a worker of quarrels born in the house and fearless of the husband. For there abides a terrible, ever re-arising, treacherous keeper of the house, unforgetting Wrath, child-avenging.'

<sup>1</sup> Eduard Fraenkel, *Aeschylus, Agamemnon* (1950), iii. 625.

The ancient epic called the *Cypria* accounted for the wrath of Artemis by means of a story not mentioned by Aeschylus. According to Proclus' summary of the plot of this lost work (O.C.T. of Homer, v. 104), Agamemnon had shot a stag, and in his triumph boasted that as an archer he surpassed even Artemis. A similar story is told by Sophocles in his *Electra* (563 f.). That story is not mentioned here; but can we rule out the possibility that it was, none the less, the reason for the wrath of Artemis that Aeschylus had in mind? If that is so, it follows that he has set down Artemis' anger to an obscure and arbitrary grievance, a grievance so trivial that it is not worth mentioning in the play at all. It would certainly be unsafe to deny *a priori* that this could be the case; but the conclusion is such a strange one that it seems hardly reasonable to adopt it without further examination of the evidence. Does the portent give us any clue to the reason for the goddess's anger?

Calchas says that she is angry because she loathes the feast of the eagles; and the eagles, he says, stand for the Atreidae. Here, say some scholars, we have the explanation of her anger: she hates the eagles, and the eagles stand for the Atreidae; therefore, she conceives a hatred for the Atreidae. This interpretation seems to me to rest on an intolerable confusion between the world of the portent and the world of the reality it happens in order to symbolize. The eagles and the hare belong to the world of the portent; that portent symbolizes an event which is to happen in the real world. The eagles stand for the Atreidae; so it is natural to infer that the hare must stand for some other figure or figures belonging to the real world. We can hardly avoid supposing that it stands for the Trojans and their city. So when Calchas says (137) Artemis abhors the eagles' feast, he must mean that Artemis abhors the coming destruction of Troy, which the Atreidae are destined to accomplish.

I believe that this conclusion is confirmed by the words of Calchas' explanation of the portent. But the point is not to be grasped immediately, for like most Greek prophets Calchas casts his interpretation in riddling language. 'In time', he begins (126 f.),<sup>1</sup> 'this expedition captures Priam's city; and all the plentiful herds of the people before the walls shall fate violently ravage.' This is strange language. We should have expected that the tearing of the pregnant hare would stand for the annihilation of the Trojans, not only men, women, and children, but even the unborn; we can scarcely help remembering the speech of Agamemnon to Menelaus in the sixth book of the *Iliad* (57 f.), in which he declares that not even the unborn children of the Trojans shall escape his vengeance. Yet when it comes to the explanation of the portent, we are told that the Achaeans will destroy the Trojan . . . cattle!

That seems incredible; and I have suggested that the explanation lies in the habit Greek prophets had of referring to people by the names of animals.<sup>2</sup> If so, 'the abundant herds of the people' will mean 'the abundant herds that are the people'. This is confirmed by the presence of the words 'before the walls'; for the Trojan cattle did not perish before the walls, but the Trojan men did perish 'in front of the city'.

If it is correct, the close correspondence of the portent with the future reality

<sup>1</sup> χρόνῳ μὲν ἀγρεῖ Πριάμου πόλιν ἀδε κέλευθος,  
πάντα δὲ πύργων  
κτήνη πρόσθε τὰ δημιοπληθέα  
μοῖρα λαπάξει πρὸς τὸ βίασον.

<sup>2</sup> *Rh. Mus.* ciii (1960), 76 f.

tion of Eduard Fraenkel, have seen him, if not as an arrogant and cruel despot, at least as something not far removed from one. Or can it be that several, or all of, these factors contribute somehow to his ruin? If so, how far can we hope to assign to each its proper degree of importance in working to this end?

All these questions are controversial. The most learned of Aeschylean scholars, to whom every serious student of the play must acknowledge a large debt, has even warned us that 'it would be absurd to attempt an exact calculation as to the degree of efficacy in each of the different elements that work together towards Agamemnon's fatal end'.<sup>1</sup> It is indeed important to guard against attacking the complicated task of unravelling these twisted strands with any excessive confidence that we shall reach a clear-cut answer. Yet it is agreed that the trilogy is concerned with justice, guilt, and retribution; and that seems to me to justify a fresh attempt to discover how the poet meant us to suppose these notions are exemplified in his work. Whether the results which are arrived at are absurd will be for the reader to judge.

The Chorus in its opening anapaests (60 f.) strongly asserts that the cause of the Atreidae against the Trojans is a just cause. They have been sent against Troy by Zeus, the guardian of the law of host and guest: Zeus, who has been outraged by Paris' crime against the sacred laws of hospitality. At the beginning of the first stasimon (367 f.), the point is further reinforced. The Chorus has just been told that Troy has fallen. 'They can speak of a stroke from Zeus', they begin; 'this, at least, one can make out.' Later in the play the same truth is strongly insisted on both by the Herald and by the King himself. And yet it is by the will of Zeus, as the loyal elders themselves finally acknowledge, that Agamemnon comes to his miserable end.

The reasons begin to emerge in the parodos, in that great choral ode which describes what has happened ten years earlier, when the Greek fleet lay encamped at Aulis on its way to Troy. The portent of the eagles that tore and devoured a pregnant hare has taught Calchas, the prophet of the Greek army, that Troy is destined to fall to the expedition; it has taught him also that Artemis is incensed against its leaders, the Atreidae. In the whole play nothing is more controversial than the reasons for Artemis' anger, but in an investigation of the guilt of Agamemnon the problem of her motive is not one that we can avoid.

'In time', says Calchas (126 ff.), 'this expedition captures Priam's city; and all the plentiful herds of the people before the walls shall Fate violently ravage. Only may no envious grudge from the gods strike beforehand and cast into darkness the great bit for Troy's mouth that is the host encamped. For in pity Artemis bears a grudge against the winged hounds of her father that slaughter the poor trembling hare with all her young before the birth; and she loathes the feast of the eagles. . . . The Fair One, kindly as she is towards the helpless offspring of ravening lions and pleasant to the suckling young of all creatures that roam the wild, demands fulfilment of what these things portend; favourable is the portent, yet fraught with blame. And I invoke the blessed Healer, that she prepare not against the Danaoi lengthy delays in port caused by adverse winds that hold fast the ships, striving to bring about another sacrifice, one without song or banquet, a worker of quarrels born in the house and fearless of the husband. For there abides a terrible, ever re-arising, treacherous keeper of the house, unforgetting Wrath, child-avenging.'

<sup>1</sup> Eduard Fraenkel, *Aeschylus, Agamemnon* (1950), iii. 625.

The ancient epic called the *Cypria* accounted for the wrath of Artemis by means of a story not mentioned by Aeschylus. According to Proclus' summary of the plot of this lost work (O.C.T. of Homer, v. 104), Agamemnon had shot a stag, and in his triumph boasted that as an archer he surpassed even Artemis. A similar story is told by Sophocles in his *Electra* (563 f.). That story is not mentioned here; but can we rule out the possibility that it was, none the less, the reason for the wrath of Artemis that Aeschylus had in mind? If that is so, it follows that he has set down Artemis' anger to an obscure and arbitrary grievance, a grievance so trivial that it is not worth mentioning in the play at all. It would certainly be unsafe to deny *a priori* that this could be the case; but the conclusion is such a strange one that it seems hardly reasonable to adopt it without further examination of the evidence. Does the portent give us any clue to the reason for the goddess's anger?

Calchas says that she is angry because she loathes the feast of the eagles; and the eagles, he says, stand for the Atreidae. Here, say some scholars, we have the explanation of her anger: she hates the eagles, and the eagles stand for the Atreidae; therefore, she conceives a hatred for the Atreidae. This interpretation seems to me to rest on an int'erable confusion between the world of the portent and the world of the reality it happens in order to symbolize. The eagles and the hare belong to the world of the portent; that portent symbolizes an event which is to happen in the real world. The eagles stand for the Atreidae; so it is natural to infer that the hare must stand for some other figure or figures belonging to the real world. We can hardly avoid supposing that it stands for the Trojans and their city. So when Calchas says (137) Artemis abhors the eagles' feast, he must mean that Artemis abhors the coming destruction of Troy, which the Atreidae are destined to accomplish.

I believe that this conclusion is confirmed by the words of Calchas' explanation of the portent. But the point is not to be grasped immediately, for like most Greek prophets Calchas casts his interpretation in riddling language. 'In time', he begins (126 f.),<sup>1</sup> 'this expedition captures Priam's city; and all the plentiful herds of the people before the walls shall fate violently ravage.' This is strange language. We should have expected that the tearing of the pregnant hare would stand for the annihilation of the Trojans, not only men, women, and children, but even the unborn; we can scarcely help remembering the speech of Agamemnon to Menelaus in the sixth book of the *Iliad* (57 f.), in which he declares that not even the unborn children of the Trojans shall escape his vengeance. Yet when it comes to the explanation of the portent, we are told that the Achaeans will destroy the Trojan . . . cattle!

That seems incredible; and I have suggested that the explanation lies in the habit Greek prophets had of referring to people by the names of animals.<sup>2</sup> If so, 'the abundant herds of the people' will mean 'the abundant herds that are the people'. This is confirmed by the presence of the words 'before the walls'; for the Trojan cattle did not perish before the walls, but the Trojan men did perish 'in front of the city'.

If it is correct, the close correspondence of the portent with the future reality

<sup>1</sup> χρόνῳ μὲν ἄυρεῖ Πριάμον πόλιν ἄδε κέλευθος,  
πάντα δὲ πύργων  
κτήνη πρόσθε τὰ δημοπληθέα  
μοῖρα λαπάξει πρὸς τὸ βίαιον.

<sup>2</sup> Rh. Mus. ciii (1960), 76 f.

must be taken as established. The eagles stand for the Atreidae; the hare and its young stand for Troy and its inhabitants. What reason does Calchas give for the pity felt by Artemis for the hare? He says that Artemis is the patroness of the young of all wild animals; and according to many modern interpreters this fact in itself is enough to explain her anger against the Atreidae. But this is out of the question. Just as both eagles and hare correspond to figures of the real world, so must the motive assigned to the goddess for championing the hare represent a motive for championing what the hare represents in the world of reality. We have seen that in the real world the hare represents the Trojans. Has Artemis a special motive for championing the Trojans that may correspond in the world of reality to the motive assigned her in the world of the portent for championing the hare?

She has, in fact, an excellent motive; for in the *Iliad* and in the whole poetical tradition Artemis together with her brother Apollo appears as a loyal partisan of Troy against the invaders. This supplies a motive for her hostility to the Atreidae that is fully sufficient to explain her action. The last scholar to put forward a view at all similar to this weakened his case by regarding the sacrifice of Iphigeneia as 'an atonement payable in advance for the destruction of Troy'.<sup>1</sup> This language is too legalistic: it is a mistake to talk of 'sin' and 'atonement' in this connexion. In Aeschylus, as in Homer, the lesser gods have a position in no way comparable with that of Zeus; they may range themselves on either side in the Trojan conflict, but Zeus for the time holds the balance and will in the end decide the issue. Artemis' blow against Agamemnon is one move in the struggle; it is the attempt of a pro-Trojan goddess to strike at the invaders before the invasion: Artemis must be seen not as a judge punishing a sin, but as a powerful enemy striking at an enemy. Zeus will not prevent Artemis from bringing about the sacrifice; and Calchas hints that this may have consequences beyond itself. Why may it have these consequences? 'There abides', he says (152 ff.),<sup>2</sup> 'a terrible, ever re-arising, treacherous keeper of the house, unforgetting wrath, child-avenging.' That is usually taken as an allusion to Clytemnestra; indeed, some scholars have thought that it identifies the Wrath with her. But if I am right in translating *παλίνορτος* by 'ever re-arising', the reference cannot be limited to her. There is a possibility (see Denniston-Page, *ad loc.*) that the word may mean 'arising in the future'; and in view of that I do not press the point. But it is worth noticing that if *παλίνορτος* here could bear its natural meaning, the reference would be to a child-avenging wrath that is 'ever again arising'. And that could only be the ancient wrath of the House of Atreus.

After the narrative of Calchas' prophecy, the Chorus enters upon the famous invocation that is often called the 'hymn to Zeus' (160 ff.). Why does the Chorus choose this moment for the invocation? The question is not one which every editor of the play has tried to answer; but the choral lyrics of Aeschylus are not normally irrelevant to the dramatic situation, and there is no reason why this one should form an exception to the rule. What is the situation at this point? Zeus has sent the Atreidae against Troy; but Artemis has confronted them with the intolerable choice between abandoning the expedition Zeus has ordered or consenting to Iphigeneia's killing. Where might Agamemnon have looked

<sup>1</sup> B. Daube, *Zu den Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon* (Zürich, 1939), pp. 147 f. <sup>2</sup> μίμνει γὰρ φοβερὰ παλίνορτος οἰκονόμος δολία, μνάμων μῆνις τεκνόποιος.

for help? And where might the elders of Argos appeal in the face of the anxiety that even now, ten years later, still torments them in consequence of what happened at Aulis? Only Zeus could have helped him, and them, to cast from their minds 'the burden of futile worry' (165). Zeus' power is over all, and he teaches men, by means of bitter experience, to obey his stern law of reciprocal justice. Artemis has faced Agamemnon with a terrible alternative. Zeus has sent him against Troy; surely he can hope for aid from Zeus.

Yet the Chorus does not appear at all confident that such aid will be forthcoming. 'Why not?', the audience may wonder. The Chorus gives no indication of the reason for its fears; at this point, the audience can only ponder on the riddling final words of the prophecy of Calchas. But, in the light of a full knowledge of the play, the reader may well wonder, 'Will aid from Zeus be forthcoming for the son of Atreus?'

From the invocation the Chorus returns abruptly to the scene at Aulis, and Agamemnon's grim dilemma. Should he have given up his expedition and gone home? Many scholars have been of this opinion. But in his brilliant introduction to the play D. L. Page has argued that Agamemnon has no choice. Zeus, he has pointed out, has ordered the expedition; it is his will that Troy shall fall. Hear the words attributed to Agamemnon (214 f.): 'That they should desire with passion exceeding passion a sacrifice to still the winds, a sacrifice of maiden's blood, is right in the sight of heaven'.<sup>1</sup> It is no use trying to water down the final word *θέμις*, whose emphatic position no less than its solemn associations lends it great weight in this place. Yet we must notice that Agamemnon's action is described by the Chorus in words that leave no doubt that it is considered as a crime (218 f.): 'And when he had taken upon him the bridle of compulsion, and the wind of his purpose had veered and blew impious, impure, unholy, from that moment he reversed his mind to a course of utter recklessness. For men are made bold by evil-counselling shameless infatuation, the beginning of woe. So he brought himself to sacrifice his daughter, in aid of a war to avenge a woman's loss and as advance payment for his ships.'

We are faced with an apparently glaring contradiction. We must agree with Page that Agamemnon has no choice but to sacrifice his daughter; the expedition had to sail. Yet E. R. Dodds<sup>2</sup> is equally right in insisting that his action was, and is meant to be regarded as, a crime. The text is explicit on this point. Can it be that both are right? Can Zeus have forced Agamemnon to choose between two crimes, either of which was certain to result in his destruction? My answer to this question would be, Yes.

The words just now quoted which describe how Agamemnon made his decision imply that he is mentally deranged: *τάλαντα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων* (222). These words recall the famous passage in the nineteenth book of the *Iliad* in which Agamemnon tries to account for his reckless behaviour in provoking Achilles. 'I was not responsible', he exclaims, 'but Zeus and my portion

<sup>1</sup> πανσανέμον γὰρ θυσίας  
παρθενίου θ' αἷματος ὄρ-  
γὰ περιόργω σφ' ἐπιθυ-  
μεῖν θέμις· εὐ γὰρ εἰη.

I follow Page in accepting Bamberger's emendation of *περιόργως* to *περιόργω σφ'*. At P.V. 944 (cited by Fraenkel as a parallel supporting the manuscript reading), I

would render *τὸν πικρῶς ὑπέρπικρον* by 'you whose excess of bitterness shall taste bitter in your own mouth', supposing the adverb to involve the sense of the word *πικρός* illustrated by Fraenkel, op. cit. ii. 301, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> 'Morals and Politics in the Oresteia', in *Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc.* 186, n.s. vi (1960), 19 f.; on this point see pp. 27-28.

and the Eriny that walks in darkness, who while I spoke put cruel Ate in my mind' (86-88). Infatuation, *παρακοπή*, in the *Agamemnon* is hardly distinct from Ate in the *Iliad*; and Ate is commonly an instrument of Zeus.

Zeus is indeed determined that the fleet must sail; Agamemnon has indeed no choice. But how has Zeus chosen to enforce his will? Not by charging Calchas or some other accredited mouthpiece to inform the king of his decision; but by sending Ate to take away his judgement so that he cannot do otherwise. Does it follow that Agamemnon is not held responsible for his action? Certainly not. In Homer Agamemnon excuses his behaviour by pointing to the action of Ate on his mind; but it does not occur to him to deny his responsibility, or to shuffle out of paying the enormous compensation which he has promised to Achilles. It is the same in Aeschylus. Dodds (loc. cit., p. 27) is right in saying that where Plato said *αἵρια ἐλομένους θεός αὐτίριος*, Aeschylus might have said *αἵρια ἐλομένους θεός παναίριος*: it is curious that in spite of this he still thinks Agamemnon could have chosen not to kill his daughter. Zeus has taken away Agamemnon's judgement; but that does not absolve Agamemnon from the guilt his error will incur. Nothing could better illustrate the saying of Aeschylus' Niobe that Zeus makes a fault in men, when he is determined utterly to destroy a house (fr. 277, Loeb edition, pp. 15-16).

But what leads Zeus to determine to destroy a house? A famous chorus of the *Agamemnon* (750 f.) gives a definite answer to this question; and it stands in such a context that we can hardly doubt that the belief which it expresses is meant to be regarded as a true one. Prosperity in itself, the Chorus insists, is not sufficient to arouse the anger of the gods; only crime brings down punishment on a man or on his descendants after him. Despite the Chorus's claim of originality, this doctrine is not, of course, peculiar to Aeschylus; Page (loc. cit., p. 136) has reminded us that it is found in two places in the fragments of Solon, a writer not unfamiliar to Aeschylus' audience. It is likely to represent Aeschylus' own belief. If so, it is unlikely that Zeus' decision to destroy Agamemnon is without a motive.

Zeus has faced Agamemnon with an impossible alternative. Also, he has taken away his judgement, so that he takes a fatal course; not that the other choice would not have been equally fatal. Why has he done this? Why, in using Agamemnon to punish Troy, has he chosen a course which must lead inevitably to the ruin of Agamemnon? Do we know of any guilt previously attaching to the King himself? No. But do we know of any guilt attaching to his ancestors? More than half the play has elapsed before we hear anything of such guilt. But let me continue with the commentary on the play's successive scenes that I have begun, resuming from the scene that follows the parodos.

Running right through the play we find a deliberate parallel between the fate of the house of Priam and the fate of the house of Atreus; equally pervasive, only less important, is the parallel between the fate of Helen and the fate of Clytemnestra. Again and again we find this sequence repeated; first, pious moralizings as the working of Zeus' law is traced in the just punishment of Troy; next, gradually increasing realization, both by the audience and by the Chorus, that what is true of Troy may prove true also of Troy's conquerors; lastly, agonized apprehension. This is the pattern of scene after scene and chorus after chorus. It was the pattern of the Chorus's initial anapaests together with the parodos; it is the pattern of the scene between Clytemnestra and the Chorus that follows.

In the first of her two great speeches in that scene (281 ff.), Clytemnestra describes the rapid journey from Troy to Argos of 'the light lineally descended from the fire of Ida' (311). Some people see nothing in the Beacon Speech but an irrelevant, if magnificent, geographical excursus. No one could be more reluctant than I to attribute to ancient authors anything like what is generally meant by the modern term 'symbolism'. But I cannot doubt that in Clytemnestra's mind the fire from Ida stands for the avenging fire of Zeus; nor that the Beacon Speech is highly relevant to the parallel between the fates of the Priamidae and that of the Atreidae which I have just mentioned. In the second of her speeches in this scene (320 f.) Clytemnestra paints for the Chorus a vivid picture of what she imagines to be happening in the captured city. If the conquerors show piety, she says, towards the gods of the conquered land and towards their shrines, then they may escape being conquered in their turn. But if they commit sacrilege, they may provoke revenge; and even if they avoid sacrilege, they may arouse the vengeance of the spirits of the dead. Clytemnestra's pretended fears are obviously her secret hopes. This speech looks forward to the later scene in which the Chorus gradually extracts from the innocently optimistic Herald the news of the storm that has scattered the returning ships. This disaster was directly provoked by the sacrilege Clytemnestra had anticipated, and its occurrence greatly facilitated the accomplishment of her plan; for it was owing to the storm that Agamemnon returned in a single ship and without his brother. The adventures of Menelaus after the storm formed the subject of the satyr-play that accompanied the trilogy, the *Proteus*; this, too, may help to explain the importance assigned by the poet to the brothers' separation.

The first stasimon begins on a note of triumph and ends on one of disaster. From the theme of the just punishment of Troy, the Chorus passes to that of Helen and of the lives sacrificed for her sake, and ends on a note of anxious foreboding (459 f.) 'My anxious thought waits to hear something yet shrouded in darkness. For the gods are not unwatchful of the killers of many; and in time the black Erinyes consign to darkness him who is fortunate without justice, reversing his fortune and ruining his life; and he has no protection once he is among the vanished. To be praised exceedingly is dangerous. . . . My choice is the prosperity that comes without envy. May I not be a sacker of cities, nor yet be made captive by others and see my life waste away.'<sup>1</sup> It is remarkable that Agamemnon's own loyal councillors can seem to imply that he is 'fortunate without justice'. If he has killed many, is it not because he is the minister of Zeus' vengeance? If he has made war and sacrificed his daughter for the sake of Helen, has it not been at Zeus' order?

<sup>1</sup> μένει δ' ἀκοῦσαι τί μου  
μέριμναν νυκτηρέφει.  
τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ  
ἀσκοποὶ θεοί. κελα-  
νει δ' Ἐρινύες χρόνω  
τυχηρὸν ὄντ' ἀνευ δίκας  
παλιντυχεῖ τριβῆ βίου  
τιθεῖσ' ἀμαρτόν, ἐν δ' αἴ-  
στοις τελέθοντος οὐτις ἀλ-  
κά τὸ δ' ὑπερκέπως κλύειν  
εὖ βαρύ· . . .  
κρίνει δ' ἀφθονον ὀλβον.  
μήτ' εἶην πτολιπόρθης,

μήτ' οὖν αὐτὸς ἀλούς ὑπ' ἀλ-  
λων βίον κατέδοιμι.

κατέδοιμι is Valkenaer's emendation of the manuscript reading κατίδοιμι. It is usually supported by quoting *Il.* 6. 202 ὁν θυμὸν κατέδων; but a better parallel is furnished by Quintus Smyrnaeus, 3. 456 βίον κατέδων δόδυγον. To hold on to the manuscript reading and suppose that βίον κατίδοιμι can be construed with ἀλούς as though it were a verb of knowing (as Murray, Fraenkel, and Page all do) seems to me impossible.

The scene of the Herald repeats the now familiar sequence of hope and triumph followed by the slow realization that all is not well; it ends with the Chorus forcing the Herald, much against his will, to describe the disaster of the storm. Then the second stasimon takes up once more the theme of Helen, and illustrates her nature by the fable of the lion cub. It shows Helen to be in a sense a daemonic being, one sent into the world for the express purpose of causing havoc and destruction. We are meant to remember that Clytemnestra is her sister; later in the play, the Chorus itself will observe the similarity of their careers (1468 f.). From the theme of Helen, the Chorus goes on to speak of guilt and divine justice (750 f.). Prosperity does not of itself provoke the anger of the gods; evil deeds alone bring down divine justice either on their doer or on his descendants after him.

Immediately after this famous passage the King enters the stage; we can hardly doubt that the words the Chorus has lately uttered somehow apply to his case. The elders welcome him. In the past they have criticized his conduct in making war to recover Helen; but now that his plan has been successfully accomplished, they are glad to greet him with enthusiasm and to warn him against secret enemies. Perhaps the presentation of the King himself may furnish some clue to the problem of his guilt. But the character assigned him by the poet has been, and is, the subject of acute controversy. 'It is a common view', wrote Fraenkel in 1942,<sup>1</sup> '... that king Agamemnon is either the villain of the piece or, at any rate, a reckless, overbearing and impious tyrant.' His own view is very different. For him Agamemnon is 'in everything ... a great gentleman, possessed of moderation and self-control';<sup>2</sup> he is "'every inch a king"; his every word and gesture is expressive of a powerful sincerity'.<sup>3</sup> Page takes a view of Agamemnon's character not widely removed from that against which Fraenkel has so energetically protested. 'His first address does not endear him,' he writes, 'he is ready with pious phrases, he greets success with gratitude, but without surprise. ... He neither mentions his wife nor expresses pleasure in his home-coming ...' (loc. cit., pp. xxxiii f.). When he gives in to Clytemnestra and fatally consents to make a triumphal entry into the palace, treading underfoot the purple tapestries normally reserved as offerings to the gods, that happens, according to Page, 'simply because he is at the mercy of his own vanity and arrogance, instantly ready to do this scandalous act the moment his personal fears of divine retribution and human censure are, by whatever sophistry, allayed' (loc. cit., p. 151).

Let us investigate the reasons for this singular disagreement. Fraenkel seems to me to have established that his calling the gods 'jointly responsible' for his victory does not immediately convict the King of *hybris*; such language was for a Greek perfectly consistent with a properly respectful attitude.<sup>4</sup> But it cannot be denied that in his opening speech Agamemnon looks back upon his ruthless extirpation of his enemies with a fierce satisfaction. 'The blasts of destruction still have life; and the embers as they die with the dead city waft upwards the rich incense of its wealth' (819-20). 'There is no sentimental lamentation in this fine sentence,' writes Fraenkel (p. 378), 'but a true note of profound sympathy.' A few lines later Agamemnon says, 'The ravening lion leaped over the wall, and lapped his fill of the blood of kings' (827-8). I find

<sup>1</sup> *Proc. Brit. Acad.* xxviii. 22.

*Stuttgart*, 1957), p. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Aeschylus, Agamemnon*, ii. 441.

<sup>4</sup> *Aeschylus, Agamemnon*, ii. 371 f.; cf. *Proc.*

<sup>3</sup> *Der Agamemnon des Aeschylus* (Zürich and

*Brit. Acad.*, loc. cit., 22-23.

no sympathy, profound or otherwise, in that sentence or in anything that Agamemnon says about the Trojans; and I find it difficult to deny that the complaisance with which he views the extermination of his enemies must bode ill for him. Clytemnestra has, we know, been hoping that the Greeks will commit some act of sacrilege and provoke the anger of the gods; and the Herald has told us, in a line most unconvincingly obelized by Fraenkel (527), that the altars and shrines of the gods are to be seen no more. Agamemnon now boasts of the city's total destruction; are we to suppose that he has somehow managed it in such a way as to leave the shrines intact?<sup>1</sup> It is true that in his vengeance Agamemnon has acted as the minister of Zeus. But it is no less true that it is dangerous to be a sacker of cities, and that the destruction of the Trojan temples must provoke divine resentment.

We must agree with Page that the grimness and harshness of Agamemnon make an unfavourable impression; but we cannot deny that there is much in the situation that makes this understandable. It is hardly reasonable to reproach him with his coldness to his wife; it seems clear that rumours of what is going on at home have found their way to him. Nor is his behaviour at any point undignified; here we must contrast him with Aegisthus, whom the poet has portrayed in a most unsympathetic fashion. Both recent editors have remarked on the meanness of his conduct and the vulgarity of his language: what purpose had the poet in depicting him in such a way if not that of showing his enemy in a comparatively sympathetic light? Further, we must note the trust and affection of the humble Watchman who speaks the prologue; he looks forward to clasping in his own his master's well-loved hand. Notice, too, the attitude of the Chorus. They acknowledge to the King himself that they have criticized his conduct in the past. But they are glad to welcome him back from Troy with a friendly greeting; and their sincerity is proved by their lamentations at the miserable end of him whom they call their 'kindly guardian' (1452). Fraenkel and Page are both right; we have here a character of light and shade. This conclusion is confirmed by a comparison of Aeschylus' Agamemnon with that of Homer; the two are remarkably alike. Homer's Agamemnon is not, on the whole, an agreeable character. He is proud and irascible, to such an extent that he becomes involved in quarrels with his allies that have disastrous consequences. He is utterly determined to exterminate the enemy, declaring to Menelaus that even the unborn children in the womb shall perish (6. 57 f.). He is ready to proclaim in open council that he prefers the captive concubine Chryseis to his wife Clytemnestra (1. 113 ff.). But these defects cannot blind the reader to his magnificent heroic qualities. He is a good fighter, at his best in a difficult situation; his management of affairs is, as Apollo says in the *Eumenides* (631-2), on the whole successful. Like many hot-tempered men he is capable of behaving with dignity and nobility, as his reconciliation with Achilles plainly shows.

Let us now examine the crucial scene in which Clytemnestra induces her husband to tread upon the purple tapestries (932 ff.). Why does Agamemnon end by succumbing to his wife's persuasion? Fraenkel (loc. cit., p. 441) argues that he yields partly out of chivalry towards a lady, partly because after long years of struggle he is weary and his nerve finally gives way. This is not convincing. Chivalry of such a kind seems to be a medieval and a modern rather than an ancient concept; and the psychological explanation that the

<sup>1</sup> See Denniston and Page, op. cit., p. 120.

King sees through his wife but is too weary to oppose her has a decidedly modern ring. It is a far cry from Aeschylus' Agamemnon to Mann's Aschenbach; nor is such a notion firmly grounded in the text. Must we then believe with Page that Agamemnon secretly longs to make a triumphal entry, and eagerly grasps at the sophistical excuses offered by the Queen? Or should we rather accept a third explanation lately offered us by Hermann Gundert,<sup>1</sup> who has argued that Agamemnon surrenders because he has been outwitted, and that he has been outwitted because Zeus has taken away his wits?

With these three theories in mind let us turn to the text. 'In a moment of fear', says Clytemnestra, 'might you not have vowed to the gods that you would do this?' This is no argument; an offering made to discharge a vow would have been in honour of the gods, but what Clytemnestra is proposing would be in honour of the King himself. Agamemnon knows this, and might have said it; what he does say is that, on the advice of an accredited *exegete*, he would have done so. 'What do you think Priam would have done?', the Queen asks. This again is a sophism; Priam was not only a barbarian, but a man under a curse. This too Agamemnon knows and might have said; instead he is content with the dry answer, 'Yes, *he* certainly would have done it.' 'Have no scruple, then,' says Clytemnestra, 'for the reproach of men.' Agamemnon could have answered that the reproach of men did not worry him, but that what he dreaded was the anger of the gods. Instead, he lamely replies, 'Yes, but public opinion is a great power.' Considered in terms of what we know of Aeschylean morality, this answer surely indicates a moral blindness. 'But the man who arouses no jealousy is not enviable', says the Queen. Agamemnon knows that to incur *φθόνος* is dangerous; yet he can counter only with the feeble complaint that a woman ought not to desire contention. 'But for the fortunate', his wife answers, 'it is becoming to yield the victory.' 'Do you think victory in this contest so important?' 'Be persuaded; if you give in to me, you are the winner.' The King has no answer to this; and after removing his boots in a futile gesture of appeasement, he enters the palace.

Agamemnon's answers to the last two questions give a definite indication that he has provoked divine *φθόνος*: the more closely we consider them, the harder it becomes to accept Fraenkel's explanation of Agamemnon's conduct. Must we agree with Page that he gives in 'simply because he is at the mercy of his own vanity and arrogance'? Here we are troubled by the empirical fact that during a performance of the play we find ourselves at this point regarding Agamemnon not with contempt, but with compassion. Note in particular the lines that immediately precede the stichomythia (926 f.). The king has replied to his wife's long and effusive speech of welcome with a curt and almost brutal refusal to accept her praise. But the conclusion of his speech, summing up his attitude, makes him, almost for the first time, sympathetic. 'Apart from foot-wipers and embroideries sounds the voice of fame; and good sense is the god's greatest gift. Men should call him happy who has ended his life in the prosperity that we desire. And if in all things I can act thus, I lack not confidence.' These do not seem the accents of hypocrisy. Yet in the scene that follows, Clytemnestra twists her husband round her little finger; he is as helpless as Thrasymachus before Socrates against her devastating dialectic.

How can we account for Agamemnon's rapid collapse? Page's view that under temptation he reveals his secret moral weakness is not a wholly convin-

<sup>1</sup> In *Θεωπλα (Festschrift für W. H. Schuchhardt)* (Baden-Baden, 1960), pp. 69 f.

cing explanation of the change in him. Here we must carefully consider the explanation offered by Gundert, that Zeus and his portion and the Erinys have put Ate into his mind, to use the words put into Agamemnon's mouth in the nineteenth book of the *Iliad* (quoted on pp. 191-2). A parallel which seems to me to lend strong support to Gundert's view is furnished by that scene in the *Seven against Thebes* in which the Messenger describes to Eteocles the seven champions who are arrayed against the seven gates. Against the first six Eteocles dispatches champions from his own command. At the seventh gate stands Eteocles' own brother Polyneices. Like Agamemnon Eteocles is a harsh and grim character who is yet not unsympathetically portrayed. He knows that if he fights his brother he will not survive; he knows that pollution of the most hideous sort is caused by the shedding of a brother's blood; and yet he cannot bring himself to do as the Chorus wishes and send another in his place. The reason for this is clearly indicated in the text, as Friedrich Solmsen has shown in an important article;<sup>1</sup> Eteocles is in the power of the Erinys. In Agamemnon's case the evidence of the text is less positive; but I have little doubt that Gundert is right in thinking that the reason for his behaviour is the same.

Not that Gundert's explanation seems to me entirely sufficient; in a curious way I believe that he and Page are both partly right. Gundert goes too far in arguing that Agamemnon reveals no *ψῆψις*, but mere stupidity; for when Zeus takes away a man's wits, he sends upon him a moral blindness, *τάλαντα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων*. Zeus' action in sending Ate upon Agamemnon causes Agamemnon to commit a crime; so far Page is right; but in so far as the crime is the result of Zeus' action, Gundert has supplied an element of the truth which Page's explanation has ignored. It is clear that we have come upon an anomaly similar to that which so much perplexed us in the matter of Agamemnon's fatal decision at Aulis. There Page argued that Agamemnon could not be held responsible; Dodds argued that his action was a crime, and was called a crime by the Chorus; both views, I have argued, contain an element of truth. Here too it is the same. In one sense Agamemnon is guilty; Page has shown that he utters words that are bound to bring down on him divine envy, and we know that he will presently pay the penalty. Yet in a certain sense Agamemnon is innocent; he acts as he does because Zeus has taken away his wits. But why has Zeus done so? For the same reason as at Aulis; because of the curse. As Agamemnon succumbs, vanquished by the irresistible persuasion of Helen's sister, the destined instrument of his destruction, we look upon him not with scorn, but with compassion. Guilty as he is, he is not, like Aegisthus, mean and contemptible; destined as he is to ruin, at once guilty and innocent, he is a truly tragic figure.

The King disappears into the palace; the Chorus sings the third stasimon,<sup>2</sup> full of ominous foreboding; and we are already waiting for Agamemnon's death-cry. But we are kept waiting till the end of the Cassandra scene. That scene occupies nearly 300 lines, not much less than one-fifth of the entire play. The power and beauty of that scene are so overwhelming that it is easy to forget to inquire what is its function in the unfolding of the plot. What is that function? Cassandra makes a desperate effort to get across to the uncomprehending Chorus a warning of Agamemnon's mortal danger which it is in-

<sup>1</sup> *T.A.P.A.* lxviii (1937), 197 f.; see also my review of K. von Fritz, *Antike und Moderne Tragödie* (Berlin, 1962), which is

shortly to appear in *Gnomon*.

<sup>2</sup> I hope soon to supplement this article by a discussion of this ode.

evitably bound not to grasp. This provides a wonderful opportunity for the working up of an uncanny atmosphere and for the gradual building up of suspense. But this is not all. Since the narrative of the prophecy of Calchas, the audience has felt that there is some dark factor in the situation which has only been hinted at; something which if known would do more to explain the sinister forebodings of the Chorus than any vague talk of murmurs in the city against the princes. What that something is is instantly known to the foreigner Cassandra, whom Clytemnestra has supposed may be ignorant of Greek. No sooner does she begin to move in the direction of the door than she sees in a vision (1096) the murdered children of Thyestes. Soon after she exclaims that even now a mighty evil is being plotted in the house (1102); and she describes in confused and agitated utterance a vision of the approaching murder. During the first part of the scene Cassandra speaks in lyrics; that part concludes with her calling to mind the fate of her own family and nation, and recalling once more to the audience the parallel, so often suggested during the first four great odes, between the fate of the Priamidae and the fate of the Atreidae. Then by a last great effort she collects herself, and in trimeters instead of lyrics, in speech instead of song, she openly declares to the Chorus (1178 f.) that the house of Atreus is beset by the Erinyes; that it is haunted by the spirits of the murdered children; that she and Agamemnon are presently to die an awful death; and that they will not go unavenged. And just before her final exit, she returns once more (1287 f.) to the fate of Troy and the not dissimilar fate of its conquerors.

We cannot regard the Cassandra scene as a mere episode, one whose presence may be amply justified by its effect but which is not essential to the development of the plot. Cassandra supplies us, first obscurely and later at the climax explicitly, with the vital piece of information that gives the missing clue for which we have so long been seeking. One main contribution of the scene to the unfolding of the plot is Cassandra's futile warning; but a more important one is her bringing into the open, for the first time in the play, the origin and nature of the curse.

There follows the scene in which Clytemnestra, standing over the dead bodies of the murdered pair, boldly confronts the Chorus and exults in her revenge. Returning to the theme so often played on in the early lyrics of the play, the Chorus cries out against Helen; now her deadly work has achieved its final triumph. 'O mad Helen,' they exclaim (1455 f.), 'you who alone destroyed those many, all those many lives beneath Troy, now have you crowned yourself with the last, the perfect garland, not to be forgotten, by means of the blood not washed away.' Clytemnestra forbids the Chorus to blame Helen. Next the old men address the daemon of the house (1468 f.): 'Daemon, you who fall upon the house and the two Tantalids, and exercise through women an evil sway. . . .'<sup>1</sup> 'Now you have set right your utterance', the queen replies, 'by calling on the daemon of this race, thrice glutted.' 'Great is the daemon of whom you speak,' says the Chorus, 'evil is his wrath, insatiate of baneful fortune. Woe, woe, through the will of Zeus, the cause of all, the doer of all. For what is fulfilled for men without Zeus? Which of these things is not god-ordained?'

<sup>1</sup> My translation assumes that in l. 1470 one may restore responsion and at the same time remove the very real difficulty of

*τούτους* by accepting Rauchenstein's conjecture *κακόφυχος*.

These words of the Chorus are not spoken idly. We can now trace, from the *πρώταρχος ἄτη* of Thyestes, the grand design of Zeus. The action of the Theban trilogy, almost the only other of which we have a reasonable knowledge, is determined from the start by the curse upon Laius; so, I feel certain, is the action of the *Oresteia* by the curse upon Atreus. From his birth Agamemnon's fate, like that of Oedipus or Eteocles, has been determined; he is the son of the accursed Atreus. Zeus uses him as the instrument of his vengeance upon Troy; but he uses him in such a fashion that his own destruction must inevitably follow. At the outset of the expedition, Artemis, a partisan of Agamemnon's enemies, demands of him blood for blood. Agamemnon cannot refuse, for it is Zeus' will that the fleet sail; and Zeus sends Ate to take away his judgement and force him to consent. The King bows to the goddess's demand: and his consent brings down upon him the vengeance of his wife, who shares her sister's uncanny and daemonic nature serving like her as an instrument of Zeus' destructive purpose. Even his righteous revenge upon the Trojans involves Agamemnon in yet further guilt. In one sense, it is a triumph of divine justice; in another, an atrocious crime; the instrument of Zeus' punishment of Troy must himself be punished. But such guilt as the King contracts from the sacrifice of his daughter and from the annihilation of Troy with its people and its temples is only a consequence of the original guilt inherited from Atreus; the curse comes first, and determines everything that follows. Zeus brings about the ruin of Priam; Zeus brings about the ruin of Agamemnon. The Chorus of the *Agamemnon*, like Sophocles' women of Trachis,<sup>1</sup> can justly echo Homer's words at the beginning of the *Iliad* and say that all that has happened has been in accordance with the will of Zeus.

Christ Church, Oxford

HUGH LLOYD-JONES

<sup>1</sup> *Agam.* 1485-6; Sophocles, *Trach.* 1278.

## THE WATCHMAN SCENES IN THE *ANTIGONE*

PROBABLY no Greek tragedy has proved as rich a source of perplexity, theory, and debate as the *Antigone*. A number of the formidable problems which various critics have seen in the play emerge from the two watchman scenes and the great ode which separates them. It will be argued here that these difficulties are the result of certain radical misunderstandings and are capable of straightforward solution.

I shall begin by tabulating the main problems in the order in which they appear:

- (1) 223 ff. Why is the Watchman, who is apparently merely the bringer of bad news, in terror for his life, anticipating that he will himself be accused?
- (2) 249–52 seem pointless. 'Neither pick-axe nor mattock nor wagon were in any way to be expected from the course of events that preceded.' (A. B. Drachmann in *Hermes* xlivi (1908); translated in *C.R.* xxiii (1909), 212–16.)
- (3) 256–8. How could a light covering of dust protect the body from animals? Of the whole passage 245–58 Drachmann says: 'That this is nonsense hardly needs saying.' Drachmann's own theory is almost beneath the level of rational discussion, but the difficulties on which it is based, once raised, deserve to be resolved. The younger Wilamowitz effectively refuted Drachmann in his essay on the *Antigone* (appeared originally in 1911; republished as the first chapter of his posthumous work *Die dramatische Technik des Sophokles*, 1917) but many of the details of his explanations are inadequate or unacceptable, as I shall show.
- (4) 293 ff. Creon's angry accusation that the watchmen have been bribed is quite unreasonable. Of course those who regard Creon as a suspicious and hot-tempered despot find his behaviour entirely natural. But Carl Wex (*Sophokleische Analecten*, p. 67) pointed out in 1834 that if Creon is interpreted as a 'böswilliger Tyrann' he ceases to be a hero of the Greek drama, and I shall suggest later that Creon's stature as the tragic 'hero' is much more impressive if his reaction here is seen to be reasonable and not the expression of a tyrant's mean and arbitrary spite.
- (5) What is the relevance of 'the most famous of Sophocles' odes'? Is it virtually an *έμβολμον*, a mere 'curtain', its insertion justified by its own grandeur?
- (6) 417–21. What is the significance of the dust-storm? Is it simply, as Jebb says, 'a dramatic necessity, to account for Antigone reaching the corpse unobserved'?
- (7) Finally there is the problem of the 'Second Burial'. Why does Antigone return to the body? Can we tolerate Jebb's suggestion that she had inexplicably failed to bring the libations on her first visit? Or is this just a trick which Sophocles thought he could play on his unthinking audience without being found out? This problem is not yet laid to rest but is still giving rise to ingenious theories, such as that of S. M. Adams, who in *Phoenix* xi (1957) attempted to resuscitate an argument which he

originally put forward in *C.R.* xiv (1931), 110–11, to the effect that Antigone could not have carried out the *first* burial, which he would explain as the result of a previous—and unmentioned—dust-storm.

The solution of these problems seems to me to depend on the answers to two preliminary questions:

When is Antigone supposed to have buried the body, and what duties have the watchmen been carrying out?

Jebb, taking the same view as Campbell, says (253 n.): 'Antigone had done her deed in the short interval between the publication of the edict and the beginning of the watch over the corpse. ὁ πρῶτος ἡμεροσκόπος, the man who took the first watch of the day, was the first who had watched at all.' A more recent critic, Professor H. D. F. Kitto, in his *Form and Meaning in Drama*, p. 155, offers an explanation similar to Jebb's except for one important detail: 'When they [the watchmen] came to their post it was of course night-time, and there was nothing whatever to arouse their suspicions—no cart-tracks, no up-cast of earth. All seemed as it should be. Then dawn came, and the watch saw that all was not as it should be: the body was covered with light dust.' But the 'post' to which the watchmen come can only be the body of Polyneices. Can we suppose that the men began their watch over a body which they could identify on the corpse-strewn battlefield as that of Polyneices, but which at the same time was so effectively covered with earth that, when viewed in the clear light of day, it could be said to have disappeared (*ἡφάνιστο* 255)? Yet in the one detail which makes nonsense of this explanation and also distinguishes it from Jebb's, Kitto is certainly right, though he takes no pains to emphasize the point. In saying that it was night-time when the watchmen came to their post he implies that Antigone must have done her deed in the night-time and also of course that the first scene, in which she disclosed her intentions to Ismene, took place in the night-time. That the play begins in the night is an important fact. As the fact itself has been missed or ignored by a large number of critics, it will be necessary to demonstrate it as well as to bring out its importance.

We may start with the word *ἡμεροσκόπος*. It is difficult to believe that Sophocles used this very special term simply as a substitute for *φύλαξ*. *ἡμεροσκόπος* implies the contrast of *νυκτοφύλαξ* and the plain sense of 253 is that *ἡμέν* refers to the *νυκτοφύλακες* and the *πρῶτος ἡμεροσκόπος* is their relief who took over at dawn. As it is clearly absurd to imagine the night-watch (to which the *ΦΥΛΑΞ* belongs) mounting guard over the corpse after Antigone has covered it with earth, it follows that she must be understood to have performed the burial while the night watchmen were on duty. Once this is realized, the problems listed as (1), (2), and (4) are immediately seen to be resolved. The Watchman has the best of reasons for being afraid for his life: he has failed in his duty. No wonder he emphasizes the fact that no pickaxe, spade, or waggon has been used: if they had, the complicity of the watchmen could not be denied. Creon's anger is not evidence of a tyrant's irrational fury: he has good cause to believe that his own men have betrayed him. It is remarkable that T. von Wilamowitz, who, unlike most English critics, understood that the watchmen are supposed to be on guard while Antigone carries out her task, completely missed the point of 249–52. He suggested that, as it must be a laborious business to cover a body with earth by hand, the Watchman might reasonably expect

tools to have been used; as they were not, he naturally remarks on the fact to give Creon and the audience some idea of the manner of Polyneices' burial (op. cit., p. 27). This is trivial. It is perfectly plain that the Watchman is doing precisely what his previous behaviour should lead us to expect him to do: he is primarily concerned to avoid blame, and he therefore begins his story by stressing that this was no ordinary burial involving tools and a cart and the breaking of ground, which no guards could have honestly failed to detect. Wilamowitz manufactured a new problem at this point: from the description of the ground in 250-3 he concludes that the surface must have been entirely bare and asks where Antigone got the dust with which she covered the corpse.<sup>1</sup> W. Schmid (Schmid-Stählin, *Gr. Lit.* I. ii. 349, n. 3) was impressed by this difficulty. But *στύφλος* and *χέρσος* surely have a simple significance, simpler indeed than Jebb's interpretation; for Jebb thought that the adjectives indicate why no footprints are traceable (248 n.). Campbell's explanation—'undisturbed by implements of husbandry'—is perhaps nearer the truth. But this is a matter of grave-digging, not husbandry. The word *στύφλος* implies that the ground had not been loosened by digging; *χέρσος* implies that there was no damp (i.e. deeper) earth thrown up by digging; *ἀρρώξ* implies that the surface had not been broken by digging. The repetition of the single idea is entirely appropriate to character and context.

However, Wilamowitz raised a more serious difficulty here: how could Antigone approach the body in spite of the watchmen, even in the night, and accomplish her purpose undetected? His answer to this is that she could not have done so, and he suggests that Sophocles, realizing the impossibility, made a virtue out of necessity and deliberately emphasized the incomprehensible nature of the whole business in order to increase the dramatic effect. It becomes apparent at this point that Wilamowitz has been carried away by the speciousness of his own theory of Sophocles' technique. Having begun his Dissertation with the admirable quotation from Goethe, 'Ja, wer wollte leugnen dass selbst Sophokles manchmal seine Purpurgewänder mit weissem Zwirn zusammengenäht habe', he is now asking us to believe in a Sophocles who used the white thread to embroider magic signs upon his princely garments in order to astonish the beholders. Sophocles is certainly mystifying his audience here but, not being nearly so fond of *τὸ δλογον* as those critics suppose whose theories feed on illogicalities, he carefully provided a complete solution to the puzzle. Why should not Antigone have reached the body unobserved under cover of darkness when she does so later in daylight under cover of that very convenient dust-storm? Here is at least part of the answer to problem (6). It appears that Jebb's comment, which I quoted, was more to the point than he realized; the storm is a dramatic necessity to account for Antigone reaching the corpse unobserved *on her first visit*. Two details help to demonstrate that what Sophocles is doing in this passage is explaining how Antigone got away with it the first time. In 411 we are told that the watchmen kept away from

<sup>1</sup> Minor contradictions were grist to the mill of Wilamowitz's theory. To support the existence of this one he used a subtle argument. Quoting *Septem* 1039 *κόλπῳ φέρουσα βυσσίνον πεπλώματος* ('die Erde nämlich'), he suggested that this absurd detail was put in because the interpolator wanted to explain the difficulty which he had recognized in

Sophocles' description. To this there are two objections: it is by no means certain that Aeschylus was not the author of the final section of the *Septem* (see H. Lloyd-Jones in *C.Q. n.s.* ix [1959], 80-115) and Wilamowitz's interpretation of 1039, though based on the scholium, is almost incredible Greek as well as preposterous sense.

the corpse to avoid the stench and that they kept each other awake so as not to fail in *this* (the *τοῦδε* is emphatic) task. This suggests that they may not have been very close to the corpse during the night and that they might have been asleep. This assumption—that Antigone accomplishes her purpose, not by anticipating the watchmen, but by outwitting them while they are on duty—is no new interpretation, for the third hypothesis attached to the play states: *καὶ δὴ λαθοῦσα τοὺς φύλακας ἐπιβάλλει χῶμα*. This explanation is supported, if not indeed proved, by the passage 259–67. For the watchmen to accuse each other of being concerned in the burial would be utterly unreasonable if they had simply arrived too late to prevent it; it makes excellent sense if they know that the thing has been done during their watch.<sup>1</sup> But this understanding is denied to those commentators—and they are many—who have committed themselves to the belief that the play begins 'at daybreak' (Jebb). This misconception lies at the root of most of our difficulties and it needs to be finally eliminated.

That the action of tragedy is not limited to the hours of daylight is demonstrated in several of the extant plays. The *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroe*, *Eumenides*, *I.A.*, and *Rhesus* provide evidence for this ranging from the certain to the possible. But it is not enough merely to show that there is no theoretical objection to the action of the *Antigone* beginning in the night; we should naturally expect so important a detail to be made clear to the spectator at an early stage, as it is in the *Agamemnon*. Sophocles does make it clear, but unfortunately in so economical a manner that modern critics have been able to obscure his meaning. The phrase *ἐν νυκτὶ τῇ νῦν* (16) means simply 'in this present night', and it would be unnecessary to labour the point, were it not that some ἄνδρες 'Ελληνικώτατοι have thought otherwise. Over more than a century most of the translators and commentators have taken the phrase to mean 'last night'. Jebb's note deserves close examination. He provides 'parallels' which are not instructive; he offers, in fact, three illustrations of the use of *ὅδε* which do not go far to illuminate the meaning of *νῦν*. It is not in doubt that in certain places certain authors use *νῦν* to refer to the recent past, but in elucidating this passage the essential preliminary is to establish how Sophocles normally uses *νῦν* with the definite article and a noun. There are nearly fifty instances of this combination in his extant plays and in all of them *νῦν* refers to the present, with the possible exception of *Ant.* 151 (the text of 151 has been impugned, but I would not attach weight to this point). It is then highly probable, to say the least, that the phrase *ἐν νυκτὶ τῇ νῦν* is intended to indicate that this is a night scene. If it is realized that the prologue takes place at night, the parodos appears in its true light—the light of dawn. Clearly this ode begins as a hymn to the sun which has only risen.

It is not difficult to explain how some of the earlier critics failed to recognize that the action of the *Antigone* begins in darkness. They were deluded by the old misinterpretation of Aristotle into attempting to force every tragedy into the fetters of the 'Unity of Time', which requires 'that the whole action should be comprised within the space between the rising and the setting of the sun' (Dale). J. Camerarius, writing a generation before Castelvetro, was free to comment: 'Antigone audet noctu clam sepelire fratrem.' But it is not easy to

<sup>1</sup> I assume that the watchmen are to be thought of as keeping guard in a group, but the scholium on 260 speaks of them watching

ἐκ διαδοχῆς and the phrase ὁ πρῶτος ἡμεροσκόπος (253) might lend support to this view. But the detail has no dramatic significance.

excuse the persistent misunderstanding of the time factor by modern critics. Even those who allow an earlier start to the action than Jebb ('It is the moment of dawn') are remarkably reluctant to set the prologue in the unqualified night: it is 'dans la nuit qui se termine', 'in frühester Dämmerung', 'ἐπι βαθέος ὥρης', 'in the grey dawn'. Yet the action of the play cannot be properly understood unless it is accepted that Antigone proposes her plan to Ismene in the night and has in addition time to carry out her resolve under cover of the dark. For it should be noted that the tragic clock, which moves at very irregular speeds, takes a jump forward between the prologue and the parodos while Antigone outwits the night watch. This is an ordinary licence of tragedy and there is no need to talk of chronological impossibilities (Bruhn, 253 n.), still less to suppose that Sophocles' immaturity is indicated by his inadequate management of the time (Campbell, ed. 1, p. 398).

(3) This problem ought never to have been raised at all. Jebb's note on 257 ff. makes the point adequately that the order of words is significant. Antigone reached the body before the dogs, thus successfully giving burial that anticipates defilement. It is central to Sophocles' dramatic purpose that Antigone should bury her brother's body in an honourable state and that Creon should cause it to be defiled. Obviously Antigone's action cannot provide permanent protection for the corpse. What Haemon (696 ff.), pleading a case, quotes as the city rumour is not evidence for anything. But a number of critics have not been content with Jebb's explanation. Knowing presumably that it requires at least six feet of tightly packed earth to keep marauding dogs from a corpse, some regard the imagined protective power of the dust as proof of Sophocles' incompetence, others hail it as a miracle of deep religious import. Both groups are inspired by an excessive respect for naturalism: the laws of nature must be obeyed even in the smallest things; if they are not, the author must be either bungling or revealing the hand of the gods. It would, if one thought it needful, be perfectly possible to furnish a naturalistic explanation of why the body is still unmolested when the watchmen realize that it has been 'buried'. Even a light covering of dust is enough to keep off carrion birds, which identify their food by sight (they do not in any case operate at night), and curs scavenging on a battlefield littered with dead bodies (1080-3) will certainly leave to the last the one which is covered with dust and lying in the neighbourhood of watchmen.<sup>1</sup>

(5) Of the first stasimon it has been said: 'This is certainly the most irrelevant ode of this or any other play.' This seems to be virtually the *communis opinio*, but those who are properly reluctant to assume that Sophocles chose to abandon weaving for patchwork at this point will look further. The answer to the question whether this splendid ode is relevant or not depends on the meaning of the word δευός. This is indeed a *vocabulum variae potestatis* and therefore one that suffers severe diffraction when passed through the prism of translation. Perhaps the most thorough treatment of the meaning of δευός in this passage is by P. Friedländer in *Herms* lxix (1934), 56-63. He argues vigorously that

<sup>1</sup> Wilamowitz (op. cit., pp. 28-29) made use of the alleged effectiveness of the layer of dust to prove that Antigone's burial was a real and not merely symbolic rite. It is not clear whether he himself was unacquainted with the biological facts or only supposed

Sophocles to be ignorant or careless of them. In any case his argument is irrelevant because, as Pohlenz points out (*Erläuterungen*, p. 82), religious belief made no distinction between symbolic and actual burial.

the sense is primarily 'ungeheuer', but he is hard put to it to explain what the ode has to do with the events of the play. 'Ungeheures, Gewaltig- Entsetzensvolles ist wahrhaftig genug geschehen und gesagt worden seit Antigones zweitem Verse.' This is not enough, or rather it is too much, for it would justify the insertion of the ode at some stage in most Greek tragedies. Yet while urging his interpretation he is forced to confess that for most of the ode the idea of *cleverness* seems to be dominant. Cunning, inventiveness, cleverness, are indeed the main theme and it is entirely appropriate that the reaction of the chorus to the preceding events should be centred upon it. It is only the failure of commentators to appreciate exactly what *Antigone* has done that has obscured the application of a song on cleverness to the burial of Polyneices. Drachmann, for example, says: 'What has happened argues no particular inventiveness.' True enough, if the person who buried the body merely got to it before the watchmen. But what if the body was buried while the watchmen were on guard? Was not that an act of extraordinary cunning? The watchmen themselves are certainly dumbfounded and immediately assume that one of their own group is responsible (259 ff.); Creon at once concludes that the watchmen must have been accomplices; the chorus (278-9) see a superhuman agency at work, thereby earning much modern applause. This is not to suggest that  $\delta\epsilon\nu\omega\varsigma$  is adequately translated by 'clever', for that would obliterate the ideas of the terrible, the wonderful, the strange, which are inherent in the word.<sup>1</sup> But it appears that if cleverness is recognized as the dominant notion conveyed by  $\delta\epsilon\nu\omega\varsigma$  in this context, the ode is perfectly integrated with the action of the play. A terrible deed has been cleverly accomplished by a human agent defying the law and deceiving the armed guardians of the law. This leads the chorus to reflect on the  $\delta\epsilon\nu\omega\tau\eta\varsigma$  of man, which lies in his being  $\pi\epsilon\rho\phi\rho\delta\eta\varsigma$ ,  $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\omega\pi\omega\varsigma$ . This  $\delta\epsilon\nu\omega\tau\eta\varsigma$  is amoral and may lead to good or evil (cf. Aristotle, *E.N.* 6. 12-13 and E. Schlesinger on 'Deinotes' in *Philologus* xci [1936], 59-66). But the large body of critics who deny that the first stasimon is linked to the action has powerful leaders. The elder Wilamowitz, for example, pronounced, with almost angry vehemence, that the ode has no connexion with the action of the play or any person or event outside it (*Die gr. Tragödie*, p. 115). Some scholars have argued that the ode refers to the action of Creon (Schmid, *Gr. Lit. I. ii.* 350, n. 4); others take a middle view (Untersteiner, *Sofocle*, i. 109: 'il Coro pensa tanto ad *Antigone* quanto a Creonte'). The argument I have put forward naturally supports the older, traditional interpretation that the reference is primarily to the action of *Antigone*. But often a tragic lyric has more than one level of reference: at the surface it relates clearly to the preceding events; at deeper levels it may bear extended meaning which is only revealed in the wider context of the play as a whole. The conclusion of this ode, for example, taken at its face value, applies to the deed of *Antigone*; underneath lurks ironic relevance to the  $\delta\epsilon\nu\omega\tau\eta\varsigma$  of Creon, whose boasted political wisdom will bring him to destruction. There have been many attempts to identify wider references to contemporary events or persons and to interpret

<sup>1</sup> This is indeed how it was rendered by T. Johnson in his translation of 1708. 'Multa quidem solertia, nihil vero Homine solertius est.' He translates  $\pi\epsilon\rho\phi\rho\delta\eta\varsigma \delta\eta\varsigma$  (344) by 'vir praeditus solertia' and  $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\omega\pi\omega\varsigma$  (360) by 'ad omnia

ingeniosus'. Cf. Camerarius: 'Chori carmen ingenium humanum praedicat, neque quicquam homine dicit esse callidius, nec item audacius, perque fas et nefas ruere in omnia.'

the 'message' of the lyric, but most of them are vitiated by the assumption that this is a kind of tragic parabasis, in which Sophocles speaks directly to Athens and mankind. No interpretation can be satisfactory which does not begin by recognizing the firm attachment of the stasimon to its dramatic context. This attachment was not obscure to earlier critics. P. Brumoy in his *Théâtre des Grecs*, iii. 403 (Paris, 1749) commented: 'L'Intermeûdu Chœur est une morale sur l'adresse extrême de l'homme. . . . Cette morale tombe sur le prétendu coupable, qui a eû l'adresse de rendre les derniers devoirs à Polynice, malgré l'attention des gardes, sans pouvoir toutefois éviter la supplice qui l'attend.'

(6) The manner of Antigone's deed will cease to have significance as soon as she appears. Detailed explanation of her movements would be totally irrelevant to the disclosure of her thoughts and feelings which must follow when she comes face to face with Creon; it is the 'why' and not the 'how' of her action that matters now. It has already been suggested that Sophocles employs the dust-storm to illustrate how Antigone was able to elude the watchmen, but he also uses it to achieve a particularly splendid dramatic effect: like a curtain twitched aside the passing of the storm reveals the brilliant picture of Antigone confronted by her brother's outraged corpse and making the natural response of love and piety. The convention of the 'messenger speech' was never more superbly used. But why was Antigone there at all? Had she not already done all that was necessary? This is the final problem.

(7) There are really two questions here. Jebb's rather confused note on 429 appears to raise both. Why does Antigone pour dust on the corpse at this point, when she had already done that effectively once, and why has she returned, having already done her duty to Polyneices?

The first question may be answered very simply. It was an offence against the *ovpárioi θeoί*, as well as an insult to the dead man, to leave a corpse uncovered. If the three handfuls of earth mentioned by Horace (C. 1. 28. 35) came to be accepted as an adequate symbol of burial, it would seem that originally complete covering from the eye of heaven was regarded as desirable, perhaps essential. Antigone, finding the body desecrated, is bound to try to cover it again. This should trouble only those critics who regard burial merely as the purchase of a ticket for the traveller across the Styx for which it is unnecessary to pay twice.

Why does Antigone return to the grave (for the dust-covered corpse is to all intents and purposes a grave)? This is a valid question and it deserves a reasonable answer. Of course for Wilamowitz and his followers the explanation is simple: Sophocles had no need to bother with anything as tiresome as motivation; he is solely concerned with exciting and effective theatrical presentation. In other words, the dramatic results justify false mechanics which have a good chance of passing undetected by an uncritical audience. Such an idea may, perhaps, have led to the downfall of Carcinus (Aristotle, *Po.* 17). It should be remembered that the practice of Sophocles was one of the main sources from which Aristotle derived his precept that the sequence

<sup>1</sup> T. Franklin (1759), who appears to have set the fashion for not seeing the connexion of this ode with the subject of the drama, dismissed Brumoy's explanation thus: 'Surely the refinement of French criticism is required

to discover an allusion so distant.' But cf. Camerarius (1556): 'Inter haec autem respiciunt ad sepultum clam custodibus Polynicen.'

of events should accord with probability or necessity. Sophocles is, to say the least, no worse a dramatist if it can be shown that his audience would have thought it probable or necessary for Antigone to return to Polyneices' grave.

It is convenient at this point to deal with a subsidiary but closely related problem raised by Wilamowitz (pp. 32 ff.). He felt that it was senseless for Creon to order the watchmen to produce the criminal and that the actions of the watchmen in returning to the body, scraping off the dust, and mounting guard again are positively mad. They had no reason to suppose that the person who had carried out the burial would come back again, and the eventual arrival of Antigone merely intensifies the difficulty, as her return to pour libations is neither necessary nor obvious. We may grant at once that Antigone's return is not meant to be an obvious likelihood at this point. But it is one thing to disguise what is going to happen (and Sophocles is clearly doing this by making Creon give orders without details) and quite another to exhibit or describe action which appears either unmotivated or unlikely. The Athenian audience did not, like chess players, see several moves ahead, but they did like to see the characters behave in a comprehensible manner. In the next scene, therefore, it is important that the action of both watchmen and Antigone should appear reasonable. What the watchmen are doing is obeying Creon's order. This order is not, as is usually supposed, the original commission to see that no one pays honour to the corpse and that it be left open to defilement by birds and dogs, but the new command most forcefully expressed in 304-12 and again in 324-6: 'Bring me the criminal!' Now the hunter who sits up over a tiger's kill does not need to explain why he does so; it is the custom of tigers to return to their kills. It was the custom of Greek mourners to return to graves, and the watchmen's only chance of catching their quarry is to watch the grave. They sweep off the dust (thereby incidentally making easier the dramatically necessary desecration by beasts and birds) because they know very well that anyone who cares for the dead man enough to bury him cannot observe such desecration unmoved. The reference in 408 makes it quite plain that they are acting under the impulse of Creon's threats (305 ff.), not his original order. There is an excellent parallel to this use of a desecrated corpse as bait in the famous story of Rhampsinitus' treasure chamber (Herodotus 2. 121  $\gamma$ ). One is tempted to suppose that this is another of the many Herodotean allusions in Sophocles (for lists of correspondences see Schmid-Stählin, I. ii. 318, n. 3, and J. E. Powell, *History of Herodotus*, p. 34). Three such allusions have already been seen in the *Antigone*: 905-12: Hdt. 3. 1. 9; 1038: Hdt. 3. 94; 1216: Hdt. 2. 121  $\beta$  (the last one is in the Rhampsinitus story, but it is not very convincing). It would not be surprising if Sophocles had this particular tale in mind, for he probably composed the play within two or three years of the 'publication' in Athens of the earlier part of Herodotus' work. But this is no more than an attractive possibility. It is sufficient for my argument to show that the audience who first saw the *Antigone* should not have found it difficult to appreciate the watchmen's trap.<sup>1</sup>

We must now consider the need for Antigone to return to the grave. Of

<sup>1</sup> Those who find it strange that Sophocles does not explain why Antigone wants to return with libations would do well to observe that Herodotus, an author not usually

reticent of detail, does not say why the mother of the dead thief wants the body recovered.

recent articles which deal with this topic the most useful is by E. Struck in *Gymnasium* lx (1953), 327–34 (cf. Pohlenz, *Erläuterungen*, p. 80). He points out that Creon's edict is not simply a prohibition of burial. In 26–30 two things are forbidden: burial and lamentation (more precisely 'keening', for *κωκύειν* is properly used of the ritual wailing of female relatives).<sup>1</sup> Again in 35 (*τούτων*) and 203–4 the double aspect is clear. He argues further that *τάφω κτερίζειν* (204) means more than *τάφω καλύψαι* (28) and implies the giving of offerings. 'Also jede Totengabe und Totenklage wird mit *τάφω μήτε κτερίζειν μήτε κωκύσαι τινα* ausdrücklich verboten neben dem Begräbnis.' But though he shows that lamentation and libation (the most important form of offering) are forbidden as well as burial, he does not explain why Antigone failed to perform these offices on her first visit. In the case of the *κωκυτός* the answer is obvious: Antigone had to remain silent, if she was to avoid detection by the watchmen. She had to avoid detection in order to carry out her chief task—the actual burial. This is the reason for her stealth and cunning, not any desire to escape the consequences of her act, which would be quite out of character, as is shown by her command to Ismene in 86–87, her whole attitude in the prologue, and her bold behaviour when she is captured. It is debatable whether she ever accomplishes a real *κωκυτός*. The word *ἀνακωκύει* (423) is hardly ritual wailing; it is, however, magnificently evocative both of the peculiar shriek of birds robbed of their young and of the idea that Antigone has come to keen over her brother's corpse. This spoiled lament is part of the carefully worked pattern of the play; for in the three main funeral offices—burial, lament, libation—she is personally successful but her aims are frustrated by the minions of Creon. The claim of her last words before she is led away to die (*τὴν εὐσεβίαν σεβίσασα* 943) is just, yet the body she buried is desecrated, her lament is turned into a curse (426–8), and she is pounced on as a criminal at the very moment that she completes the sacred offering (429–33).

The failure to make libations is not as easy to explain as the absence of the *κωκυτός*. The one absolute certainty here is that Antigone returns with the intention of pouring libations; otherwise she would not have a ewer and the appropriate liquid ready to hand (430–1). Is it certain, however, that she did not pour libations on her first visit? W. Schmid (Schmid-Stählin, I. ii. 349, n. 3) argued that *δυφία κόνις* implies that no libation has been poured. This imposes too strong a meaning on what is virtually an *epitheton ornans*. On the other hand, the words *κάφαγοστεύσας ἀ χρή* (247) have been taken to mean that all the offerings have been made. Struck's ingenious interpretation of 245–7 as signifying that only the minimum requirement (i.e. strewing with dust) has been fulfilled is awkward and not wholly convincing. There is indeed some evidence to suggest that *χοαί* in honour of the dead could not be made at night (cf. *Eumenides* 107–9; Stengel, *Opfergebräuche der Griechen*, pp. 133 ff.) and this fits in neatly with the recognition that Antigone buries the body at night—too neatly: 'Verrallum olet'. Burial at night was probably no less improper (cf. *Troades* 446). But all these arguments are beside the point, for it makes no difference whether libations were poured on the first visit or not. The purpose of *ἐπιτύμβιοι χοαί* is such that even if Antigone had already offered them once, an Athenian audience would still find it perfectly natural

<sup>1</sup> As burial and lamentation are often mentioned together, so also *ἀθαντος* and *ἀκλαυτος* regularly form a pair. In *Cho.* 430–4 the climax of Clytemnestra's wickedness is the burial of her husband without lamentation.

for her to offer them again. It is a mistake to think of *χοαί* simply as one of the elements in the ritual of burial. Burial is normally a single act of piety, whereas libation is the repeated offering of nourishment to the spirit of the departed for a considerable time after death.<sup>1</sup> So deeply rooted was this belief in the need to provide sustenance for the souls of the dead that the making of offerings —like the practice of *κωκυτός*—has survived in many parts of Greece into modern times (see J. C. Lawson's fascinating study *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*).

To summarize my conclusion on problem (7) in Aristotelian terms, it seems not only *eikός* but *ἀναγκαῖον* that Antigone, in view of her resolve to show her love for her brother at whatever cost, should return to his grave to continue the payment of honour and affection to his spirit.

Finally, I suggest that the details of interpretation put forward here have some bearing on the character of Creon and the functions of the Watchman. Creon is not an out-and-out tyrant; he is a man who, only a few hours before the action of the play begins, has suddenly and unexpectedly become the ruler (156, 168–74). This detail has often been obscured, e.g. by Jebb, who in his note on 994 quotes the later *O.T.* as evidence that Creon has been regent, a notion clearly contradicted by 168–9. He is a religious man (184, 199), a man of duty and a lover of his country (175–91). His words may reasonably be taken at their face value and not assumed to be a proof of hypocrisy. He has inherited a tottering throne and is desperately anxious to establish it firmly and to suppress *στάσις*. He makes his fatal decree in order to demonstrate that traitors, no matter how noble, will be mercilessly punished and loyal men honoured. This is to be his principle for securing stable government. Therefore he must stand or fall by this his first edict, and he cannot allow it to be broken. The first scene with the Watchman, instead of being interpreted as a revelation of the suspicious injustice of a puny tyrant set against the foil of a comic rustic with the jitters, gains enormously in tragic force if it is understood as being played out between a ruler with obvious justification for believing himself betrayed and the soldier who has good cause to fear that he will be executed for failing in his duty. There would be nothing tragic in the baseless suspicion and bad temper of a tyrant; there is tragedy in the natural anger and growing stubbornness of a ruler who can see only malicious rebellion in the defiance of his mistaken but well-intentioned decree.

The argument as to whether Antigone or Creon is the 'hero' of the play is a very old one, and there are vigorous partisans of each today, as well as supporters of the 'two hero' theory of Wex. But anyone who has seen a competent production of the *Antigone* is bound to admit that the spectacle is dominated by Creon.<sup>2</sup> Yet the prejudice which refuses to allow Creon any tragic stature is deeply rooted in the minds of critics. It is instructive to compare the attitudes

<sup>1</sup> Lucian was scoffing at this belief when he wrote of the dead: *τρέφονται δὲ ἄρα ταῖς παρ' ἡμῶν χοαῖς καὶ τοῖς καθαγιζομένοις ἐπὶ τῶν τάφων* (*περὶ πένθους*, 9); cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, i. 243. It is true that libations appear to have been normally repeated for the first time on the third day after burial, but Sophocles had no more reason to be precise over this than to make Antigone wait till the third day after death to conduct the

*έκφορά*. The tragedians were not bound by the rubrics of a national church.

<sup>2</sup> Those of us who find it possible to pity Creon are, according to the elder Wilamowitz, exhibiting 'moderne sentimentale Schwäche' (*Gr. Tr.*, p. 114). Though critics have become less willing to worship Antigone the 'Märtyrerin', sympathy for despots has not grown in the forty years since Wilamowitz wrote.

adopted by most of them to Creon's suspicion and denunciation of the Watchman and Teiresias with their treatment of the far more outrageous accusations made against Teiresias and Creon by Oedipus. This is of course merely part of an insidious and persistent general opinion that Oedipus is the almost faultless ideal hero and Creon of the *Antigone* the typical tyrant so hated by the Athenian people. Jebb is able to describe Oedipus' slanders upon Creon as an 'indiscretion'; Oedipus he regards as 'a character of the nineteenth century' in his attitude to religion; the Creon of the *Antigone*, on the other hand, is 'rather of the Prussian type' or—in the making of his edict—like 'Hippias in the later period of his "tyranny"'.<sup>1</sup> It is not my aim to try to reverse the popular view that the Oedipus of the *O.T.* is noble and the Creon of the *Antigone* ignoble, but simply to suggest that they might be more fairly judged on their actual behaviour within their respective dramas.<sup>2</sup> If Creon is indeed a typical tyrant, it must be admitted that this assessment of his character gains little support from the watchman scenes, or indeed from the Teiresias scene.<sup>3</sup> Critics show unwarranted readiness to assume that Athenian dramatists and spectators tended to think ill of autocrats and well of rebels. Yet the governments of Greek legend were almost entirely monarchical and these monarchs were regarded as legitimate rulers. This legitimacy is in fact emphasized in Creon's opening speech (162 ff., especially 173-4; cf. Schadewaldt, *Aias und Antigone*, p. 84). At any rate, if Creon is a Hippias, the resemblance between *Antigone* and Aristogiton is singularly slight.

While Creon in the first episode is playing a part which is not intended to make him an object of scorn, the Watchman is not meant to be a figure of fun.<sup>4</sup> It is true that he can be rendered very amusingly on the stage, particularly before 'sophisticated' audiences who regard dropped aitches as an invitation to laughter. But this does not prove that Sophocles designed him as a 'comic' character. He is not a clown whose exaggerated timidity is meant to match the absurd rage of a petty tyrant. He is certainly deftly characterized as what Pohlenz calls 'der kleine Mann aus dem Volke', but his situation is anything but funny. Could Sophocles have intended his audience to laugh at a soldier facing death for disobedience? Would he have wished to disperse the tragic atmosphere by showing the dominant character of his play as silly rather than disastrously misguided? Tycho von Wilamowitz may have applied his theory with excessive enthusiasm but the basis of it is certainly sound: the ultimate criterion of criticism in Greek tragedy should be what we judge to have been the effect upon the audience intended by the dramatist, who was not writing a book to be puzzled over by posterity but devising a play with which he

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the fantastic defence of Oedipus and furious condemnation of the unfortunate Creon of the *O.T.* (Jebb's 'good type of Scottish character') by U. von Wilamowitz in *Hermes* xxxiv (1899), 55-80.

<sup>2</sup> The extreme view that Creon is the same man in all three Theban plays has little to commend it. See L. D. Peterkin in *C. Phil.* xxiv (1929), 263-73, and G. Méautis, *Sophocle*.

<sup>3</sup> The comparison with the *O.T.* is striking: Oedipus accuses Teiresias of regicide as soon as he shows unwillingness to speak; Creon, after Teiresias has told him that his mistaken policy has brought pollution to the

state, reluctantly accuses the seer of the common vice of his trade—venality.

<sup>4</sup> This raises the broader question whether comic characters were ever introduced in conventional tragedy, for the Watchman is perhaps the strongest candidate in the extant plays. I incline to the view succinctly expressed by D. C. Sennellos in his edition of 1887: 'Η δὲ ἀνάμειξις τοῦ τραγικοῦ καὶ κωμικοῦ, οἷαν ἐπιτηδεύονταν οἱ νεώτεροι δραματικοὶ καὶ μάλιστα δὲ Shakespeare εἶνε διλογία τῆς παλαιᾶς δραματικῆς τέχνης, ἣτις διέκρινεν αὐστηρῶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ εἰδη τοῦ δράματος καὶ ἀμυγῇ ἐπήρει αὐτά (223 n.).

hoped to win a competitive prize before a vast and largely unsophisticated crowd on a unique occasion.<sup>1</sup>

A. T. VON S. BRADSHAW

<sup>1</sup> I am deeply indebted to Mr. G. W. Bond, Mr. R. J. Norman, and Professor H. Lloyd-Jones, who read drafts of this paper and offered valuable criticism. I am of course entirely responsible for any faults which appear in the final version.

## EMENDATIONS TO CALLIMACHUS

(i) *Hymn. 5.* 82-84. Athena, indignant with Teiresias, who had caught sight of her and Chariclo bathing naked in the river, reproaches the youth and foretells his immediate blindness:

ἀ μὲν ἔφα, παιδὸς δ' ὅμματα νὺξ ἔλαβεν.  
† ἐστάθη δ' ἄφθογγος, ἐκόλλασαν γὰρ ἀνῖαι  
γώνατα καὶ φωνὰν ἔσχεν ἀμαχανία.

Pfeiffer accepts without hesitation Buttmann's correction *ἐστάκη*, but Schneider (*Callimachea*, i. 353 ff.) has proved, with immense and unassailable erudition, that neither *ἐστάθη* nor *ἄφθογγος* are touchable. Cahen, more prudently than Pfeiffer, leaves the *lectio tradita* *ἐστάθη* in the text, naturally with a *crux*.

A further step towards the healing of the text was taken by Schneider himself, in so far as he realized that, since the beginning of the line does not scan, and a corruption there must be, this must necessarily lurk between the two untouchable words. He proposed *ἐστάθη*, *ἄ*, *ἄφθογγος*, which will clearly not do: apart from the ugly clashing of the two *a*, the *ά* in *A.P. 9. 103.7* quoted by him in support of his emendation is interposed in an exclamation, whereas the context in the Callimachean passage under discussion is clearly narrative, and not exclamatory; in any case, he could quote only *ἢ μάλα,ἢ τάχα, et sim.* from properly epic authors (Aratus, Quintus, Nonnus). By a process of palaeographical<sup>1</sup> and stylistic<sup>2</sup> trials and errors I had finally come to restore *ἐστάθη ἀδ' ἄφθογγος κτλ.* when I saw my emendation confirmed by *Ap. Rh. 3. 422 f.*, where Jason, at the end of Aletes' challenge, remains 'speechless and helpless in his evil plight':

ὡς ἄρ' ἔφη· ὁ δὲ σίγα ποδῶν πάρος ὅμματα πήξας  
ἢστ' αὐτῶς ἄφθογγος,<sup>3</sup> ἀμηχανέω ν κακότητι.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 213, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> On *ἀδε* 'saepissime cum adjectivis et adverbii' cf. *Thes.*, s.v., 1989 D, 1990 C, and *Passow*<sup>5</sup>, s.v., 1, b. Whatever the explanation of the process (cf. *Passow's discussion*) *ἀδε* in this construction came to mean 'so very', 'so sehr', where *so* is used emphatically, without an explicit correlative: in other words, *ἀδε* has become the equivalent of *μάλα*, *πάνυ*, *adeo*. In *Epigr. 61. 1* Pf. *ἀδε*, as rightly understood by Pfeiffer, means *adeo*: it is to be connected with *πονήσεις* (= 'not any longer *so very fit*'), as I have tried to demonstrate in *Hermes* xc (1962). This usage of *ἀδε* is not unknown to Callimachus' rival, Apollonius Rhodius, cf. e.g., *Argon.* 1. 296 *ἀδε λίγν* 'adeo vehementer' Shaw, = *πάνυ τετηρημένως* scholiast ad loc. In our passage, *ἀδε ἄφθογγος* means either '*prosorsus elinguis*', '*so completely, utterly dumb*', or, if we prefer to supplement

the correlation, 'so dumb (as the goddess had just declared he would be)'. In the epigram quoted above the correlation would be, correspondingly, 'so fit (as the Centaur was)'. Cf. also *Hymn 4. 114 ὁδ' αἰεὶ ταχνοί* (incidentally note the same *Wortstellung* as in *Epigr. 61. 1*, i.e. an adverb, *αἰεὶ* or *οὐκέτι*, between *ὁδε* and the adjective) = 'always so very swift', or 'always so swift (as they are on the present occasion)'; in *Aet. 1. 1. 16* Pf. *ἀδε μελιχρότεραι* probably means 'so much sweeter', or 'so much sweeter (as the canons of art render them)', cf. 1. 17; for another way of supplementing the *ἀδε* cf. Pfeiffer ad. loc. Cf. *Theocr. 25. 80*, *Mosch. 4. 7* and 87.

<sup>3</sup> '*Prorsus elinguis*', Shaw. That one poet is echoing the other appears doubtless, as the lexical coincidences show: we cannot say, however, who is imitating whom. As is almost invariably the rule in such cases,

The best explanation of the corruption, from the palaeographical point of view, is haplography of cursive *ωδ*.<sup>1</sup>

(ii) *Hymn.* 6. 91–93. Erysichthon, punished by Demeter, was tormented by a burning hunger, and he became thinner and thinner, till he was nothing but skin and bones:

ώς δὲ Μίμαντι χιών, ώς ἀελίῳ ἐνι πλαγγών,  
καὶ τούτων ἔτι μέζον ἐτάκετο, μέστ' ἐπὶ νεύροις†  
δειλαίῳ ρινός τε καὶ ὀστέα μῶνον ἐλεύθη.

This is clear from line 93, rightly restored by Pfeiffer from the papyrus; on the other hand, *ἐπὶ νεύρας* (the MSS. reading) and *ἐπὶ νεύροις* (most probably the papyrus reading, cf. Pfeiffer's apparatus) do not fit into the picture at all, as Schneider did not fail to observe.

In a desperate effort to save the accusative *νεύρας* Mair punctuated and interpreted as follows:

καὶ τούτων ἔτι μέζον ἐτάκετο μέσφ' ἐπὶ νεύρας·  
δειλαίῳ ἵνες τε καὶ ὀστέα μῶνον ἐλεύθεν.<sup>2</sup>

('And even as the snow upon Mimas, as a wax doll in the sun, yea, even more than these he wasted to the very sinews: only sinews and bones had the poor

*variatio* has been used in the process of *imitatio*: Callimachus used *ωδε*, whereas Apollonius preferred its synonym *αὐτῶς*, which, coupled with an adjective (like *οὐτῶς*, cf. L.S.J., s.v. *οὐτῶς* III, 1), had acquired precisely the same meaning as we have shown *ωδε* to have done: we might supplement 'so elinguis (as he had become through fear)'. The semantic development in question, fully reached in Alexandrian Epic, is clear in the passages listed in Thes., s.v. *αὐτῶς*, 2587 D: cf. in particular Rumpel, *Lex. Theor.*, s.v. *αὐτῶς*, 2; add Nic. *Alex.* 436, *Ther.* 19, 278 and 420; Opp. *Hal.* 3. 469. For the post-Homeric usage of *αὐτῶς* the article in L.S.J. is useless. Apollonius is, in the passage under discussion, more faithful to Homer than Callimachus, because *αὐτῶς* in Homer is coupled with negative adjectives (*ἀφρων*, *ἀκηδής*, *νήπιος*; cf. Ap. Rh. *Arg.* 3. 805 *ἀστεγὸς αὐτῶς*, 'effuse *prorsus*' Shaw; 3. 1250 f., where the intensive *αὐτῶς* is coupled with *μάλα*: *μάλ* *αὐτῶς* *δάγεις*, 'pro*rus* inflexibilis', Shaw), whereas *ωδε*, in the sense 'so sehr', is used by Homer with verbs (cf. Capelle, *Wörterb. zu Hom.*, s.v.). Cf., however, Ap. Rh. *Arg.* 1. 1290 *ἡσ' αὐτῶς* *εὐκηλος* ('ita quietus', Shaw), 3. 769 *αὐτῶς* *εὐκηλος* ('omnino quiete', Shaw), 3. 53 *δηραῖς αὐτῶς* ('after so long'; 'longum adeo post', Shaw). The adverb *αὐτῶς*, lit. 'thus', 'like that', developed its strengthening value (as opposed to its contrary meaning, = 'merely': for a parallel development of both senses in *οὐτῶς*, strengthening and diminish-

ing, cf. L.S.J., s.v. *οὐτῶς*, III and IV) when coupled with verbs or adjectives which admitted of the interpretation 'like that', 'thus' > 'so sehr', instead of 'merely'. For example, Homer's *παῖς δ' ἔτι νήπιος αὐτῶς* (*Od.* 12. 284) could be taken to mean 'noch so jung (wie er eben jetzt ist)', i.e. a mere youth, or 'ganz jung', 'völlig jung', cf. Capelle, op. cit., s.v. *αὐτῶς*; with verbs of feeling, *αὐτῶς* 'thus' could be taken to mean not only 'frustra', but also 'so sehr': in *Arg.* 2. 880 either meaning would do, but in *Arg.* 3. 773 the meaning 'so sehr' is clear (cf. Wellauer ad *Arg.* 2. 880: Apollonius is most likely to have read *αὐτῶς*, and not *οὐτῶς*, in *Il.* 6. 55 and 21. 106).

<sup>1</sup> I had at first thought that the tachygraphical suprascript sign for *ω*, in *εσταθῆ-δαφθοργος*, might have been simply left out by the copyist; but initial *ω* was not represented by ~, cf. Lehmann, *Die tachygr. Abkürz.*, p. 36). In the Ptolemaic cursive, *ωδ* looked something like *ωω*: cf. specimens in Thompson, *Introd. to Gr. and Lat. Pal.*, Greek Cursive Alphabets, No 1 (facing p. 190). Another corruption in a Callimachean Hymn (3. 213) I have emended and shown to have originated in Ptolemaic cursive in C.R. n.s. xii (1962). Such corruptions may well have arisen when the author's own manuscript in cursive was transcribed by professional copyists into the literary script.

<sup>2</sup> This is the MSS. reading.

man left'), but the repetition of sinews (*νευράς*<sup>1</sup>) and sinews (*Ἰνές*) is intolerable,<sup>2</sup> not to mention the harsh asyndeton which would ensue (δειλαίψ κτλ.). Cahen, with better judgement, left the traditional *crux* before *νευράς* and translated 'le malheureux fondait, tant qu'à la fin il ne lui resta plus, à côté des nerfs, que les fibres et les os'.

Now that we do not read *Ἰνές τε* any longer, but *μύνός τε* with Pfeiffer, the unbearably awkward<sup>3</sup> repetition *ἐπὶ νευράς*—*Ἰνές* is avoided, but the addition *ἐπὶ νεύροις* 'besides his nerves' to the skin-and-bone cliché<sup>4</sup> is still unwelcome: why should the nerves be specified, indeed put in the emphatic position at the end of the line?

Schneider's suggestion is monstrous, stylistically as well as logically. He argues (op. cit. 386): 'quum is (sc. Callimachus) dixisset, Erysichthoni usque evasisse ventrem promissorem et in maris profunditatem crevisse (v. 89), appareret non apte poetam locuturum fuisse, si dixisset praeter nervos . . . nihil mox iuveni superfuisse quam fibras et ossa. imo *ventrem* superfuisse prae ceteris dicendum fuit. itaque non dubito quin Callimachus scripserit: μέσφ' ἐπὶ νευρά δειλαίψ *Ἰνές τε καὶ ὅστέα μῶνον ἔλειφθεν*, quod id ipsum quod quaerebamus significat, praeter *ventrem* homini fibras et ossa reicta esse sola'. From the stylistical point of view, as we have already observed, an addition to the skin-and-bone cliché would be uncalled for, unless justified by some specific reason which is clearly absent here; from the logical point of view, anyway, Schneider's thesis is grotesque. If Erysichthon was *wasting*, a point on which the poet insists (cf. *ἐτάκετο* v. 92, *ἐστρεύγετο* v. 67), how could he possibly have a fat belly? 'Dura cutis, per quam spectari viscera possent . . . ventris erat pro ventre locus' aptly says Ovid of *Fames*, in his own treatment of the Erysichthon story (*Met.* 8. 803–5). Erysichthon's belly was not, as Schneider bizarrely imagines, swelling 'in maris profunditatem': Callimachus' simile means, as Ovid testifies, that Erysichthon's *γαστήρ* could receive, and make disappear, an endless intake of food, just as the sea—without swelling!—'recipit de tota flumina terra, nec satiatur aquis peregrinosque ebibit amnes' (*Met.* 8. 835–6): the food was of course immediately digested; the burning hunger, which Callimachus (line 67) calls *αιθων*, is well described by Ovid:

utque rapax ignis non umquam alimenta recusat  
innumerisque faces cremat et, quo copia maior  
est data, plura petit turbaque voracior ipsa est:  
sic epulas omnes Erysichthonis ora profani  
accipiunt poscuntque simul: cibus omnis in illo  
causa cibi est semperque locus fit inanis edendo. (*Met.* 8. 837 ff.)

The food was, in other words, not left to accumulate and inflate the stomach:

<sup>1</sup> The word *νευρά* does not seem to mean anywhere, in Epic, 'sinew', but Mair doubtless based his argument upon Hom. *Il.* 8. 328, where *νευρά* was taken by some as equivalent to *νεῦρον* (cf. L.S.J., s.v. *νευρά*, 5): Callimachus might well have wanted to show to us that he accepted this interpretation of the word in the Homeric line in question.

<sup>2</sup> The image 'he wasted to the sinews' would be undeniably strange in itself.

<sup>3</sup> *μύνός* was already conjectured by Valkenaer, 'qui et ipse statuit *νευράς* esse nervos et fere non diversas ab *Ἰνές* et propterea pro *Ἰνές* scripsit *μύνός*' (Schneider, op. cit. 386).

<sup>4</sup> Cf., e.g., Ap. Rh. 2. 200 f. . . . οἱ αὐσταλέος χρῶς ἔσκαλήκει, μύνοι δὲ σὺν ὅστέα μῶνον ἔργον, and the scholiasts ad loc. μύνοι δὲ μῶνοι ξυνεῖχον τὰ ὅστρα αὐτοῦ· τὸ δέρμα ἀντός μῶνον τὰ ὅστέα συνεῖχεν.

the Callimachean metaphor ἐς βυθὸν οὐλα θαλάσσης (v. 89), like the Ovidian one (*Met.* 8. 843: *alta . . . voragine ventris*), does not imply any idea of swollenness, but only one of bottomlessness. There is no doubt, of course, that Callimachus' ἐξάλλετο γαστήρ (v. 88) is an etymological interpretation of Homer's ἀναλτος γαστήρ: as Schneider has seen (op. cit. 384 ff.), Callimachus connected ἀναλτος with ἀλλομαι:<sup>1</sup> but that the punctiliar ἀλλομαι could be forcibly made by the poet to acquire the durative meaning *swell*<sup>2</sup> is hardly credible. Callimachus has rather employed ἐξάλλομαι—the verb indeed occurs used absolutely, as a synonym of ἀλλομαι<sup>3</sup>—in the same sense as ἀλλομαι has when referring to parts of the body ('twitch, quiver, throb': attested in Theocritus and Hellenistic Greek, cf. L.S.J., s.v. ἀλλομαι, 3).<sup>4</sup>

Although his conjecture is, in conclusion, without any foundation, nevertheless Schneider *rem acu tetigit* in that the corruption must lie precisely in the words *ἐπὶ νεύρους*.

The post-Homeric adjective δειλαῖος is nothing but an expanded form of the Homeric δειλός: such an expansion being permissible in Epic,<sup>5</sup> δειλαῖος is used by both Apollonius (*Arg.* 3. 464) and Callimachus (cf. Pfeiffer's *Index*, s.v.). Now, δειλαῖος, which in a general sense means 'wretched', is in the passage under discussion semantically associated with the idea of illness: cf. lines 100–4, where the specific meaning of δειλαῖον in the context is made clear by νόσον:<sup>6</sup> Erysichthon was wretched inasmuch as he was suffering from the disease. This is a clear echo of such Homeric passages as *Od.* 15. 407–8:

Πείνη δ' οὐποτε δῆμον ἐσέρχεται, οὐδέ τις ἀλλη  
νοῦσος ἐπὶ στυγερὴ πέλεται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν.

Lines like the ones just quoted explain, no doubt, why the adjective δειλός was also given, by ancient interpreters, the meaning 'debilis, infirmus' (cf. Thes. s.v., 945 D), as is demonstrated by the Hesychian gloss δειλόν ἀσθενῆ. Could it be that in the corrupt *ἐπὶ νεύρους* there is hiding a word qualifying the general δειλαῖος with the more specific notion of 'being ill'?

<sup>1</sup> This etymology is attested in ancient lexicographers: in *Et. M.* 94. 17 ἀναλτον = τὸν ἀλλεοθαν μὴ δυνάμενον refers to Iros, cf. Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.*, s.v. ἀναλτος.

<sup>2</sup> Schneider's interpretation is accepted, however dubiously, in L.S.J., s.v. ἐξάλλομαι II. 2: but the aspect of ἀλλομαι is clearly punctiliar, and therefore the verb (or any of its compounds) could not be used of the process of swelling, which, in the case of Erysichthon's belly, cannot but have been a durative, slow one. The imperfect ἐξάλλετο can only be explained (cf. the attestations of this tense in Veitch, *Gr. Verbs*<sup>4</sup>, s.v. ἀλλομαι) as iterative (i.e. = 'twitch, quiver, throb'). The sensitivity to the aspect of ἀλλομαι (and its compounds) remained clearly felt till late in Greek, cf., e.g., the iterative imperfect in Heliodorus 8. 9. 14 as opposed to the punctiliar aorists in 1. 28. 1; 3. 17. 2; 5. 8. 3; 5. 22. 4; 5. 25. 1; 5. 32. 6; 7. 21. 2; 8. 9. 16; 8. 11. 3; 9. 25. 1; 10. 9. 3; 10. 10. 1; 10. 16. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. L.S.J., s.v. ἐξάλλομαι. Callimachus must have considered ἀναλτος as a synonym of Hom. ἐξάλμενος, which is used absolutely at *Il.* 15. 571; in other words, he derived ἀναλτος from ἀνάλλομαι.

<sup>4</sup> After reaching this conclusion I have found that it had already been arrived at by Schaefer, cf. Thes., s.v. ἀλλομαι 1538 B.

<sup>5</sup> This expansion remained permissible in Epic until late: Nonnus, for instance, coined γαλαξίος from γαλάξιος.

<sup>6</sup> The same process is visible at 6. 68, where the general meaning of σχέτλος ('unwearied', L.S.J.; cf. in particular Capelle op. cit., s.v.), well illustrated by the words ὅσσα κτλ., is made more specific by νούσῳ, v. 67: Erysichthon was wretched, because he was ill. Callimachus is, of course, offering to us one of his Homeric interpretations: in certain Homeric attestations of σχέτλος he evidently recognized, within the general meaning 'rastlos', a more specific one, 'elend', cf. Capelle, loc. cit.

Another passage from Homer will now help us further. In *Il.* 21. 463-6 we read:

... βροτῶν ἔνεκα πτολεμίξω  
δειλῶν,<sup>1</sup> οἱ φύλλοισιν ἔοικότες ἄλλοτε μέν τε  
ζαφλεγέες τελέθουσιν, ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδοντες  
ἄλλοτε δὲ φθινύθουσιν ἀκήριοι.<sup>2</sup>

It is of course impossible to say whether Callimachus had in mind precisely these two Homeric quotations,<sup>3</sup> or whether there are intermediaries now lost for us, as seems more likely: however, since the adjective *ἐπίκηρος* is used by Callimachus in *Epigr.* 58. 3 Pf., we may safely restore

μέστ' ἐπικήρω  
δειλαίω ρίνός τε καὶ ὄστέα μῶνον ἐλείφθη.

At first, also led by palaeographical considerations (pap. -*ροις*, MSS. -*ρας*) I had thought of

μέστ' ἐπικήρω  
δειλαίω κτλ.

where the adverb *ἐπικήρως* qualified the adjective<sup>4</sup> *δειλαίω* (cf., for this construction, in the same *Wortstellung*, Hymn 4. 148-9 ὄμοιως / *καρπερός*): in the adverb *ἐπικήρως* (attestations are in predicative use) the notion 'being fatally debilitated, mortally ill' appears to have prevailed altogether, already in Attic times, as Isocrates' metaphorical usage testifies (11. 49 τῆς φιλοσοφίας *ἐπικήρως διακειμένης* 'more eorum, qui fato lethifero et fatalibus morbis obnoxii sunt', Thes.; 'cum philosophia quasi calamitate fatali laborat', Mitchell; 'es steht schwach mit der Philosophie', Pape-Sengebusch); this meaning is evident in Philo 2. 194. 2 (= *De Ebriet.* 122) τοὺς τὰ σώματα ἐκ φύσεως ἐπικήρως ἔχοντας, οἷς καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα νόσου πρόφασις μέγα ἐμπόδιον πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι 'those whose bodies are fatally stricken by nature [i.e. are incurably ill], with whom the misfortune of their malady ever stands to prevent their finding health and safety' (Colson-Whitaker); cf. also 5. 255. 13 and 6. 98. 6; *ἐπικήρως διακεισθαι* is the equivalent of *ἔσχάτως διακεισθαι*, cf., for example, Diod. Sic. 18. 48. 4 'be fatally ill, be at the point of death', and Thes., s.v. *ἔσχάτως*.

However, the adverbial qualification of the adjective *δειλαίω* would be, in itself, a rather unusual construction in Epic, and *ἐπικήρως* only occurs used as a predicate, directly depending upon *διακεισθαι* or like verbs, as the quoted attestations show; besides, Apollonius' *ἀκήριον* and the other epic passages mentioned above really demand an adjective, and not an adverb, in Callimachus' line. These considerations lead us to prefer *ἐπικήρως* / *δειλαίω*, all the more so, as this very Hymn 6 offers various instances of adjectival asyndeta

<sup>1</sup> δειλῶν] ἀσθενῶν, *Schol. Gr. in Hom. Il.*, ed. Dindorf, iv. 274.

<sup>2</sup> ἀκήριοι] νεκρούμενοι, *Schol. Townl.*, ed. Maas, ii. 363.

<sup>3</sup> One cannot help noticing their semantic connexion with Erysichthon's predicament (*Od.* 15. 407-8 πείνη, νούσος, δειλῶις; *Il.* 21. 463 ff. δειλῶν, ἔδοντες, φθινύθουσιν). Callimachus is making use of the *τόπος λιμός ~ λοιμός*, as appears from *Il.* 66-67 λιμός ... νούσων. Cf. the scholiast, on *Od.* 15.

407-8 (= *Schol. Gr. in Hom. Od.*, ed. Dindorf, ii. 617): οὐδέ τις ἀλλη νοῦσος] τῷ λιμῷ τὴν νοῦσον συνέζευξεν, ἐπει τῷ λιμῷ καὶ λοιμῷ παρακολουθεῖ. "λιμὸν ὄμοις καὶ λοιμόν. ἀποφθενθούσι δὲ λαοὶ" (= *Hes. Op.* 241).

<sup>4</sup> As *ἔσχάτως*, *ἀκρως*, or *δεινῶς* can qualify adjectives.

<sup>5</sup> All my quotations from Philo are according to Leisegang's *Index* (i.e. volume, page, and line of Cohn-Wendland's edition).

(6. 2 + 119; 16; 67; 83; 90, adverbs). The *Wortstellung* resulting from our emendation is supported by the asyndeton at Hymn 4. 241-2:

... ὅθι δειλαί  
δυστοκέες κτλ.

The parallelism, not only limited to the *Wortstellung*, but indeed extended to the vocabulary (δειλαί—δειλαίω), makes the support even stronger.

The article ἐπίκηρος not being satisfactory in L.S.J.,<sup>1</sup> the following observations will perhaps be useful to the reader. ἐπίκηρος had a more general meaning, taken from κῆρ = death, doom in general, namely 'caducus, perishable, ephemeral, mortal'. This meaning was the most common (e.g. Hippocr. *Morb. Sacr.* 1, = vi. 362 Littré, ii. 57 Ermerins: τὸ ἐπικηρότατον 'ce qu'il y a de plus fréle' Littré, 'maxime morti subjectum' Ermerins, of the ἀνθρώπου σῶμα as opposed to God, pure and eternally incorruptible; Arist. *Mu.* 392<sup>a</sup>34 παθητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν καὶ ἐπίκηρον (φύσιν); Ecph. ap. Stob. 4. 7. 65 ἐπίκαρον ὃν τὸ ζῶν; Dion. Hal. 8. 60. 2 ἀπὸ θνητῶν καὶ ἐπικήρων σπερμάτων; frequent in ecclesiastical writers).<sup>2</sup> Callimachus, as is typical of him, avoided this more common, and vaguer, meaning,<sup>3</sup> and used ἐπίκηρος in his epigram in one of its two rarer, and more specific, meanings, = 'hazardous'<sup>4</sup> (from κῆρ = violent death, calamity): in so doing, he gave to what must have been a current expression (cf. on ἐπίκηρος βίος = ephemeral, *Hist. Eccl.* 1. 2. 18 τούτοιν τὸν θνητὸν καὶ ἐπίκηρον βίον, and Marc. Aur. 6. 47 αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπικήρου καὶ ἐφημέρου τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωῆς) a slight twist: the poet does not mean that Leontichos' life was ephemeral in that he was a mortal human being; the fisherman's *particular* life (as ἔον emphasizes) was hazardous (as is explained immediately afterwards, by θαλασσοπορεῖ). In the Hymn Callimachus avoided once more the general meaning of the adjective, and gave ἐπίκηρος its other rarer, and more specific, sense, i.e. *infirmus*, delicate, weak, invalid, ill (from κῆρ = disease, physical blemishes), which was known to writers on physiological matters:<sup>5</sup> cf. Arist. *Gen. An.* 753<sup>a</sup>7 ἐπικηρότερα (opp. to *ἰοχύς*); often in Theophrastus (attestations in Wimmer's *Index* to his Teubner edition, e.g. *De Caus. Plant.* 3. 22. 2 ἀσθενέστερα καὶ ἐπικηρότερα, explicitly of both vegetable and animal beings; *De Caus. Plant.* i. 20. 3 ἀσθενέστατον καὶ ἐπικηρότατον; cf. Thes., s.v.: 'ab . . . Theophr. opponitur ἐπίκηρος . . . τῷ ισχυρῷ'; cf. also *Plat. Axioc.* 367 B πᾶν τὸ τῆς

<sup>1</sup> Much better are the articles in Thes. and in Pape-Sengebusch.

<sup>2</sup> Quotations from the volumes of the series 'Griech. christl. Schriftsteller': Orig. 2. 280. 14 τῷ ἐπικήρῳ ήμῶν γένει; 2. 340. 1 τὸ ἐπίκηρον σῶμα; Eus. 1. 8. 18 θνητὸν καὶ ἐπικήρου τέλους; 1. 204. 29 τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἐπικήρα (opp. τῷ ἀφθαρτὸν καὶ ἀσώματον τοῦ θεοῦ βασιλείαν); 6. 179. 2 θνητὸν καὶ ἐπίκηρον τὸ καθ' ήμᾶς γένος; 6. 211. 29 τινὰ τῶν ἐπικήρων (conj. for ἐπικαίρων) καὶ θνητῶν; Clem. Alex. 2. 155. 12 ήμῶν ἐπικήρως τῷ φύσιν (opp. to τὸ θεῖον, which is ἀνενδεές καὶ ἀπαθέτης); Philo (in all the passages the adjective means 'perishable' as opposed to God's nature) 3. 132. 21 τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπικήρου γένους; 3. 283. 2 τὸ ἐπίκηρον ήμῶν γένος; 4. 293. 14 τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἐπίκηρον; 5. 329. 8 ἀνθρώποι, ζῶα ἐπικήρα καὶ φθαρτά; clearest in 1. 24. 17 ἀνθρώποις . . . βραχὺ

ζῶον . . . καὶ ἐπίκηρον. Cf. also Boissonade, in Eunap. p. 243 (now add Philod. *Mort.* 38 τὸ θυητὸν καὶ ἐπίκηρον).

<sup>3</sup> Cahen (*Callim. et son œuvre poétique*, p. 535) has best exemplified the poet's love for precision of diction, which at times became even *trop grande*.

<sup>4</sup> This is the meaning of the adjective in the epigram as all interpreters have recognized (Cahen, Mair, Waltz). In this sense the adjective is not attested before Callimachus (cf. L.S.J., s.v., 2): cf. Cahen, op. cit. 492 and 500 f., for similar cases (*πολίχνη, θερισμός, φρυάσσομαι*).

<sup>5</sup> For such cases in the Hymns cf. Cahen, op. cit. 491 ('βλητός au sens physiologique'), 493 (*μονοτόκος, διαγγής*, words pertaining to the 'vocabulaire scientifique d'Aristote'); cf. also pp. 491, 494, for words used by Callimachus and attested in Hippocrates or Galen.

φύσεως ἐπίκηρον καὶ δυσαλθές (the instance in question being an old man); S.E. *Adv. Math.* 9. 90: ἄνθρωπος is ζῶον ἐπίκηρον τε καὶ ἀσθενές; Plut. *Mor.* 371 B τὸ ἐπίκηρον καὶ νοσῶδες (τοῦ σωματικοῦ) and *Mor.* 662 F τὸ ἐπίκηρον καὶ νοσῶδες; Themist., p. 363. 18 Dind. ὅσα ἐπίκηρα καὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς φύσεως μέτοχα; Philo 3. 235. 16 τοῖς ἐπικήροις ἡμῖν ('invalid, weak', as opposed to God's μέγιστον κράτος; cf. also 5. 367. 3; at 5. 61. 7 the *ἰατροί* are called ἐπίκηροι in the sense 'liable by nature to disease and ill health'); Clem. *Alex.* 2. 517. 14 ὁ ἀσθενής καὶ ἐπίκηρος (= ἄνθρωπος); also Hesychius: ἐπικηρότατος ἐπισαθρότατος.

Why did Callimachus elect to employ ἐπίκηρος, rather than use Homer's adjective ἀκήριος? Most probably for reasons of *variatio*. We have already said that the skin-and-bone image was used by Apollonius Rhodius, *Arg.* 2. 201; we may now go one step farther, and add that the words ρίνοὶ δὲ σὺν ὀστέα μοῦνον ἔεργον were employed by Apollonius with reference to Phineus, whose hunger, though caused by a different reason, nevertheless had had much the same effect on his body as the *αιθων λιμός* had on Erysichthon's. Phineus, writes Apollonius, was (2. 196) ἀκήριον ἡντ' ὄνειρον; the scholiast ad loc. explains ἀκήριον as ἀψυχον, adding διὰ τὸ καταλελεπτύθαι ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου.

There is no means of establishing the chronological relationship between the Apollonian passage and Callimachus' Hymn 6: therefore we must content ourselves with concluding that either Callimachus innovated upon Homer, for love of *variatio*, and Apollonius afterwards 'corrected' him by emphasizing that the right form to be used was ἀκήριος, upon Homer's authority, not ἐπίκηρος, or, if Apollonius' lines were written before Callimachus', then the latter wanted to show that he could imitate Homer with more originality—through *variatio*—and less servility than the former.<sup>1</sup> From the palaeographical point of view there are no difficulties in explaining the corruption: on confusion between *κ* and *ν* cf. Bast, *Comm. Pal.*, p. 726; the ligature *εν* of the type resembling *ω* can, on account of the long vertical stroke on the left, look very much like a minuscule *η* (cf. Gardthausen, *Griech. Pal.*<sup>1</sup>, Tafel 6, letter *v*, col. 15, and Tafel 7, letter *v*, col. 5). The endings *-pas*, *-pois* in the corruption can be explained palaeographically (misunderstanding of tachygraphical symbols), but are more likely to be *Verschlimmbesserungen*, arisen when one tried to give a rection (accus. or dat.) to what came by mistake to be regarded as the preposition *ἐπί*, followed by the substantive *νευρά* or *νεῦρον*.

*Epigr.* 38 Pf. (= *A.P.* 13. 24)

Τὰ δῶρα τάφροδίτη  
Σίμον ἡ περίφοιτος, εἰκόν' αὐτή  
ἔθηκε τήν τε μίτρην  
ἡ μαστούς ἐφίλησε τόν τε Πάνα  
†καὶ τὸν αὐτοὺς ὄρῃ τάλαντα θάρσους.

2 εικοναντη Palatinus: εἰκόν' αὐτῆς Salmasius, cui assentit Pfeiffer: εἰκόν' αὐτῇ Schneider; εἰκόν' αὐτῇ Cahen 4 ἡμᾶς τοὺς Palatinus, recte distinxit Anna Fabri

This epigram is gravely damaged, but not beyond repair; at least, its very

<sup>1</sup> For a list of passages in which the reader may find, as he pleases, coincidence or 'versteckte Kritik' between Apollonius and Callimachus, cf. A. W. Mair's Introduction to his Loeb edition of Callimachus, p. 23. It will be noted that Apollonius used ἐλειφθεν (*Arg.* 1. 1325), whereas Callimachus, if we

follow the papyrus reading with Pfeiffer, preferred ἐλείφθη; the plural ρίνοι in the sense 'human skin', accepted by Apollonius on Homer's authority (*Od.* 5. 426, 435; 12. 46: cf. Capelle, op. cit., s.v.) is refused by Callimachus who employs the singular ρίνος.

witty point, which is now blunted by corruptions, can be restored to its original sharpness.

Critics have made matters worse by emending words which are perfectly sound or by reading into the poem things which are simply not there. The first point to be established is that Simon is a prostitute: Callimachus says this explicitly, *Σίμων ἡ περίφοιτος*,<sup>1</sup> but some scholars have compelled the woman to become a part-time Bacchant as well. Schneider, for instance, writes (*Callimachea*, i. 426): 'Simone . . . Baccha fuisse videtur (si quidem recte, ut arbitror, pro θάρσους in ultimo versu θύρσους repositum Bentl.) et coniuncta Bacchi et Veneris castra secuta esse. iam quum Veneri valedicat, non iniuria inter dona posuit etiam talia quae Baccho propriora sunt, θύρσους et πανόν.' Where does the torch come from? 'Sane τὸν τε Πάνα vereor ut hoc contextu de Panis imagine intelligi possit', he notes, whereupon the god is transformed into a 'fax Bacchica'. Callimachus, however, has made the 'Epigramsituation' obvious from the very beginning (*τάφροδίτη . . . ἡ περίφοιτος*): the epigram is evidently of the well-known type in which a prostitute abandoning her trade dedicates her apparel to Aphrodite (e.g. *A.P.* 6. 17, 210, 211; cf. also 208). *Πάν* ('la statuette de Pan', Cahen, who entertains quite unjustified doubts on the text) is definitely not out of place here: cf. τὸν . . . *Ἐρωτα* in *A.P.* 6. 211. 1 and 260. 1; for his phallic associations—clear in Callim. fr. 689 Pf.—the god has been chosen by Callimachus instead of Eros (we shall revert to this point later).

Bacchic rituals have, in sum, nothing to do with the situation as clearly defined by our epigram:<sup>2</sup> nevertheless, having turned the prostitute into a Bacchant, Schneider is not yet satisfied, and makes her into a kind of mythic Maenad, raging on the rocks: 'et ut sententiam quoque, qualem fuisse putamus, certe demonstremus aliqua coniectura, cui neminem nimis confidere iubemus, ita fere Callimachum scripsisse putamus: τὸν τε πανὸν καὶ τὸν <ποτ' ἀντίναξεν> ἀυτοῦ <ἀν'> ὅρη τάλαινα θύρσους'. Such a tentative restoration is unhesitatingly accepted into the text by Beckby, who renders the passage ' . . . und diese

<sup>1</sup> The meaning of *περίφοιτος* in Callimachus has been clarified by Bentley, cf. Schneider, op. cit. 423; cf. also Engl. *street-walker*, Germ. *Gassendirne*, Ital. *passeggiatrice*. Bentley proposed *περίφοιτε* for the much discussed *περίφενε* in *Epigr.* 45. 1 Pf.: the conjecture is palaeographically excellent (*φενε* > *φοιτε*): I cannot understand Schneider's misgivings in this respect, cf. his apparatus to *Epigr.* 46) and was indeed received into the text by Dübner, but cannot be accepted, as Schneider has shown, on account of Callimachus' own statement in *Epigr.* 28. 3 Pf. Wilamowitz, as his punctuation implies (*ληφθῆσαι, περίφενε Μενέκρατες*), took *περίφενε* as a vocative, but *περίφενε* does not exist. Cahen prints *ληφθῆσαι, τπει φενε* ('tu seras pris, tu peux fuir, Ménocrates') and notes, on 'tu peux fuir': 'texte et sens incertain'; Beckby rightly takes *περίφενε* as a compound verb and renders 'lauf nur, Menekrates, fort, ich krieg' dich! Both these interpretations, whilst correctly understanding the nature of the imperative

(see below), fail to clearly account for the preverb *περι-*; Pfeiffer admits: '*περίφενε* (sic AP) non intellego'. In reality, the text is sound, and *περίφενε* is very aptly used by the poet. The verb *περίφενε* implies a notion of escaping from a danger, cf., e.g., π. τὴν φθοράν Pl. *Lg.* 677 B: Callimachus means 'you may well go on fleeing (note the present imperative; Menecrates was a *reluctant* lover, not a *περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος*) from the φθορά (*sensu erotico*) which I am going to do to you: you will change your mind, and come to me'. The imperative, as Beckby and Cahen have seen, is concessive; the value of the preverb did not escape Mair, who, on the other hand, did not recognize the concessive nature of the imperative ('flee and save thyself, Menecrates!').

<sup>2</sup> Women who, like Porphyris, *A.P.* 6. 172, performed the *Bacchanalia* on the permitted religious dates were otherwise quite respectable bourgeois ladies. Agathias, *A.P.* 6. 74, plays on the difference between the rites of Dionysus and those of Aphrodite.

Thyrsen, welche auf den Bergen die Arme einst geschwungen', and by Paton, in his Loeb edition of the Anthology.

Whether or not a line has fallen out after v. 4 is not certain: we cannot exclude the possibility that Callimachus might have wanted to mark the close of the poem with a succession of two phalaecians.<sup>1</sup> In any case, if a line has disappeared it must have been self-contained in its meaning, because our text of line 4 makes sense,<sup>2</sup> and is well connected with line 5 (*τε . . . καὶ*); on the other hand, there is no doubt that the last phalaecian is corrupt.

Now, if we examine this line, the first *punctum dolens* will appear to be *αὐτούς*, which is metrically impossible and contextually unaccountable. The word *όρη*, too, is most suspicious: we cannot reduce it to mountains, as Schneider does, but as a verbal form in a list of objects it is highly doubtful.

Having come to consider the list, what do we miss in it? The portrait,<sup>3</sup> *εἰκών*, is there, as was to be expected, the *μίτρη* traditionally offered is not absent, the statue of *Πάν* is fully entitled to its place amongst the other items, as we have observed: where are the *δλισθοί*?<sup>4</sup> Was she ashamed to dedicate them in public? And why should she be *τάλαντα*? The epithet hardly fits into the context: Brunck and Jacobs changed it to *μάκαιρα*, as a vocative addressed to the goddess (cf. A.P. 6. 17. 2 *Κύπρι μάκαιρα*), but this harsh change of construction would clash with *τάφροδίτη . . . ἔθηκε*; we expect the epithet to pertain, like *περιφοιτος*, to Simon. Headlam, in a marginal note to his copy of Schneider's *Callimachea*<sup>5</sup> wrote 'why?' near *τάλαντα*, and suggested *λέαντα*, which, if applied to a priestess, would be suitable (he accepted Bentley's *θύρσους*) but is clearly out of the question once we have established Simon's identity. What the sense of the passage rather requires is an epithet referring to Simon and somehow connected with her act of dedication.

All these considerations lead me to restore *καὶ τοὺς αὐτοχεριδέ δράλαια ταρσούς*.

The *αὐτή* in line 1 is to be left alone: Simon herself, in person, placed the objects dedicated by her in the temple (that is, she did not have them placed

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Pfeiffer ad loc.: 'tertius *ἡμίαμβος* deesse *videtur*' (italics mine); his laudable caution is not shared by Schneider (loc. cit.): 'nemo satis attendit, quod mihi propter metrum carminis *certissimum* videtur, post v. 4 excidisse versum minorem' (italics mine).

<sup>2</sup> I think that *ἢ μαστούς ἐφίλησε* is, in all probability, a pun on Aeschylus' *φιλόμαστος*. Dübner (in his commentary on A.P. 13. 24) has already drawn our attention to epithets like *φιληλάκατος* referred to things: one might add that *φιλορράθων* (of a muzzle, A.P. 6. 246) is a most enlightening example. The specific mention of the *μαστούς* was rightly felt as necessary by Callimachus (cf. A.P. 5. 199. 5 *μαλακάι, μαστῶν ἐκδύματα, μίτραι*; 6. 272. 2 *μίτραν μαστοῖς σφιγκτά περιπλομέναν*; cf. also 6. 201) because *μίτρη* alone was ambiguous: cf. Waltz ad A.P. 6. 292. 1 and Bühler, *Hermes*, *Einzelschr.* xiii. 117 f. Olivieri (*Epigrammatisti Greci*, (Naples, 1949), p. 66) does not seem to know that the brassière-motif was common.

<sup>3</sup> Either of Simon herself (cf. A.P. 6. 208, with Waltz's note) or of Aphrodite (as

Schneider believes, cf. A.P. 9. 605). On the 'miniatures obscènes, qu'on employait fréquemment comme ex-voto', cf. Waltz on A.P. 6. 17.

<sup>4</sup> There is no doubt amongst the commentators (Jacobs, *Animadu.* i. 1. 387; Waltz and Beckby ad loc.; cf. also Crusius, *Untersuch. zu den Mim. des Her.*, p. 129, n. 3) that in A.P. 6. 21. 5 *ἄ . . . οὐ φωνητά πρός αὐδρός* means *δλισθοί* (on the *κακέμφατον*-motif cf. Lucian, *Amor*, 28 *τὸ δὲ εἰς ἀκοήν σπανίλας ἤκον ἔνομα—αἰσχύνομαι καὶ λέγειν*, *Dial. Mer.* 5. 4 *μη ἀνάκρινε ἀκριβώς, αἰσχρὰ γάρ ὥστε μὲ τὴν Οὐρανίαν οὐκ ἀν εἴποιμι*; cf. also, on *βαυβάν* omitted 'ut *κακέμφατον*' by Herodas, Herzog's *Index*, s.v., in Crusius' Teubner edition). In all probability *τὰ παίγνια* in A.P. 16. 17. 1 (a licentious parody of A.P. 6. 13) denotes the same objects, cf. Waltz on the *ἀθυρμα* at A.P. 6. 37. 3.

<sup>5</sup> The book is now the property of King's College Library.

<sup>6</sup> The final syllable *-ρι* is long by position, as in Callim. *Epigr.* 20. 3 Pf., and Manetho, 3. 200.

there by a servant) : cf. *A.P.* 6. 3. 3. (*Διονύσιος αὐτὸς . . . θῆκε*), 6. 8. 1 (*Λαοδάμας . . . αὐτὸς ἀνέθηκε*) ; this use of *αὐτὸς* is fairly frequent in Callimachus, cf., for example, fr. 67. 1 Pf., *αὐτὸς Ἐρας ἐδίδαξεν* ; fr. 70. 2 Pf., *αὐτὸς ὁ τοξευτής* ; fr. 85. 9 Pf. *εἰκόνα . . . αὐτὴ Λοκρὶς ἔθηκε* ; fr. 110. 57 Pf. *ἔθηκε αὐτή μιν Ζεφυρίτις*, etc. The idea expressed by *αὐτή* ('herself, in person'), referring to comparatively harmless objects such as a *μίτρη* or a statuette of *Πάν*, is, when introducing the last item, strengthened by the epithet *δράλανα*, which is most welcome, as a gloss,<sup>1</sup> in an author like Callimachus : prepared by this word, the reader, if at all familiar with the type of dedications which the poet is jokingly imitating,<sup>2</sup> knows what to expect next, at the end of the list, as a *climax* (the same emphatic position is occupied by the *δλισβοι* in the list given at *A.P.* 6. 210). Instead of *δλισβοι*, however, he finds 'wicker-work';<sup>3</sup> but his astonishment is of short duration, the point of the epigram being only too transparent ; what Simon, *λαμυρά* that she is, has dedicated is a special kind of 'wicker-work' articles, namely those which are used *αὐτοχερί*, in other words, *τὰ γέρρα*. The adverb *αὐτοχερί*,<sup>4</sup> not unknown to Callimachus (cf. *Epigr.* 20. 3 Pf.), is used here attributively, as the position of the article *τούς* indicates.<sup>5</sup> The god *Πάν*, whose *τρύπανον* Callimachus celebrated in fr. 689 Pf., is an ideal companion to these particular *ταρσοί*.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The evidence offered by Hesychius (*δράλανα· λαμυρά· Κώοι*) is most important, and enables us to reconstruct the history of the gloss : the Coan word must have been picked up from the local dialect, and given literary dignity, by some poet living on, or familiar with, the island (Theocritus? Philitas? Herodas?), whom Callimachus is here echoing. *Δράλανα* was hastily dismissed as a 'glossa corrupta' in *Thes.*, s.v., but today one rightly refrains from such hurried methods (cf. L.S.J., s.v.; Latte, in his edition of Hesychius, leaves the word unaltered ; cf. also Lobeck, *Proleg.*, p. 36). An etymologically satisfactory explanation of the gloss is hardly possible : Schmidt (cf. his apparatus to Hesychius) wanted to emend it to *δράκανα* taken in its proper sense, = 'she-dragon'. If, as seems more probable, *δράλανα* is, somehow, connected with *δράκανα* taken in its metaphorical meaning (on *δράκανα* of prostitutes cf. L.S.J., s.v.), since dissimilatory *λ* from *ρ* was not uncommon (cf., e.g., Thumb-Kieckers, *Handb. griech. Dial.* § 187. 25), may we think of *Fernassimilation* (*δράκανα* > \**δράκανα*) followed by dissimilation (\**δράρανα* > *δράλανα*) ?

<sup>2</sup> We have already noted that *A.P.* 6. 17 is a parody ; cf. Waltz's *Notice* to the sixth book of the Anthology, in his Budé-edition, pp. 18 ff.

<sup>3</sup> On the basis of Hesychius' *θαρσία· τρασά* (cf. Schmidt's note ad loc.) we might suspect that there existed a *Nebenform* *θαρσός* (which had specialized in the obscene meaning?) and leave *θαρσούς* unchanged in the text ; but, since cases of erroneous spelling

like *θαρσιάριος*, *θαρσιός* are attested in papyri (v. L.S.J., s.v.) it is better to correct *θαρσούς* into *ταρσούς*.

<sup>4</sup> The origin of the corruption is not difficult to explain : in the group *-τοχερί*, the syllable *το* was ligatured, and *τοχ* was misread as *τούς* ; confusion between *ε* and *ο*, and *η* is of course common.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. in particular Krüger-Pökel, *Griech. Sprachlehre*, i. 2<sup>8</sup> (Leipzig, 1873), p. 111 (= § 50. 8 Anm. 4) : *τὸν αὐτοδάκ τρόπον, ἡ Φρυγιστὴ ἀρμονία* ; the treatment of adverbs used attributively is not satisfactory in Kühner-Gerth, i. 594. 6. Excellent treatment of attributive uses in general in A. Svensson, *Der Gebrauch des bestimmten Artikels in der nachklassischen griechischen Epik* (Lund, 1937).

<sup>6</sup> The *δλισβοι* were not only used by respectable ladies, as Herodas vi shows, and by Lesbians, *τριβάδες* (Lucian, *Amor.* 28; *Dial. Mer.* 5), but they appear to have been very popular amongst prostitutes, most probably because these, no longer being able to derive any personal pleasure out of their intercourse with clients equipped with normal-sized *membra*, sought a remedy by procuring abnormally large *δλισβοι*. On the fact that such articles could be ordered to measure Aristophanes plays with his *δκτωδάκτυλος* ; on the use of *δλισβοι* by 'Hetären' (who oiled their instruments, in order to facilitate an otherwise difficult insertion), cf. in particular H. Licht, *Sittengesch. Griech.* ii. 30 ; *Ergänzungsbd.*, p. 39 f., 182, cf. also p. 249 ; cf. Kraiker, *Jahrb. d. arch. Inst.* xlii (1929), 174.

The poet has, in conclusion, made a calembour<sup>1</sup> on the two synonyms<sup>2</sup> *ταρσός* and *γέρρον*, one<sup>3</sup> of which<sup>4</sup>—whatever the etymological explanation of the semantic development—had acquired the meaning *δλισθος*.<sup>5</sup>

*King's College, Cambridge*

<sup>1</sup> On such calembours—frequent in the Anthology generally—cf., for Callimachus' epigrams, Cahen's edition, p. 132, n. 2, and p. 136, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Both *ταρσός* and *γέρρον* meant primarily 'frame of wicker-work'; there was semantic coalescence also in certain specialized meanings (cf., e.g., L.S.J., s.v. *γέρρον*, II 'eyelashes', and s.v. *ταρσός*, II, 6).

<sup>3</sup> We cannot of course rule out the eventuality that *ταρσός* as well, alongside *γέρρον*, had acquired the specialized obscene sense = *δλισθος*: certain of its known specialized meanings (e.g. L.S.J., s.v., II. 4 and 5) are attested only once.

<sup>4</sup> On the various designations of the *βαυβών* cf. Headlam-Knox on Herodas 6. 19.

<sup>5</sup> On *γέρρον* cf. the statements of ancient etymologists: *Et. Gud.*, s.v. *γέρρα* and *γέρρον*; *Et. Magn.*, s.v. *γέρρα*; Hesychius, s.v. *γέρρα*, 441-2 Schmidt; 'Suidas', s.v. *γέρρα*; Orion, p. 42. 24 Sturz (the most accurate, cf. L.S.J., s.v. *γέρρον*, v). There is no doubt, I think, that *γέρρον sensu obsceno* meant primarily, and with extreme probability exclusively, the *δλισθος*. The ancient lexicographers, connecting *γέρρα* with leather shields and tents, explain its obscene meaning as *δερμάτινα αίδοια*: if applied to female genital

G. GIANGRANDE

organs, this would be nonsense (cf. the clumsy explanations attempted in *Et. Gud.* and *Et. Magn.*), whereas the meaning *δερμάτινον αίδοιον* fits the *δλισθος* perfectly (cf. Larcher's note on Orion, loc. cit., and Crusius, *Philol. Supplementb.* vi [1893], 284); if we accept the modern etymological explanation of the obscene sense (from *γέρρον* = pole, stake: v. L.S.J., s.v. *γέρρον*, V; Frisk, *Griech. Etym. Wörterb.*, s.v.; Olivieri on Epich., fr. 174 = 235 Kaibel [to the evidence add *οι τόποι οι περιπεφραγμένοι* from *Et. Magn.*, s.v. *γέρρα*, and *οι περιπεφραγμένοι τόποι* from Eust. *Od.* 22. 184 = ii, p. 278 ed. Weigel]) this also fits the *δλισθος* admirably. The confusion with the female genital organ apparent in *Et. Magn.*, *Et. Gud.*, Hesychius, Eustathius, loc. cit., and *App. Prog.* i. 72 (= i. 390. 15 Leutsch-Schneidewin) can be explained either as a subsequent extension in the use of the word, or, much more plausibly, as a mistake of the lexicographers, who—except for the more accurate Orion!—were misled by the fact that exclusively women used the *γέρρον* = *δλισθος*. Perhaps *δλισθοι* were really dedicated in temples: cf. the statement in *App. Prog.*, loc. cit., which is supported by Petronius, *Sat.* 138; cf. Crusius, *Untersuch. zu den Mim. des Her.*, p. 128.

## NONNIANA

### I. SOME EMENDATIONS OF THE *DIONYSIACA*<sup>1</sup>

PROFESSOR RUDOLF KEYDELL has recently given us a greatly improved text of Nonnus' *Dionysiaca*.<sup>2</sup> But much remains to be done. Many problems are still unsolved: many a corruption may still lie unsuspected, since the manuscript on which we rely is one in which obvious corruption tends to be concealed by conjecture (see below on 25. 424-6).

Nonnus is not, relatively speaking, a difficult author. His style is peculiar; but it is also remarkably consistent and abundantly documented. One can predict what he will say, and how he will say it, as one cannot predict of a Hellenistic poet. His thought, and to some extent even his language, is formulaic, and analogy is a useful working principle in dealing with his text.

The poem was left in an unfinished state. That is why we find alternative versions of certain passages side by side, and sections complete in themselves, but never properly worked into their contexts. But the same explanation is not applicable where a single verse or sentence is faulty in sense; we cannot suppose that Nonnus actually wrote down nonsense, intending to make sense of it somehow at that later revision which he failed to carry out. I make this point in order to deprive of a subterfuge those who have a temperamental antipathy towards emendation. In each of the passages I discuss there is a difficulty or abnormality such that corruption is, in my opinion, the likeliest hypothesis.

1. *D.* 5. 307-9 (Actaeon spying on Artemis):

καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀνείμονος εἶδος ἀνάστης  
ὅμματι λαθριδίῳ δεδοκημένον ὅμματι λοξῷ  
Νηὸς ἀκρήδεμνος ἀπόπροθεν ἔδρακε νύμφη.

ὅμματι λοξῷ is appropriate to the context, and supported by 15. 238 f.:

λαθὼν νέος ὅμματι λοξῷ  
λευκὸν ὄιστευτῆρα βραχίονα δέρκετο κούρης,

29. 151-2, 48. 341-3. ὅμματι λαθριδίῳ is also in itself unobjectionable, cf. 42. 134, ὅμμασι λαθριδίοισιν ἐδέρκετο γείτονα κούρην. But the combination of both is impossible; the repetition of a noun in successive lines with different adjectives, as in 13. 480-1 and 20. 192-3, is not parallel. On the other hand, the two adjectives could be carried by a single ὅμματι, cf. 25. 380, etc.

I suggest ἔδρακε λαθριδίῳ. The anaphora of the verb for emotional effect would be similar to that at 15. 392-3.

ἔδρακε δ' Ἀδρήστεια, μαιάφονον ἔδρακε κούρην,  
ἔδρακεν Ἀδρήστεια νέκυν σπαίροντα σιδήρῳ.

The type of corruption postulated, viz. anticipation at the beginning of the line of a word that comes later in it, occurs elsewhere in the manuscript, e.g. at 1. 79, 6. 60, 11. 141.

<sup>1</sup> My thanks are due to Professors R. Keydell and H. Lloyd-Jones for their helpful comments on these suggestions; it should not

be assumed that they agree with them.

<sup>2</sup> *Nonni Panopolitanus Dionysiaca*, Berlin (Weidmann), 1959.

2. *D. 8. 198–200 (Semele's pregnancy):*

καὶ τόκον οὐ φαύοντα τελεσσιγόνοιο Σελήνης  
γαστρὸς ἀσημάντου χλοερὴ κήρυξε παρειῆ,  
καὶ χλόος τὴν ἐπέων μελέων πάρος.

200 οἰνώπων Ludwich: *ἡν μελέων ἐπέων* Wifstrand, *Gnomon* xxxiii (1961), 47, 'und die fahle Blässe der Glieder war an redender Worte Statt'. I suggest καὶ χλόος *εἶπε* νέων μελέων βάρος. Cf. 48. 946 (of a newborn child) *πήχει* κονφίζουσα νόθον βάρος (νέον βάρος Koechly), and of a child in the womb, *A. Cho.* 992,

ἔξ οὐ τέκνων ἡνεγχ' ὑπὸ ζώνην βάρος,

Lyc. 477. The use of *εἶπε* would admittedly be unusual, but paralleled by Homer's *φόως ἐρέων* (*Il.* 23. 226).

3. *D. 10. 333–4:*

τοῖσι μὲν οὐ τρίπος ἡν αέθλιον, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ νίκη  
ἀνθεμόεις παρέκειτο λέβης, οὐ φορβάδες ἵπποι.

Read *προύκειτο*. Cf. [Hes.] *Sc.* 312 *τοῖσιν δὲ προύκειτο μέγας τρίπος ἐντὸς ἀγῶνος*, Lys. 1. 47 *όρῶντες οἴα τὰ δύλα πρόκειται τῶν τοιούτων ἀμαρτημάτων*, X. *Cyr.* 2. 3. 2 *τὰ τῶν νικωμένων πάντα τοῖς νικῶσιν ἀεὶ δύλα πρόκειται*, Thuc. 2. 46. 1, E. *Hel.* 42–43, *I.G.* xii (9). 234. 18, etc.

4. *D. 12. 363–5 (Satyrs treading grapes):*

καὶ τις ἀναβλύζων φρενοθελγέος ἴκμάδα Βάκχον  
τικαμπύλον ἵχνος ἔκαμψε ποδῶν ἐλικώδει παλμῷ  
δεξιὸν ἐκ λαιοῖο μετήλυδα ταρσὸν ἀμείβων.

Perhaps *κάρπιμον* ἵχνος, as in 12. 6–7 (of the Horai),

αἱ δὲ φερεζώιο παρ' ὅμμασιν ἡνιοχῆος  
κάρπιμον ἵχνος ἔκαμψαν.

The adjective is appropriate here because they are making wine. Cf. *LSJ* s.v. *καρπός* (A) I. 1.

5. *D. 14. 137–8 (Satyrs):*

ψεδνὴ δ' ὀξύσεντι καρήατι φύετο χαίτη  
ἀκροφανῆς σκολιοῖσιν τέπ' ἀνδράσιν.

τέπ' ἀνδράσιν is clearly corrupt. The epithet 'crooked' or 'wavy' should here refer to hair, cf. 182 (Satyrs again),

καὶ σκολιαὶ πλοκαμῖδες ἀνηέξητο καρήνων.

Perhaps *σκολιῆσιν* ἐθειράσιν.

6. *D. 20. 216–19 (Iris masquerading as Ares, to Lycurgus):*

τέκνον ἐμόν, μεθέπεις ⟨ἴδιον⟩ σθένος, οὐδὲ χατίζεις  
πατρὸς Ἐνυαλίοιο, καὶ εἰ πτολέμοισιν ἀνάσσει  
ἔμπης δ', ἦν ἐθέλης, θωρήξομαι, οὐδέ σε λείψω  
μοῦνον ἐνὶ πτολέμοισι.

πτολέμοισι in 219 has the appearance of a mistaken repetition from 217

(where, as usual, the manuscript has the form ππολεμ-; see Keydell, *Nonni Panopolitani Dionysiaca*, i. 23\*-24\*.) Similar passages such as 11. 326-7, 30. 173-4, etc., give no assistance. I suggest μοῦνον ἐνὶ πλεόνεσσι, comparing *Il.* 15. 610-12,

ἀντὸς γάρ οἱ ἀπ' αἰθέρος ἦν ἀμύντωρ  
Ζεύς, ὃς μιν πλεόνεσσι μετ' ἀνδράσι μοῦνον ἔοντα  
τίμα καὶ κύδαινε.

4. 387-90; *Od.* 20. 28 ff. In all these passages, a man who is 'alone among many' is supported or promised support by a deity. For the exact words cf. *Od.* 22. 13, μοῦνον ἐνὶ πλεόνεσσι.

7. *D.* 23. 280-3:

'Ωκεανὸς δ' ίάχησεν ἀπειλείων Διονύσῳ,  
ὑδατόεν μύκημα χέων πολυπίδακι λαιμῷ,  
καὶ ρόον ἀενάων στομάτων κρουνηδὸν ἰάλλων  
ἡμόνας κόσμοι κατέκλυσε χεύμασι μόθων.

'Oceanus' speech is equated with his pouring waters, just as the lamentation of Cithaeron is equated with its springs in 46. 265-6,

ὡς φαμένον Κάδμοιο, γόνον κρουνηδὸν ἰάλλων,  
δάκρυσι πηγαίοισι γέρων ἔκλανε Κιθαιρών.<sup>1</sup>

In each phrase the balance between the two parallel phenomena is preserved. Only in 282 is it upset; for ἰάλλων requires an object that expresses the sound of Oceanus' words (cf. γόνον in the passage just cited). ρόος can indeed be used metaphorically of speech, as in Nonnus' *Metaphr. Ev. Io. Γ* 164 ἀειλιβέος ρόον ὄμφῆς, Z 195, Θ 44, O 27. But it cannot bear the required meaning by itself, and στομάτων is too ambiguous in the context to supply it. Read θρόον, cf. 29. 295,

φρικτὸν ὄμογλώσσων στομάτων θρόον,

where ρόον in the following line forbids the converse emendation.

8. *D.* 24. 13-14 (the river Hydaspes asks for mercy):

ἀσάμην Διόνυσε, πυριτρεφές· οὐρανίην γάρ  
σῶν δαῖδων ἀμάργυμα τεὴν κήρυξε γενέθλην.

Dionysus has rescued his forces from being overwhelmed by the angry river, by lighting up his *narthex* and setting aflame its waters, banks, and bed (23. 254 ff.). Hydaspes now refers to this experience as a token of Dionysus' birth—not merely that he was divine, but that he was born in fire, πυριτρεφής. The evidential value of the δαῖδες lies in their celestial or supernatural quality. I would accordingly expect οὐράνιον γάρ.

9. *D.* 24. 135-6:

ἢ μὲν νεβρὸν ἔβαλλεν ἀελλόπον ἢ δὲ λαθοῦσα  
ἄλματι λυστίζεντι κατέδραμε λυσσάδος ἄρκτον.

<sup>1</sup> On this kind of thinking in the *Dionysiaca* see now R. Keydell, *Mythendeutung in den Dionysiaca des Nonnos*, in the *Gedächtnisschrift für* Georg Rohde (Ιπαρχαί, Band 4), Tübingen, 1961, pp. 105-14.

ἀλματὶ λυσσήντι is unobjectionable, cf. 5. 353,

ἀλματὶ λυσσήντι κατεσσεύεσθε λεόντων.

So, in itself, is λυσσάδος ἄρκτου, cf. 48. 251,

πολλάκι δ' ἀγράσσουσα κατέτρεχε λυσσάδος ἄρκτου.

But one would expect Nonnus to vary this epithet (his standard one for bears, cf. also 5. 362, 9. 195, 10. 250, 44. 30) after λυσσήντι, since there is no rhetorical point in the juxtaposition: e.g. φωλάδος (cf. Theoc. 1. 115, *Hymn. Is.* 46; Nonnus has φωλάδες ὄδραι, 2. 142); or γείτονος.

10. *D.* 24. 256-8 (Aphrodite tries her hand at weaving):

καὶ πόνος ἦν ἀγέλαστος ὑφαινομένοιο δὲ πέπλου  
εὐρυτενής ὡγκοῦτο πέλωρ μίτος· αὐτόματοι δὲ  
στήμονες ἐρρήγνυντο παχυνομένοιο χιτῶνος.

ἀγέλαστος is barely intelligible. The work does in fact cause amusement to Athene (275) and Hermes (296), though it causes a sad interruption in the world's physical harmony. The context suggests ἀτέλεστος. Cf. *Il.* 4. 26, 57. Aphrodite is eventually persuaded to give up:

καὶ μίτον ἡμιτέλεστον ἀπορρίψασα χιτῶνος,  
αἰδομένη Γλαυκῶπιν, ἐῆς ἐπεβήσατο Κύπρου. (322-3)

11. *D.* 25. 424-6 (Amphion depicted on a shield):

σιγαλέῃ δὲ λύρῃ μεμελημένον ἄνδρα δοκεύων,  
κραιπνὸν ἀνακρούοντα μέλος φευδήμονι πέτρῃ,  
ἄγχι μολεῖν ἔσπενδες.

The word πέτρῃ has long been suspected. It was defended by Maas, *Byz.-Ngr. Jb.* iv (1923), 266, who explained it as 'der auf dem Schild dargestellte Stein', i.e. the rocks which were moved by the sound of Amphion's lyre. These are referred to in 420-2 and 428. But there is no reason why they should come in here; and if Nonnus were making a point about a man sitting and making music to an audience of stone, he would almost certainly have said . . . μάρτυρι πέτρῃ.

However, πέτρῃ is not what the scribe of the manuscript originally wrote; the τ is an alteration from χ. Now there is no obvious mechanical reason why he should have written a χ here instead of a τ; and in view of the known tendency of the scribes of this manuscript to emend (cf. Jacoby, *Hesiodi . . . Theogonia*, pp. 68-70; Russo, *Hesiodi Scutum*, p. 41; H. Fränkel ad A.R. 1. 19, 67, etc.; Keydell, p. 13\* f., seems to me somewhat over-optimistic), considerable attention must be paid to anything that he wrote before correction. I suggest that what he found before him, and altered to πέτρῃ, was a corrupt form of τέχνῃ. Tau and pi are of course easily confused. So are a minuscule nu and rho (examples in this manuscript: Hes. *Th.* 596 πρόπαρ for πρόπων a.c., 717 Τιτῆρας a.c., 879 ἀνθρώπωρ a.c.). Only the change from chi to tau is less easy; and this is the change that we catch the scribe in the act of making.

12. *D.* 25. 469-70:

καὶ νέον οἰκτείρουσα δεδουπότα μάρτυρι πότμῳ  
Νηιάς ἀκρήδεμνος ἐπέστενε γείτονι νεκρῷ.

Both *μάρτυς* and *γείτων* are frequently used as adjectives by Nonnus. *γείτονι νεκρῷ* is a little unusual, though not impossible if we regard the adjective as being transferred from *Νηάσ*. But we expect *μάρτυρι νεκρῷ*, as, for example, 11. 240,

*πλοχμὸν ἔνα τριήσας ἐπεθήκατο μάρτυρι νεκρῷ.*

And instead of *μάρτυρι πότμῳ*, which I for one do not understand, one might expect *γείτονι πότμῳ*: his fate is 'close at hand', because it stems from a serpent coiled round his neck. So 36. 211 f.,

*ἄλλος ἐνγλώχινι παρ' ὄμφαλὸν ἄκρον δίστῳ  
βλήμενος αὐτοκύλιστος ὄμιλες γείτονι πότμῳ,*

Met. A 51 (Lazarus), ὅτε κεῖνος ὄμιλες γείτονι πότμῳ.

13. D. 28. 29-31:

*στέμματα μὲν κορύθεσσιν, ἐπέκτυπε δ' αἰγίδι θώρηξ,  
ἔγχει θύρσος ἔθυσε, καὶ ἵσαζοντο κοθόρνοις  
ἀντίτυποι κνημῖδες.*

ἔθυσεν occurs as the aorist of *θνίω* in Call. fr. 223 (*ἴθυσεν* Meineke). Cf. h. Herm. 560 v.l. The verb and construction are possible; cf. 48. 287-8,

*κούρη δ' ἐγρομένη πινυτόφρονι μαίνετο Δάφνη,  
καὶ Παφίη καὶ Ἔρωτι μαχέσσατο.*

But we require the imperfect ἔθυε.

14. D. 34. 329-33 (Morreus appeals to Chalcomede):

*ἢν ἔθέλης, ἀτε λάτρις ὑποδρήσσω Διονύσῳ·  
ἢν ἔθέλης με δάμαζε καὶ αὐλένος ἡ κενεῶνος·  
οὐκ ἀλέγω θανάτου τεῦ δεδαγμένος αἰχμῇ·  
μοῦνον ἐμὲ στενάχιζε δεδουπότα· μυρομένης δὲ  
δάκρυα Χαλκομέδης με καὶ ἐξ Αἴδαο κομίσσει.*

It is not clear why Morreus should either expect or desire to be raised from the tomb by Chalcomede's sanguinely anticipated grief. A parallel is provided neither by 12. 142 ff., where Dionysus' grief for Ampelos persuades the Fates to allow the youth an after-life in the form of wine, nor by 30. 155-6, where Tectaphos, slain against his will, desires to be saved by craft. Morreus is a willing martyr to his love. He says 'slay me if you will; only weep for me'. Compare Hymnus in 15. 316 ff., 357 ff. He cannot then add, 'and your tears will bring me back from the dead'.

I propose *εὐ Αἴδαο*, taking *κομίσσει* in the sense 'tend'. So in 4. 151-9 Aphrodite, speaking to Harmonia in a dream, says she is willing to die for love of Cadmus, and will derive comfort from her love in Hades by making Persephone and the female dead jealous.

15. D. 36. 16-20 (Ares attacks Athene):

*μέσσην αἰγίδα τύφεν, ἀθηῆτον δὲ καρήνου  
ῆλασε Γοργείης ὄφιώδεα λήια χαίτης,  
Παλλάδος οὐτῆσας λάσιον σάκος· ὀξυτενῆς δὲ  
πεμπομένη ροιζηδὸν ἀκαμπέος ἔγχεος αἰχμῇ  
ποιητὴν πλοκαμῖδα νόθης ἔχαράξε Μεδούσης.*

The metaphor *λήια* implies not *ἥλασε* but *ἔθρισε*; the aegis was damaged, not merely struck. Cf. 25. 40 ff.,

καὶ ἔγκυον αὐχένα νύμφης  
Γοργόνος Εὐλείθυνα μογοστόκος ἔθρισεν ἀρπῇ  
αὐλακος ἵπποτόκου θαλύσιον ἀπτολέμον δὲ  
Περσεὺς ὀκυπέδιλος ἐκούφισε σύμβολα νίκης  
ἄπνοια Γοργείης ὄφιώδεα λήια χαίτης.

31. 17-19,

καὶ ἀμώμων παρὰ πέτρῃ  
λήια συρίζοντα, θαλύσια λοξὰ κομάων,  
Γοργόνος ἀδίνοντα διέθρισεν ἀνθερεῶνα.

4. 402, 5. 1-2, etc.

16. D. 37. 531-3 (a boxing-match):

ἐπιθρωσμῷ δὲ προσώπου  
εὐρυτέρου γεγαῶτος ἐκυμαίνοντο παρειά,  
όφθαλμοὶ δ' ἐκάτερθεν ἐκοιλαίνοντο προσώπου.

The repetition of *προσώπου* is not impossible for Nonnus; in earlier Greek, the eyes are more usually spoken of as being on or in the *μέτωπον* (Hes. Th. 143, 145, Aristeas 5. 1, Theoc. 11. 31-33, etc.), but in Nonnus their regular location is the *πρόσωπον* (37. 517, Met. I. 31, 124, etc.), the *μέτωπον* being more associated with horns.

But it is not clear how the eyes become hollow when the cheeks are swelling. Hollow eyes are associated with rage (*A. Pl.* 4. 142) and sleepless love. One might imagine that the swollen flesh round the eye would make the eye itself appear sunken. But this would be the answer of abstract theory; anyone who has witnessed the vile sport of boxing knows that the eye becomes closed, everything being swollen except the eyeball itself, which cannot be swollen any more than it can be hollow. So Theoc. 22. 101,

οὖματα δ' οἰδήσαντος ἀπεστείνωτο προσώπου.

I propose ἐποιδαίνοντο *προσώπω*, 'swelled on the face'. 'Eyes' here must on any view include the flesh surrounding the actual eyeballs; for the coupling of *οἰδαίνω* with *κυμαίνω*, cf. 48. 371,

σύνομος οἰδαίνοντι χόλῳ κυμαίνετο δαίμων.

17. D. 37. 667:

καὶ σόλον αὐτοχόωνον ἄγων ἐπέθηκεν ἀγῶνι.

Read ἐνέθηκεν, comparing 705,

ἡμίονον ταλαιργὸν ἐνεστήριξεν ἀγῶνι,

33. 73-74 ἀργύρεος δὲ | κεῖτο λέβης ἐν ἀγῶνι, *Od.* 24. 86-87, *Il.* 23. 273, 654.

18. D. 40. 183-5:

πατρὸς ἐνοσφίσθην χάριν ἀνέρος· ή πρὶν ἀγήνωρ  
καὶ θυγάτηρ βασιλῆος, ἐγώ ποτε δεσπότις Ἰνδῶν,  
ἔσσομαι ἀμφιπόλων καὶ ἐγώ μία.

The first *ἐγώ* is unwanted, and probably a mistaken anticipation of the second: e.g. *ἐμῶν*.

19. *D.* 40. 448-50:

συμφερτὴν ἀτίνακτον ἀρηρότι δήσατε δεσμῷ  
δίφρον ἀλός, σχεδίην πρωτόπλοον, ἢ διὰ πόντου  
ὑμέας ὄχλιζειε.

A ship does not lever you through the sea, it carries you. *όχλιζειε* is scarcely to be defended by Nic. *Al.* 505 (the leeches are pressed into position by the current of water), nor can we assume that Nonnus adopted a perverse interpretation of A.R. 4. 962-3. I see two possibilities: *όκχήσειε*, a form which Nonnus does not use elsewhere, though it occurs in Hellenistic poetry; cf. *Il.* 24. 731 *νηνὸν ὄχήσονται*, etc.; or *όχμάζειε*. On this optative of verbs in -ζω see Maas, *Byz.-Ngr. Jb.* iv (1923), 265.

20. *D.* 41. 371-4:

ποικίλα παντοίης ἔχαράσσετο δαιδαλα τέχνης  
μαντιπόλοις ἐπέεσσων, ὅτι πρώτιστα νοήσει  
Πάν νόμιος σύριγγα, λύρην Ἐλικάνιος Ἐρμῆς,  
δίθροον ἀβρὸς Ὑαγνις ἐντρήτοι μέλος αὐλοῦ.

Hermes has no place on Helicon, and Nonnus does not invent epithets indiscriminately. We expect an epithet to balance *νόμιος*. Pan and the syrinx are to the pastoral scene as Hermes and the lyre to public gatherings; and seeing that Nonnus uses *ἐναγάνιος Ἐρμῆς* twice elsewhere (10. 337, 48. 231), there can be little doubt that it is to be read here.

21. *D.* 42. 67-70:

ισταμένης δὲ  
στήθει χεῖρα πέλασσε δυνάμερον, ἄκρα δὲ μίτρης  
ὡς ἀέκων ἔθλιψεν ἐπιφαίνουσα δὲ μαζῶν  
δεξιτερὴ νάρκησε γυναιμανέος Διονύσου.

What is meant by *ἄκρα μίτρης*? And why should Dionysus wish to squeeze, *ὡς ἀέκων*, this or any other part of Beroe's clothing? What he wishes to squeeze, and does squeeze, must surely be *ἄκρα μαζῶν*. Cf. 1. 347-8, *ὡς ἀέκων δὲ | οἰδαλέην ἔθλιψεν ἀκαμπέος ἄντυγα μαζῶν*,

4. 148-9. τεθναίην ὅτε μοῦνον ἀφειδέα χεῖρα χαλάσσας  
ἀμφοτέρων θλίψειεν ἐλεύθερον ἄντυγα μαζῶν.

42. 451-2 *ἄκρα δοκεύων | στήθεα*. Having done so, he goes on to touch<sup>1</sup> her *παρθενίη* *ζώνη*—the normal and natural sequence (1. 348-51, 35. 33-35, Hdt. 5. 18. 5-20. 1, etc.) We should therefore transpose *μίτρης* and *μαζῶν*.

A *μίτρη* can of course clothe a girl's breast as well as her loins; cf. 1. 529 f., 5. 312 f., 605, 48. 654-9.<sup>2</sup> But in the context there can have been no ambiguity. Cf. [Theoc.] 27. 49,

τί ρέζεις σατυρίσκε; τί δ' ἐνδοθεν ἄψαο μαζῶν;  
and 55, φεῦ φεῦ, καὶ τὰν μίτραν ἀπέσχισας. ἐς τί δ' ἔλνσας;

22. *D.* 42. 396-9 (Dionysus woos Beroe):

ποῖά σοι Ἐννοσίγαιος ἐπάξια δῶρα κομίσσει;  
ἢ ἥδα σοι ἔδνα γάμοιο τεδέξεται ἀλμυρὸν ὕδωρ,  
καὶ στορέσει πνείοντα δυσώδεα πόντιον ὁδμὴν  
δέρματα φωκάων, Ποσιδόνια πέπλα θαλάσσης;

<sup>1</sup> Cf. 12. 387, Call. fr. 75. 45 pf.

<sup>2</sup> See W. Bühler, *Die Europa des Moschos*

(*Hermes Einzelschriften*, xiii (1960), pp.

117-18.

Read *ἢ ρά οἱ . . . δεδέξει . . . στορέσεις*. The correction of 397 is straightforward; dative pronoun as in 402, *Il.* 2. 186, etc. That in 398 requires some further explanation. In outlining the advantages of marriage with himself Dionysus has volunteered to make the bed himself (394-5), as he had promised Nicaea in like circumstances (16. 94-101). But if she chooses Poseidon, such unusual self-sacrifice is not to be presupposed. She will have to perform the task herself, and the odorous sealskins will offend her then as well as when she sleeps on them. Nonnus does not need to emphasize the contrast by means of a *σύ* or *αὐτή*, because in default of a *θαλαμηπόλος* this is a bride's normal duty, cf. 2. 326, 43. 155, 47. 391, *Theoc.* 6. 33, etc.

23. *D.* 42. 447-55:

*εἰς Βερόην σκοπίαζε, καὶ ἐκ ποδὸς ἄχρι καρῆνου  
κούρης ἵσταμένης διεμέτρεεν ἔνθεον ἥβην,  
οὗν δὲ λεπταλέοι δι' εἴματος, οὐα κατόπτρω,  
ὅμμασιν ἀπλανέεσσι τύπον τεκμαίρετο κούρης,  
οὐά τε γυμνωθέντα παρακλιδὸν ἄκρα δοκεύων  
στήθεα μαρμάροντα πολυπλεκέεσσι δὲ δεσμοῖς  
μαζῶν κρυπτομένων φθονερὴν ἐπεμέμφετο μίτρην,  
δινεύων ἐλικηδὸν ἐρωμανὲς ὅμμα προσώπου,  
παπταίνων ἀκόρητος ὅλον δέμας.*

The account contains a clear contradiction. Poseidon admires Beroe through her diaphanous apparel, and sees her breasts that shine through as if they were naked (cf. *Ach. Tat.* 1. 1. 10-11 *τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ τῆς ἐσθῆτος ὑπεφαίνετο . . . καὶ ἐγίνετο τοῦ σώματος κάτοπτρον ὁ χιτών*). Yet he curses the tightly wrapped *μίτρη* that conceals her *μαζόλ*.

It is clear from *μαρμάροντα* that the *πολυπλεκέες δεσμοί* do not cover her breast, which is only thinly clothed. Nonnus only speaks of skin as white or gleaming when it is visible (cf. 351); it *becomes* white when it is uncovered by a wanton breeze (15. 223-32).

It follows that here again *μίτρη* must mean the *ὅμμα κορείης*. For *μαζῶν* we should in this case probably read *μηρῶν*, a common Nonnian euphemism. There is possibly a parallel for the corruption, or rather alteration, at 46. 279,

*στήθεα φοινίξασα καὶ ἀσκεπέων πτύχα μαζῶν.*

This is the reading of the manuscript, though the zeta in *μαζῶν* is a correction: Koch's *μηρῶν* is supported by 35. 32 and 48. 118 *ἀσκεπέων πτύχα μηρῶν*, and 48. 655 *στήθεα . . . καὶ ἀσκεπέος πτύχα μηροῦ*.

24. *D.* 46. 253-5 (Cadmus laments the death of Pentheus):

*καλὰ φέρεις Διόνυσε τεῦθ θρεπτήρια Κάδμῳ.  
καλά μοι Ἀρμονίης νυμφεύματα δῶκε Κρονίων.  
Ἄρεος ἄξια ταῦτα καὶ Οὐρανίης Αφροδίτης.*

Ares and Aphrodite are Harmonia's parents. *Prima facie*, Cadmus is asking indignantly whether Zeus has granted the children of the marriage a just fate, in view of the bride's divine parentage.

*Ἴνῳ πόντον ἔχει, Σεμέλην ἔφλεξε Κρονίων,  
μύρεται Αύτονόν κερόν τέκος, ἀ μέγα δειλὴ  
ἔκτανεν δὲ τέκε μοῦνον ἀώριον νιὸν Ἀγανῆ,  
καὶ μογέει Πολύδωρος ἐμὸς λιπόπατρις ἀλήτης. (256-9)*

The difficulty lies in the juxtaposition of this outraged protest with the ironical approval of the νυμφεύματα in 254; if 255 were similarly ironical, ἄξια would have to stand in a more emphatic position. I suggest:

Ἄρεος ἄξια ταῦτα, καὶ οὐ γαμίης Αφροδίτης.

(γαμίη . . . Αφροδίτη 48. 297; Οὐρανή Αφροδίτη not elsewhere in Nonnus.) There will now be no reference to Ares and Aphrodite as parents of Harmonia. The sense will be that Zeus' gifts are more appropriate to a state of open hostility than to a marriage alliance.

25. D. 48. 502-5:

τίς γαμίοις δάροισι παραπλάζει φρένας ἄρκτον  
εἰς Παφίνην, ἐς Ἐρωτα; τίς ὡμίλησε λεαίνη;  
τίς δρυῖ μύθον ἔλεξε; τίς ἀπνοον ἡπαφε πεύκην;  
τίς κρανένην παρέπεισε, καὶ εἰς γάμον ἡγαγε πέτρην;

I would transpose πεύκην and πέτρην. This is supported both by the proverbial association of δρῦς and πέτρη (Paroem. Gr. ii. 158-9; in Nonnus cf. 3. 68 καὶ δρῦς ἐψιθύριζον, ἐμυκήσαντο δὲ πέτραι, 16. 224 παρθενικὴν μέμφασθε φύλαι δρῦνες· εἴπατε πέτραι . . .) and by the order in 15. 404-5:

καὶ Νύμφας ἀκάχησεν, ὀρειάδος οὐ κλύει τέρης,  
οὐ πτελέης ἡκουσε, καὶ οὐκ ἡδέσσατο πεντην.

## II. ISAAC CASAUBON'S ADVERSARIA ON NONNUS

The library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, possesses a copy of the *editio princeps* of the *Dionysiaca* (Falkenburg, Antwerp, 1569) owned and annotated by Isaac Casaubon. Mr. R. G. M. Nisbet called my attention to this book, and very kindly allowed me to borrow it for inspection. It is mentioned by Fraenkel, *Agamemnon*, i. 63, but, so far as I know, it has never before been properly examined.

The majority of the marginalia are alternative readings and conjectures copied from Falkenburg's notes at the back of the book. But there remains a not inconsiderable number of emendations by Casaubon himself. Over a hundred of these are merely corrections of errors in the printed edition from which the Laurentian MS. is free. The remainder are listed below. Many of them are quite unacceptable, being based on imperfect knowledge of Nonnus' metre and style, and in some cases, it must be said, complete misunderstanding of the narrative. Nevertheless, I have not thought it proper to make a personal selection, and accordingly present them complete. On the other side of the balance a great many of these conjectures were made again by later scholars, and these are generally admitted to be correct.

The book is signed Is. Hortusbonus, the name Casaubon used before his father's death in 1586. He must have begun to read it shortly before 1584. In the *Lectiones Theocriticae* which appeared in that year he cites Nonnus only once—from Book 2. In the second edition (1596), however, he quotes freely from all parts of the *Dionysiaca*, and mentions two of his emendations (see on 5. 375). He therefore has priority over Lubinus (1605), Cunaeus (1610),<sup>1</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Cunaeus sent Casaubon a copy of his edition, and the latter, in acknowledging the gift (*Ep. 668*), professes to have derived great profit from it.

the anonymi Villoisonianus and Lipsiensis, who used Cunaeus' text (cf. Keydell, p. 29\*). In the cases of Scaliger and Rhodomann the priority is uncertain.

Casaubon's conjectures are almost all accompanied by the word 'forte' or 'credo' or 'quid si...?' I have omitted these words, but reported other accompanying notes. Comments of my own are enclosed in square brackets. I have occasionally given Falkenburg's text (denoted by letter f), where this is necessary in order to make the conjecture intelligible. I have also named the later scholar to whom each conjecture is usually attributed. The working dates of these scholars (apart from those mentioned above), i.e. the dates when they published the conjectures concerned, are: Daniel Heinsius 1610 (*ap. Cunaeum*); Wakefield 1789; Moser 1809; Graefe 1809-17; Ouwaroff 1817; Hermann 1823; Koechly 1836-58; Koch 1855; Meineke, Rigler, de Marcellus 1856; Tiedke 1878; Ludwich 1913.

1. 34 ἐθελοντὶ, alias θύρσους τε [lacuna in f]	187 αὐτὶς vel αὐθὶς [αὐτῆς f]
340 ἄρπαγος ἄρπαγμον	394 μολπῆ [Scaliger]
	528 βαθυσμήριγγος [anon. Lips.].
2. 281 κύκλον	398 Παχύνιον [Rhodomann]
505 ἔμφυτον [anon. Villois.]	531 ἡοῦς [Heinsius]
[Scaliger]	565 Τυφωέα
3. 154 δακρύεντα [sic]	651 πῆξεν [anon. Villois.]
si τὸν et ἔδρακεν? aut si relinquemus τὶς, supplendum τὶς εἴη. [τὸν Koechly, ἔδρακεν iam Canter in ed. Falk.].	344 εἰχεν
4. 117 τρομέης	169 χολωμένη
κρήμους	322 ὅτε [Graefe]
373 δακόντος [θανόντος f].	336 βαθυ-
5. 1 πτολέμου	186 ὡν [Graefe]
-εν ἔον vel ἔθεν [έον Graefe, fort. recte, cf. 3. 333-4, 12. 189-90] <sup>1</sup>	329 νεβροφόνων [Scaliger]
ἔτρεχεν	471 ἐθελήσαις
6. 170 χρισθέντος	178 ἐτέρως vel ἐτερός
ἰσόφθογγοις [Koechly]	296 ἐφορῶν
ἐρυμνώθησαν [Graefe].	308 θαλασσαίη Ηφροδίτη
7. 100 ἐπιείμενος vel ἐπιείμενον	116 ἦν γραφὲν
χεροῖν.	139 ὄρθριος
8. 5 Κρονίδαο	211 κατηφιώσα [Graefe]
9. 23 ἐφήμιστεν [Koechly]	55 προθοροῦσα
parum videtur quadrare Βάκχον, idem enim esset atque Melicerta	56 quid si βαιὸν, nam hic
nescio quid hic quadret, Νεῖλου, fortasse κείνου legendum vel Βάκχον ut infra	71
p. 177 versu 12 [= 10. 85. Βάκχον de Marcellus]	151 ἔάει
νάπος ἐνναετῶντος	169 καὶ
231 ὑποκλέπτοντα	296 ἐκόρυξαν.
10. 159 Σατύροις	193 ὄμεστον
11. 54 ἄλλοτε forte, ut referatur ad πῆ μὲν πῆ δὲ [Rhodomann]	303 ἀερτάσειν [Rhodomann].
τόνος	286 ὥρη [Ouwaroff]
κούρῳ? sed ex sequentibus appetet καρπὸν esse proprium pueri nomen.	385 quid si
12. 63 ὄρμον [Graefe] vel ὄρμων	139 μοίραι [Cunaeus]
[Cun.]	177 χειρῶν
334 ἀκρὸν [sic].	
13. 18 μυθήσατο [Graefe]	124 καὶ τὴν ὑαμπ.
	178 ἀρούρη [Koechly]

<sup>1</sup> [Casaubon published these two conjectures in the revised version of his *Lessiones* *Theocritae*, cap. xxii.]

204 πεφύτιστο 287 ἀλῆτις 341 ἐπὶ [Rhod.] 429 ἐκόσμεεν οἰστρον  
 434 σφήκειαν ἀλικτύπτου 544 ὄμβριον [de Marc.].

14. 154 ἀρτίτοκον vel os [ων f, os Moser] 290 βάκχου 309 νῆις  
 421 μὲν.

15. 354 alias σμίλακος.

16. 24 πετάσω [-σσω] Koechly] 270 λοχείην [Wakefield] 290  
 ὑμέναιε [Rhod.] 295 ἥ.

17. 53 δεῖπνα [Scal.] 247 Λιαίου [Graeſe] 329 σχιζόμενοι [Gr.]  
 352 alias ἐσχίζετο [Gr.] 392 ὅπη [Gr.].

18. 19 δῶμα [Cunaeus] 177 προκέλευθον [Gr.] 208 ἀμελγομένης  
 238 ἀλλοφυεῖς [Gr.] 240 λαίμων [Cun.] 241 ἐρευγόμενοι [Cun.]  
 323 βότρυος 337 κατηφιώντι [Gr.] 368 ἐγχιμάχοιο.

19. 237 δ' possit tolli [Graeſe].

20. 66 ἐην [Gr.] 163 δίφρον [Gr.] 315 ὡς σφέας 347 ἐφυβρί-  
 ζουσα vel ἐπιβρίθουσα [hoc Gr.] 373 ἵχθυβόλους ἐs ἀγάνας vel -βόλων [hoc  
 Graeſe; verum ἐs suspectum, cf. 37. 149, 42. 513, Met. E 113, Musae. 197]  
 386 ἀδωνᾶς vel νόν.

21. 76 φυοῖς 110 ἀμνήμονες forte, propter ea quae sequuntur 148 hic  
 aliquid desideratur, nam est subita digressio nec hic est nomen libera-  
 tricis Lycurgi de qua loquitur, nisi loco ἀρραβίας scribendum esset ἀλλ' ἡρη  
 σχεδὸν etc. nam ex sequentibus appetet de Junone eum loqui. 197 σκάλμος  
 [σκέλμος f] 205 δέρμα [Gr.] 256 ἀρότρων [Cun.] vel τρου 286  
 ἀίσσουσα.

22. 1 Ιξεν [Gr.] 2 ὅπη [Gr.] 14 καὶ δρυάδες credo vel aī δρυάδες δ'.  
 nisi quod saepe usurpat ἀδρυάδες pro ἀμαδρυάδες 61 μίμημα 78 Διονύσου  
 credo, nam quorsum hic ποταμοῖο, cum superius enarrata miracula sint a  
 numine Bacchi. 87 πυκαζομένη [Gr.] 102 ἐπὶ 121 ἀνὰ δρύας [Gr.]  
 196 κατέσπασε 290 ἀνάδυνος [Gr.] 306 προσχόμενος [Gr.]  
 347 ἴων [Cun.].

23. 5 στείχοντες 146 ἀνέκυψε 156 καθίππενεν credo, nam καθιπ-  
 πεύων construi non potest [155 δαμναμένη δὲf] 180 ὅτι 186 μιγήμεναι  
 credo, et magis videtur convenire [Rhodom., Falk. ap. Cun.] 319 Ὑδάσπην  
 [Cun.].

24. 10 μον 50 γάμον 89 ἡερίους [Gr.] 127 ἄμα δρυαδ. credo  
 propter sequens vocabulum ἀδρυάδες [de Marc.] 252 ἀτρίπτου vel  
 ἀτρέπτου.

25. 38 πλοχμὸν 272 Βάκχου 308 μετρήσαντα 454 πύλον forte,  
 sed quid sit nescio.

26. 33 θυγατέρος [Cun.] 52 ἀν [Gr.] 63 χίδροπα [χύδροπα f].

27. 18 βελῶν 33 ὑποδρηστῆρα [Gr.] 97 ἐφορώμενος 243 ἡγερέ-  
 θοντο.

28. 45 ἐὸν πόδα [Koechly] ἐρείσας [de Marc.] 176 μαρνάμενος [Gr.].

29. 72 κυκλούμενος [Tiedke] 154 ἐρευθομένων [Tiedke] 198 χαλκείη  
 [Gr.] 215 φαλάραν 261 δίχα [Falk. ap. Cun.].

30. 10 ἀīξε 26 ἡμέτεροι [Gr.] 56 λυσσήντι [Lubinus] 61 καβείρων  
 114 ἐπικλάγγοντας [de Marc.] 172 αἰδωνῆα [Meineke] 192 δεσμῷ  
 209 μονῆς f. ob sequentia [sc. pro ζαμενῆς].

31. 75 διερπύσσασα 205 alias χοροιτίδες [χορήτιδες f].

33. 261 γαμβροῖς [Koch].

34. 48 φάμενος [Gr.] 88 ἐπιπτεν vel ἴανεν [hoc Ouwaroff] 126 ἀπὸ<sup>hod.</sup>.

35. 83 αἰχμὴν [Scaliger]	168 τευχέων [Rhod.]	170 ἀμφότερον [Gr.]
36. 101 κυήσας [Rhod.] vel μηδὲ καταρρήξας	480 ἐφοπλίσασα γαλήνη.	177 φυταλείης 327
θαλπόμενος 415 βάκχαι		
37. 24 προβλῆτι 238 νοήσας [Gr.]	283 ἀλήτης [Gr.]	349
Ἀρισταίον [Gr.].		
38. 91 πατρὸς 155 κοῦρον [Rhod.]	172 ἄξον [de Marc.]	365
ἐσσφόρος [ἐώσφορός Gr.].		
39. 84 στόμαθ' [Rhod.]	127 χαλκόκροτον [Rhod.]	305 βεβύθυντο.
40. 6 μορφὴν [Koechly]	12 δύνασαι [Rhod.]	17 ἦ [Gr.] 62
μαρναμένω [Gr.] vel μαρνάμενος [Koechly]	111 ἐπὶ πατρὶ vel γενετῆρι [hoc Cun.]	
117 ρέεθρω [Rhod.]	315 ἀλμῆ [Gr.]	450 ὀχλίσει [Rhod.]
497 πλάγξεται.		
41. 139 φορβῆς [Cun.]	186 ἀβρὸν [Gr.]	189 ὄπλαις [Rhod.]
265 νόω 336 μοι δώκε [Rigler: μοι ἔδωκε Gr.].		
42. 188 βεβολημένον 222 πεπτάμενον [de Marc.]	353 ὅτε 383	
ἀτιμήσασ' [noluit Gr.] 455 οἰστρομανῆς credo, nisi adverbialiter sumatur		
οἰστρομανῆς [Cun.] 464 τιθήνης ut referatur ad Ὁρχομένοιο		540
κυδοιμῷ [Gr.].		
43. 155 Βασσαρίδες [Gr.] 167 κομίσσατο [165 ἐρύσσατο f]	174 μῶν	
βελέων 207 ἀπ' [Gr.] 282 νώτω [Gr.]	364 ratio versus postulat	
ut legatur δουλοσύνην μετὰ τηρῆσις etc.	400 δαδία [?] vel δαδάλα [Gr.].	
44. 91 ἐοῦ for. quia de Pentheo mentio fit credo, ut sit instrumentaliter posita [Gr.]	181 μητρὸς [Scal.] 304 ὡντὸς.	266 ἦ
45. 277 παλάμαις [Gr.] 288 ρινότορος 300 μαζοὶ [Rhod.]	330	
κορύμβῳ 341 θεσμοῦ cr. aut aliud quiddam ut θείω		344 πολλὴ ut
referatur ad αἴγλη		
46. 1 ἀνὴρ [Scal.] 132-3 ὁχθον for. [Gr.] nam ὁχλος ἀρούρης nihil significat. et ἐπάκτιος f. nam hic non convenit ἐπάξιος	183 θάμνου cr. ut	
sit constructio ὀλκον θάμνου	214 περιπλεχθεῖσα [Hermann].	
47. 20 δίχροον [Rhod.] 25 Μυγδονίη [Rhod.] 75 ἀσκῶν [Gr.]		
184 ἔῆς 381 φεύξω 403 ἀκούσω [de Marc.] 437 ἐμνησε [ἐμμινε f]		
467 πυρόεν [Koechly]	606 τεθυωμένον	630 ἔθνος 726
ρέξατε [Rhod.].		
48. 13 γιγάντων [Scal.] 19 ὅπος [an voluit ὅπως? ὅπη f]	126 ἔβαλλον	
199 ράχων [Falk. ap. Cun.] 383 γὺψ 423 ἐμῶν [anon. Villois.]	492	
φεῦγον forte ut referatur ad φάρμακον [Gr.]	592 δὲ διψώνοσα [Ludwich]	
ut supra vel διοπτεύοντα	674 ἡχοῦς [anon. Villois.]	899 ἐλθετε
948 γαῖαν for. aut aliud simile [γαῖη f]		951 ἀνηράρησε vel
ἀνηρέησε [ἀνηράρησε f].		

## ΔΕΝ IN CLASSICAL GREEK

Δέν occurs in two classical contexts. They are: (i) Alc. 320 L.-P. (23 Diehl) καὶ κ' οὐδὲν ἐκ δενὸς γένοιτο; (ii) Democr. 156 Diels (in Plut. *Adv. Colot.* 4, p. 1108 F. . . . ὁ Κολώτης ἐσφάλη περὶ λέξιν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἐν ἦ διορίζεται μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἡ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, δὲν μὲν ὄνομάζων τὸ σῶμα, μηδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν. Further, Diels adds two other passages showing Democritus' use of the word. Simpl. *De Caelo*, p. 294. 33 f. Heiberg (Diels, *Frag. d. Vorsokr.* ii. 93) προσαγορεύει δὲ τὸν μὲν τόπον τοῖσδε τοῖς ὄνμασι, τῷ τε κενῷ καὶ τῷ οὐδενὶ καὶ τῷ ἀπέιρῳ, τῶν δὲ οὐσιῶν ἐκάστην τῷ τε δενὶ καὶ τῷ ναστῷ καὶ τῷ ὄντι. Galen *De Elem. Sec. Hipp.* 1. 2 (Diels, op. cit., p. 97) κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δὲν καὶ μηδέν ἔστι τὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν τοῦτον εἴρηκεν αὐτός, δὲν μὲν τὰς ἀτόμους ὄνομάζων, μηδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν.

There should not be any doubt about the origin of δέν as a back-formation made from οὐδέν / μηδέν by the isolation of the negative element οὐ- (μη-) instead of the correct οὐδ- (μηδ-). Etymology is not always so easy. But even here attempts have been made to avoid the obvious.<sup>1</sup> An ingenious older interpretation (Wharton, *Etyms Graeca*)<sup>2</sup> suggested deriving δεῖς from δεῖνα, on the analogy of εἰς: that is, presumably, δεῖς as a nominative masculine would be a back-formation from δεῖνα, with this form taken as an accusative and on the analogy of the declension of εἰς. The sense would not be impossible: δεῖνα 'so and so, somebody'; δέν 'something'. But a number of difficulties arises whose effect is surely fatal. There is no form \*εἴνα as accusative of εἰς; nor is δεῖς itself attested, but only the neuter δέν.<sup>3</sup> This upsets the analogical pattern of the morphology. Further, the attempt to connect with δεῖνα illustrates the danger of etymologizing without reference to the facts of usage. Alcaeus provides the first evidence of the use of δέν, but about six generations pass before the earliest use of δεῖνα (Aristophanes, Sophron). Again, Lesbian and Ionic have δέν, Attic and Doric δεῖνα. The separation of time and place is too much to bridge.

Schwyzer (*Griech. Gramm.* i. 588, n. 4) notes with approval the suggestion of Kühner-Blass, i. 634 (also 614), that the separation of δεῖς, δέν was made possible by the psilosis of εἰς in Aeolic, and, presumably, Ionic. I cannot see any reason why psilosis was a necessary stage in the development. It is thereby suggested that a pronunciation *ouden* could easily be divided into *ou-den*, but that in Attic the pronunciation *oudhen* (*oud'hen*) to which the emergence of οὐδέν in the fourth century bears witness prevented such a division and so stopped the creation of the word. This does not make sense. All that stood in the way of the formation of the word δέν was a correct morphological division of οὐδέν, and that would be the same whether there was an aspirate present or not after οὐδ-. For a speaker of Aeolic 'one' was εῖν, and of Attic εἶν: the amount

<sup>1</sup> A brief reference will suffice for Pisani, *Rendic. Accad. Lincei*, vii (1931), 71 ff. He derives οὐδέν from οὐ δέν, the latter supposedly an emphatic particle built upon a new form \*δέ and on the analogy of μέν. There is no justification at all for this view, which also leaves out of account the pronominal

use of δέν in Alcaeus and Democritus.

<sup>2</sup> I owe the reference to Professor L. J. D. Richardson.

<sup>3</sup> Hence it might have been better for L.S.J. to use δέν as their lemma, and not the form δεῖς, which only appears in *Et. Mag.* as part of its explanation of the form δέν.

of distinction from *den* in the first case, and from *dhen* in the second, was precisely the same. The only role that aspiration could have played—but did not—might have arisen if in a non-psilotic dialect *oúdén* were pronounced as *ouden*, while *év* retained the aspirate; in this way the link between the two words would have become less obvious, and so the way laid open for an interpretation of *ouden* as *ou-den*. In other words, *non-psilosis* might have assisted in the formation: psilosis could not. In a psilotic dialect *év* and *-év* in the compound remained as closely linked as ever they were.

It is not, however, to be assumed that *dév* was due to a mistaken analysis of *oúdén*<sup>1</sup> if that implies that the correct morphological division of the word was not at the same time appreciated. In my view Alcaeus and Democritus were quite aware of what they were doing; it would be most surprising if they were not. *oúd(ε)-* was commonly found in other compound words as the initial element. Thus, *oúdépota* and *oúdépw* occur in Lesbian verse. Could Alcaeus have 'mistakenly' isolated \**dépota* 'ever', or \**dépw* 'yet' from these forms? The question hardly needs an answer. Again, *dév* is not found in language drawing upon a popular source, such as comedy, yet that would be a more likely context for it if based upon *Volksetymologie*.

The analysis into *oú-dén*, artificial as it is, is due to a sophisticated, and not an ignorant, division of the word. Its purpose is not difficult to see. It was made in order to provide a striking antithesis of form to the negative *oúdén* (*μηδέν*); and the use of *dén* in antithesis in both passages (*καὶ κ' οúdén ἐκ δενὸς γένοιτο: μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι*) shows that the word was felt to be a form which could not be used freely in isolation from its opposite. There is a parallel in the use of the precisely similar form *θév*, made from *oúdén*: this word appears in Theodotion's translation of the *O.T.*, quoted by Philoponus, *De Opif.* ii. i. 59. 12 (Reichardt): *ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν θὲν καὶ οὐθέν.*<sup>2</sup> We note again the appearance of the two opposites, one a regular form, the other an artificial construct. For parallels to this usage I would refer among others to the use of the verbal form *ártēi* (*Theog.* 621 *πᾶς τις πλούσιον ἄνδρα τίει, ἀrtēi δὲ πενιχρόν*), which is irregular in prefixing *á-* to a purely verbal stem; also *árt̄dōma* (*Hermipp.* 77 K. *ἀ τόθ' ἥσθη, ταῦτα νῦν ἀνήδομαι*).

We may now turn to the meaning of *dén*. In view of its derivation, and its use in antithesis to *oúdén* and *μηδέν*, there would seem little reason to question the meaning 'something', 'anything' (on the analogy of *τι*: *οὐ τι*); or possibly 'one thing' (*dén* = *év*). 'Something' is the interpretation of *Et. Mag.* 305. 1 Gaisford (s.v. *εἰς*): *δεῖς, δενός: ὅπερ ἵστοναμοῦται τῷ τις: ὅπερ μετὰ τοῦ οὐ, οὐδεῖς, οὐδενός: καὶ μετὰ τοῦ μή, μηδεῖς.*<sup>3</sup> So too 'etwas' in Frisk, *Et. Wb.*; Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.* ii. 593; Leumann, *Homeriche Wörter*, p. 108. In the usage of Democritus it is quite plain that this is the sense required: *τὸ δέν* is 'something' in the sense of matter or substance. *θév* in Theodotion has the same meaning. It is when we come to the earliest use, the passage of Alcaeus (*καὶ*

<sup>1</sup> Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.* i. 426, n. 1, and Frisk, *Et. Wb.*, use the terms *falsche Auslösung*, *falsch ausgelöst*. Schwyzer makes this comment on *dén* in reference to cases of compounds in which 'das Hinterglied für das Sprachgefühl völlig undeutlich wurde'. But it is quite clear that these words could not be applied to *dén*.

<sup>2</sup> I take the reference from Diels, *op. cit.*,

ii. 174, discussing Democr. 156. Notice also Philoponus' comment on the passage: *θὲν ἦν, τούτεστι ἦν τι.*

<sup>3</sup> It is necessary to remove from the text *εἰς, εἴός*, which was corruptly inserted after *δεῖς, δενός*. A later reference in *Et. Mag.* (639. 17, s.v. *οὐδεῖς*) is a source of the fragment Alc. 320 I.-P., but does not go into the question of meaning.

κ' οὐδὲν ἐκ δενὸς γένοιτο), that difficulty arises; or perhaps we should say, has been unnecessarily produced. L.S.J., s.v. δεῖς, offer two meanings, one for each occurrence: (i) 'no one' or 'thing', for Alcaeus; (ii) 'something', for Democritus. Reinach-Puech (Budé) give the translation for Alcaeus (no. 35), 'Rien ne naîtrait de rien.' Treu, *Alkaios*, p. 77, 'Aus nichts könnt' nie etwas entstehen.' The index of Lobel-Page, *Poet. Lesb. Frag.*, p. 318, has δεῖς: δενός (= οὐδενός). An older commentator than any of these can be traced in a manuscript of the second source of the fragment (Schol. Marc. in Dion. Thrac. *Art.* 12, p. 381 Hilgard), which has οὐδενός in place of ἐκ δενός: this will have arisen from a gloss on δενός. This highly unlikely interpretation may be due to a desire to range the Alcaeus fragment with the later philosophical statement of the materialists, that physically nothing can come into being out of nothing. Treu indeed explicitly affirms this (*Alkaios*, pp. 114, 173). Can the Greek bear this meaning? It cannot be seriously suggested that δέν in itself meant 'nothing': everything argues against such a view. Treu (op. cit., p. 173), in stating that δέν equals οὐδέν, refers to *Et. Mag.* 639. 17 ff. This passage runs: οὐδεῖς· ἴστεον ὅτι τὸ οὐδεῖς ὅτε ισοδυναμεῖ τῷ οὐτις δύο μέρη λόγου εἰσι, τό τε οὐ καὶ τὸ δεῖς· οὐδὲ γάρ ἔστι σύνθετον (there follow remarks on the accentuation of οὐδεῖς) . . . αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ οὐδεῖς<sup>1</sup> (δεῖς Edmonds) τὸ οὐδέτερον δέν χωρὶς τῆς οὐ παραθέσεως ἔχομεν παρὰ Ἀλκαιώ ἐν τῷ ἐνάτῳ καὶ κ' οὐδὲν ἐκ δενὸς γένοιτο· Ζηνόβιος. There is nothing in this to justify the remark that δέν = οὐδέν. The final sentence refers only to the morphology of δέν; and, as previously mentioned, *Et. Mag.*, s.v. εἰς, informs us that δεῖς has the meaning of τις. One must therefore conclude that it is supposed that δενός in the particular context of the Alcaeus fragment acquired negative meaning; and that this was due to the preceding οὐδέν. However, this line of explanation is equally untenable. It would have to suppose that the negation in οὐδέν could be carried on and turn δενός into a negative. But this is not possible. 'Nothing comes out of nothing' is οὐδὲν ἐξ οὐδενὸς γίγνεται. Further, because of the Greek preference for repeated negation, οὐδὲν ἐξ οὐδενὸς γίγνεται could also quite regularly mean 'nothing comes out of something (anything)': cf. Kühner-Gerth, ii. 204, quoting among other examples *Pl. Parm.* 166 a τάλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίᾳν κοινωνίαν ἔχει (also with repeated οὐδεῖς). It is, however, possible for the meaning 'nothing out of something' to be given by indefinite forms (pronominal and adverbial) after οὐ or οὐδεῖς: cf. Kühner-Gerth, ii. 206, n. 4, and *Pl. Phaed.* 57 a οὐτε Φλειασίων οὐδεῖς πάντι τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Αθήναζε οὐτε τις ζένος ἀφίκεται; also *Parm.* 166 a (the continuation of the passage just quoted) οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἔστιν. This second course was especially useful if there was risk of ambiguity: οὐδὲν ἐκ τινος γίγνεται could not be mistaken for 'nothing from nothing'. Thus we see that, so far from being able to take οὐδὲν ἐκ δενός as 'nothing from nothing', we can only enjoy the freedom

<sup>1</sup> δεῖς appears both a simple and a desirable emendation of οὐδεῖς (*τοῦ δεῖς* replacing *τοῦ οὐδεῖς*: so Edmonds, *Lyra Graeca*, i. 426). It is still possible to make sense with οὐδεῖς. The article in *Et. Mag.*, after saying that οὐδεῖς is made up of οὐ and δεῖς, then goes into a long discussion of the accent of οὐδεῖς, so that this form is foremost in the mind. It would therefore not be out of the question to continue by referring to it:

'of this word οὐδεῖς we have the neuter form δέν without the added οὐ- in Alcaeus'. Contrasted with this, *τοῦ δεῖς* returns to the earlier mention of the word: *χωρὶς τῆς οὐ παραθέσεως* will then draw attention to the rarity of the form δέν, as compared with the frequency of the compound οὐδέν. It will be seen that the problem of the reading does not vitally affect the general sense of the passage.

of alternative translations with the double negative form of sentence οὐδὲν ἐξ οὐδενός. The language of Alcaeus (and of Sappho) does not differ from this general situation. I have not found in it any other example exactly of the type seen in our fragment: that is, of οὐδείς followed by an indefinite form. But there are several cases of repeated negation. Note especially Alc. 69. 5 L.-P. οὐ πάθοντες οὐδάμα πῶσλον οὐδέν. This has repetition in οὐδάμα and οὐδέν, but πῶ retains its indefinite form (after οὐ). Further id. 129. 16 μηδάμα μηδένα τῶν ἑταίρων; Sappho 56. 1-2, 63. 5-6.

What then is the meaning of the Alcaeus fragment? Unfortunately we have too little of it to give the basis for a certain answer. The most likely seems to be, 'nothing may come out of something (anything)'; 'something (anything) may lead to nothing': that is, perhaps, one may labour to no purpose. As already mentioned, Reinach-Puech give the translation 'Rien ne naîttrait de rien'; and Treu, *Alkaios*, p. 77, 'Aus nichts könnt' nie etwas entstehen'. Treu discusses the passage, op. cit., pp. 114, 173. He sees it as the oldest certain example of the philosophical maxim found later in Anaxagoras and Democritus; suggests a connexion between Alcaeus and Thales; and regards this 'philosophical' fragment as a sign of Alcaeus' advanced and modernistic outlook. The conclusions would be important both for the study of Alcaeus and for that of the Greek materialists if capable of justification; but the arguments against are too strong. The principal one is that already advanced, that δένός cannot mean 'nothing'. By itself this does not completely destroy the philosophical case, since it is open to argue that Alcaeus was aware of the maxim and was making a parody of it, with 'nothing out of something' instead of 'out of nothing'. Alcaeus nowhere else shows any approach to philosophical or scientific thought, so that if he did know of the maxim, a parody might be less inappropriate than a statement of philosophical belief. But could he have known of it, at that time? This seems most unlikely. The historians of philosophy, as Professor Kerferd informs me, are not able to put the date of the doctrine so far back as Alcaeus. We are then left with the conclusion that the similarity of Alcaeus' phrase to the philosophical use is accidental.

I do not know whether anyone has proposed an 'etymological' translation of the passage: 'the word οὐδέν might be derived from δέν'. It would be pleasant to put Alcaeus among the founders of Greek grammar instead of philosophy, but I am afraid it would be safer to deny him this honour as well.

*University College, Swansea*

A. C. MOORHOUSE

#### ADDENDUM

A possible third occurrence of δέν came later to my notice: Ar. *Thes.* 1197 δλλ' οὐκ ἔκω δέν (generally taken as ἔκωδέν for ἔκω οὐδέν). It is thus read by van Leeuwen. His account of δέν deserves mention, though I regard it as wrong: it would be *decurtatum* for οὐδέν, with the negative lost as in Fr. (*pas*) *du tout*—as in N. Gk. δέν has replaced οὐδέν (there of course under the influence of stress accent). But I doubt that we can accept such loss of the negative for Classical Greek.

## ΕΥ ΟΙΔΑ AND ΟΥΔΕ ΕΙΣ: CASES OF HIATUS

### I

THERE are in iambic trimeters a number of examples of hiatus where *εῦ* is followed by forms of *οἶδα*, mainly in Comedy but also (very rarely) in Tragedy. These are notable because they fall outside the usual range of hiatus in drama, which covers passages with interrogative *τί* (probably the most common) and *ότι*, *περί*, invocatory *ὦ*, exclamations such as *φεῦ*, *αἰαῖ*, and interjections. The use seems to deserve closer attention.

In Aristophanes there are nine cases: *Lys.* 154, 764, *Pax* 373, 1296, *Pl.* 72, 183, 838, *Thes.* 12, fr. 152. 2.<sup>1</sup> The forms of the verb found in these nine cases are *οἶδα* and *ἴσθι*, and are always followed by *ότι* (though *ότι* does not always follow in other metres of the poet). The phrases occur always at the end of the line (*εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι*, *εὖ ισθ' ὅτι*, where *ότι* provides a convenient termination) with the exception of *Pl.* 838 where it ends the speech but not the line; and in four positions in the sentence. These are as follows. (i) Initial, with a subordinate clause following. *Pl.* 72–73 . . ., *εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι* | *κακόν τι μ' ἐργάσεσθε*. (ii) Medial, with a part of the subordinate preceding and a part following. *Pax* 1296–7 *οὐ γὰρ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι* | *οὐ πράγματ' ἀστεῖ*. Also *Lys.* 764, fr. 152. 2. (iii) Final, after the subordinate. *Lys.* 154 *σπόνδας ποιήσαντ' ἀν ταχέως, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι*. Also *Pl.* 183, 838. (iv) By itself constituting the whole remark. *Pax* 373 *εὖ ισθ' ὅτι*. Also *Thes.* 12. The use of *ότι* in type (iv), where there can be no question of a subordinate clause, shows that this is a stereotyped phrase which is functionally equivalent to an adverb such as *σαφῶς* 'certainly, undoubtedly'. The same is probably true of type (iii); though I have referred here to a subordinate clause, it is in fact very doubtful whether the listener, or speaker, had any sense of subordination. Contrast the type of sentence introduced by *λέγω ὅτι*, which has subordination: with this we would not have the order *σπόνδας ποιήσαντ' ἀν ταχέως λέγω ὅτι*. If we use further the technique of substitution, we find that an adverb or adverbial phrase can replace *εὖ οἶδ'* (*ἴσθ'*) *ότι* in the sentences of types (iii) and (iv). I shall mention later another feature of word order pointing to equivalence of a *εὖ ισθι* phrase to an adverb (on Soph. *O.T.* 1438).<sup>2</sup> In view of this we may feel doubt whether even in types (i) and (ii) there is any real subordination, though that cannot be proved.

In Attic Old Comedy apart from Aristophanes I have noted only one example: *Phryn.* 59. 1 *ἡν γὰρ πολίτης ἀγαθός, ὡς εὖ οἶδ' ἐγώ*. In Middle and New Comedy there are the following: *Alex.* 251. 2 *ἀλλ' εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι* | *κυμινοπρίστης ἐ τρί-ος ἐστί σου πάλαι*. *Philem.* 152. 1 *οὐ μάτην εὖ ισθ' ὅτι* | *τὸ ρήμα τοῦτο δόξαν ἐν Δελφοῖς ἔχει* (οὐ μάτην of course with *τὸ ρήμα . . . ἔχει*). *Hipparch.* 1. 2 *οὐδαμόθεν, εὖ οἶδ' ἐγώ, | ἀλλ' η . . .* *Diox.* 4. 2 *εὖ οἶδα* (start of line, makes whole remark). *Anon. ap. Page, Lit. Pap.*, p. 274 (60. 10) *ἀν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι* | *οὐδεῖς με]μάθηκεν οὐθέν*. *Anon., ibid.* p. 306 (65. 78) *εὖ ισθι, βουλοίμην ἀν* (start of line).

<sup>1</sup> A tenth example might be in fr. 186. 1, where *εὖ ισθι* is conjectured by Meineke for *ἐντορε* at the start of the line. This would make the only example in Aristophanes of the phrase at the start of an iambic line. The passage is from the *Daedalus* and could be by

Plato and not Aristophanes.

<sup>2</sup> There is similar use of *οἶδ'*, *ἴσθ'* *ότι* without *εὖ*. A parallel use of *ότι* without a subordinate clause is seen in *δῆλον ὅτι*: here the equivalence to an adverb is especially marked in the form *δῆλονότι*. Cf. Dale on *E. Ale.* 48.

Menander has eight occurrences (also a possible ninth, *Epit.* 552, where *εν ολδα* is restored): *Dysc.* 13, 819; *Her.* fr. 5; *Epit.* 199, 770; *Phasm.* 43; fr. 334. 7, 532. 3. All have either *ολδα* or *ισθι*. Only one of these is followed by *στι* and a subordinate clause (*Epit.* 770). In the majority (six) *εν ολδα* (*ισθι*) is in parenthesis; once it makes the whole remark (fr. 334. 7). Five times it is initial in the line, twice medial, once final.

To sum up the evidence of these examples from Comedy, the principal features are these. The forms of the verb used are either *ολδα* or *ισθι*. The phrase is either employed with *στι* (in which case, where another clause accompanies it, there is doubt as to its subordinate status), or without *στι*, in parenthesis or independently. No effort seems to have been made to avoid the hiatus, which was not found embarrassing. Unfortunately it is not possible to infer the metrical value of the syllable *εν*, since it is always in the first part of the iambic foot; but that is not so serious since there are two cases in Old Comedy of *εν* before forms of *ολδα* in trochaic metre, where *εν* shows a long quantity. These are *Telecl.* 41. 4 *ων δ' ἔκατι τοῦτ' ἔδωκε, καίπερ εν εἰδὼς ἔγώ*; and *Ar. Vesp.* 425 *ως ἀν εν εἰδή τὸ λοιπὸν . . .* It seems reasonable to suppose that *εν* before *ολδα* and *ισθι* in iambics would be similarly scanned as long.<sup>1</sup>

We turn now to Tragedy, where we find that Aeschylus does not use *εν ολδα*, *εν ισθι*.<sup>2</sup> It may be thought that he even deliberately avoided their use, for in *Persae* there are several phrases which show only slight variation from them: vv. 173 *εν τόδι* *ισθι*, 211 *εν γάρ ιστε*, 431 *εν γάρ τόδι* *ισθι*, 435 *εν νν τόδι* *ισθι*, 784 *εν γάρ σαφῶς τόδι* *ιστε*.<sup>3</sup> Elsewhere he does not use the collocation of *εν* and *ολδα*, apart from the participial *εἰδώς γ' εν*, *Ag.* 934, *Sept.* 375 (without *γε*), which has Epic association. There is the more dignified equivalent *εν γάρ ἐξεπισταμαι*, *Ag.* 838: this also has a form of repetition, since the preverb *ἐξ-* is broadly expressing the same idea as *εν*. But it has not the tautology of *εν . . . σαφῶς*, with repetition of the same part of speech.

Sophocles has one example with hiatus, *O.T.* 959 *εν ισθι' ἐκεῖνον θανάτουμον βεβηκότα* (spoken, be it noted, by a messenger). Here *εν ισθι* governs a subordinate clause with the accusative. In other examples of *εν* with *ολδα* (*O.T.* 59, 1133, *Ant.* 1043) or *ισθι* (*O.T.* 1438, *El.* 605), *ιστε* (*Tr.* 1107), hiatus is avoided by interposing particles, or demonstratives, or both. Where *στι* is found (*O.T.* 59, 1133, *Ant.* 1043) the phrase is initial, and followed by a subordinate clause. Sophocles has no example of *εν ολδι' στι* in isolation. But the equivalence of *εν τοῦτι' ισθι* to an adverb meaning 'certainly' rather than the parenthetical use seems clearly marked by *O.T.* 1438 *ἔδρασ' ἀν εν τοῦτι' ισθι' ἀν, ει μη . . .* Here we cannot separate *εν τοῦτι' ισθι* by punctuation to make a parenthesis, as may elsewhere be done; *ἔδρασ' ἀν, εν τοῦτι' ισθι', ἀν, ει μη . . .* would leave the second *ἀν* in unsupported isolation, which does not look possible. The material for discussion of the place of *ἀν*, and its repetition, was collected by Wackernagel

<sup>1</sup> The point is of some value in considering the pronunciation of *εν ολδα*, to which we shall come below. It may be noted on the other hand that *ἀν* appears shortened in hiatus in *Pl. Com.* 153. 3 *οι δ' αν ἐκεῖθεν* (anapaestic) and *Archestr.* ap. *Ath.* 6. 300 *ε οντος γάρ αν οστι' ἐκεῖθεν* (hexam.).

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 199 (326 Mette), quoted by Jebb *ad*

Soph. *O.T.* 959, has *σάφ' ολδα* and not *εν* in the citations of both *Dion. Hal.* 1. 41. 3 and *Strab.* 4. 1. 7.

<sup>3</sup> The expressive redundancy seen at v. 784 in *εν . . . σαφῶς* recurs in *Ar. Pax* 1302 *εν γάρ ολδ' ἔγώ σαφῶς* and is surely a reflex of current speech. So too Broadhead, *ad loc.*

(*I.F.* i (1892), 387 ff.), whose treatment is still fundamental. He explains cases of repetition as due to contamination, a combination of the use of inherited second position with that of other, later positions which were adopted in the classical period, both in prose and in verse. This is far more likely than to see nuances of emphasis, as do Smyth (*Greek Grammar*, § 1765) and L.S.J. (s.v. ἀν, D II). Smyth quotes Soph. fr. 673 πῶς ἀν οὐκ ἀν ἐν δίκῃ θάνοιμ' ἀν; but this involves him in an absurd position. If ἀν gives emphasis, we should have as many as three points of emphasis in this short sentence and yet would leave out ἐν δίκῃ, which has at least as good a claim to be emphasized as the other part.

On Soph. *O.T.* 1438 Wackernagel (p. 393) divides as ἔδρασ' ἀν (εὐ τόδ' [sic] ισθ') ἀν; here he somewhat obscurely explains the placing of the second ἀν as due to the initial placing of the verb. But he also quotes examples with initial verb and a single ἀν following, as Dem. 20. 61 μάθοιτε δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἀν. It is of course obvious that, where the verb is initial, ἀν will come somewhere after; but it does not seem established that an initial verb necessarily requires ἀν in a particular position, nor that it should be repeated. Wackernagel returns to *O.T.* 1438 on p. 396, where ἀν is listed as an instance of repetition after a parenthesis or other intervening clause. However, all his other examples show ἀν in this use in association with another word, as indeed we expect to find it (e.g. Soph. *El.* 333 ὀστ' ἀν, εἰ οὐτένος λάβοιμι, δηλώσομι' ἀν; Ar. *Ran.* 585 καί, εἴ με τίπποις, οὐκ ἀν ἀντείπομι σοι). *O.T.* 1438 would be alone in having its ἀν isolated. Wackernagel indeed appears to propose an isolated ἀν after a parenthesis in one other example (p. 396: I copy his punctuation): Pl. *Phaed.* 102 a σὺ δ'—οἶμαι, ἀν, ως ἐγώ λέγω, ποιώνης. But there is no reason to separate οἶμαι from ἀν. Burnet's text runs: σὺ δ', εἰπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, οἶμαι ἀν ως ἐγώ λέγω ποιῶς. οἶμαι is integrated in the sentence in parataxis, and ἀν follows it as second word after the inserted conditional clause. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6. 1. 9 οἶμαι ἀν, αὐτῶν εἰ καλῶς τις ἐπιμελοῖτο, οὐκ εἶναι ἔθνος . . . ; Aeschin. 1. 122 οἶμαι δ' ἀν, εἰ . . . , ταῖς ύμετέραις μαρτυρίαις ράδιως ἀν ἀπολύσασθαι τοὺς τοῦ κατηγόρου λόγους (both with object clause after οἶμαι, but that makes no difference to the present argument). I therefore take εὐ τοῦτ' ισθ in *O.T.* 1438 as an adverbial equivalent, and not parenthetical; it is not then unnatural to find ἀν repeated after this phrase as it might be in, say, ἔδρασ' ἀν ἀσφαλέστατ' ἀν. The placing of ἀν after adverbs is too familiar to need illustration.

The possibility should also be mentioned (but, I think, rejected) that ἀν is itself attached to a parenthetical εὐ τοῦτ' ισθ: thus L.S.J. (ἀν, D II), punctuating ἔδρασ' ἀν, εὐ τοῦτ' ισθ' ἀν, εἰ . . . There are several different positions found for ἀν in a sentence including a parenthesis (in which ἀν may syntactically belong either to the principal clause, or to the parenthesis itself). First ἀν occurs at the head of a parenthesis of which it is syntactically a member (Dem. 1. 14 τί οὖν, ἀν τις εἴποι, ταῦτα λέγεις): here it has been attracted to the second place in the sentence as a whole, following the initial phrase. A parenthesis can separate ἀν (in second place in the sentence) from the rest of the clause to which it belongs (Ar. *Ran.* 1222 οὐδ' ἀν, μὰ τὴν Δήμητρα, φροντίσαιμι γε); or ἀν may follow the parenthesis (Ar. *Pax* 137 ἀλλ', ω μέλ', ἀν μοι οὐτιῶν διπλῶν ἔδει: compare the position of indefinite τις in Pl. *Rep.* 337 ε πῶς γάρ ἀν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ω βέλτιστε, τις ἀποκρίναιτο . . . ). But we must notice that in none of these cases is ἀν isolated both before and behind from the clause to which it belongs syntactically. It is that isolation which I find unnatural in

the proposal to take  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\tau\bar{o}\bar{v}\tau'$   $\iota\bar{o}\bar{\theta}\iota$  as a parenthesis in *O.T.* 1438, whether  $\bar{v}$  is attached to that parenthesis or separated from it. The passage then should simply be written as  $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{\delta}\bar{p}\alpha\sigma'$   $\bar{a}\bar{v}$   $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\tau\bar{o}\bar{v}\tau'$   $\iota\bar{o}\bar{\theta}\iota$   $\bar{a}\bar{v}$ ,  $\epsilon\bar{l}$  . . . .

I return now to the listing of passages with  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $o\bar{\delta}\alpha$ . Euripides has one example: fr. 946  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\iota\bar{o}\bar{\theta}\iota$ ,  $\bar{o}\bar{t}\bar{a}\bar{v}$   $\tau\bar{i}\bar{s}$   $\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{o}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{b}\bar{a}\bar{w}\bar{v}$   $\bar{\theta}\bar{v}\bar{v}\bar{v}$   $\bar{\theta}\bar{e}\bar{o}\bar{i}\bar{s}$ . Elsewhere  $\epsilon\bar{v}$  is separated from the imperative by a particle ( $\delta'$  *Andr.* 368, *Hipp.* 656), or particle (or adverb) plus  $\tau\bar{o}\bar{\delta}\epsilon$  ( $\nu\bar{v}\bar{v}$   $\tau\bar{o}\bar{\delta}$ ), *Med.* 593;  $\nu\bar{v}\bar{v}$   $\tau\bar{o}\bar{\delta}$ , *Rhes.* 816;  $\bar{y}\bar{a}\bar{p}$   $\tau\bar{o}\bar{\delta}$ , fr. 1033. 1).

There are no examples in any of the other Tragic fragments in Nauck.

From this pattern of use we can infer that  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $o\bar{\delta}\alpha$ ,  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\iota\bar{o}\bar{\theta}\iota$  ( $\bar{i}\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{e}$ ), with or without  $\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{i}$ , and in just these particular forms of person, tense, and mood,<sup>1</sup> are formulaic phrases from everyday speech, where they acquired their set character from frequency of employment. It was therefore in error that Jebb explained the hiatus at *O.T.* 959 ( $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\iota\bar{o}\bar{\theta}\iota$   $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{e}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{i}\bar{v}\bar{o}\bar{v}\bar{o}$   $\bar{\theta}\bar{a}\bar{n}\bar{d}\bar{a}\bar{m}\bar{o}\bar{v}$   $\bar{\beta}\bar{e}\bar{b}\bar{\eta}\bar{k}\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{a}$ ) by referring to a literary and archaic precedent, the Epic use of *Il.* 1. 385  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $e\bar{\delta}\bar{\delta}\bar{w}\bar{s}$   $\bar{a}\bar{y}\bar{o}\bar{p}\bar{e}\bar{v}\bar{e}$  (to which other Epic passages can be added): not only because the digamma accounts for the Epic hiatus, but also because Epic has a participial phrase, specially associated with a context of prophecy in a number of passages (as also in *Aesch. Ag.* 934), while the passages of Comedy and Tragedy that we are considering do not have the participle (apart from the exception in Telecleides just mentioned) nor the special sense.

The colloquial character of our phrase was used by L. Radermacher<sup>2</sup> to account for the hiatus. He took it as one of several phrases or words which were adopted by literature from ordinary speech, in which usage hiatus would have been allowable. Another case would be  $\tau\bar{i}$   $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{o}\bar{t}\bar{u}\bar{s}$ ; (frequent in Comedy, but also found in Tragedy). It is relevant to add that  $\epsilon\bar{v}$  is not used in hiatus in iambic trimeters before words other than forms of  $o\bar{\delta}\alpha$ . Thus, to take just one example, Aristophanes wrote at *Vesp.* 859  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\gamma$   $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{p}\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{i}\bar{\zeta}\bar{e}\bar{i}\bar{s}$   $\bar{a}\bar{v}\bar{r}\bar{a}$ . Of course  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\gamma$  ( $\epsilon$ ) is a very frequent combination, used where there is no question of metrical convenience. None the less I think it was found serviceable here metrically, and that Aristophanes would not have been able to write  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{p}\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{i}\bar{\zeta}\bar{e}\bar{i}\bar{s}$  if only because this adverb and this verb made a combination only rarely in use and so with no degree of fixity.

It remains to consider a little more closely the phonetic situation postulated by Radermacher's hypothesis. He proposed that (a) hiatus was regular in the spoken language, and that (b) when words or phrases were taken over from it for literary use, the freedom to allow hiatus remained. In addition to the two examples already quoted, he so explained  $\chi\bar{a}\bar{p}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{e}$   $\bar{a}\bar{\theta}\bar{a}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{u}\bar{s}$  (*Epidaurus*, *I.G.* iv. 1.<sup>2</sup> 129. 11) and Soph. *Tr.* 222  $\bar{i}\bar{\delta}\bar{e}$   $\bar{i}\bar{\delta}\bar{e}$   $\bar{w}\bar{f}\bar{i}\bar{l}\bar{a}$   $\bar{y}\bar{i}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{i}\bar{s}$ . With regard to the latter the first  $\bar{i}\bar{\delta}\bar{e}$  in the phrase  $\bar{i}\bar{\delta}\bar{e}$   $\bar{i}\bar{\delta}\bar{e}$  would be left unelided but the second would suffer elision, since he also proposed that this could occur at the end of the set phrase. There is, however, a difficulty here, since in the former example we should not expect  $\bar{a}\bar{\theta}\bar{a}\bar{v}\bar{a}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{u}\bar{s}$  to figure in everyday speech, so that it would only be  $\chi\bar{a}\bar{p}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{e}$  itself which would be colloquial; and, if that is correct, elision could occur at the end of this single word.

<sup>1</sup> The range of forms is very restricted, as is clear from the examples. Exceptionally, there is the single use of a subjunctive form,  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $e\bar{\delta}\bar{y}\bar{v}$ , in Ar. *Vesp.* 425 (trochaic), and of the participle,  $\epsilon\bar{v}$   $e\bar{\delta}\bar{\delta}\bar{w}\bar{s}$ , in Telecl. 41. 4 (also trochaic), due to analogical extension. It is

not difficult to accept that the three meanings 'I am sure', and 'You may be sure' (imperative, singular and plural) would be much the most common uses.

<sup>2</sup> *Anzeiger der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Wien, Phil.-hist. Kl.* lxxi (1934), 135-8.

In the main I would accept Radermacher's explanation of the phrases  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{ o}\bar{\delta}\alpha$  and  $\tau\bar{i}\text{ \v{e}στω}$ ; but with this modification, that through frequent colloquial use the two words of each phrase made a stable combination, and that within this combination the rules of internal hiatus (*Binnenhiat*) were applied.<sup>1</sup> In other words the phrase was treated as a single unit. For  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}$  in such a situation there is ample analogy in the many compound words beginning with  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{-}$  ( $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{αγής}$ ,  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{ελπίς}$ , etc.; before  $\text{-ο}\bar{\iota}\text{-}$ ,  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{οικος}$ ,  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{ωνος}$ ).

The pronunciation of the diphthong  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}$  itself remained unchanged in such hiatus, but after it a glide sound  $u$  (or  $w$ ) may well have developed, for which there is direct evidence in spellings such as Cor. *Εὐφαρχος*, Lac. *Εὐφανδρος*, Cypr. *ευακοροσε* = *Εὐφάγοπος*.<sup>2</sup> For  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{ o}\bar{\delta}\alpha$  we should then have a pronunciation *euwoida*, as for  $\tau\bar{i}\text{ \v{e}στω}$ , *tijestin*. Schwyzer indeed (*Griech. Gramm.* i. 197) gives *euwoida*, because he regards *eu* as the regular pronunciation of the classical diphthong  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}$  (so that it would not be a true diphthong, but the second element would be consonantal). However, the isolated case of  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{ o}\bar{\delta}\alpha$  with hiatus is not good evidence for this, as he supposes; for if  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}$  was universally spoken as *eu* (as well as *eu* occurring as a syllable in other words), why then should  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}$  not have been used in hiatus before any other word beginning with a vowel? Why only before certain forms of *o}\bar{\delta}\alpha* itself? Why should the pattern of use of  $\epsilon\bar{\nu}\text{ o}\bar{\delta}\alpha$  so strongly suggest that it belonged to a particular part of the literary language, that based on colloquial speech? Schwyzer further quotes the spellings Cor. *Εφθερος*, Cret. *ἀφτός*, Locr. *Ναφπακτίων*, but these seem to be equally incapable of proving a pronunciation *eu*, *aw*, in which *w* had a consonantal, unsyllabic role.<sup>3</sup> We cannot have a syllabic division of *ἀφτός* into *a-wtos*, or of *Εφθερος* into *e-wthe-los*: the division must be after *a<sub>f</sub>*, *e<sub>f</sub>*.<sup>4</sup> We may concede that the occasional use of *f* instead of *v*, and of special signs in Pamphylian and Acarnanian, to denote the second member of *eu*, *au* diphthongs, may (but not necessarily) indicate a slight modification in their pronunciation, but not that they had ceased to be diphthongs.

The spellings with both *f* and *v* simultaneously (Att. *ἀφντάρη*, Ion. (Naxos) *ἀφντό*, Cret. *τάφνος*, *ἀμεφνύοσθαι*) give further indication of a diphthongal value, in which the vocalic *u* is evident. *f* here stands for the glide between the two members of the diphthong.<sup>5</sup> This seems more likely than to deny that *f* has any sound value here, as Scherer does:<sup>6</sup> the fact (to which he refers) that inherited

<sup>1</sup> I use the term 'combination' (like Bloomfield's 'phrasal combination') of a close association of words which has not the complete fixity of the compound. Similarly I have written elsewhere of the negative combination seen in such groups as *οὐκ ἔαω*, *οὐκ ἔθλω* (*Studies in the Greek Negatives*, pp. 28 ff.). Denniston (*Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 'Hiatus') also writes of hiatus in drama 'within a more or less closely unified word-group', and this is the essential point which Radermacher did not bring out.

<sup>2</sup> Lejeune, *Traité de phonétique grecque*, § 239.

<sup>3</sup> Note that Schwyzer's text (p. 197, l. 10) has *sibrisches u*, but this is a mistake for *unsibrisches* which is put right in his *Corrections*.

<sup>4</sup> We may have *w* as first sound in a syllable

where it is followed by a vowel or diphthong, or by a liquid, but not by a consonantal stop. The pre-liquid position can be seen in El. *ράτρα*, Lesb. \* *ρρόδον* as shown by *ρρόδον*; also Cypr. *εὐφρέταστρον/εὐφρέταστρον*, where the second of the alternative forms preserves the original *ε-φρέτ-*. In *εὐφρέτ-* the sound of the semi-vowel *f* (*w*) has been anticipated, changing the initial vowel into a diphthong. This change, seen also in some other forms (e.g. Lesb. *εὐράγη*, Hom. *ταλαύρινος*: Buck, *Greek Dialects*, p. 51), is the opposite of that postulated by Schwyzer (*autos > awtos*).

<sup>5</sup> Lejeune, *op. cit.*, pp. 141 (with fn. 2), 151.

<sup>6</sup> Thumb-Scherer, *Handbuch der griech. Dialekte*, ii. 292-3.

*f* had been lost very early intervocally is no argument against the use of the letter as symbol of a transitional glide, which was no doubt in more widespread use than the epigraphic record suggests, but for which there is in fact evidence from as many as eight dialects, including Ionic. We are not, of course, dealing with an inherited sound.<sup>1</sup>

It should be added that to take *f* in *afv* as a glide need in no way imply acceptance of the view that *ἀφνάρρ*, *ἀφντό* were trisyllabic, with *a* and *v* pronounced with distinction. The evidence for that is lacking both on phonological and on metrical grounds. Webster, *Glotta* xxxviii (1960), 253, 260, has lately supported trisyllabic value for *ἀφνάρρ* on the Attic verse-inscription (Schwyzer, *Del.* App. I, 2; Peek, *Griech. Versinschr.* i, no. 155: the second line runs *καλὸν ἴδεν ἀφνάρρ Φαιδίμος ἐρύσσατο*).<sup>2</sup> He suggests that *f* is omitted from *ἴδεν*, where it would not scan, but written in *ἀφντάρ*, where it can make a trisyllable. But it is clear that the sculptor Phaidimos, who made the inscription, had no choice whether or not to write *φιδεν*: that form did not exist in Attic, nor did any other form with inherited *f*. It would have been astonishing if we had found *φιδεν* in the inscription. As for *ἀφντάρ*, there is no difficulty in scanning it as a spondee. The other inscription with which he deals has *ἀφντό* (*αὐτοῦ*): Schwyzer, *Del.* 760 τ]δ *ἀφντό* λίθο ἐμὶ ἀνδρίας καὶ τὸ σφέλας. This too has been much discussed. If it is verse at all, an iambic scansion is as good as any, perhaps better, giving τδ *ἀφντό* as the first foot (so again, a spondee). It may, however, be prose. Webster writes: 'Either it is prose (and the *f* militates against this) or it is a dactylo-epitrite line' (with suggestion then of alternative forms of scansion). But one can hardly use the presence of *f* as a sign that the inscription is not prose. The argument, if I am not doing it injustice, could be put as follows. *ἀφντό* is to be taken as a trisyllable, and is used in that form (rather than as disyllabic *αὐτό*) because it suits the metre. But how do we know that it is metre here? Because we have *ἀφντό*! One might add that, if trisyllabic value were genuine, we might expect to find other evidence of it with so common a word as *αὐτός*. But I know of none.

I have referred earlier to the long metrical value of *εῦ* before forms of *οἶδα* in two trochaic passages of Old Comedy (Telecl. 41. 4, Ar. *Vesp.* 425). This implies a diphthongal value for *εῦ*, and argues against the pronunciation *ewoida*.

Finally, there is other evidence that *av*, *ev* kept their diphthongal value into the post-classical period, especially that of Latin and Indian transcriptions, and of the musical extension of syllables found in the Delphic hymns; but this need not be repeated here.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sturtevant, *The Pronunciation of Greek and Latin*<sup>2</sup>, p. 53, would also take *afv* as showing a contamination of the two spellings *av* and *af*, so that this would be a purely graphic phenomenon and *f* and *v* would represent a single sound. I find it difficult to agree with his refusal to accept the possibility of a glide sound *w* between *a* and *v*, which he claims, in criticism of Buck, would not be natural in the position preceding the *u*-sound, but only following it (op. cit., pp. 53-54 fn.).

The glide may facilitate transition to the *u*-sound, as well as from it.

<sup>2</sup> The form *ἀφνάρρ* may also occur in Attic on a fragmentary stone from the Acropolis, illustrated in Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, Plate II. 7, where *ἀφν[* is found: the inscription is too fragmentary to show whether it is metrical.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Sturtevant, op. cit., pp. 53-54; Schwyzer, *Griech. Gramm.* i. 197.

## II

If the explanation offered for *εν οιδα* is correct, that it made a stable combination in which internal hiatus was permitted, a parallel to it can be seen in *ουδε* (and *μηδε*) *εις*.<sup>1</sup> This stronger form of *ουδεις* (*μηδεις*) reasserted the value of the negative element, as English *not one* is more emphatic than *none*, and is found both in prose and in verse.<sup>2</sup> Elision was regularly avoided: so Hdt. 3. 125. 2 and five other times (though usually he prefers *ουδεις*: cf. Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus*, s.v.). Tab. Heracl. i. 136-7 *ουδε ης ουδε εν*; 157 *μηδε ηνα*. Buck, *Greek Dialects*, 115. 49 (Cyrene) *ουδε [ης ο]υδε εν*. Cf. ibid. 26. 12 (Lesb.) *μηδεια* (but 16, 24 *μηδεν*). Where a particle or preposition intervenes, *ουδε* may be elided: so especially with *αν* in *ουδε αν εις*. Ar. *Pl.* 137 f. *ουδε αν εις θυσειν ανθρωπων ητι | ου βοην αν, ουχι φυστον, ουκ αλλ' ουδε εν*. Plat. *Gorg.* 512 ε *την ειμαρμενην ουδε αν εις εκφυγοι*. Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 1 *ουδε υφεντο ενος*. In such cases *εις* stands in sufficient distinction, however *ουδε* is treated.

One may in passing raise here the question, what value is to be assigned to the orthographical distinction made in some texts of Lesbian verse between *ουδε εις* and *ουδεις*, *μηδε εις* and *μηδεις*? In Lobel-Page (*Poet. Lesb. Frag.*) I find the following. (a) Sappho. (i) Book-texts (i.e. from papyri): forms of *ουδεις* 67 (a) 7, 95. 10, 96. 35; forms of *μηδεις* 63. 6, 82 (b) 2; *μηδε εις* 5. 8. (ii) Quotations: *ουδενα* 56. 2; *ουδε εν* 31. 8, 11. In total, six undivided, three divided. (b) Alcaeus. (i) Book-texts: forms of *ουδεις* 37. 3, 73. 5, 119. 5, 296. 6 (with *ον* restored); *ουδε εν* 69. 5 (with *δε* restored); *μηδε ηνα* 129. 16. (ii) Quotations: *ουδεν* 320, 335. 2; *ουδε εις* 360. 2; forms of *μηδε εις* 342, 349 (a) 1. In total, six undivided, five divided. In the first place it must be recognized that the difference in pronunciation between *ουδεις* and *ουδε εις* is minimal: hence, even if the poets wished to indicate distinction of meaning by use of the two forms (though I cannot see that any is intended in the passages under discussion), it would be difficult for an audience to appreciate the fact. Next, the evidence of the papyrus book-texts (which should be our best guide) does not seem to support the use of the two forms, to judge from the plates and diplomatic transcripts. There are three passages from these texts in which Lobel-Page use division. For Sappho 5. 8 the plate of the papyrus (*P. Oxy.* 1. 7) shows no apostrophe to mark elision, and Grenfell and Hunt (following Blass) read *μηδεις*.<sup>3</sup> At Alc.

<sup>1</sup> As already mentioned, I see examples of negative combination where *ουδε* is used in close association with certain words (e.g. *ουκ ιδω*). With *ουδε* hiatus would not arise, as the alternative forms *ουδε*, *ουχ* are regularly used before vowels. But note the use of *μη* with hiatus in the phrases *μη οπασι*, *μη οπασ* (Aristophanes, Alexis, Menander: *μη* is required here because of the underlying wish).

<sup>2</sup> Not that the negative element *ουδε* in *ουδεις* was not appreciated as such: that seems hardly credible. Meillet (*Aperçu d'une histoire de la langue grecque*, p. 263), referring to the back-formation *δεν* (Alcaeus, Democritus) remarked that this showed that *on ne sentait pas ουδε*. But this is to read too much in the evidence of this plainly artificial form, which is due to a sophisticated rather than

an ignorant division into *ουδεν*. I have dealt further with *δεν* on pp. 235 ff.

To return to the sense of the negative element in *ουδεις*, a valuable indication is given by the form *ουθεις* which in Attic and elsewhere displaced *ουδεις* in popular favour for a period from the start of the fourth century B.C.; for *ουθεις* owed its *-θ-* to the influence of the aspirate on the final of *ουδε-*, and so shows consciousness of a division *ουδε-ηεις*.

With regard to the aspirate in *ουδε εις* it may also be remarked that there seems no reason to suppose that this feature made the hiatus easier (as suggested by Jebb *ad Bacchyl.* 15. 5 *δυθεμοντι Ερπω*). Cf. Lejeune, *Traité de phonétique grecque*, p. 287.

<sup>3</sup> So too Lobel, *C.Q.* xv (1921), 163.

69. 5 (*P. Oxy.* 1234, fr. 1. 11) Lobel-Page have *οὐ[δ' εἴ]ν*: naturally we could also write this as *οὐ[δὲ]ν*, as did Grenfell and Hunt, and this would agree with *οὐδέν* at fr. 3. 5 of the same papyrus (= Alc. 73. 5). The third example of division is that of *μηδ' ἔνα* (Alc. 129. 16, *P. Oxy.* 2165, fr. 1. 16): here too *μηδένα* in the first edition of the papyrus. So there seems to be no evidence in the papyri to make us read sometimes *οὐδεῖς* and sometimes *οὐδ' εἰς*; and, so far as we can be guided here by palaeographic evidence, it would appear that on the ground of consistency *οὐδ' εἰς* and *μηδ' εἰς* should be replaced by the undivided forms in our texts of the Lesbian poets. I would, of course, include in the change the texts derived from quotations, for which too there seems no reason to postulate alternative forms. Whether we will then have restored the original form cannot, unfortunately, be claimed as certain, because the palaeographic evidence is not in itself conclusive. The scribes were not consistent in using the apostrophe generally, any more than with other *Lesezeichen*; and they were writing long after the date of composition of the texts. However, we should expect use of the apostrophe the more if we were to suppose that they sometimes intended division of *οὐδεῖς*, and sometimes not: it would be a serviceable means of distinction. Further, we can add to their evidence, negative as it is, the text Alc. 320 L.-P. *καὶ κ' οὐδὲν ἐκ δενὸς γένοιτο*,<sup>1</sup> in which the unified form *οὐδέν* is guaranteed by the antithesis with *δενός*. The form *δέν* is only possible when so opposed to *οὐδέν* (or to *μηδέν*, as in Democr. 156 *μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δέν η τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι*),<sup>2</sup> and the use of *οὐδ' ἔν* would hopelessly obscure the contrast.

Examples of *οὐδὲ* (and *μηδὲ*) *εἰς* together, and unelided, occur in Comedy, both Old and (more frequently) Middle and New. The following are some examples (but the list is by no means exhaustive): Ar. *Lys.* 1044, *Pl.* 37, 138, 1115, 1182, *Ran.* 927. Aristophon 9. 5, 10. 1. *Philem.* 11. 3. *Alex.* 27. 1, 3; 125-6. 11. *Men.* *Dysc.* 252 and six other times in this play (cf. Lloyd-Jones's index); twenty-seven times in the other plays and fragments (cf. Koerte's index). To these iambic examples may be added, in other writing that drew on popular sources, *οὐδὲ εἰς* in Epicharmus 245. 2, 283, 285. 3 (Kaibel: all trochaic); *μηδὲ εἰς* in Hippoanax 62 (Diehl: scazon). But in Tragedy the use is almost wholly absent. There is no example in the three major tragedians. The nearest that we come to it in these authors is in the form with *ἄν*, *οὐδ' ἄν εἰς*: Soph. *Ant.* 884, *O.T.* 281, *O.C.* 1656, *Tr.* 1072, fr. 619. 1. Eur. fr. 1064. 6. In Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, I have found two cases of *οὐδὲ εἰς* itself. Dionys. 7. 2 (p. 795) *τοῖς οὐδὲν οὐσιῶν οὐδὲ εἰς ὅλως φθονεῖ*. Fr. adesp. 477 (p. 933) *ἄνευ θεοῦ γὰρ οὐδὲ εἰς ἀνὴρ σθένει*.<sup>3</sup> The distribution of *οὐδὲ εἰς* as between Comedy and Tragedy is remarkably similar to that of *εὐ οὐδα*.

### III

Finally, another and a different type of support for the use of *εὐ* in combination is to be found, in such phrases as *ἀντ' εὐ ποιεῖν, πάσχειν*. Dem. 20. 64 *ὅσους εὐ ποιήσαντας η πόλις ἀντ' εὐ πεποίηκεν* (*ἀντευπεποίηκεν*, FA). *Ibid.* 124

<sup>1</sup> Even here Lobel (A.M. 84) read *καὶ κ' οὐδ' ἔν . . .*, but, as noted, in *Poet. Lesb. Frag.* return is made to the form *οὐδέν*.

<sup>2</sup> I amplify this point in considering separately the use of *δέν* (pp. 235 ff.).

<sup>3</sup> Meineke would remove both of these,

assigning the first to the comic poet of the same name, and proposing emendations to displace *οὐδὲ εἰς* in the second. But such a very rare appearance of the use in Tragedy is not to be ruled out in principle.

ἀντ' εὐ ποιήσωμεν (again written unseparated, FA). Plat. *Gorg.* 520 ε τὸν εὐ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ' εὐ ποιεῖν (separated, B; unseparated, TWF). Ibid. εὐ ποιήσας ταῦτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὐ πείσεται. Further ἀντ' εὐ ποιεῖν (or ἀντευποεῖν) at Ar. *Pl.* 1029, Xen. *Anab.* 5. 5. 21, Arist. *E.N.* 1179<sup>a</sup>28, *Rh.* 1374<sup>a</sup>24. Also with *κακῶς*: Thuc. 3. 13. 1 μὴ ξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς . . . ἀλλὰ ξυνελευθεροῦν. This last example is especially valuable because it gives the decisive answer to the problem posed by the unusual position of the preverb, in apparent isolation from its verb. Kühner-Gerth (*Griech. Gramm.* i. 538) look at it from an incorrect aspect, seeking to explain the insertion (*die Dazwischenstellung*) of the adverb (εὐ, κακῶς) which divides the compound verb, and so coupling their discussion of it with that of cases of tmesis. That course might not seem impossible for ἀντ' εὐ ποιεῖν, e.g. in Dem. 20. 64 (the first example quoted above). One would start from ἀντιποιῶ, to which would be added εὐ which produces a separation of ἀντι- from -ποιῶ. This is, however, open to the objection that ἀντ' εὐ πεποίηκεν is contrasted, in the passage under discussion, with εὐ ποιήσαντας: the antithesis is effected by adding, in the second phrase, ἀντί to the earlier εὐ ποιῶ. This suggests that the constitution of the phrase is that of (i) ἀντί + (ii) εὐ ποιῶ. There is a similar basis of antithesis in the other passages with ἀντ' εὐ ποιῶ and πάσχω. Still more convincing is the use of ξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν in Thuc. 3. 13. 1, for here it is quite out of the question to start with ξὺν-ποιεῖν (*συμποιεῖν*): we are not asked to contemplate an act consisting of τὸ συμποιεῖν, to which a modifying κακῶς is added. Again, the antithesis with ξυνελευθεροῦν shows that ξὺν is added to κακῶς ποιεῖν: to the idea of 'doing an injury' is added 'in company with others'.

The problem of the proper graphic, and accentual, convention for these phrases (whether ἀντ' εὐ ποιεῖν, or ἀντευποεῖν) still remains. This might only be solved by finding direct evidence for the orthography used by, say, Thucydides or Demosthenes; but possibly, not even then. In other words, we cannot expect to solve it. But that is a matter of small account. Linguistically it seems plain that we have examples of combination in εὐ ποιεῖν, εὐ πάσχειν, and κακῶς ποιεῖν; that it is this association which allows the phrases to be preceded by the prefixes ἀντί (or ἀντι-), οὐν (or οὐν-), as if a simple verb followed; and that the association is parallel to that seen in εὐ οἶδα.<sup>1</sup>

University College, Swansea

A. C. MOORHOUSE

<sup>1</sup> I am glad to acknowledge assistance given me by Mr. P. J. Parsons.

## TIME AND PYTHAGOREAN RELIGION

IT is, I think, a fair presumption to suppose that there was some bond uniting all the different aspects of Pythagoras' thought, a bond strong enough to satisfy Pythagoras himself, but loose enough for the *μαθηματικοί* to be able, later, to cast off the religious and mystical doctrines without endangering the rest. If we reject Cornford's suggestion for the reconciliation of Pythagorean religion and science, namely that they were both based on the concept of Unity, the One, the obvious candidate is simply numbers in general, the number-mysticism which is common both in archaic Greece and in other primitive societies. I suggest, in fact, that Aristotle's words<sup>1</sup> *καὶ ἀνάγοντι πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς* would, in Pythagoras' original teaching, have applied to religion as well as to science. We need not, of course, expect any very logical connexion between the two. Even without Aristotle's well-known comment,<sup>2</sup> it is clear that Pythagoreanism is full of inconsistencies, a jumble of different ideas which the Master, inspired perhaps initially, or confirmed later, by his discoveries in harmonics, gathered together and justified as best he could in terms of numbers. Indeed, it seems to me that his philosophy is founded on a mystical, and by comparison with other Pre-Socratics, irrational basis, and not, as Mr. Kirk maintains,<sup>3</sup> on a bold inference from the musical scale. *καν εἰ τί πον διέλειπε, προσεγγίζοντο τοῦ συνειρομένην πάσαν αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὴν πραγματείαν.*<sup>4</sup>

Now we know that Pythagorean ethics were connected with mathematics, as we should expect from the Table of Opposites, though the details are not very clear. Cornford cites a parallel to the equation of Justice with four from Mexico, where the word for 'four' seems to be closely related to the concept of the Command or Rule of Life, 'suggesting wholeness, perfection or indefeasibility'.<sup>5</sup> But how the Pythagoreans avoided the conclusion that Justice, being an even number, is evil, we do not know; to mystics illogicality is probably of no account.<sup>6</sup> As for politics, we might be justified in inferring that Archytas' theory of political *ἀρμονία* was held in some form by Pythagoras himself, especially since *ἀρμονία* is the mark of an aristocratic state—not equality, but proportion in an unequal ratio—and the opposition to Pythagorean domination came from the democrats.<sup>6</sup>

But how are the main religious doctrines to be fitted into the numerical hotch-potch? These are stated by Porphyry thus:<sup>7</sup> *ὡς ἀθάνατον εἶναι φησι τὴν ψυχήν, εἴτα μεταβάλλονταν εἰς ἄλλα γένη ζώων, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γενόμενά ποτε πάλιν γίνεται, νέον δ' οὐδὲν ἀπλῶς ἔστι καὶ ὅτι πάντα τὰ γενόμενα ἐμψυχα ὁμογενή δεῖ νομίζειν. φαίνεται γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὰ δόγματα*

<sup>1</sup> Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*<sup>10</sup>, 58B25.

<sup>2</sup> D.-K. 58B4.

<sup>3</sup> 'Sense and Common Sense in the Development of Greek Philosophy', *J.H.S.* lxxxi (1961), 107-8.

<sup>4</sup> *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 206 n. 1 (Harper Torchbook edition, 1957).

<sup>5</sup> This situation often arises with binary taxonomies (systems of classification where, at each level, there are only two opposed

categories—good and bad, odd and even—into one of which everything must be fitted without qualification). In some primitive societies it is argued 'quite logically' that justice is evil because, although social order is good, the carrying out of justice involves the use of force, which in other contexts is evil. (I owe this point to Dr. E. R. Leach.)

<sup>6</sup> See J. S. Morrison, 'Pythagoras of Samos', *C.Q. n.s.* vi (1956), 252-6.

<sup>7</sup> D.-K. 14. 8 a.

*πρῶτος κομίσαι ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας.* Now with the first (transmigration and the immortality of the soul) is connected the third (the kinship of all living things), and from that follow some of the rules of abstinence. So if we could connect the first and the second (repeated cycles of events) with numbers, a lot of loose ends would be tied up.

Dr. E. R. Leach, in an essay in which he tries to discover why we include under one concept two basic but different experiences, the *repetition* of certain phenomena in nature and the *irreversible* process of ageing, writes:<sup>1</sup>

'Indeed in some primitive societies it would seem that the time process is not experienced as a "succession of epochal durations" at all; there is no sense of going on and on in the same direction, or round and round the same wheel. On the contrary, time is experienced as something discontinuous, a repetition of repeated reversals, a sequence of oscillations between polar opposites: night and day, winter and summer, drought and flood, age and youth, life and death. In such a scheme the past has no "depth" to it, all past is equally past; it is simply the opposite of now.'

'It is religion, not common sense, that persuades men to include such various oppositions under a single category such as time. Night and day, life and death are logically similar pairs only in the sense that they are both pairs of contraries. It is religion that identifies them, tricking us into thinking of death as the night time of life and so persuading us that *non-repetitive events are really repetitive.*'<sup>2</sup>

'The notion that the time process is an oscillation between opposites—between day and night or between life and death—implies the existence of a third entity—the "thing" that oscillates, the "I" that is at one moment in the daylight and at another in the dark, the "soul" that is at one moment in the living body and at another in the tomb. In this version of animistic thinking the body and the grave are simply alternative temporary residences for the life-essence, the soul. Plato, in the *Phaedo*, actually uses this metaphor explicitly: he refers to the human body as the *tomb* of the soul (*psyche*). In death the soul goes from this world to the underworld; in birth it comes back from the underworld to this world.'

'This is of course a very common idea both in primitive and less primitive religious thinking. The point that I want to stress is that this type of animism involves a particular conception of the nature of time and, because of this, the mythology which justifies a belief in reincarnation is also, from another angle, a mythological representation of "time" itself.'

Here, then, is a connexion between time and reincarnation. The obvious objection that the Pythagoreans *did* think of time as going 'round and round the same wheel' is easily met. A few sentences before the passage quoted, Dr. Leach distinguishes primitive, unsophisticated thinking from more modern notions of time: 'Only mathematicians are inclined to think of repetition as an aspect of motion in a circle.'

Pythagoras might well have taken reincarnation and substituted a circular for the oscillatory concept of time which went with it. (One thinks of the Ionian philosophers in this connexion.) An alternative way of assuaging the uncomfortable psychological feelings aroused by ageing and entropy is that taken by

<sup>1</sup> 'Two Essays concerning the Symbolic Representation of Time. (i) Cronus and Chronos', *Rethinking Anthropology* (1961), pp. 126-7.

<sup>2</sup> My italics.

Parmenides, to deny time altogether, and thus deny death. There may not, in practice, be much difference between thinking of time in oscillatory terms, and thinking of it as a *κύκλος*; certainly at a later date the circular notion was as common a cliché as it is to us, a metaphor with as much or as little significance as the speaker may wish to imply.<sup>1</sup> But to make the jump at so early a date, and, above all, to quantify the *κύκλος*, to apply arithmetic to the cycle and its periods, is surely a step which a *mathematician* would be most likely to take.

Now time is expressible in numbers, and the Pythagoreans did so express it. Commenting on Aristotle's remark that opportunity (*καιρός*) was a *τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος*, Alexander says that 7 was the number for *καιρός*, since the critical stages of a man's life went in periods of 7 (birth at 7 months, cutting of teeth at 7 months after birth, puberty at 14, maturity at 21), and the sun which was the causal agent responsible for all such critical periods was the seventh of the heavenly bodies, counting towards the centre.<sup>2</sup> Aristotle also says<sup>3</sup> that the seasons of the year were correlated with a certain kind of number (the square number 4). Ross in his note on the passage writes: 'There may also be a reference to the comparison, ascribed by Aristides Quintilianus (*Musica*, 3, p. 145 Meib.) to Pythagoras, of the seasons to the concords; spring is to autumn the fourth, spring to winter the fifth, spring to summer the octave, so that the four seasons are to one another as 6, 8, 9, 12.' Not only do all these events repeat themselves, each one individually (Eudemus' *εἰ δέ τις πιστεύεις τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὥστε πάλι τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῷ*),<sup>4</sup> but the very numbers which mark off each stage are themselves repetitive: you count up to ten and then start again with ἑνδεκα.<sup>5</sup> There is a number for the soul,<sup>2</sup> too, the 'I' that is subject to all these experiences, which studies in *θεωρίᾳ* the numerically-based *κόσμος* of the universe to assimilate its orderliness, and which is purged in *κάθαροις* by the numerically-expressed harmonies of music. And it undergoes its cycle of reincarnations which is again given numerical expression: Herodotus says that its *περιήλιος* lasted 3,000 years, in a passage<sup>6</sup> which is agreed by many to include a reference to Pythagoras, whose own lives seem to have been set out by later followers in a fairly detailed time-schedule based on the cube of 6.<sup>7</sup> To these details may be added the direct statement of Aristotle:<sup>8</sup> *ολον ἔστι τις τῶν τοῦ ἡλίου φορῶν ἀριθμός, καὶ πάλι τῶν τῆς σελήνης καὶ τῶν ζώων γε ἔκαστον τοῦ βίου καὶ ἡλικίας* (animals, of course, as well as human beings are residences for the soul). Finally, for what it is worth, there is the theory of the soul held by Alcmaeon, who seems to have been in some sort of contact with the Pythagoreans. The soul, he thought, is immortal, because it is always in (circular) motion like the heavenly bodies.<sup>9</sup> Yet man dies because he cannot join the beginning to the end;<sup>10</sup> the inference seems clear—the body can only traverse half the circle, and it is left to the soul to complete the journey, arriving eventually for its next reincarnation at the place where the circle began.

The connexion between time and numbers, though obvious enough in itself, was of particular importance to the Pythagoreans. In the fragment of Aristotle

<sup>1</sup> e.g. Hdt. 1. 207. 2; Eur. *Alc.* 449; Pl. *Tim.* 38 a.

<sup>2</sup> See Ross ad Arist. *Met.* A 5. 985<sup>b</sup>30.

<sup>3</sup> *Met.* N 6. 1093<sup>b</sup>14.

<sup>4</sup> D.-K. 58B34.

<sup>5</sup> D.-K. 58B15.

<sup>6</sup> D.-K. 14. 1.

<sup>7</sup> D.-K. 14. 8.

<sup>8</sup> D.-K. 58B27.

<sup>9</sup> D.-K. 24A12.

<sup>10</sup> D.-K. 24B2.

preserved by Stobaeus<sup>1</sup> we are told that the universe (presumably  $\tauὸ\ πρῶτον$   $\epsilonὐ$  is meant here) drew in from the Unlimited, *inter alia*, time. That is, time only begins when numbers begin and the count starts, 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . . The time-sequence is generated as part of the same process as the generation of numbers and the world. Thus, when Parmenides rejects the generation of the world, he rejects the time-sequence with it. Time keeps numbers apart in one respect as the void keeps them apart in another—it is (according to Archytas at least)  $\deltaιάστημα\ τῆς\ τοῦ\ παντὸς\ φύσεως$  and thus closely associated with the void in several passages, including the Stobaeus one.<sup>2</sup>

But there seems to be no evidence that the cosmogony will ever be repeated. The Pythagoreans were quite capable of restricting, however illogically, the periodic cycles of events to events *in* our universe. The fact that the dissident Hippasus is said to have held  $χρόνον\ ὥρισμένον\ εἶναι\ τῆς\ τοῦ\ κόσμου\ μεταβολῆς$ ,<sup>3</sup> is perhaps a good reason for accepting Zeller's view that the cosmos will never be destroyed. Or, since we hear no more of the periodic cycles, an original cyclical theory of cosmogonies might have been dropped by the later *μαθηματικοί*, together with reincarnation and associated ideas.

If my suggestion is right, we have a picture showing Pythagoras to have been a thinker as irrationally systematic as Heraclitus was rationally systematic. And such a picture, it seems to me, befits the great man that the founder of such a long-lived school must have been.

King's College, Cambridge

M. F. BURNEYAT

<sup>1</sup> D.-K. 58B30.

<sup>3</sup> D.-K. 18. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Ross's note on Arist. *Phys.* 218<sup>a</sup>33.

## NOTES ON CICERO, *AD ATTICUM* 1 AND 2

1. 1. 5: *Hermathena tua valde me delectat et posita ita belle est ut totum gymnasium †eliu ἀνάθημα esse videatur.*

Since *ἀνάθημα* is a good Greek word, most scholars have assumed that it must be retained, and that the corruption is confined to the unintelligible letters which precede it. Constans<sup>1</sup> deleted these letters as the remnant of a gloss, Sternkopf emended them to *velut*; neither solution is satisfactory, since *ἀνάθημα* by itself, without an indication of the recipient, is hardly intelligible. Hence several suggestions for a genitive to denote the recipient, e.g. *illius* (Muretus), *eius* (variant reported by Graevius);<sup>2</sup> syntactically the genitive<sup>3</sup> is unobjectionable (cf. *T.L.L.* v. 1. 2021. 68), but the sense is still not convincing: it is difficult to suppose that Cicero regarded the whole *gymnasium* as a votive offering (like a statue or other work of art) laid at the feet of the goddess.

A more promising idea was put forward by Casaubon. Commending the conjecture of Muretus (*illius ἀνάθημα*), and enlarging on Muretus' explanation of it, he says: 'tuum illud signum eo loco ea arte collocatum est in gymnasio meo ut videri possit totum gymnasium esse ei consecratum . . . et *quasi fanum* esse ei signo dedicatum'. The statue or bust<sup>4</sup> of Athena on its 'herm' makes the whole *gymnasium* look like a temple dedicated to the goddess; it corresponds to the cult-statue in the *cella* of a temple. The sense is excellent, but unfortunately *ἀνάθημα* cannot mean a temple. This was pointed out in 1836 by Billerbeck, who proceeded to suggest an alternative method of obtaining the same sense: for *eliu ἀνάθημα* read *Ἐρμαθήνης*. This suggestion (one of the very few original ideas in the whole of Billerbeck's commentary) has been undeservedly forgotten; it is doubtful if it was known to Housman when he 'jotted down'<sup>5</sup> in the margin of one of his books what I think is the final solution of the passage: 'perhaps *Ἐρμαθήναιον*'. Cicero may well have coined this word in jest, on the analogy of *Ἀθηναῖον*, a 'temple of Athena', just as at 1. 4. 3, equally in jest, he has broken up the word *Hermathena* into its component parts (*et Hermes commune omnium et Minerva singulare est insigne eius gymnasi*).

1. 10. 6: *Tulliola tibi diem dat, sponsorem non appellat.*

In an earlier letter (1. 8. 3) Cicero reports that Tullia (a child of eleven) is dunning Atticus for a promised present, and is calling upon himself, as Atticus' surety, to pay the debt: *Tulliola . . . tuum munuscum flagitat et me ut sponsorem appellat.* A few months later (1. 10. 6) Atticus has still not paid up but, if the manuscript reading is accepted (as it is by Sjögren), Tullia is *not* calling upon a surety. One would expect the surety to be identified, as in the earlier letter; and the negative is surprising—one would expect Cicero to repeat his previous statement (that Tullia *is* calling upon himself) in order to bring home to Atticus the urgency of discharging the debt. Both expectations can be satisfied by

<sup>1</sup> *R.Ph.* v (1931), 224 ff.; his theory of the origin of the gloss is fantastic.

<sup>2</sup> Cratander's *ἱλίον* is justly described by Constans as 'bizarre'.

<sup>3</sup> Constans calls the genitive 'difficult'. It is true that in *Leg.* 2. 45 Cicero uses the

dative (*donum deo*, a translation of *ἀνάθημα*).

<sup>4</sup> 'Dabei muß es offen bleiben, ob diese *Hermathena* eine Schulter- oder Körperherme . . . gewesen ist', R. Lullies, *Würzb. Jhbb.* iv (1949-50), 137.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. A. S. F. Gow, *A. E. Housman*, p. 23.

emending *non* to a form of the first person pronoun: R. Klotz read *me* (which has been accepted by Mueller and other editors), but *nos*, with the consequential change of *sponsorem* to *sponsores*, is palaeographically easier; for a plural noun in apposition to *ego = nos*, cf. *Fam.* 13. 4. 4 *nos eorum perpetui defensores*.

1. 16. 3: *Pauci tamen boni inerant* [sc. among the jurymen empanelled to try Clodius in 61 B.C.] . . . *qui maesti inter sui dissimilis et maerentes sedebant*.

*Maesti et maerentes* is an 'alliterative combination' such as those listed by Wölfflin, *Ausg. Schr.*, pp. 253 ff.; it would be completely acceptable if it were possible to discern any difference of meaning between the two words. Tyrrell tried to do so, but though his distinction was repeated by Boot (1886) it is rightly rejected by Dr. Shackleton Bailey (*Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc.*, 1956-7, p. 13) as based on no real evidence. That Cicero regarded *maestus* and *maerens* as synonyms is suggested by the parallelism in *Fam.* 4. 6. 2: *non enim, ut tum me a re p. maestum domus excipiebat quae levaret, sic nunc domo maerens ad rem p. configere possum ut in eius bonis adquiescam*.

For *maerentes* Madvig suggested *mirantes*, Dr. Shackleton Bailey (*loc. cit.*) tentatively proposes *verentes* ('ashamed' to be in such company); both of these are palaeographically good, neither is really convincing. Much better, I think, would be *gementes*; the corruption of *gem-* to *meg-* (with the consequential change to *mer-*) would be of the type copiously illustrated by Housman, *Manil.* i, p. lvi; and for the resulting combination *Livy* 39. 53. 11 *maerens quidem et gemens* may be compared.

1. 18. 8: *Nunc vides quibus fluctibus iactemur, et, si ex iis quae scripsimus tanta etiam a me non scripta perspicis, revise nos aliquando*.

Most editors later than Orelli have been content with *tanta*, which they take either with what precedes ('those topics which I have treated at such length', 'with such emphasis', Tyrrell-Purser) or with what follows ('les choses si graves que je ne te dis pas', Constans). Neither interpretation is convincing, nor is any of the emendations which have been suggested (e.g. *tamen* Manutius, *tacita* Lambinus, *cuncta* Orelli, *antea* Reid).

It is possible that *scripsimus* also should be regarded with suspicion for two reasons. (a) The plural verb is immediately followed by the singular pronoun *me*; it is true that Cicero's Letters are often disconcerting in the rapidity with which they change from plural to singular or from singular to plural, but I know of no instance so startling as this one, where the same verb is repeated with a different number (*scripsimus . . . a me non scripta*).<sup>1</sup> (b) With this particular verb *scribo* and its compounds Cicero in his Letters is curiously restrained in the use of the first person plural in the sense of the singular, and even more restrained where the reference is to letter-writing (and not to his other literary works): there are only five examples of (*per*)*scribemus*, one of *scriberemus*, and

<sup>1</sup> Conway, 'The Singular Use of *nos* in Cicero's Letters', *Trans. Camb. Phil. Soc.* v (1899), 48 and 51, includes *scripsimus* under two of his headings, 'formal plurals in phrases relating to letter-writing' and 'the plural of patronage'; he says it seems half-humorous, half-formal, 'the long political

treatise with which we have favoured you'. But Cicero's discussion of the political situation in this letter (§§ 2-7) is, by Ciceronian standards, not really very long; and I do not believe that there is any humorous note in this sentence, though it is unmistakable in the next (*nam ne absens censeare, etc.*).

one other of *scripsimus* (*Att.* 4. 4 *haec properantes scripsimus*, in a letter written 'in haste'); by contrast, there are hundreds of examples of the first person singular.

For *scripsimus tanta* I suggest *scripsi multa*, the origin of the corruption being (i) wrong division of words, (ii) dittography of *ta* to produce *tata*. My suggestion is supported by (i) the end of §1 of this letter: just as *revise nos aliquando* repeats *te exspectamus, te desideramus, te iam etiam arcessimus*, so *multa etiam a me non scripta* corresponds to *multa sunt enim quae me sollicitant anguntque*; (ii) the end of the preceding letter (1. 17, written about six weeks before our letter, and with the same foreboding of impending storm): *quid aliud scribam ad te? quid? multa sunt, sed in aliud tempus*; (iii) other passages like 13. 9. 1 *multa ἀφατα ἀδιηγητα, sed unum eius modi quod . . . ne ipse quidem auderem scribere*; *Fam.* 2. 12. 1 *sunt enim multa, sed ea non audeo scribere*.

2. 3. 2: Cyrus aiebat viridiorum διαφάσεις latis luminibus non tam esse suavis; etenim ἔστω ὄψις μὲν ἡ *A*, τὸ δὲ ὄρώμενον *ΒΓ*, ἀκτῖνες δὲ *ΑΙΓΑΓ*; vides enim cetera.

*αἱ Γα Δ: AITA vel AITA RPM<sup>1</sup>: Δ καὶ E Salicetus-Regius, vulg.*

Atticus had criticized the windows in one of Cicero's villas for being too narrow; in self-justification Cicero appeals to the authority of his architect Cyrus and embarks on a demonstration in optics intended to prove that narrow windows give a pleasanter view than wide ones. He gets as far as constructing his diagram and then breaks off,<sup>1</sup> having proved precisely nothing. Obviously the 'demonstration' must not be taken seriously; Cicero is probably repeating a sample of the architect's jargon and poking fun at it.

The diagram which he has in mind is very simple:



Now a glance at almost any page of Euclid's *Optica*<sup>2</sup> will show how Euclid would have expressed himself; he would have said *ἔστω ὄψις μὲν τὸ A, ὄρώμενον δὲ τὸ ΒΓ, ἀκτῖνες* (or *ὄψεις*) *δὲ αἱ AB, ΑΓ*. There are three terms: (a) the eye; (b) the object of vision; (c) the rays which are emitted from (a) to (b) and thereby produce vision.

(a) For the eye Cicero uses *ὄψις*, not *ὄψια*; probably by a slip, since in Euclid *ὄψις* is synonymous with *ἀκτῖς*.

(b) The object of vision is designated by two letters (*ΒΓ*) because it has extent and is therefore represented by a line, not by a point; it is quite wrong to print a comma between *B* and *Γ*, as apparently all editors have done. In putting the definite article with *ὄρώμενον* instead of with *ΒΓ* Cicero departs from the Euclidean norm.

(c) The rays likewise are represented by lines, not by points; therefore Cicero must have designated each *ἀκτῖς* by two letters, and consequently the vulgate (*Δ καὶ E*) must be wrong<sup>3</sup> (as well as palaeographically improbable).

<sup>1</sup> *Enim* is not what we should expect. Corradus suggested *iam*, Wesenberg deleted. Perhaps *autem*.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Heiberg (Teubner); e.g. p. 2. 23 or

4. 12.

<sup>3</sup> This consideration, if no other, rules out the conjecture of Constans *ἀκτῖνες δὲ Δ κτλ.*

The archetype clearly had *AIΓA*; the corruption (in the few  $\Sigma$ -class manuscripts which contain the Greek) of  $\Gamma$  to  $T$  is an easy and common one. The first two letters are the definite article in its proper form (*ai*); so Cicero here returns to the Euclidean norm of putting the article with the letters. The remaining two letters, *ΓA*, are a correct designation of one *ἀκτίς*; the other, on the same principle, must have been designated *BA*. The solution<sup>1</sup> of the passage, therefore, is to read *ἀκτῖνες δὲ ai* *(BA)*, *ΓA*. It is true that Cicero is following the theory that vision takes place through the emission of *ἀκτῖνες* from the eye to the object (as against the Epicurean view that the object gives off a succession of *εἴδωλα* which strike upon the eye), and one might therefore have expected him, in designating the *ἀκτῖνες*, to put the eye-symbol (*A*) before the object-symbols (*ΒΓ*); but it is immaterial whether the straight line joining points *A* and *B* is designated *AB* or *BA*, and Euclid himself sometimes<sup>2</sup> puts the object-symbol first.

2. 4. 2: *Clodius ergo, ut ais, ad Tigranem! velim †sirpiae† condicione, sed facile patior; accommodatus enim nobis est ad liberam legationem tempus illud cum et Quintus . . . in otio consederit et iste sacerdos Bonae deae cuius modi futurus sit sci<erim>us.*

*sirpi(a)e ΠΦC: syripi(a)e Δ condicione ΠΦΜC: -es Δ*

Atticus had reported a rumour that the triumvirs intended to send off Clodius on a *legatio* to Tigranes of Armenia. Cicero himself at the time (April 59 B.C.) was toying with the idea of accepting a *legatio* which would take him abroad (cf. 2. 5. 1).

About twenty attempts to emend *sirpiae* have been made, but the only helpful discussion is that of Lehmann (*Quaestiones Tullianae*, pp. 127-8). He points out that all suggestions for restoring an imprecation ('I hope he comes to a bad end') are quite out of place, since they do not fit the succeeding context ('but I don't mind, for a later date will suit me better to go on a *libera legatio*'); the only sense which fits this context is, as Lehmann says, 'velim mihi idem contingat'. His own tentative suggestion, *velim ipse pari condicione* is, I think, unquestionably on the right lines<sup>3</sup> (the *s* which the  $\Delta$  manuscripts offer at the end of *condicione* is satisfactorily explained as a dittography of the first letter of *sed*). As an improvement on it I would propose *velim exire ipse ea condicione*. For *exire* in connexion with a *legatio* cf. 4. 2. 6 *potestatem . . . exundi*; 6. 3. 1 *ea lege exierat* (Pomptinus, Cicero's *legatus* in Cilicia); and other passages listed in *T.L.L.* v. 2. 1356. 48 ff. The confusion of *x* and *s* is frequent.

This *legatio* of Clodius is mentioned again at 2. 7. 2: *acueram <me> ad exagitandam hanc eius legationem; quam si ille contemnit, et si . . . bilem id commovet et latoribus et auspiciis legis curiatae, spectaculum egregium. Hercule verum ut loquamur, subcontumeliose tractatur noster Publius.* Nowhere else, I think, does Cicero use *hercule* as first word in a sentence, any more than he uses *me hercule* in that position.<sup>4</sup> Some of the manuscripts punctuate so as to take *hercule* with *egregium*, but the order of words then raises scruples (one would expect *egregium hercule spectaculum*); it is therefore preferable to insert *et* before *hercule*.

<sup>1</sup> The credit for this solution belongs to Mr. W. S. Barrett, for whose help in this passage I am most grateful. My original suggestion was *ἀκτῖνες δὲ AB, ΑΓ*.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. Heiberg, pp. 14. 9, 18. 20.

<sup>3</sup> On these lines also is Constans' *velim*,

*sirempse condicione*; but *sirempse* (even assuming that it can be construed with *condicione*) is not a word which can be foisted on Cicero (except possibly in a quotation from a law).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Shackleton Bailey, *Towards a Text*, p. 83.

2. 9. 1 : Subito cum mihi dixisset Caecilius quaestor puerum se Romam mittere, haec scripsi raptim ut \* \* \* tuos mirificos cum Publio dialogos, cum eos de quibus scribis, tum illum quem abdis et ait longum esse quae ad ea responderis perscribere; illum vero qui nondum habitus est . . . — sic velim putes, nihil hoc posse mihi esse iucundius. Si vero quae de me pacta sunt ea non servantur, in caelo sum, ut sciat hic noster Hierosolymarius traductor ad plebem quam bonam meis  $\dagger$ putissimis $\dagger$  orationibus gratiam rettulerit.

A verb governing *dialogos* is missing. The usual supplement, *elicerem*, has been convincingly discredited by Dr. Shackleton Bailey (*Towards a Text*, p. 8); Cicero could not have asked Atticus for an account of the conversations, since it is clear that Atticus had already sent him an account of all but one of those that had already taken place. One other conversation, however, is still to take place; about this one Cicero says that nothing could give him greater pleasure than it. Could he similarly have said about the others how much pleasure it had given him to read Atticus' account of them? hardly, because there was one of which Atticus had not given an account. But what he could have said, and probably did say, is how much pleasure it would have given him to listen to them taking place; so perhaps *ut (inam audissem) tuos*. In any case I think it is an improvement to put a full stop after *raptim*; whatever Cicero said about the conversations, it seems to me improbable that he mentioned them as his purpose in writing to Atticus 'in haste'.

In the next sentence Koch (*Conjectanea Tulliana*, p. 20) was the first to confess his inability to understand *ut sciat*, from which editors and translators extract sense only by doing violence to the Latin (e.g. Wieland 'mag er dann sehen'); he therefore conjectured *<et faciam> ut sciat*. Constans likewise was dissatisfied and proposed (in his apparatus) *at sciet*. Better than either of these would be *tum sciat*.

'It may, I believe, be stated with as near an approach to certainty as is ever possible in such a matter that Cicero did not write *putissimis*' (Reid, *Hermath. xiii* [1905], 375); yet editors continue to print this *vox nihili*<sup>1</sup> without an obelus. Reid himself argued for Turnebus' *putidissimis*; but a complimentary word is certainly required. This requires  $\sim$  is fulfilled by Boot's *politissimis*, which, however, would limit the compliment to style, whereas we expect a word denoting general excellence. Reau *p(st)atissimis*, i.e. *praestantissimis*; for the omission of medial letters cf. Mueller's note on *Fam. 1. 7. 9*.

2. 9. 1 : Festive, mihi crede, et minore sonitu quam putaram orbis hic in re publica est conversus, citius omnino quam potuit; id culpa Catonis, sed rursus improbitate istorum qui auspicia . . . neglexerunt, . . . qui regna qui praedia tetrarchis, qui immanis pecunias paucis dederunt.

It is impossible for any wheel to revolve more quickly than it can revolve. It is true that *potest* sometimes implies *oportet* (as at 3. 15. 4 *quod meritis meis perfectum potuit*), but it cannot mean *oportet*, as editors have taken it here (e.g. Manutius explains by 'licuit, debuit, aequum fuit'); to obtain this meaning one must read *oportuit* (which first appears in the notes of Ursinus and has been

<sup>1</sup> It has been foisted by some editors into the text of Catull. 29. 23, *urbis o putissime*, where the manuscript reading is *urbis opulentissime*. Better than most of the rubbish

which has been suggested in this passage would be *urbis editissimi*; for *editus* = *praelatus* cf. *T.L.L. v.* 97. 51; the manuscript reading would then be a gloss on *ditissimi*.

frequently adopted). It is more probable, I think, that *provideri* has dropped out in front of *potuit*, just as at 5. 11. *I poterit* has dropped out between *provideri* and *provide*; the phrase *provideri potest* occurs at least six times in the Letters, as well as in Cicero's other works. On the other hand, *omnino*, which Reid (*Hermath.* xiii [1905], 377) wished to place after *culpa*, is in the right position; as sometimes happens with *omnino*, the contrast is not expressed but must be supplied from the context (here *sed tamen minore sonitu quam putaram*). I take *id* to refer only to *citius . . . oportuit*; i.e. Cato on the one hand and the triumvirs on the other are blamed not for the political revolution which has come about (the passing of power from the senate to the triumvirs) but for the speed with which that revolution has proceeded.

'The word *praedia*, standing alone, to denote territory bestowed on the tetrarchs, is not only without parallel but inherently improbable' (Reid, loc. cit.). Reid seems right in saying that *regna* means what is called in *Dom.* 129 *regum appellationes*; if so, R. Klotz's reading, *regna quasi praedia*, cannot be what Cicero wrote. Nor is *praesidia* ('fortresses'), an old conjecture advocated by Reid, really probable here, although the two words are often interchanged. In several of the passages which Reid cites the grant of the title 'rex' appears side by side with the grant of a *foedus*; e.g. *Vatin.* 29 (of Vatinius) *fecerisne foedera tribunus plebis* (in this year) *cum civitatibus, cum regibus, cum tetrarchis*; *Phil.* 5. 12 (of Antonius) *foedera interea facta, regna data*; *Suet. Iul.* 54. 3 (of Caesar) *societates ac regna pretio dedit*. Possibly, therefore, for *praedia* read *foedera*; the capitals *F* and *P* are easily confused.

2. 12. 1: *Hoc vero regnum est et ferri nullo pacto potest. Emittat ad me Publius qui obsignat.*

*potest G(?)RPZ<sup>lb</sup>: potes Ω emittat] mittat N*

Tyrell and Purser found *emittat* ('send from the city') 'a little strange'. Boot (*Observationes Criticae*, p. 43) stoutly maintained that *mittat* was a necessary correction: 'emittebant aliquem e carcere, e vinculis, ex urbe . . . sed mittebant qui aliquid nuntiaret vel denique faceret'. And Boot was right: the Ω archetype clearly read *potes emittat*, which is a simple corruption (in *scriptura continua*) of *potest mittat*.

2. 12. 2: *Quanto magis vidi ex tuis litteris quam ex illius sermone quid ageretur! de truminatione<sup>†</sup> cottidiana, de cogitatione Publi, de lituis Boώπιδος, etc.*

This metaphorical 'daily chewing of the cud' is not merely 'strange' (Tyrell-Purser); it is intolerable. One might tolerate the fact that nowhere else in ancient Latin is the noun found in the metaphorical sense; but what does 'daily' mean here? and what metaphorical cows are doing the chewing? Of the few emendations which have been suggested the most promising is that of Purser (*Hermath.* xii [1903], 52), *rerum mutatione*; I should accept *mutatione* but (I hope) improve on *rerum* by writing *ru(morum)*. The 'daily change of rumours' in Rome is exactly what Cicero, in a letter [2. 15] written a few days later, says is mirrored for him by Atticus: *ista ipsa me varietas sermonum opinionumque delectat; Romae enim videor esse cum tuas litteras lego et, ut sit in tantis [? talibus] rebus, modo hoc modo illud audire*. When *rumorum mutatione* had, from an obvious cause, become *ruminatione*, the 'influence of Christian phraseology' (Reid, *Hermath.* xiii [1905], 381) produced *ruminatio*.

2. 12. 3: sed tota res etiam nunc fluctuat, *κατ' ὀπώρην τρύξ*; quae si desederit, magis erunt liquata quae scribam.

This sentence contains a triad of brilliant emendations: *τρύξ* (Bosius) for *τραχύς*; *desederit* (Manutius) for *decesserit*; and *liquata* (Orelli) for *iudicata*. Though the last two are adopted neither by Sjögren nor by Constans, they are all three equally certain, at least in essentials. In a minor point perhaps the third can be improved upon, since *liquata* still leaves the first two letters of *iudicata* unexplained; Kayser suggested *iam liquata*, but I prefer *mi* (or *mihi*) *liquata*.

2. 12. 4: Terentia delectata est tuis litteris; impertit tibi multam salutem, *καὶ Κικέρων ὁ φιλόσοφος τὸν πολιτικὸν Τίτον ἀσπάζεται*.

'Dieser scherzhafte Schluss des Briefs . . . bedarf hoffentlich keiner Auslegung' (Wieland, i. 371 n.). Nevertheless editors insist on explaining it, and in one important point they all<sup>1</sup> explain it wrongly, because they take *Κικέρων* to be Cicero himself. In the last words of a letter one expects to find greetings not from the writer himself to the recipient but from other members of the writer's family; and that *Κικέρων* here is Cicero's young son Marcus is made abundantly clear by the closing paragraph of three other letters written during this same month (April 59 B.C.): 2. 7. 5 *Terentia tibi salutem dicit. Cicero tibi mandat ut Aristodemo idem de se respondeas quod de fratre suo . . . respondisti*; 2. 9. 4 *Terentia tibi salutem, καὶ Κικέρων ὁ μικρὸς ἀσπάζεται Τίτον <τὸν> Αθηναῖον*; 2. 15. 4 *ea* [sc. *Terentia*] *tibi igitur et Κικέρων, ἀριστοκρατικώτατος παῖς, salutem dicunt*. In each case Cicero passes on greetings (or a message) first from Terentia and then from young Marcus. In calling his son (still less than six years old) *ὁ φιλόσοφος* Cicero is jocularly attributing to him his own philosophical interests and pursuits, just as in 2. 15. 4<sup>2</sup> he attributes to him his own political sympathies (*ἀριστοκρατικώτατος* = 'optimatum studiosissimus'). It is quite possible, as Wieland (i. 363, 368) thought, that the boy was learning Greek at the time (the Aristodemus mentioned in 2. 7. 5 being his tutor), and that he was allowed to add these Greek messages at the foot of his father's letters to show off his progress in the language; this is, of course, guess-work, but the view of Tyrrell and Purser that it is 'rendered extremely improbable' by our passage is based on the misconception of the passage which I have pointed out above.

2. 15. 2: *sive ruet* [sc. Clodius] • • • *get rem p., praclarum spectaculum mihi propono.*

siveruetget C: servetget Z<sup>lb</sup>: *sive ruet* Mm: servet GHV<sup>ods</sup>

It can be assumed (a) that *sive ruet* is sound, since *ruere* is an entirely appropriate word for Cicero to use of Clodius (cf. 4. 3. 2, *Dom.* 141), (b) that *sive ruet* was followed by another *sive* clause containing a transitive verb in the future tense. Moreover, this verb must (i) provide a satisfactory contrast to *ruet*, (ii) be such a word as Cicero could conceivably have used of Clodius; these two conditions are satisfied by none of the three suggestions listed in Purser's apparatus. My own suggestion is *< sive par > cet rei p.*; the interchange

<sup>1</sup> I have found the correct explanation in one place only, a brief biography of young Marcus given by C. Bardt in his *Ausgew. Briefe*, Kommentar, p. 384.

<sup>2</sup> Were it not for this passage it would be tempting to emend *ὁ φιλόσοφος* to *ὁ φιλοσόφος*, but while this would achieve greater accuracy it would rob Cicero of his little joke.

of *C* and *G* is common. Cicero could hardly have said that he expected Clodius, even on his best behaviour, to do more than *parcere rei p.*; for the expression cf. 8. 1. 1 *reliquis membris [sc. rei p.] non parcere*; *Vat.* 7 *patriae pepercerim*.

2. 16. 4: *Si possim discedere, ne causa optima in senatu pereat ego satis faciam publicanis; εἰ δὲ μῆ, (vere tecum loquar) in hac re malo universae Asiae et negotiatoribus.*

The question at issue was whether or not some duties on goods were payable in the province of Asia. The *publicani* took the view that they were payable, the provincials and the business men that they were not; Cicero himself had given it as his considered opinion that they were not payable. However, if he can back out of this opinion, he will, out of political expediency, satisfy the *publicani*; but if he cannot back out of his opinion, 'to be quite frank', he says, 'my sympathies lie with the provincials and the business men'. But is it only if he cannot back out of his opinion that his sympathies lie with them? Surely he means that his sympathies lie with them in either case. *Malo* is not the apodosis of *εἰ δὲ μῆ*; there is no apodosis but only an aposiopesis, which is here equivalent to a shrug of the shoulders; compare the aposiopesis after *sin autem* at *Fam.* 14. 3. 5 and perhaps also at *Att.* 10. 7. 2. *Vere tecum loquar* then begins a new sentence, as does *vere tecum agam* in *Fam.* 12. 22a. 2(4).

I see no difficulty in *discedere*; it is easy to supply *de mea sententia* from the immediately preceding words *quid ego de ea re sentiam*. It is true that *decedere* would be more usual (cf. *T.L.L.* v. 1. 122. 77), but *discedere* is supported by Caesar, *B.C.* 1. 2. 5 *a sua sententia discessit* (adduced by Miss Alford).

2. 17. 1: *haec in Arpinati . . . non deflebimus . . . sed conferemus tranquillo animo τὰ immortales neque tam me εὐελπιστία consolatur, ut antea, quam ἀδιαφορία.*

According to *T.L.L.* v. 1. 892. 39 the exclamation *di boni* is found only in conjunction with a question or an exclamation.<sup>1</sup> In Cicero the same rule generally holds for *di immortales*, either by itself or preceded by *o* or *pro*; there are no exceptions in the Letters (12 examples, excluding the one quoted above) or *Philosophica* (12 examples), and very few<sup>2</sup> exceptions in the Speeches (58 examples).<sup>3</sup> In our passage, therefore, we must assume a lacuna, in which stood presumably an exclamation;<sup>4</sup> the simplest solution is *conferemus*. *⟨Quam sum⟩ tranquillo animo, di immortales! neque, etc.* For the order of words cf. 3. 2 *ita sum animo perculso et abiecto*; for *conferemus* cf. 1. 20. 1, 16. 13b(c). 2; and for *di immortales* in an expression of philosophic resignation or indifference cf. 14. 9. 1 *di immortales! quam mihi ista pro nihilo!*

2. 17. 2: *Solebat enim me pungere ne Sampsicerami merita in patriam ad*

<sup>1</sup> The statement in *T.L.L.* ii. 2086. 31 that *di boni* always precedes the question or exclamation is not correct; cf. *Phil.* 2. 80, 5. 14. The simple *o di* has been denied to Cicero (e.g. by Krebs-Schalmz, *Antibarbarus*, ii. 433), but it occurs three times in the Letters (*Att.* 9. 18. 2, *Q.F.* 3. 2. 2 and 6 (8). 4).

<sup>2</sup> I have found four: *Verr.* 5. 97, *Mur.* 84, *p. red. ad Quir.* 4 (almost equivalent to an exclamation), *Phil.* 11. 10.

<sup>3</sup> I give these figures as being (I hope) more correct than those given in *T.L.L.* v. 1. 892. 46.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Shackleton Bailey, *Towards a Text*, p. 8.

annos sescentos maiora viderentur quam nostra; hac quidem cura certe iam vacuus sum; iacet enim ille sic ut †phocis curiana† stare videatur.

Ziehen's conjecture,<sup>1</sup> *prae hoc Isis Curiana*, has received some approval (it has been accepted, most recently, by Latte, *Röm. Religionsgeschichte*, p. 282, n. 3), but it cannot possibly be right; it is completely ruled out by *hoc* following so closely on *ille*, both referring to Pompey (Ziehen's attempted defence, 'hoc nach *ille* desshalb gebraucht, weil auf ihm der Nachdruck liegt', is a mere subterfuge). We expect the mention of someone (or something) who (or which) is generally looked upon as low, either literally ('thrown to the ground', 'overthrown') or (more probably) metaphorically ('base', 'despised'). The fact that Cicero contrasts the reputations which he himself on the one hand and Pompey on the other will enjoy among future generations suggests that he may have chosen, from past history or mythology, an example of some person whose reputation stands low in the eyes of posterity. If so, what sort of person? Perhaps the beginning of the letter affords a clue: ὁμολογουμένως τυραννίδα συσκευάζεται (sc. Pompeius). The personification of evil tyranny throughout antiquity was Phalaris; so in Cicero himself *Att.* 7. 12. 2 *φαλαρισμόν* and 20. 2 (both times of Caesar) and often elsewhere. Perhaps, therefore, *Pharis* *tyrannu* or *Φάρις* τύραννο; compared to Pompey the arch-tyrant Phalaris has a savoury reputation.

2. 19. 2: Bibulus . . . ita laudatur quasi 'unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem'.

Did Cicero quote Ennius in such a way as to break his own grammatical rules? Vahlen (*Ennianae poesis rel.*<sup>2</sup>, pp. 66 and 197) believes he did, and quotes the equally ungrammatical *quorum* (likewise introducing a quotation from Ennius) in *De re p.* 1. 49; most editors of the Letters appear to share this view. But a few have wished to make the words of Ennius conform to normal Ciceronian syntax, either by writing *restituat* (a suggestion reported by Corradus) or *restituerit* (Wesenberg) or by inserting *qui* after *homo* (an alternative suggestion of Wesenberg). Much better to leave Ennius' words intact and restore grammar by inserting *qui* after *quasi*, where it may easily have dropped out by haplography.

2. 20. 6: a Vibio libros accepi; poeta ineptus et tamen scit nihil, sed est non inutilis.

Cicero criticizes the work in question, by Alexander of Ephesus, for defects both of substance and of style; this is clear from the later passage (2. 22. 7), where Alexander is called *neglegentis hominis et non boni poetae sed tamen non inutilis*. The two judgements are identical, except that the charge (in the earlier passage) of being an ignoramus is (in the later passage) toned down to a charge of carelessness; the parallelism with *neglegentis hominis* shows that *scit nihil* should not be made into a compliment, as it is by Wesenberg's suggestion *scit non nihil et est*, etc.

There are many instances of *tamen* in Cicero's Letters which have been suspected by some scholars and defended by others (especially by Lehmann), but this instance is probably as difficult to defend as any; certainly Mueller's explanation<sup>2</sup> ('poeta ineptus est et scit ille quidem nihil, sed tamen non est

<sup>1</sup> *Hermes* xxxiii (1898), 341. (1949-50), 3.

<sup>2</sup> Followed by Martin, *Würzb. Jhbb.* iv.

inutilis') seems impossible. Any adversative sense accorded to *tamen* suggests a non-existent contrast between the two criticisms, and blunts the real contrast which comes at the end of the sentence. Reid (*Hermath.* xiii [1905], 390) may be right in transposing *tamen* to follow *sed*, as it does in the later passage; but an easier and (I think) quite satisfactory solution is just to transpose *et* and *tamen*: 'I have received the work, but its value to me is limited'.

2. 21. 4: *timeo tam vehemens vir tamque acer in ferro et tam insuetus contumeliae ne omni animi impetu dolori et iracundiae pareat.*

In 1841 G. H. Moser (*Symbolae criticae*, v. 3) pointed out that *acer in ferro* must be corrupt. Perhaps *acer in furo* (re); for the expression cf. 13. 26. 1 *intemperans sum in eius rei cupiditate.*

2. 22. 5: *totum est in eo, si [sc. te videro] ante quam ille [sc. Clodius] ineat magistratum. Puto Pompeium Crasso urgente, si tu aderis qui per Boōnū ex ipso intellegere possis qua fide ab illis agatur, nos aut sine molestia aut certe sine errore futuros.*

Reid (*Hermath.* xiii [1905], 391) produced four convincing arguments to prove that the words *Pompeium Crasso urgente* must be corrupt. Cicero hopes to avoid trouble when Clodius becomes tribune because somebody is putting pressure on somebody else. We should expect Clodius to be the object of the pressure, and Pompey to be one person who is applying it. This is confirmed by an earlier passage in the letter (§ 2): *cum hoc* [sc. Clodio] *Pompeius egit et, ut ad me ipse referebat (alium enim habeo neminem testem), vehementer egit*; Pompey has been pleading with Clodius, and, according to his own account (which Cicero does not know how far to trust), pleading strongly. Similarly in our passage I think Cicero said that Pompey and Crassus are each putting pressure on Clodius, but Cicero is not quite sure how far they are sincere in doing so; this uncertainty could easily be cleared up by Atticus, who, if he were on the spot, could find out the truth from Clodius himself through Clodia. The required sense can easily be obtained by reading *Pompeio eum* (et) *Crasso urgente*; for the singular participle with two agents acting independently cf. 1. 16. 12 *Catone et Domitio postulante.*

2. 24. 1: *res est, ut spero, non tam exitu molesta quam auditu.*

*Auditu* is impossible, because it provides no contrast whatever to *exitu*; for this reason Victorius emended it to *aditu*. This is justifiable palaeographically (Mueller, ad loc., quotes instances of *au* written in error for *a*), and it is possible, in some contexts,<sup>1</sup> for *aditus* ('approach') to be contrasted with *exitus* (e.g. *Verr.* 4. 117, a description of the harbours of Syracuse); but this is not a satisfactory contrast in our passage, where Cicero is using language appropriate to the stage. For such language applied to political developments, cf. 1. 18. 2 *post profectionem tuam primus . . . introitus fuit*<sup>2</sup> *fabulae Clodianae*; Caelius ap. *Fam.* 8. 5. 3 *eadem actio de provinciis introbit* and 8. 11. 3 *scena rei totius haec*; similar, though perhaps wider in meaning (not confined to stage-shows) is *spectaculum* in passages like *Att.* 2. 15. 2 (see p. 258 above), *Fam.* 8. 14. 4 (Caelius).

<sup>1</sup> In *Dom.* 123 the two words occur together, but there is no proper contrast between them.

<sup>2</sup> After this word some manuscripts insert

*in causam*; Orelli remarks 'exspectabas potius *in scenam*'. I think that *in causam* is the corruption of a gloss *in caveam*; for *cavea* = *theatrum* cf. *T.L.L.* s.v.

In this stage-context the proper contrast to *exitu* is (as Lambinus pointed out) *introitu*,<sup>1</sup> and this, I suggest, is what Cicero wrote; the corruption has begun with the confusion of *O* and *D*.

2. 24. 4: *Quid quaeris? nihil †me† fortunatus est Catulo cum splendore vitae  
tum mortis tempore.*

*est Bosius: et Ω mortis Lambinus: hoc Ω*

Shackleton Bailey (*Towards a Text*, p. 11) successfully discredits the usual reading (which goes back to Goveanus, 1544) *nihil me <infotunatus, nihil> fortunatus*; he tentatively proposes *me <hercule>* (for *me hercule* in a sentence introduced by *quid quaeris?* there is a parallel at 5. 10. 1). It is easier to replace *me* by *mi* or *mihi*, a Dativus Iudicantis; the misinterpretation of this dative may have caused not only the corruption of the pronoun but also the corruption of *est* to *et*.

*University of Aberdeen*

W. S. WATT

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *T.L.L.* v. 2. 1536. 83 ff., vii. 2. 75. 38 ff.

## SOME PROBLEMS IN PROPERTIUS

2. 19. 29-32

Cynthia will leave Rome for the country: how fortunate that there will be no one there to seduce her—provided there is no visitor from the outside world! Propertius will himself go hunting. If Cynthia has any temptations, let her remember that in a few days he will be with her:

sic me nec solae poterunt auertere siluae  
nec uaga muscosis flumina fusa iugis,  
quin ego in assidua mutem tua nomina lingua:  
absenti nemo non nocuisse velit.

mussem *Paulmier*: motem *Hertzberg*.

29: *sic* is dubious, unless *sic* . . . *quin* can stand for *sic* . . . *ut non*. Dr. Shackleton Bailey prefers Passerat's *hic*;<sup>1</sup> Munro's *set* would better suit the interpretation of 32-32 to be advanced here.

31-32: *nomina* may be no more than a poetic plural for *nomen*, (as in 4. 2. 50, Ovid, *Ibis* 552, Horace, *Odes* 3. 27. 76, etc.), but it may have a better reason. Shackleton Bailey suggests that *mutem* is the equivalent of *iterem*,<sup>2</sup> and it may be conceded that *mutem tua nomina* could mean 'repeat your name in varied tones'. But the difficulty is to see the connexion in thought between this and the pentameter. Shackleton Bailey in his paraphrase explains by inserting 'I have good reason to be anxious', but devotion rather than anxiety is evinced by the lover who repeats the loved one's name to the trees, cf. 1. 18. 31-32.

There is an old suggestion, revived by Hertzberg, that the repetition of Cynthia's name was a charm to preserve her from the attentions of Propertius' rivals; there is, however, no parallel for such a proceeding. The best remedy may be to accept Jacob's neglected *metuam*, but not his interpretation.<sup>3</sup> The meaning will be: 'no rural surroundings will so distract me that I shall not fear the repetition of your name on a (suitor's) pressing tongue: no one would be unwilling to take advantage of an absent lover'. The adjective *assiduus* (but not the adverb) always carries for Propertius the connotation of 'pressing', 'wearing down', or 'harmfulness'. The following is a complete list of passages: (a) as here, of attentions to a woman, 1. 9. 30 *assiduas a fuge blanditas*; 8. 28 *assiduas non tulit illa preces*; 19. 24 *flectitur assiduus certa puella minis*; 2. 18. 1 *assiduae multis odium peperere querelae*; 33. 44 *eleuat assiduos copia longa uiros*; (b) otherwise, 1. 3. 5 *assiduus Edonis fessa choreis*; 2. 1. 68 *ne tenera assidua colla grauentur aqua*; 18. 16 *assiduusque meo sanguine bella gerit*; 16. 14 *rumpat ut assiduus membra libidinibus*; 3. 11. 56 *dixit et assiduo lingua sepulta mero*; 16. 26 *qua facit assiduo tramite uolgas iter*.

<sup>1</sup> *Propertiana*, p. 101; all further references to Shackleton Bailey are to this book, which must in general be taken as a basis by anyone who entertains a hope of making any further progress in elucidating difficulties.

<sup>2</sup> But his parallel, Stat. *Theb.* 2. 599, (*Briareus*) *lasso mutata Pyracmonem temnens fulmina*, is not relevant: the meaning there is that the standard of Pyracmon's workman-

ship falls off as he tires, so that in the latter stages of the battle Briareus can treat Jupiter's ammunition with contempt.

<sup>3</sup> 'pulcritudinis ac doctrinae tuae fama quae in omnium ore est, ut te satis occultare potuerit, timeo'. Jacob was followed by Enk in his *Commentarius*, with *mi* for *non* in the pentameter.

For *lingua* 'a harmful tongue' cf. 1. 16. 37; 2. 28. 14; 32. 25; 3. 8. 11. The plural *nomina*, suggesting repetition, has a parallel at 4. 5. 35, where *ingerat Apriles* seems to mean 'keep on mentioning April'.

## 3. 11. 55-70

There is a helpful discussion of this passage by Shackleton Bailey, who argues that Passerat's transposition of 67-68 to precede 59-60 is insufficient. He maintains that 69-70 should follow 61-64, the sense being 'Rome's earlier deliverances are commemorated thus and thus, the temple of Apollo commemorates Actium'. He therefore adds to Passerat's transposition one of 65-66 to follow 59-60. It would, however, be a more economical correction to transfer 65-68 as a block to precede 59-60, as was proposed by Housman.<sup>1</sup> If the lines are transcribed in this order, it will be seen how well 65 follows on 57, as was noted by Enk in his *Commentarius*; he there explains *nunc ubi* etc. by 'prae hac uictoria omnia parui facienda sunt'.

'non hoc, Roma, fui tanto tibi ciue uerenda'	
dixit et assiduo lingua sepulta mero.	
septem urbs alta iugis, toto quae praesidet orbi,	57
.	58
haec di condiderant, haec di quoque moenia seruant:	65
uix timeat saluo Caesare Roma Iouem.	66
nunc ubi Scipiadae classes, ubi signa Camilli,	67
aut modo Pompeia, Bospore, capta manu,	68
Hannibalis spolia, et uicti monumenta Syphacis	59
et Pyrrhi ad nostros gloria fracta pedes?	60

For line 58 missing in N the other manuscripts offer *femineas timuit territa Marte minas* (*timuit* om. FL). This is not nonsense, like their supplement in 3. 1. 27, nor doubtful in metre, like that at 3. 9. 35, but it stands condemned by the absence of an epithet for *Marte* (or for *minas* if *femineas* be changed to *femineo*) and by the feebleness of *timuit territa*.<sup>2</sup> Bailey thinks that if the line is interpolated, 'the general sense of the original is not likely to have been dissimilar'. Perhaps if read as a question 'expecting the answer "no"' it gives a sense that suits the triumphant tone of the context; but I should suggest that an interpolator might have got nearer the mark with *stat non humana deicienda manu*, a boast which would then be overtrumped with v. 66. A line thus ending in *manu* would incidentally account for the misplacement, through homoeoteleuton, of 65-68.

## 4. 1

This note is concerned with the old problem whether the opening poem of Propertius' fourth book is in fact one poem or two. I hope at least to show that those who think it is one<sup>3</sup> have more serious difficulties to overcome than they usually recognize, and perhaps to stimulate an attempt to meet them.

The first seventy lines are a monologue in which Propertius tells some stranger

<sup>1</sup> *Journal of Philology* xvi (1897), 10; more recently the same transposition has been hesitantly suggested by Schuster, with a vain reference to W. A. Baehrens, *Philologus* N.F. xxvi (1913), 276.

<sup>2</sup> *pennis*, if correct, is not feeble, because *timuit pennis* forms a striking phrase.

<sup>3</sup> Most recently W. Wimmel, *Kallimachos in Rom* (Hermes Einzelschriften 16), pp. 277 ff., who gives an account of earlier work.

<sup>2</sup> Virg. *Aen.* 5. 505 *timuitque exterrita*

to Rome of its humble early beginnings and present greatness. He explains that he wishes to record its buildings (57 *moenia*, cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 1. 515 *hi fient  
ingentia moenia colles*, Virg. *Aen.* 2. 234, 6. 549), following the model not of Ennius but of Callimachus. He concludes that he will write of religious ceremonies, festivals, and old topographical names:

sacra diesque canam et cognomina prisca locorum;  
has meus ad metas sudet oportet equus.

One would have supposed the poem too had reached its conclusion. But the manuscripts continue with eighty more lines. Propertius is addressed in warning tones by someone who promises that he can deliver the truth. He is Horos, an astrologer of the highest Babylonian and Greek antecedents—a genuine honest astrologer, unlike many of his contemporaries, who will tell lies for the money to be made out of them<sup>1</sup>. He proceeds to support his claims by a couple of instances where his prophecies came true. He then runs down rival methods of foretelling the future, and adduces the case of Calchas, whose blindness was exposed by the final shipwreck of the expedition to Troy. At last at 119 he comes to telling Propertius' fortune, which is not a good one. First informing him about his past, to gain credit by speaking truth where his words can be checked, he tells of the poet's birthplace, his father's death, the loss of his property, his diversion by Apollo from a legal to a poetical career. At 135 he advises him to write elegiacs (I think this is more likely than to put the words into the mouth of Apollo), and then passes to prophecy: there is one woman whose slave he will always be, and who will never firmly be his. Fated to escape any violent death, he will die the slave of love.<sup>2</sup>

Taken as a whole the last eighty lines appear to be a character-sketch of an astrologer. It is very much like that of the *lena* in the fifth poem of this book. Both are constructed in the same way: a descriptive central passage is preceded and succeeded by passages which bring the character into relation with Propertius. They differ in that the astrologer speaks the whole of these lines, whereas the *lena*'s speech is confined to the central portion of that poem. One would at first sight be justified in seeing here too an independent poem, that might be entitled *The Astrologer*, as the other might be entitled *The Procureess*. The reason for not adopting this view lies in the opening lines of the astrologer's speech, which run as follows in almost all recent editions:

quo ruis imprudens, uage, dicere fata, Properti?  
non sunt a dextro condita fila colo.  
accersit lacrimar cantans: auersus Apollo;  
poscis ab inuia uerba pigenda lyra.

cantans *Baehrens*: cantas aduersus FDV.

<sup>1</sup> I pass over vv. 87-88, which cannot be in their right place here and appear to find no place anywhere else; they present an unsolved conundrum. I cannot count as a solution the explanation offered by Lejay, *Journal des Savants*, 1915, p. 505: 'Horos interrupts his speech to imitate Propertius; he apes his tone and his ideas.'

<sup>2</sup> The last line, *octopeditis Canceris terga sinistra  
time*, is a notorious puzzle. No doubt from the standpoint of serious astrology it is nonsense, but Propertius intended it to con-

vey something. It is most improbable that his astrologer concludes with a meaningless phrase prognostications that are otherwise entirely consistent with a picture that the poet often draws of his relations with Cynthia. In some way Cancer represents a danger to Propertius; perhaps it was Cynthia's natal sign. The general interpretation of the last four lines of the poem is supported by 2. 27. 11-12, *solus amans nouit quando periturus et  
a qua / morte, neque hic Boreas flabra neque arma  
timst*, cf. 3. 7. 72, 16. 11-14.

Those who maintain the unity of the poem understand these lines to be a warning against engaging in antiquarian and aetiological poetry such as was envisaged in vv. 57-70. The astrologer prophesies that Propertius' success will lie not here but in amatory poems.

The first difficulty about what may be called the unitary view is the only one recognized by Butler and Barber. The sole argument, they say, for separating 1-70 from 71-150 'is the fact that in 121-6 the astrologer, to prove his powers, tells the poet that he comes from Umbria, a fact of which Propertius himself has already informed him in 63-6'. They meet this objection by continuing: 'Umbria is a wide region, and Propertius has merely said that he comes from an Umbrian hill-town, of which there are many. But Horos, after an introductory reference to the poet's own statement, tells him that it is near Mevania . . . and that the name of the town or hill on which it stands is Asis.' This would be a good reply if it correctly reported the astrologer's speech. But, in their text at least, what he says is:

Vmbria te notis antiqua Penatibus edit.  
mentior? an patriae tangitur ora tuae?<sup>1</sup>

In the hexameter he tells Propertius that he comes from Umbria; in the pentameter he asks whether what he has told him is true. The difficulty therefore stands in all its original strength. It is not even possible to claim that the astrologer adds a new fact by telling Propertius that he came of a well-known family. By insisting on the point that he has correctly told him his native place he cuts the ground from under that defence. Some critics have attempted to find a way past the difficulty by supposing that the astrologer is not identical with the stranger addressed in v. 1 and does not come on the scene until *after* Propertius has mentioned Umbria as his birthplace.<sup>2</sup> But what reader could be expected, in the absence of stage-directions, to understand this situation? First the poet addresses someone, about whom no details are given, except that he is a stranger; next comes a reply by someone who declares that he is an astrologer. The reader must have the intelligence to divine that this astrologer is a third person who has come unheralded to join the conversation. The idea is absurd, but it would hardly have been put forward if there had not been a difficulty to be overcome, a difficulty fatal, if not disposed of, to the unitary view. Yet if this were the only difficulty, that view might still be maintained, since there is a way of escape. That is to adopt Markland's punctuation of 121 ff., viz.:

Vmbria te notis antiqua Penatibus edit.  
mentior an patriae tangitur ora tuae  
qua nebulosa cauo rorat Meuania campo, etc.?<sup>3</sup>

'Do I speak false or is the boundary of your birthplace reached where Meuania,

<sup>1</sup> Barber in his O.C.T. places a dash after *edit* and after *tuae*, the punctuation adopted by Lachmann.

<sup>2</sup> K. Barwick, *Würzburg. Jahrb.* ii (1947), 12, brings him on at line 67. A. Dieterich, *Rh. Mus.* lv (1900), 210, claims that every Roman would understand why it is just at line 70 that an astrologer appears: Propertius is on the south-west corner of the Palatine,

and with the words *has meus ad metas sudet oportet equus* descends to the Circus Maximus, a notorious haunt of astrologers (*Cic. Div.* i. 132, *Hor. Sat.* i. 6. 113); the steepness of the hill, accelerating the poet's pace, accounts for Horos' opening words *quo ruis?*

<sup>3</sup> Markland further read *tenditur*. In punctuation he was followed by Hertzberg, Palmer, and Enk.

etc.?" This will preserve Horos' presence during Propertius' speech, and his identity with the stranger of v. 1.

Another possibility is to make a division into two separate but related poems: first Propertius boasts of his intentions to a stranger, then on a later occasion an astrologer who had not been present but knows of them in general outline warns the poet to desist. This was probably Lachmann's view: he printed a transverse line after v. 70 and wrote 'de primo carmine ita statuo, priorem eius partem alio ac posteriorem tempore scriptam esse'.

The apparent inconsistency between 63-64 and 121-2 may thus be surmounted, but it is not, as Butler and Barber claim, the sole reason for dividing the poem. It is not even mentioned in a powerful attack on the unitary view published over seventy years ago by E. Reisch, *Wiener Studien* ix (1887), 124-9; much of what follows can be found there. The position of the unitarians is that the poem is a variation on 3. 3, where Propertius dreams that he has followed Ennius in historical epic, but Apollo and Calliope intervene and tell him to stick to amatory poetry. So here, he proposes to write about Rome's history and topography; Horos intervenes and tells him to refrain, claiming the support of Apollo (73, *aversus Apollo*). The difficulties involved in this interpretation are formidable.

1. There is the obvious objection that Propertius did not refrain from writing the sort of poetry he had proposed: half of the poems that follow are of that nature. It is sometimes replied that Horos is not Apollo, but a grotesque or comic figure, who is not to be taken seriously. To see him thus is to see him with modern eyes. In Propertius' time astrology was defended by philosophers and employed by emperors. If we look at the poem without prejudice we find that Horos offers first-rate credentials and justifies his claims by an accurate account of Propertius' life: this is impressive, not comic.<sup>1</sup> If Horos is a reliable astrologer, he must be taken seriously when he warns Propertius against antiquarian poetry. We may see in him an excuse for not carrying out in full the programme suggested in 57-70. But if this was Propertius' intention, it involved the risk of prefixing to his ventures in a new kind of poetry a preface that condemned them in advance as unsuccessful.<sup>2</sup> Such diffidence, improbable in itself, is strangely unlike the assured and masterful style which pervades the book.

2 (a). The words in which Horos is supposed to discourage Propertius from straying from amatory poetry are unsuitable for the purpose. It is no answer to a poet who says *sacra diesque canam et cognomina prisca locorum* to reply *quo ruis imprudens dicere fata?* Of course *sacra*, *dies*, and *cognomina* are to a determinist all due to destiny, but so is everything else about which a poet could sing, including (as Horos will point out) his love affairs. *dicere fata* can hardly mean anything else in the mouth of an astrologer than 'foretell the future', and the whole of his speech is in fact concerned with prophecy.

Let us suppose, nevertheless, that *fata* may mean *fata populi Romani*, the history which is commemorated in festivals and place-names. The supposition

<sup>1</sup> The determination not to accept Horos as a seriously-intended figure leads Paley to say that he made 'a pretty safe guess' in prophesying that both Arria's sons would be killed at the wars. Service in the Roman army was not so suicidal as that. The incident of Cinara is not meant to be absurd; see Dieterich, *Rh. Mus.* lv (1900), 213, and R. Reitzenstein, *Hermet* 1 (1915), 474, both quoted by Bailey.

<sup>2</sup> I assume that Propertius did not intend to suppress these poems, whether Book 4 was arranged by himself (as I incline to believe) or after his death.

is hardly made before it is exploded by the pentameter—*non sunt a dextro condita fila colo*: the threads of fate are unfavourable, and no one could say that of *fata populi Romani*.

The meaning here given to the pentameter is not that assigned to it by most modern writers. They suppose the threads to be those, not of fate, but of poetry, and the meaning to be that Propertius will spin bad aetiological poems. They fail to remark that this would be the only passage in all Latin literature to equip a poet with a distaff, whereas Fronto very justly observes that *poetae colus et fila fatis assignant* (p. 233, 8 Naber). Although the metaphor of spinning a poem (*deducere*) is familiar, the use of *filum* for poetry is rare: *T.L.L.* has Horace's *tenui deducta poemata filo* (*Epist. 2. 1. 225*) and a couple of imitations by Ausonius (Columella 10. 225 may be added), as against about thirty examples where the word is connected with the fates. To take *fila* here, after *fata* in the previous line, to signify poetry is only possible to one who brings a preconception about what the couplet must be made to mean. Moreover, this forcible interpretation is not even consistent with the past tense of *condita sunt*:<sup>1</sup> Propertius has said *canam* not *cecini*; the aetiological poems are still in the future, not already written.

2 (b). It must now be considered whether a way of escape is offered by W. Otto, *Hermes* xx (1885), 569. He supposes that since Propertius by uttering the words *sacra diesque canam* foretells his poetic future, by *dicere fata* Horos means 'tell your own future'. This will avoid the difficulties which beset the usual view of the hexameter (although *tua fata* would have been clearer). But the pentameter remains awkward. If 'your fated future is not a good one' has any reference to poetry, it appears to mean 'your fate is to write unsuccessful poems', which is far from acceptable in sense. Could it, however, mean 'your future is not the desirable one of writing a great series of antiquarian poems'? This is perhaps the best that can be done for the unitarian view, but if this is the meaning, the couplet puts it obscurely and ineffectively.<sup>2</sup>

3. If Horos' opening words are to be taken as a warning that Propertius will not achieve his poetical programme, it is odd that no further overt reference is made to the subject. Antiquarian verse is never brought up again. On the contrary, Horos later tells Propertius to write elegiacs (135), which is exactly what he had proposed to do: he had disclaimed emulation of Ennius and set himself to be a Roman Callimachus. It may be said that *inge elegos* must there be understood to mean 'compose (amatory, not aetiological) elegiacs'. There is an obvious reply. This distinction is notoriously not one that the Roman poets are accustomed to make. Propertius can in the same breath refer to the *Aitia* and recommend Callimachus as a model for amatory poetry (2. 34. 31), nor does he himself keep the two kinds of poetry apart. In this book the Tarpeia-poem, which deals with *cognomina prisca locorum*, is largely taken up with a picture of a woman in love, while of the two Cynthia-poems one (7) starts with an account of a religious rite at Lanuvium.

There is a known motif, derived from Callimachus' *Aitia*, by which Apollo intervenes to restrain the poet from writing epic and to confine him to poems of a shorter kind or another genre (Prop. 3. 3, Virg. *Ecl. 6*, Horace, *Odes* 4. 15);

<sup>1</sup> *Condita* has been thought apposite to poetry because of the phrase *condere carmen*, but *condere fata* or *fatum* is also known (Virg. *Aen.* 10. 35, Lucan 7. 131).

<sup>2</sup> Reisch, p. 125, says that Otto was not the first to offer this solution; he finds *imprudens* unsuitable to Otto's interpretation.

if Propertius had intended to adapt this motif to make the god draw an unfamiliar distinction between two kinds of elegiac poetry, he ought to have taken some pains to make it clear what he was doing.

My conclusion is that a unitary view of the poem can be maintained only by a number of forced interpretations. It remains to consider, as Reisch unfortunately omitted to do, whether vv. 71–150 make a satisfactory independent poem, parallel (as suggested above) to the sketch of the *lena* in the fifth poem. There is, as far as I can see, a single obstacle to this view, and that is constituted by lines 71–74. Embarrassing as they were to the unitary view, they are quite as embarrassing if taken to be the opening of a new poem. To begin with, line 71 with its injunction not to tell of destiny seems to be irrelevant to a poem of which the subject is an astrologer and his telling of Propertius' fortune. But a closer inspection of the line than that yet given reveals two flaws in it. The first, already noted by Palmer, is the addition of the epexegetic infinitive to *quo ruis?* *Ruo* and infinitive may be paralleled in silver Latin poetry: *scire ruunt* (*uolunt* GV) seems to be right at Lucan 7. 751, but Statius, *Theb.* 7. 177 *ruimus* (*luimus* P, Garrod, Klotz) *ditare Mycenas* is less certain. But *quo ruis dicere?* is not a self-consistent phrase, since *quo* asks the destination and *dicere* states it.<sup>1</sup> *Quo ruis?* or *quo ruitis?* with or without an adjective, is a stock locution, complete in itself and (so far as I know) never extended. Hor. *Epod.* 7. 1, *quo sclesti ruitis?*, Virg. *Aen.* 10. 811 *quo moriture ruis?*, Persius 5. 143 *quo deinde insane ruis?*, Virg. *Aen.* 2. 520, 5. 741, Ovid, *Met.* 15. 123, Statius, *Theb.* 8. 338 *quo ruis?* Virg. *Aen.* 12. 313, Ovid, *Met.* 9. 428, 13. 130 and 131, *Fasti* 2. 225 *quo ruitis?*

The second doubt is raised by the word *uage*, awkward whether taken in asyndeton with *imprudens* or as going with *Properti*, and unsuitable to the context. *Vagus* denotes, not taking the wrong course, but wandering about without plan, uncertainty, capriciousness, vacillation; it is therefore not a good word to associate with *quo ruis?*, which implies a definite and chosen course. There is reason, then, for suspecting the correctness of this hexameter's text. Two small changes will not only remove the flaws, but also yield a couplet both lucid and appropriate to the poem I wish to see.

quo ruis imprudens? caue discere fata, Properti;  
non sunt a dextro condita fila colo.  
caue Schippers (fuge Livineius) discere 5

'Seek not', says the astrologer, 'to learn your fate: it is no fortunate one.' It may be objected that this is nonsense because he *does* foretell the poet's future in 139–50. But these opening words are a rhetorical flourish, no more to be taken at their literal face value than is the orator who prefixes a lengthy account of something with the words 'why should I tell of...?'.<sup>2</sup> The next words are again to the point, *accersis lacrimas*,<sup>3</sup> 'you are bringing cause for grief on your own head', sc. by demanding to know your future. Horos picks this

<sup>1</sup> To punctuate (with Rothstein) *quo ruis imprudens, uage? dicere fata Properti?* would be a counsel of despair. But *imprudens* can govern *dicere*; see the additional note at the end of this article.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Virg. *Aen.* 6. 614–24, introduced by *ne quaere doceri*.

<sup>3</sup> Plaut. *Amph.* 327 *illic homo sibi malam*

*rem arcessit; Sen. ep. 99. 13 non debes causas doloris arcessere*, although not quite the same, has the same sense of unnecessarily going out of one's way to incur trouble. Note that the phrase is precise in the context here proposed, and somewhat far-fetched in that of failing to write enough (or good enough) aetiological poems.

up at v. 120, when he finally comes to Propertius' destiny—*incipe tu lacrimis aequus adesse nouis*.<sup>1</sup>

Now we come to the crux of the passage:

cantas auersus Apollo  
poscis ab inuita uerba pigenda lyra.

The idea that bad verses are written or would be written when the god is *auersus* is familiar: Ovid, *Amores* 3. 12. 17, *auersis . . . Musis*, Martial 4. 31. 5, *auerso fonte sororum*, 8. 62. 2, *auerso . . . deo*, and cf. Calpurnius 4. 9 *diuersus Apollo*. Hence these words point at first sight irresistibly towards the view that the soothsayer is warning Propertius off from writing antiquarian poetry; they seem to demand the interpretation in that sense, for all the difficulties it has been shown to involve, of the previous couplet. So modern editors (with the exception of Tremenheere) are unanimous in emending the corrupt *cantas* to suit this view, and in writing *cantans*, joined with *accessis lacrimas*. It is strange, if such a simple solution is right, that it had to wait for E. Baehrens and the year 1880, while scholars of the calibre of Heinsius and Lachmann overlooked it in favour of *auersis Charisin cantas* and *accessis Latium: cantas*. Yet, so far as I know, only Bücheler<sup>2</sup> and Tremenheere have raised a voice against *cantans*. It is emphatically placed, although unnecessary to the supposed sense; and it is not even appropriate to that sense, for Propertius is not at the moment singing, he is (according to the unitarian view) giving notice that he will sing.

The *lyra* or *cithara* is for Propertius the attribute of Apollo (2. 31. 6, 3. 3. 14, 4. 6. 32), and never that of the elegiac poet, who with historical correctness uses the *tibia* (2. 7. 11, 2. 30. 16, 4. 6. 8);<sup>3</sup> this suggests the possibility that if any singing is done here, it is done by Apollo. Perhaps *cantas* is a mistake for *cantat*, induced by three other words ending in *-s*, and has been transposed to save the metre: we might try

auersus cantat Apollo:  
poscis ab inuita uerba pigenda lyra.

Some support for this may be found in the fact that Ovid, a poet full of echoes of Propertius, makes Apollo sing to an unwilling lyre in sorrow for an ill-fated mythical poet, *Amores* 3. 9. 23–24:

et Linon in siluis idem pater 'aelinon' altis  
dicitur inuita concinuisse lyra.

The lines to which this discussion has led may now be set out for judgement:

quo ruis imprudens? caue discere fata, Properti;  
non sunt a dextro condita fila colo.  
accessis lacrimas: auersus cantat Apollo;  
poscis ab inuita uerba pigenda lyra.

'Where are you so thoughtlessly hastening? Beware of learning your fate, Pro-

<sup>1</sup> *aequus sc. mihi*. Propertius is to give favourable and willing attention, cf. Ter. *Andr.* 24, *adeste aequo animo et rem cognoscite. nouis* either is 'modern' in contrast with the earlier calamities just recounted, or looks forward to the new troubles, still in the future, which (so Propertius is to learn) are to be added to his old ones.

<sup>2</sup> *Rh. Mus.* xxxix (1884), 427, *Kl. Schr.* iii. 36. His own *accessis lacrimas quantas!* is no improvement. Heinsius, it should be said, was misled by humanist emendations, *auersis Musis cantas* and *accessis lacrimis Charites*.

<sup>3</sup> But he will take to the *cithara* when he sings of war, 2. 10. 10.

pertius; its threads have been spun from no auspicious distaff. You are bringing cause for sorrow on your head; unfavourable is the response of Apollo; you are asking his unwilling lyre for words that must cause you distress.<sup>1</sup>

Propertius represents himself as interrupted by Horos as he is about to consult some Apolline oracle; exactly what is not made clear, and the range of prophecy under Apollo's care was a wide one (*Tibullus* 2. 5. 11-16).<sup>2</sup> The astrologer warns him that knowledge of his future can bring him nothing but pain. I submit that this is a logical introduction to the poem summarized in the first paragraph of this note, whereas the traditional text offers a series of obstacles to the unitarian view.

4. 1. 125-6 and 65-66

Vmbria te notis antiqua Penatibus edit  
(mentior an patriae tangitur ora tuae?)  
qua nebulosa cauo rorat Meuania campo  
et lacus aestiuis intepet Vmber aquis,  
scadentisque Asis consurgit uertice murus,  
murus ab ingenio notior ille tuo,  
ossaque legisti non illa aetate legenda, etc.

124 *multifariam temptatum*

125 *Asisi Lachmann.*

125

Richmond's view that 125-6 are interpolated has more to be said for it than he himself says: 'Asis aut mons fuit aut oppidi conditor Asisii, nec potuit ut arces scandere. nec "uertice" felicius, cum arx Asisii monti satis alto supposita sit . . . "Asisi" Lachmannus contra prosodiam.' There is in fact no solid basis for determining either the prosody of *Asisium* or what might be intended by *Asis*. It remains true, however, that *uertice* is an embarrassment, whether the wall 'rises on the top of Asis', or 'rises with its top'. To this may be added, first a point of form. *Vmbria . . . edit* is linked by *-que* to *ossa . . . legisti*. A single intervening relative clause *qua . . . aquis* would be easy; a double one, involving a second *-que*, not parallel to the other, is awkward and disproportionate. Also, if 125-6 are removed, the whole of this section of Horos' speech from 121 to 150 falls into groups of four lines. Secondly, if he says that Assisi is *famous as being Propertius' home*, the astrologer knocks the bottom out of his attempt to win credit by divining that the poet was born in Umbria, which on his own showing must then be a matter of common knowledge. A motive for interpolation might be found in a desire to claim Propertius' birth for Assisi, a town of which Pliny seems to have believed him to have been a *municeps* (*Ep.* 6. 15. 1 with *C.I.L.* xi. 5405). The previous couplet suggests that he may have been born in the low-lying territory of Meuania (cf. 1. 22. 9 *supposito . . . Vmbria campo me genuit*). If an interpolator is responsible, he borrowed *scadentis*, *murus*, and *ingenio* from 65-66 and modelled the anaphora of *murus* on that of *Vmbria* in 63-64:

<sup>1</sup> *pigenda* so comes into its own. If Propertius had been asking his own lyre for verses that would have turned out inferior, they would have been *pudenda* rather than *pigenda*.

<sup>2</sup> I could wish I knew that oracular Apollo ever used a lyre. This poem of Tibullus

opens with *huc age cum cithara carminibusque ueni*, but that may be because Tibullus wishes to write a poem. In *Homeric Hymn* 182 Apollo comes to rocky Pytho φορμίζων φόρμιγγη γλαφυρῆ, but did he use it after arriving?

ut nostris tumefacta superbiat Vmbria libris,  
 Vmbria Romani patria Callimachi.  
 scandentes quisquis cernit de uallibus arces,  
 ingenio muros aestimet ille meo.  
 Roma, faue, tibi surgit opus . . .

Nevertheless I doubt whether lines 65–66 contain any reference to Propertius' birthplace. Umbria had plenty of towns on hills, so that the hexameter is quite insufficient to identify Assisi.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it gives a particularly poor picture of Assisi: the ancient town, like the modern, was perched high up on a hill-side overlooking a plain; it did not 'climb out of valleys'. On the other hand, anyone standing, as Propertius imagines himself to be standing, on an eminence in Rome must even today, when many of the lower levels have been raised, be struck by the aptness of the phrase *scandentes de uallibus arces* to what lies before him. *arces*, as *T.L.L.* notes, is used '*speciatim de collibus Romae*', and compare *Cic. Rep.* 2. 11, on the excellence of the site of Rome: *colles enim sunt qui . . . adferunt umbram uallibus*. Of course Propertius did not boast that Rome got its importance from him; his hope is that people will judge the value, understand the meaning and importance, of the buildings of Rome through the accounts he will write of them (*moenia namque pio coner disponere uersu*, 57 . . . *Roma, faue, tibi surgit opus*). So interpreted the couplet is relevant to its context; the traditional view makes it an ornamental, but incompetent, flourish.

It will be objected that Ovid had the couplet in mind when he wrote *Amores* 3. 15. 11–14:

atque aliquis spectans hospes Sulmonis aquosi  
 moenia, quae campi iugera pauca tenent,  
 'quae tantum' dicet 'potuistis ferre poetam,  
 quantulacumque estis, uos ego magna uoco.'

But the passages do not contain a single word in common and the central idea in Ovid, the smallness of the birthplace redeemed by the greatness of the poet, is absent from Propertius.

4. 2. 1–2

quid mirare meas tot in uno corpore formas?  
 accipe Vertumni signa paterna dei.  
 paterna *N*: petenda *FLPDV*.

'No one has found a tolerable meaning in *signa paterna . . . petenda*, being wholly nonsensical, may well be as near or nearer the original': Shackleton Bailey. But *petenda* might perhaps have been intended to mean 'that you ought to ask about if you are not to be puzzled by my changes of appearance', and so be a 'correction' of the meaningless *paterna*. If *paterna* is to be our starting-point, the fault may lie in the assimilation of its ending to that of *signa*; we might consider

accipe Vertumni signa patere dei

'understand that those varying shapes are plain pointers to the fact that I

<sup>1</sup> Hence Luetjohann thought the couplet interpolated. Some manuscripts have a marginal note *Asis*, presumably from 125; perhaps such a note gave rise to *quasuis* (FL).

To import *Asis* into the text by writing *qui Asis*, as Butler once proposed, is an improbable solution.

am the god *Vertumnus*'. The god then goes on to reject two false etymologies of his name, and returns to this true one at 21: *opportuna mea est cunctis natura figuris* (= *meas tot in uno corpore formas*); after exemplifying at length this variety of *forma* or *figura*, he concludes at 47,

at mihi quod formas unus uertebar in omnes  
nomen ab euentu patria lingua dedit.

This interpretation meets the requirement that the opening couplet should provide an introduction to the main theme: and *patere* responds well to *quid mirare?* 'Why are you surprised? The answer is looking you in the face'.

4. 7. 79

pelle hederam tumulo, mihi quae praegnante corymbo  
mollia contortis alligat ossa comis.  
praegnante Cornelissen: pugnante      mollia s: molli O

For a defence of the emendations printed above see Shackleton Bailey. He notes that the 'appeal contrasts rather curiously with those sepulchral epigrams in which ivy is exhorted to surround the graves of poets':<sup>1</sup> especially as Cynthia wrote verses herself, and that it is 'strange to find ivy covering a tomb of one *nuper humatae*', ivy mature enough, one may add, to carry berries. Further, whereas we tend to regard ivy as a parasite, for Propertius (? for all ancient writers) it is either a plant beautiful in itself (1. 2. 10, 4. 4. 3) or a symbol of poetic inspiration (2. 5. 26, 3. 3. 35, 4. 1. 62). Similarly *corymbus* is a symbol of poetry (2. 30. 39, 4. 6. 3), and *praegnans* calls to mind the *νάρκισσον* ἔγκυον *ἱμνων* that Meleager ascribes to Melanippides.<sup>2</sup> The associations of the words are so uniformly pleasant and honourable that, if the text is to be maintained, there is a pressing need to find a reason why Cynthia should make such an unexpected request for a bare tomb. Being unable to see one, I incline to believe that she asked that ivy should be *planted* on her tomb and to read *pone* for *pelle* and *alliget*<sup>3</sup> for *alligat*. By this request she might have in mind not only her own poetry, but the fact that she had been the inspiration for that of Propertius:

ingenium nobis ipsa puella facit (2. 1. 4);  
nam sine te nostrum non ualet ingenium (2. 30. 40).

The idea that she, rather than he, should be honoured for his poetry may indeed be implicit in the preceding couplet, where she bids him burn his verses about her—*laudes desine habere meas*, 'cease to enjoy the honours which are properly mine'; this interpretation is preferable to understanding the words as an unexplained order not to keep the verses he had written in her praise.

However the passage is interpreted, the shoots and leaves of the ivy cannot literally twine around the bones: *ossa* may be used, as so often, to mean the dead person's spirit; that would make *mollia ossa* more acceptable. Yet although

<sup>1</sup> A.P. 7. 22 (Simias) ήρέμ' ὑπὲρ τύμβου Σοφοκλέους, ήρέμα, κισσό, ἐρπύζοις χλοερούς ἐκπροχέων πλοκάμους (cf. *comis*), 23 (Antipater of Sidon) θάλλοι τετρακόρυμφος, Ανάκρεον, ἀμφὶ σὲ κισσός; cf. 30 (also Antipater), 36 (Erycius), 708 (Dioscorides).

<sup>2</sup> A.P. 1. 7; incidentally I do not know whether anyone has suggested that the οὐνάσθη which represents Simonides is not

the insignificant inflorescence of the vine, but *Spiraea filipendula* (see L.S.J., s.v. III), a close relative of meadow-sweet.

<sup>3</sup> Shackleton Bailey, who keeps *pelle*, hesitantly proposes *nolim . . . alliget* for *mollia . . . alligat*. A more drastic change, which would surmount a difficulty raised in my final paragraph, would be *ambiat*.

Cynthia might describe herself as 'a gentle ghost', to do so would confuse the point which I ascribe to the couplet. Mr. W. A. Camps has suggested to me that instead of *mollia* the alternative conjecture *mollis* might be adopted, in view of *ἡρέμα* in Simias' epigram and the ivy's *μαλακὸν πόδα* in that of Erycius. In that case *ossa* might stand for '(tomb containing the) bones', and for the phrase *alligare ossa* we could compare *Carm. Epigr.* 1135, *serta quod et tumulum florida saepe ligant.*<sup>1</sup>

4. 11. 15-20

damnatae noctes et uos uada lenta paludes  
et quaecunque meos implicat unda pedes,  
immatura licet, tamen huc non noxia ueni:  
det pater hic umbrae mollia iura meae,  
aut si quis posita iudex sedet Aeacus urna,  
in mea sortita uindicet ossa pila.

uindicet *F*: iudicet *ceti*.

The general sense of the first couplet is not in doubt; in it Cornelia apostrophizes the underworld. In the third line she denies that her early death was due to any wickedness. What remains has not received adequate explanation, although Tremenheere is correct in outline.

We may start from a fact established by Hertzberg, namely that *iura dare* properly denotes 'to assign privileges or status in a state'.<sup>2</sup> The second pentameter, therefore, has nothing to do with any formal judgement of the soul, but simply means 'let the Father of this place (i.e. Pluto) assign me an easy lot in his realm'. Cornelia supposes a benevolent autocracy in Hades. It is only in the next couplet that she considers the alternative, namely that matters are arranged by process of law:

aut si quis posita iudex sedet Aeacus urna.

Here is the familiar urn from which lots are drawn to decide the order in which the cases are to be heard: *omne capax mouet urna nomen*. The first real difficulty comes with the pentameter. Modern editors, save Rothstein who impossibly makes *in* govern *pila*, join the words *in mea ossa uindicet*, and Bailey shows that this construction has parallels. But the sense thus obtained is totally out of place. Why should Cornelia pray that Aeacus should punish her? Throughout the poem she insists on her innocence. Postgate alone attempts an explanation: 'the general sense of these difficult lines is an assertion of her innocence. "If I am innocent let me have the rewards of innocence: if guilty, let me be punished by the severest judge in the underworld." This may be sense, but even the most wilful of poets does not express the idea "if I am guilty" by "si quis iudex sedet Aeacus".

Reason demands a return to the old view that *uindicet ossa* means 'let him acquit my shade'. Shackleton Bailey follows Hertzberg in denying that *uindicare* can mean 'acquit'. But this Protean word can mean something very similar. Pliny twice joins it with *absoluere*: 4. 9. 1, *causam per has dies dixit Julius Bassus*

<sup>1</sup> *alligare*, as *T.L.L.* shows, is often no more than *ligare*, a point noted by Plutarch, *Mor.* 280 a, τὸ δὲ δεσμεύειν ἀλλιγᾶρε λέγουσαν οἱ πολλοὶ Ρωμαῖοι, οἱ δὲ καθαρεύοντες ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λιγᾶρε. Cf. also *carm. epigr.* 1064 *cingant suaves ossa sepulta rosae*, quoted by

Shackleton Bailey.

<sup>2</sup> But this can imply a previous inquiry into merit; and it may be doubted whether the author of *carm. epigr.* 1109. 23, *ne Minos mihi iura dabit*, sharply distinguished *ius dicere* and *iura dare*.

... tandem *absolutus vindicatusque*, 6. 21. 3, *absolutus vindicatusque est*; cf. Cic. *De Senect. 55*, *ne ab omnibus eam (sc. senectutem) uitii videar vindicare*. Whether the word in such passages suggests 'free from peril' (cf. Cic. *Pro Flacco 40*, *dubitabit, iudices, quin ab hoc ignotissimo Phryge nobilissimum ciuem vindicetis?*) or 'free from all imputation of guilt', it is closely associated with the idea of acquittal in court. It need hardly be added that it is typical of Propertius' mature compressed style to omit an obvious word and replace it by one that carries a desired associated idea.<sup>1</sup> *Ossa vindicet for ossa absoluta vindicetque* is less remarkable than, for example, *infernas intrarunt leges for inferna intrarunt regna et infernas subierunt leges*.

To accord with this view of *vindicet ossa*, Heinsius proposed *is mea*, Fontein *in me*. Neither is needed, since the construction is *sortita in mea ossa pila vindicet (ossa)*, 'when the lot is drawn for the case against my shade, let him discharge it honourably'.<sup>2</sup>

I return to the opening words of this extract, *damnatae noctes*. No one has established the limits of hypallage. Presumably there are some, and *occisi gladii* could not be interpreted as *occisorum gladii*. But many competent scholars accept *damnatae noctes* as meaning *damnatorum noctes*, 'darkness inhabited by the damned', on the model of such phrases as *scelerata sedes* 'abode of the wicked', Tib. 1. 3. 67, *diserta ianua* 'door of a learned man', Martial 10. 19. 12. Whether they are justified or not in abstract principle, the interpretation is repugnant to the context. First geographically: on entering the underworld one does not meet immediately the regions of the damned (or condemned); they lie farther on, beyond the place of judgement. Second emotionally: a protestation of innocence does not begin with an appeal to the abode of criminals. What is required here is an address to the underworld as a whole, uttered by one who is crossing its threshold. Peerlkamp's *aeternae* would meet that need, but has no palaeographic probability. I would put forward for consideration

*damnatae nocti set uos, uada lenta, paludes,*<sup>3</sup>

'but o ye marshes given over to darkness, sluggish shallows'. This type of apposition, noun and epithet contained inside epithet and noun, occurs again in Propertius, 2. 31. 8 *artifex, uiuida signa, boues*, 2. 3. 14 *geminæ, sidera nostra, faces*, 3. 3. 31, 4. 1. 12, 4. 9. 18, cf. 1. 11. 30 *Baiae, crimen amoris, aquae*.

Certain examples of the construction *damnare* and dative are strangely hard to find. In Lucretius 6. 1231 *morti damnatus ut eset* we might conceivably have an ablative. There is almost certainly an ablative in Lucan 7. 452, *subitis damnauit noctibus Argos*, where Housman compared Ovid, *Met. 3. 335 aeterna damnauit lumina nocte* and Claudian, *Bell. Gild. 399 refugo damnauit sole Mycenæ*. Most possible examples have a nominal form that is ambiguous as between

<sup>1</sup> Cf. H. Tränkle, *Die Sprachkunst des Propertius*, pp. 95-96.

<sup>2</sup> W. A. Camps, *C.R. n.s. xi* (1961), 105, suggests reading *vindex* in 19 and *iudicet* in 20; 'if there is an Aeacus to punish crimes, I am ready to be judged by him'. (He supposes an unheard-of construction *iudicet in mea ossa*; as appears above, this is not necessary.) But if the dead are judged by Aeacus, it is gratuitous for Cornelia to ask that he should judge her, stipulating only that he should not take her out of turn. If she had demanded that

he judge her without favour, or with unusual strictness, that would have been a different matter.

<sup>3</sup> 2. 24. 42 may provide a parallel for *sed* postponed to third place. Richmond proposed (appendix, p. 394), but did not explain, *damnatae Noctis set uos*. He seems to be the only editor to find the 'poetic' plural *noctes* worth notice ('audacius pro tenebris quam densissimis'); a possible parallel is to be found in Lucan 7. 452, quoted below.

dative and ablative, e.g. Lucan 9. 985 *Pharsalia nostra uiuet et a nullo tenebris damnabimur aeuo*, Claudian, *Cons. Prob.* 42 *hic non diuitias nigrantibus abdidit antris nec tenebris damnauit opes*, Silius 15. 76 *degeneres tenebris animas damnauit Auernis*, Virg. *Aen.* 4. 699 *Stygioque caput damnauerat Orco*, etc. Fortunately there can be no doubt about Silius 5. 241 *quem deus ima colentum damnasset Stygiae nocti*. This will serve to establish as certain Statius, *Theb.* 6. 55 *damnatus flammæ torus*, and that in its turn makes probable a dative *ibid.* 81 *cuncta ignibus atris damnat*, and Martial 11. 41. 6 *damnauitque rogis*. Presumably others of the doubtful forms should be taken as datives.<sup>1</sup>

Trinity College, Cambridge

F. H. SANDBACH

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Mr. W. R. Smyth for consulting on my behalf his bibliography of conjectures, and to three friends, Mr. W. A. Camps, Mr. A. Ker, and Mr. A. G. Lee,

from discussions with whom this article has greatly profited; they are of course in no way responsible for its conclusions or its errors.

#### ADDITIONAL NOTE

I am ashamed to say that, although Housman called attention to it in *C.R.* xlvi (1934), 138, I overlooked until this article was in proof Lachmann's unexceptionable explanation of the construction of line 71, perhaps because it is attached to interpretations I cannot credit. His note runs as follows: 'quo ruis? inquit, quo per loca caeca tibique non adeunda vagaris, non aptus satis antiquis populi nostri fatis revolvendis? male tu stamina fatalia de colo tua deduces. . . . nec triplex vocativus est. . . . sed imprudens primo casu positum, imprudens dicere.' Whatever its shortcomings as a paraphrase, this shows that the line cannot be attacked as ungrammatical. *T.L.L.*, to be sure, gives no example of *imprudens* with an epexegetic infinitive, and associates this passage with Ter. *Haut.* 369, *vide sis nequid imprudens ruas*, but since *prudens*, *callidus*, *nescius* etc., have this construction, there is no reason for denying it to *imprudens*. It follows that *uage* can be dissociated from *quo ruis?* and taken with *imprudens dicere fata*: Propertius' attempts at fortune-telling can be called haphazard, unlike those of Horos, who has the ability *certa ferre certis auctoribus*. I was therefore wrong in finding fault with the line regarded in isolation; any case for emending it must rest on the difficulties arising from the context.

## THREE NOTES ON IMPERIAL ESTATES

WITH the exception of what they seized or inherited from eastern kings, the Roman emperors gathered and administered their estates like private individuals. Imperial estates differed only in being bigger. For just this reason, however, more is known of them, and it is the purpose of these notes to shed light on large private holdings, and on the range of their economic potential, by looking at three unusual kinds of activity on crown lands: the raising of herds, the exploitation of forests, and the making of bricks. Of the first two, almost nothing is known until they pass under imperial management. The same is true also of brick production, at least to this extent, that it can best be studied through the yards run by the emperors in Rome.

### (i) HERDS

The titles of his servants suggest the extent of the emperor's herds: *conductores gregum oviariorum* from around Saepinum; slaves *a iuvencis* and *peculiaris*; 'the shepherds of the estates of Our Privy Purse, that is the herders of wool-bearing sheep and of cattle'; even an imperial freedman *praepositus camellorum*. A more general term is *iumenta*, with some first-century agents *a* (or *supra*) *iumentis Caesaris*. Perhaps horses are meant. *Greges* on one estate have been taken as the coursers for imperial circus spectacles, and for this there is some support in an edict insisting on the customary payments to the stable chiefs at Rome, before any horses can be loaned to Campania 'to be used for amusements'.<sup>1</sup> Imperial studs in Italy survived till Cassiodorus' time (*Variae* 1. 4). Those in Carthage, just mentioned (note 1, *C.I.L.* 8. 12640), are not heard of again, and, west of Constantinople, there is no further evidence.<sup>2</sup>

In the East the picture is clearer. Along the high road from Ephesus to Syria, in the first and second centuries, agents of the emperor recorded their names and duties, οὐέρνα ἵππεὺς ζωητρόφος; δοῦλος Καίσαρος ἵππεύς; δοῦλος τοῦ κυρίου Αὐτοκράτορος ἵππεύς τῶν ἐν Συννάδοις. The word *ἵππεύς* can certainly mean neither *eques*, in the military sense, nor equestrian. The alternative is something like 'groom', of whom there were evidently several at Synnada. *Ζωητρόφος* is explained by a Byzantine inscription on a little plate to be affixed to harness: Ζῶον διαφέρον τῷ θείῳ ἄρμαμέντῳ προσταχθὲν κατὰ θεῖον τύπον δι' ἀγγαρίαν, 'an animal (i.e. a horse) belonging to the imperial stud

<sup>1</sup> For the Saepinum *conductores* see *C.I.L.* 9. 2438 of *a.* 168; cf. the imperial flocks in Egypt, discussed by A. C. Johnson in *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, ed. T. Frank (Baltimore, 1933-40), ii. 333, or in Africa, *C.I.L.* 8. 25902 III 17-20. Slaves *a iuvencis* in *C.I.L.* 6. 8865 and 8868, and later flocks in *Cod. Theod.* 9. 30. 2 (364), in a constitution addressed to the *consularis* of Campania; cf. 7. 7. 1-2. The *praepositus camellorum* is found in *A.E.* 1955, no. 181; for overseers of *iumenta* and *greges*, *C.I.L.* 6. 8863-4; 8. 12640; 14. 2299, *manceps gregororum dominorum Augg.* from Albano; O. Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten* (Berlin, 1905), p. 137,

n. 6, compared to *Cod. Theod.* 15. 10. 2 (381).

<sup>2</sup> J. Steinhäuser, *Trierer Ztschr.* vi (1931), 68 ff., discussing what is very probably an imperial estate north of Trèves, of the fourth century, takes it as a great horse farm, while dismissing another possibility, that it was a hunting park. His identification of the site is not convincing. Rostovtzeff suggests (*S.E.H.R.E.*,<sup>2</sup> p. 648, n. 92) that a third-century Thracian *ἐπιτηρεῖτης* was 'probably concerned with a large, perhaps an imperial, estate, where the excellent mounts of the Thracian cohorts and alae were bred'; but this is very flimsy.

assigned to the public post'.<sup>1</sup> Connexion with the *cursus publicus* is confirmed by a fourth inscription from Bithynia, of the third century, reading: Ἀγαθῆ τύχη. Μᾶρκος Στάτιος Ἰουλιανὸς καὶ Σ . . . λιος Ρούφος στρατιῶται σπείρης ἔκτης ἵππικ[ῆς] οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν [σ]τρατιῶν τῶν ἀκτῶν καὶ νουμέρων καὶ οἱ [μ]ουλιῶνες οἱ ἐπεστῶντες συνωρίᾳ εὐχαριστοῦσιν Λευ/[κο]ύλλω 'Ηδόνος ἐπιμελητῆρι κτηνῶν Καίσαρος, 'Marcus Stadius Julianus and S . . . Rufus, soldiers of coh. VI equitata, assigned to the account bureau, and the mule-drivers assigned to the drover service, good wishes to Lucullus son of Hedy, overseer of the imperial herds'. Of the various explanations offered for the unusual terms here, certainly the most likely draws together soldiers, drovers, and Lucullus as the personnel of a posting station along the public way. The last-named agent, like the ἵππεις ζωητρόφοι, handled horses bought from private individuals or raised on imperial estates, there is no saying which.<sup>2</sup>

'In the reign of Valerian, a certain Palmatius of Caesarea in Cappadocia, owning a house grander even than the emperor's and exceeding rich in horses and wealth of other kinds . . .', lost his lands to the state; and perhaps the *praefectus praetorio* Hermogenes, killed in a rising in Constantinople, was such another horse-raiser.<sup>3</sup> At any rate, Palmatian and Hermogenian were the most famous names of the tracks in the late fourth century and afterwards. It was typical of the period that, though the emperor was willing enough to supply these breeds to the races of the two capitals, and to other cities besides,<sup>4</sup> he had to complain of the dishonesty with which his gifts were administered. For one thing the beneficiary cities had to be reminded to pay for the feeding of the horses that they borrowed (*Cod. Theod.* 15. 10. 2). For another thing the horses in such demand, when they were handed over to the prefect of the city, were by him distributed only to the factions that he was induced to favor (*Cod. Theod.* 15. 7. 6); or they were stolen (10. 6. 1).

The *Notitia Dignitatum* (*Or.* 14. 6, under the *comes rerum privatarum*) lists the *praepositi gregum et stabulorum*, and a department *domorum per Cappadociam* (*Or.* 10. 2). Under their care would be the Palmatian horses of Cappadocia. Phrygian horses and horse-farms belonging to the emperor are referred to by Claudian and by a constitution of 372; and there are boundary-stones suggesting the location of the Hermogenian estates near Afion Kara Hissar, ὅποι γυμνασίοις[οι] ἵπποι[ικοῦ], in Phrygia.<sup>5</sup> At least a century later, citizens of Syrian

<sup>1</sup> W. M. Calder, *C.R.* xxiv (1910), 12. The last inscription is dated (*ibid.*) to 'the early Empire', the first to the later second century (*M.A.M.A.* 1. 30). Calder did not use the inscription treated by Robert (see next note) nor did Robert use Calder's inscriptions.

<sup>2</sup> L. Robert, *Hellenica* x (1955), 46–62, with references to earlier treatments.

<sup>3</sup> *F.H.G.* 4. 145. There is, I think, no reason for attaching the Hermogenian horses to any particular Hermogenes, but it is natural to look for some rich and prominent man with connexions in the East, whose estates there might have been confiscated. Likely candidates are the *praef. praet.* Hermogenes who died in 373 (*Dar.-Sag.* s.v. *equitum*, quoting Gothofredus); but the emperor owned Hermogenian horses already

in 371, see *Cod. Theod.* 15. 10. 1; or the *procos. Asiae* of c. 282–4 (*R-E.* s.v. Hermogenes, no. 12); or the *mag. equitum Orientis* killed in 342. The last is kindly suggested by the Reader to this journal.

<sup>4</sup> *Cod. Theod.* 15. 10. 1, to the prefect of Rome, a. 371; 8. 7. 22 (426), with reference to the *actuarii equorum currulum* in the different *regiones* of Constantinople; and 8. 7. 21, *cornicularii equorum currulum civitatum diversarum*, officials of both types appointed through the emperor. For horses furnished to Campanian cities see 15. 10. 2; for others furnished to Caesarea, below, p. 279.

<sup>5</sup> Claudian cited in W. M. Ramsay, *J.H.S.* viii (1887), 492, n. 3; *Cod. Theod.* 6. 4. 19; the horoi in W. M. Ramsay, *J.H.S.* xxxviii (1918), 135–6. But the reading is not wholly satisfactory. Ramsay dates it to c. 400.

Caesarea paid a tax to the grooms, *ἱπποτρόφοι*, of what were presumably imperial studs. The horses must have been supplied to the Caesarean hippodrome.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the emperors are seen controlling large herds in all periods and provinces and, in the East, making available some of their horses to public transport. The specialized raising of racehorses belongs to a later period, and only to Italy and the East.

### (ii) FORESTS

A very extensive walled forest near Trèves may have been an imperial hunting park (above p. 277, n. 2). Such things, under the name *παράδεισοι*, are elsewhere attested of great landowners, and indicate one use of wooded areas. In Germany, a fourth-century hill-top, dominating a similar area, was walled around by a *saltuarius*. In a near-by grave relief two other people appear, holding axes; in excavations, more axes, wagon-parts, and the like. Such rough country was hardly fit for normal crops, and F. Sprater concludes that the whole was an imperial estate organized for the production of timber.<sup>2</sup> A Pannonian imperial forest is known, too, from a stone set up by *NN vet. ex (prae)-p(ositus) silvarum dominicarum* (*C.I.L.* 3. 4219).

But the best-known imperial forests lay in Lebanon near Byblos. Here, from Hadrian's reign, occur over a hundred inscriptions set up by the emperor's procurators, perhaps under a law of 134: *Imp. Had. Aug. definitio silvarum*; or *Imp. Had. Aug. arborum genera IV cetera privata*. These are 'Keep Off' signs reserving to the fiscus the four kinds of trees, in the vicinity, which were claimed by a monopoly. The balsam gardens of the royal house of Judaea, seized and exploited by the Roman fiscus, offer one parallel from the first century,<sup>3</sup> and the papyrus marshes of Egypt another.<sup>4</sup> The latter fell to the family of Augustus, and were leased to contractors, and by them sub-leased, as late as Marcus Aurelius' day. Rent would be in the form of a *vectigal*. An inscription from Mauretania seems to show the emperor's tenants paying so much weight of wood to the fiscus, possibly rent in kind from forest land (*C.I.L.* 3. 24609): *Octavianus pro[er]c tabul(ariis) provinc(iae) Ti[ngitanae]/TAT vectigali late[. . .]/tione mundinal [.] lato fisco a provinc[ialibus]/octo ligni pensas tria octo-ginta quattuor m[ilia] pondo quindecim milia*. But the text is very obscure.

### (iii) BRICKS

Imperial brick-yards in and around Rome have been minutely studied. Their privileged position, their size, and their organization all account for the occurrence of their products even outside of Italy. Of such exported bricks, and of a smaller number of jars, most come from around Carthage, under Flavians

<sup>1</sup> B. Lifshitz, *R.E.G.* lxx (1957), 119-23. Date (p. 131), probably sixth/seventh century.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Pfalz unter den Römern* (Speier, 1929), i. 62-67. He dates the building of the wall to c. 300, its destruction to c. 350.

<sup>3</sup> R. Mouterde, *Méth. Univ. St-Joseph*, xxv (1942-3), 41-46; *ibid.* xxxiv (1957), 230-3; Pliny, *N.H.* 12. 113, on the balsam monopoly in Judaea, *serique nunc eum fiscus*. Mouterde identifies the four species as the

cypress, cedar, juniper, and fir ('sapin'). The cypress groves at Daphne in Syria belonged to the *res privata* (G. Downey, *History of Antioch* [Princeton, 1961], p. 436, n. 147).

<sup>4</sup> On the Fayûm papyrus marshes see R. MacMullen, *Aegyptus* xxxviii (1958), 185-6, with references, 186, n. 1; add T. Wiegand, *Abh. d. Preuss. Akad. Wissen.*, 1932, no. 5, p. 46, and H. J. Loane, *Class. Phil.* xxxix (1944), 10-13.

and Antonines;<sup>1</sup> others, from the same period and as late as Caracalla, from widely scattered sites in north Africa, the Istrian peninsula, Switzerland, Germany, and France.<sup>2</sup> They are too few to have economic significance, except at Carthage. There, however, they are surprisingly numerous—surprisingly, since it did not pay to ship bricks and large storage vessels very far, nor to fill the latter were there bulky exports from Rome. In any explanation the chief element must be the availability of water transport, and of a fleet regularly plying from Rome. It is nearness to water, too, which must explain the diffusion of imperial bricks over a wide area in northern Italy and around the head of the Adriatic into Dalmatia. Here the picture is somewhat confused. The largest producer was evidently the Pansian factory, and it, or its chief kilns, were probably located in Aquileia.<sup>3</sup> The presence of imperial estates in that neighbourhood is shown by the local *Augusti liberti, tabularii a patrimonio* and *rationis patrimoni*, and of soldiers seconded from the praetorian guard, in inscriptions of the second and third centuries until 211. As to the stamps, they combine the name Pansa with that of the emperor, up to Vespasian, when Pansa drops out.<sup>4</sup> So we have IMP AUG GER(MANICI) = Domitian (*C.I.L.* 5. 8112, 1 on an amphora from Trieste; cf. 11. 6695, 1 from near Parma); IMP HADRI AUG (*C.I.L.* 3. 3774, 4; 10694, 4 and 14596, from Pannonia Inferior and Moesia Superior; 5. 8110, 29 from northern Italy); or IMP ANTO AUG P (*C.I.L.* 3. 4695a-d; 3774, 5; 5. 8110, 30—from Pannonia, Histria, and Italy); and IMP SEP SE (*C.I.L.* 5. 8110, 32) and VITAL AUG N LIBERT (*C.I.L.* 5. 8110, 166). The Pansian kilns seem to have fallen to the emperor—perhaps it was Augustus—quite early, and to have continued active into Severan times.

But there was another large producer in the same area, C. Laekanius (or Laecanius) Bassus, with an estate and kilns near Pola. At this centre masses of bricks, *dolia*, amphorae, and lamps were found, bearing the mark C LAEK BASS, C LAE B, C LAEC BAS, and variants, linked with the name of his slave workmen: Amethysti, Barbii, etc. His wares reached Padua, Aquileia, Vercellae, Poetovio, and Virunum in the first two centuries A.D.<sup>5</sup> One example reads G LAE BA? CLYMENT (*C.I.L.* 5. 8112, 52), another IMP / CLYME (*C.I.L.* 5. 8112, 6 from Vercellae); and the pair together seem to show that the works were taken over by the emperor—which one is not known.

Spanish parallels for confiscated or inherited tileries are better known. In Monte Testaccio, Rome's dump for broken jars, amphorae have been found in enormous numbers testifying to the import of oil from private and, after

<sup>1</sup> H. Bloch, *I belli laterizi* (Roma, 1947), *passim*, serves to date *C.I.L.* 8. 22632, 24 ff. and 22636, 1-2 (*dolia*). The majority of the stamps belong to the period roughly 90-130. *C.I.L.* 8. 22632, 3-4 and 30 were found at Utica, a few others at Cherchel, Constantine, and Hadrumetum.

<sup>2</sup> *C.I.L.* 5. 8110, 170-4 and 327; 8. 10475, 23a-c; 12. 5678, 8; 13. 10005, 8-9; M. Labrousse, *Mé. d'arch. et d'hist. de l'École Fr. de Rome* lv (1938), 89 ff.; A. Grenier, *Manuel d'arch. gallo-romaine*, iii (1958), 80.

<sup>3</sup> On the Pansian kilns there are many opinions—more recently, T. Frank, *Econ.*

*Survey*, v (1940), 208; G. Brusin in *Mé. Abrami* (Split, 1954-7), i. 149 ff.; and S. Panciera, *Vita economica di Aquileia* (Venezia, 1957), 36-38. For occurrences of the stamp outside Italy see (apart from the *C.I.L.*) I. Petricioli, *Vjesnik za arheologiju i historiju Dalmatinsku* liv (1952), 201; M. Macrea, *Materiale si cercetari arheologice* vii (1958), 378, a Pansian jar from Dacia; and M. H. Callender, *Arch. Ael.* xxvii (1949), 65.

<sup>4</sup> G. Brusin, *op. cit.* 150-5; S. Panciera, *op. cit.* 38.

<sup>5</sup> A. Gnirs, *Jb. f. Altertumskunde* iv (1910), 79 and 84-88; M. Rostovtzeff, *S.E.H.R.E.*<sup>2</sup> p. 611, n. 26.

197, from imperial properties in Baetica, by the mark *fisci rationis patrimonii*, for example, on jars from the (formerly private) estate of Aurelius Heraclea and his son.<sup>1</sup> Kilns supplying that last firm are identified AUGGG NNN / FIGUL BARBA.<sup>2</sup> So long as there was a Severan on the throne, i.e. till 235, Rome absorbed an increasing part of the Spanish yield. Thereafter, private shippers reclaimed some of their previous activity.<sup>3</sup>

In Egypt, or at least in the Fayûm, the emperor inherited not only brick factories, which he leased to private individuals, but also the exclusive right to make bricks.<sup>4</sup> The north-eastern part of Morocco has yielded considerable evidence of imperial kilns, apparently dating from Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, and organized into at least seven ateliers. Stamps read EX FIGULN CAES N, IMP CAES AUG, F'ADI AUG, ANTO AUG, etc.<sup>5</sup> From other provinces come bricks stamped EX PRAED AUG N FIG SOCIANAS MAIOR M (Palestine); DD NN (Constantinople); EX FIGLIN CAESARIS on an amphora and NER CL CAE AUG GER and HON AUG ANDRIA . . . on bricks, from Britain;<sup>6</sup> perhaps other imperial kilns elsewhere.<sup>7</sup>

The same ovens which produced bricks in the loose sense (including *imbrices*, *tegulae*, and *lateres*) could produce coarse vessels for transport and storage (*amphorae*, *pelvis*, *dolia*). On both products one sometimes sees

<sup>1</sup> In the last dozen years most interesting studies of western amphora stamps have been made, by M. H. Callender, op. cit., and especially by E. Thevenot, whose latest article (*Rev. arch. de l'Est et du Centre-Est* x [1959], 220 ff.) contains references to his own earlier work and to the articles of Pelichet, Will, Frank, Étienne, Keune, etc. Add C. P. Ludlum, *Mem. Am. Acad. Rome* xv (1936), and T. Frank, *Econ. Survey*, v. 82.

<sup>2</sup> In Baetica lay the towns of Barba, Barbariana, and Barbesula (*R.E.* s.vv.), perhaps remembering the same firm, or its founder; cf. the modern Juan Barba. The three Augusti are Septimius Severus and his sons (209-11), the stamp recorded in Rome and in the western provinces (e.g. *C.I.L.* 13. 10002, 1; 15. 2559; M. H. Callender, op. cit. 77). Callender, loc. cit., has pointed out that, once the estates were confiscated, they ceased abruptly to export to Britain, though they continued to find Gallic customers (confirmed by E. Thevenot, op. cit. 222 and 225). The reason, he suggests, is the diversion of more oil to *congiaria* in the capital.

<sup>3</sup> Van Nostrand, *Econ. Survey*, iii (1937), 185.

<sup>4</sup> The chief text is P. Fay. 36 (111/12), with the editors' commentary; A. C. Johnson, *Econ. Survey*, ii. 330-1; and T. Reil, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Gewerbes im hellenistischen Aegypten* (Borna-Leipzig, 1913), p. 17, citing also *W.O.* 1431, 1433, and 1582, with straw for brick kilns delivered perhaps as a tax to some state factory. The imperial monopoly on manufacture, which actually served only as the basis for a trades tax, does

not seem to have extended beyond the Fayûm, nor beyond Trajan's day.

<sup>5</sup> R. Thouvenot, 'Les manufactures impériales au Maroc romain', *Publications du Service des Antiquités du Maroc* x (1954), 213-16; *A.E.* 1909, no. 72; *B.C.T.H.* 1948, pp. 526-7 (amphora), and 1954, p. 63; *C.I.L.* 8. 22632, 1-2; and M. H. Callender, op. cit. 97, doubting Dressel's completion (*C.I.L.* 15. 2986), *f*(ig). *C(aesareae) p(rovinciae) M(auretaniae)*.

<sup>6</sup> *A.E.* 1903, no. 172; *C.I.L.* 3. 7419<sup>c</sup>, *d(omi)ni n(ostr)i*; *C.I.L.* 7. 1331, 1, from Southwark, and Collingwood, *Econ. Survey*, iii. 102, the imperial tileries near Silchester, of Nero's time.

<sup>7</sup> There is the unexplained amphora stamp *AA II/AUGUST IMP* from the lower Rhine (*C.I.L.* 13. 10003, 119) and the brick-yards of Trèves contributing largely to imperial building, which may have been owned by the emperor; but cf. J. B. Keune, *Trierer Z. schr.* x (1935), 61. Then, too, there are the brick stamps from Bulgaria, *A.E.* 1944, nos. 11-12, reading *AUGG SAR* and *AUGG AUX*, for which the editors offer no explanation. The Upper German potter Sarmus (*R.E.* s.v.) can hardly have exported to so distant a point, nor are the jars stamped *AUX* (*C.I.L.* 8. 10479, 10; and 12. 5686, 1098) of any help. Possibly the bricks were stamped by fourth-century army officers (cf. S. Soproni, *Arch. Eretisitò* lxxxv [1958], 52 ff.; and *C.I.L.* 3. 3761 ff. and 4668; 10677 ff., 11376, 11856, and vol. 3, p. 2328, 197), but they remain obscure.

the same stamp. Bricks were ordinarily restricted to local use and sometimes to a particular occasion. When the emperor on his estates put up farm buildings, walls, or fortifications with his tenants' help, doubtless they also manufactured the materials. So they are required to contribute *paleam in lateribus ducendis*. It is likely, too, that brick-yards were sometimes created for special projects such as the establishing of a colony, as is suggested by the abundance of imperial bricks around Mursa in Pannonia and Augusta Vindelicum (Augst in Raetia), both raised in rank by Hadrian and by him equipped with public buildings. Bricks from Italica proclaim the name of the governor *M. Petrucidius M. f. leg. pro. pr. Alex. ST*, explained by the system seen in another inscription, where certain baths are erected through *NN leg. Aug. pr. pr.* 'through funds saved out of the tribal commune'. The Italica tileries must have been established *ad hoc*.<sup>1</sup>

These products—herds, timber, bricks—indicate the variety of specialization on the Roman country-side. Their history has some significance, too. They are most elaborately organized under the early Antonines, when the production of such things as bricks, amphorae, lamps, paper, cinnabar, marble, and glass especially flourished. These, however, could not be supported by the shaken economy of the third century. Horse farms, on the other hand, and forests were less vulnerable, and survived even in the fourth century.

*Brandeis University*

RAMSAY MACMULLEN

<sup>1</sup> On constructions *per colonos*, see *C.I.L.* 8. 8701-2, 8777, 8828; 9. 2828. For the straw for brick-kilns, *C.I.L.* 8. 14428, line 8, and above, p. 281, n. 4; and for stamps of Mursa and Augusta Vindelicum, *C.I.L.* 3, p. 711; 3. 3774, 1-5; 10694, 1-4; and 14596. The legate's bricks, and the Vespasianic bathe, are to be found in *A.E.* 1908, no. 7—*sub Augusto fere*, *P.I.R.*<sup>1</sup> s.v. Petrucidius—and *I.G.R.R.* 3. 659.

<sup>2</sup> So the well-known protocol on Spanish amphorae, *fisci rationis patrimonii* (above, p. 281); perhaps also the amphorae stamped *IMPE VECT? A //* (Vect . . . for *vectigal*?) of *C.I.L.* 5. 8112, 5, and the stamp *ATRIM = ? P]ATRIM(ONI)?* of *C.I.L.* 3. 14373. 1; cf. *vectigal patrimonii* on glass bottles (*A.E.* 1914, no. 292) and *PATRIMONI* on others (R. MacMullen, *op. cit.* 185).

### THE MSS. OF SENECA'S TRAGEDIES

C. E. Stuart, who had been working on Seneca's Tragedies was killed in 1917. At his death his collations of the mss. and other Senecan material, manuscript and printed, passed into the custody of E. Harfison, who published a note to that effect in *C.Q.* xii. 161. Since the death of Professor D. S. Robertson, in whose keeping they have been more recently, they have been handed over to the library of this College.

*Trinity College, Cambridge.*

A. S. F. Gow

